Bombardments Again!

[Didz]

I am now on my sixth attempt to get a decent #17 game out of UV and I am doing quite well so far but only at the expense of keeping the FOW switched off so I can avoid some of the more stupid actions of the AI.

I've noticed that the AI tends to sail its CV's back and forth between a point midway between Shortlands and Truk and either Lunga or Gilli so by keeping my CV's well out of the way when they charge I have managed to avoid the usual MAD (Mutually Assured Destruction) situation where both sets of CV's knock either other senseless in the first few days of the campaign.

However, it is now mid June and the IJN have started their routine bombardment of Gilli again, only this time I can see exactly whats going on.

The problem is that because of the combination of movement distance and turn phasing there is nothing that I can do to interdict these attacks. (Short of sacrificing my carriers the Rabauls LBA)

The BB task group making them is capable of moving 600 miles in a day and begins its mission well beyond effect range of the LBA at Port Moresby and Gilli and the CV's Hornet and Enterpise deployed just south of the of Louisaide Archipelago.

During the night they charge into Gilli Gilli harbour under cover of darkness and bombard my base completely immune to attack because my aircraft can't fly at night.

However, next morning they are still in Gilli Gilli harbour but despite the fact that they are now well within strike range of about 200 allied bombers the turn sequence allows Naval Movement to happen before Day Air Ops so I have to watch them steam off into the rising sun and by the time my planes get a chance to react they are 300 miles out to sea again.

This situation needs to be changed so that Air Ops happens before Naval Movement or even better both before and after Naval Movement.

[expvc5t2]

The IJN has been able to bombard Port Moresby with impunity. Six times they have come, not once did I receive a warning and not once did any aircraft try to attack the bombardment group. Short of I should not have bought this game, is there something I'm doing wrong ?:(

[Slaughtermeyer]

Historically the Japanese were able to perform overnight missions at Guadalcanal with ships based at Rabaul without having to worry about airstrikes from LBA at Guadalcanal, and since the distance from Rabaul to Gili-Gili and even to Port Moresby is shorter than the distance from Rabaul to Guadalcanal, I don't see this as a problem with the possible exception that long-range bombers based in Port Moresby might be able to reach the overnight bombardment groups.

[Erik Rutins]

The Tokyo Express is a historical tactic. When you "see" the icon there at the start of the day, it really is just an issue of the game not having moved it out yet. They're already well on their way out. By the time search planes have sent in their reports, they should be out of air ops range. Your staffs and pilots start air ops as early as they can, they don't wait until 11AM or some such.

The best way to catch them is with another Surface TF, as the US did historically at Guadalcanal. Even if you lose, you'll likely damage some enemy ships to the point that they will be unable to get out of your air ops range by morning. Then your planes can pound them into the sea, greatly increasing the losses of the bombarding fleet. Eventually, this leads to a change in tactics.

This tactic was historically frustrating for the US as well, but the answer is to use all the various options at your disposal, including surface combat TFs. Until you get P-38s combined with some long range bombers, you'll need to use this kind of combined forces tactic to really hit them hard enough to make it not worthwhile.

Regards,

- Erik

[Howard Mitchell]

I'll second what Erik says. If you intercept with a surface force you will often inflict enough damage to slow down the retiring Japanese force and then either finish it of or damage it severely the following day. I'm still learning the game but have used this tactic successfully at Guadalcanal in several scenarios. It's a bit expensive on CAs and DDs though...

[Didz]

Originally posted by Erik Rutins
The Tokyo Express is a historical tactic. When you "see" the icon there at the start of the day, it really is just an issue of the game not having moved it out yet. They're already well on their way out.

I've seen this excuse posted before and accepted it at face value but having done a bit of research since it seems that there were significant differences between the 'Tokyo Express' and the tactics being described here.

According to this US Military history website

http://www.grunts.net/wars/20thcentury/ ... canal.html

The procedure the Japanese used with ships (mostly destroyers) shuttling troops in at night became known to the Marines as "the Tokyo Expess."

In short it was a covert operation to land fresh troops at night using small fast ships. Not a major BB Task Group that carried out a massive bombardment of a major US naval base.

The article goes on to describe how the over stretched marines held out against numerous 'Banzai' attacks of between 800 and 1,000 men during the day most of which were dead by morning.

The "Tokyo Express" dropped off another 6,000 troops and on the 13th of September 3,500 of them hit the south perimeter of the airfield. This area was defended by the lst Marine Raider Battallion under the command of Lt.Col. Merritt (Red Mike) Edson. They were dug in on a ridge and bore the brunt of wave after wave of "banzai" attacks.

More importantly the article makes the point that the 'Tokyo Express' was only able to operate at Guadacanal because the marines had not yet managed to contruct an operational airfield on the island. In fact it states that:

The tide began to turn against the Japanese when the "Cactus Air Force" started to operate. Now the Japanese no longer had control of the air and soon the skies would be clear of them altogether.

