Event 1. Smith Fired
Event 2. Twisting and turning damaged Zero
That is a misrepresentation of the event. Nothing stipulates that the evading zero only in effect 'seemed to be twisting and turning because it was damaged.' Clearly it was trying to evade being destroyed. Under the circumstances, it seems likely that the diving F4F had sufficient energy to stay with the evading plane. In any case, as I have noted on numerous occasions, if bother to read a little on the matter you can find numerous accounts of F4Fs turning inside A6Ms when both were operating at high speed. You need only to go look at some of the references for which complete cbibliographic citations have been provided for your convenience.
There is plenty of data. It would not seem consistant with Japanese personal, or military code for a Zero pilot to ...
This isn't actual evidence, it's you reading something into the account that is not indicated in the account. Therefore, this, errm, "reading" of the incident in question has no merit.
Are you not the same person who has been saying Wildcats can dog fight with Zeros and are as manuverable as Zeros for 2 pages now?
I have not seen anyone make that claim. The specific claim that I have made, and that others have supported, and that you can read in the aforementioned cited volumes, is that at HIGH SPEED the F4F-4 was more maneuverable and specifically out-roll and turn inside ("cornering") an A6M2. I did not claim anywhere that the F4F was always as maneuverable or more maneuverable than an A6M. All of the evidence compellingly indicates that their relative maneuverability was dependent on IAS. As speeds increased, the control surfaces on Zeroes became relatively difficult to use, roll rates decreased, and turning radii increased (both as a function of increased kinetic energy, and as a function of the fact that the ailerons were more difficult to move from the neutral position). In contrast, the F4Fs roll rate actually improved at high speed, and because its ailerons were still quite effective at high speed, it could turn inside a Zero.
You have not offered any credible source material for your claims,
The aforementioned peer-reviewed highly credible historical scholarly studies make far more extensive use of original source material, both Japanese and US, than you or I will be able to glean from combing the internet. I recommend you actually read them. If you insist on simply disregarding them, there is little point in discussing the subject with you.
The Buenos Aires book stores seem to be all out of books published by the US Naval Institute from world renowned authors.
Multiple copies of both volumes may be purchased from Amazon. Seconds before I wrote this sentence, I checked, and both volumes are available as used paperbacks for roughly $10 for the first volume and $14 for the second volume. Since you have access to the internet (which I think should be self-evident), you would have no trouble obtaining them.
http://www.amazon.com/s?ie=UTF8&index=b ... rom&page=1
Blah, blah,...source please.
Heh. I already provided you with three. The rest of your extended, um, commentary is non-sequitur. Up to this point:
Not strange at all. It was nothing out of the ordinary for Allied commanders to tell their men, ¨We are the best. We´ll kick the hell out of the Japanese¨ etc. etc. etc.
Oddly, you make that claim having just posted a whole bunch of claims that don't support your claim. You seem to have derailed your own argument here. Thach's assessment noted that the Zero was more maneuverable and observed that the superior kill ratio of the Wildcat, its durability, and the superior skill of USN and USMC pilots essentially made up for Thach's concerns about the F4F. Thach of course was one guy. Bauer, O'Hare, and others all had different things to say about the plane, Japanese pilots, and the ability of the F4F to stay with a radically turning Zeke when the F4F had sufficient energy.
You could read about all of that if you dared.
The best you can do is fall back on a 1 to 1 ratio. By itself this number doesn´t say a lot.
Actually it does. These are sustained loss ratios over the duration of campaigns. Thus your straw man argument regarding a single incident of a Zero allegedly shooting down a corsair is non-sequitur. The sustained loss ratios through campaigns of Corsairs vs Zeroes clearly indicates that the Corsair + pilot was a far more lethal instrument to its enemies than the Zero + pilot.
If we stay focussed in at this level and throw out other factors one could logicaly assume the Zero is at least equal to the Corsair.
Only if one imagines that a single anecdote from one combat encounter serves as a good frame of reference for assessing entire campaigns.
Your claim of 1 to 1 equals fighter equality does not stand up when factoring in the tactical situation in the Guadalcanal campaign. Zeros operating at extreme range with an 8 hour flight. Radar and coast watchers alerting Guadalcanal of when the Zeros were coming and in what numbers allowing them to gain an altitude advantage most times over the Zeros. Zeros fighting with the drop tank attached. Ground fire coming from Guadalcanal itself, etc. etc.
There's actually very little to your etc etc. In direct, face to face confrontations between USN pilots operating from CVs at ranges favorable to the A6M (200-250 miles), the USN F4F pilots consistently won. They achieved a BETTER than 1:1 kill ratio against Zeroes. So under circumstances that represent the nearest thing to "neutral ground" the F4F outperformed the Zero. The ratio only becomes 1:1 if one lumps the Guadalcanal campaign (in which the kill ratio slightly favored the Japanese) with the 1942 carrier battles (in which the kill ratios strongly favored the Americans).
Guadalcanal featured disadvantages for both sides. It is true that A6M drivers had to fly a long way to fight. The USN and USMC pilots at Guadalcanal, however, were on the whole more fatigued because they were subjected to off-duty living conditions to which no Japanese pilot in 1942 was subjected. To wit: artillery fire from Japanese troops, naval gunfire from Japanese ships, pitched infantry battles fought within hundreds of meters of their bivouac area, Japanese snipers, infiltrators, and, for a good stretch of the campaign, half food rations, and unavailability of spare parts for planes (which in numerous instances led Henderson field F4F pilots to engage flying a.c. that would normally have been rejected as nonflightworthy). Furthermore, as many authors have noted, and as you could read (should you have the courage to do so), the coastwatchers and early radar were not sufficiently reliable to consistently provide early warning through the critical period through October 1942. That is why on days when the Japanese did not intend to launch a strike, Japanese pilots stood down and rested comfortably, while USN and USMC pilots remained on alert until the afternoon (because they could not know whether or not a Japanese strike was coming).
If truly the wildcat and Zero were equals in the air, given these numerous advantages it had, the Wildcat would have had a better ratio than 1 to 1 with the Zero.
That is an erroneous conclusion. Not only were the USN/USMC pilots at Henderson generally subjected to greater fatigue than Japanese pilots, but their mission was more complex as well. Japanese pilots had but one objective. Shoot down F4Fs. Allied pilots had two: fight through A6Ms to shoot down bombers. Interestingly, on days when the Japanese tried to feint with the bombers and attack with a "fighter sweep" they tended to be badly defeated.
Your 1 to 1 ratio actually works against you when looking at all the factors.
Only if one does not understand what circumstances produced these ratios and only if one has an incomplete account of said "factors."
If the situation was reversed and Zeros would have had these same advantages over Wildcats what would the score have been? You would have had to take your 1 to 1 and thrown it out the window after the first mission.
The situation was in fact reversed in 1943, with USN and USMC aviators flying up the slot, this time in better airplanes. The Japanese pilots at Rabaul and New Georgia were simply unable to approach 1:1 kill ratios against Allied planes, despite the fact that it was the US pilots logging the long pre-combat flights, and despite the fact that Japanese airwatchers were stationed on interim locations and despite Japanese radar at Rabaul.
Show me a fellow who rejects statistical analysis a priori and I'll show you a fellow who has no knowledge of statistics.
Didn't we have this conversation already?