My own analysis confirms that a BB bombardment group which spent 1 hour durng the night bombarding Gilli Gilli would not be able to place more than 150 miles between itself and the enemy LBA before morning. It can only travel 400 miles during darkness even if it didn't stop to bombard the port. So, if the program allowed mid-phase interdiction it would only be 5 hexes from Gilli Gilli and easily close enough for LBA and CV search planes to spot it and direct an attack before it steamed out of range.

In effect it would take less than two hours for a search plane to reach the retreating ships and the first air attacks would be able to take place by mid-day.

This alone is a powerful reason why UV needs to be changed to allow a six hour game turn.

[Didz]

Originally posted by Howard Mitchell
I'll second what Erik says. If you intercept with a surface force you will often inflict enough damage to slow down the retiring Japanese force and then either finish it of or damage it severely the following day. I'm still learning the game but have used this tactic successfully at Guadalcanal in several scenarios. It's a bit expensive on CAs and DDs though...

Exactly, the program forces the US player to sacrifice valuable surface ships to counter a tactic that shouldn't be possible in the first place.

[IKerensky]

I never had this kind of problem with GG but with Lunga yes.

Only solution is to make a group mixing DD and CL/CA ( 2 to 1 is a good ratio, 3 CA/CL 6 DD is potent 4/8 is deadly ) with a good leader this kind of group seems to efficiently protect or turn aways ennemy group even with BB in it.


Other things that work well:

1- Put Hudson and Beaufort to the base that is bombarded: they can naval strike to Rabaul and Shortland so range is no more a problem; and they can be absed in Lunga with minor building effect.

2- Use B17,B25,B26 to port attack Rabaul or Shortland Island and get thoses ships while they are resuplying.

3- Set one of your force as bombardement too. This is the kind of game 2 people can play.

4- Mine outside your base 3 hex dep or more. Especially easy for the slot or GG ( where you can mine a belt 3 hex away from your base and 4 to 5 hex depth by basing DM at GG ). Take care in mining the slot, your own force will go around your minefield and so they take more time to do their trip and can get annoyed by ennemy air force.


Basically point 2 and 3 enabled me to put the BB Hiei out of comision and numerous more important ships, but Hiei never ever got a chance to do anything. Popint 1 is very eeficient in protecting GG, the last CA run to their never reach it in his ingo leg, beaufort torpedoes grind them.

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LBA rules !
I am once again left with no CV for a years but I dont care, I can eat any Japanese CV that try to go souther than SI or RAbaul and I do it. JApanese sink : 2CV 3CVL, all by land based bomber. silly AI. Total naval supremacy and still losing :p

[Erik Rutins]

Didz,

I'm sorry, but I disagree. This IS historical and it needs to be in UV. I used the term Tokyo Express because it has come to encompass all the high speed night runs down the slot. That is the same tactic being used against you. If you read a bit more, you'll find the Japanese also did this with Cruiser and, yes, BB led groups that were to bombard Lunga, wreak havoc on any ships there and then retire out of LBA range by morning.

By historical calculations, they could do it, they did it in fact. Only when their ships were damaged were they generally caught by the bombers from Henderson. If you keep only the fastest Japanese BBs, CAs and DDs in a TF, you can most definitely run in and out of range.

Any in depth study of the combat in this theater, particularly around Guadalcanal, will highlight the existence of this tactic and its effectiveness when not opposed at night by another surface force. Now, once you get P-38s and combined them with longer range bombers, you can catch them before they come in and after they leave. Until then, though, you'll have to rely on a combined strategy to defeat them.

Regards,

- Erik

[Paul Vebber]

Also make sure you note the way surface action TF's react. They move to confront enemy TF"s IN BASE HEXES. So while you can;t bring them easily to decisive combat in open ocean, you CAN fight them when they actually try to go after your base.

See teh thread on "Question to designers" on feedback form Gary why this is so (basically to keep the game from bogging down time wise)

[The Gnome]

Early in the game the IJN was using this tactic against PM and was driving me nuts. The Japanese had control of Gili which I didn't contest and were running BB's at will through there.

I sent Lexington and Yorktown on a little run 3 or 4 hexes to the SE of Gili (just outside of Rabaul LBA) and pounded to groups both led by BB's and containing several CA's and DD's. Both groups were almost complete losses.

The AI must have gotten REALLY annoyed because the next day a third group -led by Yamato- was being rushed at my air TF and was in an adjacent hex!!! That group got whomped on too.

So carrier air can be used most effectively if you can position it near the Bombardment group's jump off point.

Also, once some damage is inflicted and the speed of the bombardment group is slowed the LBA will come to life and clean up!

[NorthStar]

I've also had some rather limited success in slowing the Japanese down useing PT boats to attack them. It doesn't stop them from bombarding, and it costs me quite a few PT boats, but it makes them pay for it at least a little bit. I've put two torpedos into the Kongo this way (over a few nights) and the CA Haruna as well. Plus, once the Kongo was wounded, I was able to put a 500 lb bomb on her from Lunga the next day. (She hit a mine as well, so I've pretty much hit her every possible way so far.)

Obviously, a surface force would be better, but I'm playing Green Hell, and at the begining I'm outnumbered at least two carriers (and a CVL) to one, and four battleships to one, so until my reinforcements arrive, its a realatively low cost way of paying them back.

[thantis]

I haven't tried it yet (but plan to as part of my Operation Double Punch), but is it possible to reverse the process - i.e. station my bombardment group at Lunga & hit Shortland at night and make it back before the IJAF comes to play?

[BB56]

Didz:
If you read: Guadalcanal: The Definitive account of a the landmark battle, by Richard B. Frank, it will go into great detail about the IJN nightly bombardment runs and the sacrifices made by may USN sailors to stop them.
UV is modeling these correctly and yes, you will need to send whatever forces at your disposal to slow them down so you LBA can hit them in the daylight hours.
Happy hunting.

[Didz]

Originally posted by Erik Rutins
Didz,

I'm sorry, but I disagree. This IS historical and it needs to be in UV. I used the term Tokyo Express because it has come to encompass all the high speed night runs down the slot. That is the same tactic being used against you. If you read a bit more, you'll find the Japanese also did this with Cruiser and, yes, BB led groups that were to bombard Lunga, wreak havoc on any ships there and then retire out of LBA range by morning.

Then I'm afraid we must agree to disagree.

From what I have read this is certainly not a historically accurate representation of what the 'Tokyo Express' was or the conditions that enabled the IJN to use this tactic for a short period after the capture of Guadacanal. And yes I did read about the japanese attempt to bombard Lunga with a BB task group and the fact that it was intercepted and heavily damaged after only managing to cause minor damage to Henderson Field. The point was made also that this attempt was made before Henderson Field was fully operational for local air support. Once Henderson was fully operational the IJN had to abandon all attmepts because of heavy losses.

By historical calculations, they could do it, they did it in fact. Only when their ships were damaged were they generally caught by the bombers from Henderson. If you keep only the fastest Japanese BBs, CAs and DDs in a TF, you can most definitely run in and out of range.

Sorry! again I must disagree. Simple mathematic's will confirm that it is a physical impossibility.

Even assuming a full 12 hours of darkness and that the TF is capable of maintaining a constant speed of 30 knots for the entire period it could only cover 414 miles during the night.

Thats 207 miles in and 207 miles out again. Therefore, assuming that it didn't stop to bombard the target at all it would still be within 210 miles (7 Hexes) of the target at dawn the next morning and within 45 minute strike range of any aircraft launched from the target base.

[Supervisor]

Originally posted by Didz
Sorry! again I must disagree. Simple mathematic's will confirm that it is a physical impossibility.

Even assuming a full 12 hours of darkness and that the TF is capable of maintaining a constant speed of 30 knots for the entire period it could only cover 414 miles during the night.

Thats 207 miles in and 207 miles out again. Therefore, assuming that it didn't stop to bombard the target at all it would still be within 210 miles (7 Hexes) of the target at dawn the next morning and within 45 minute strike range of any aircraft launched from the target base.

Then you have to add in the 45 minutes (minimum) for the search planes to get out there (in which time the ships add another 25 or so miles of distance. Then, assuming that you find them right away, and you launch, it would take at least an hour for the attack to form up, and proceed to the attack position (even if the flight were sitting ready on the ground). That adds another 35 or so miles to the distance. By this time, they are (using your example, 5½ hours of night steaming plus, say, 1 hour for the search and 1 hour for the attack) approximately 7½ hours out, or about 260 miles. Now this is just inside extended Dauntless range, but is outside of Wildcat range. So, in ideal conditions, you would be sending out unescorted bombers to take on ships that are within LBA-based CAP range.

Also, what if the ships begin their run in a bit before sunset? If you do see them, the odds are that a strike wouldn't get there before dark. That would give them more time after the bombardment to retire before sunrise.

[Didz]

Originally posted by Rowlf

Then you have to add in the 45 minutes (minimum) for the search planes to get out there (in which time the ships add another 25 or so miles of distance. Then, assuming that you find them right away, and you launch, it would take at least an hour for the attack to form up, and proceed to the attack position (even if the flight were sitting ready on the ground). That adds another 35 or so miles to the distance. By this time, they are (using your example, 5½ hours of night steaming plus, say, 1 hour for the search and 1 hour for the attack) approximately 7½ hours out, or about 260 miles. Now this is just inside extended Dauntless range, but is outside of Wildcat range. So, in ideal conditions, you would be sending out unescorted bombers to take on ships that are within LBA-based CAP range.

Also, what if the ships begin their run in a bit before sunset? If you do see them, the odds are that a strike wouldn't get there before dark. That would give them more time after the bombardment to retire before sunrise.

Yes! but on the negative side lets also accept that the night is not going to be 12 hours long, that the bombardment group will not be able to maintain a constant speed of 30 knots in the dark through the reefs, islands and shallows around Gilli Gilli and will need at least an hour on target to ake it worthwhile. Also bear in mind that after a couple of nights the defenders will be ready for them and have their air searches tuned to spot them either approaching or retiring and that as at Guadacanal the intelligence units had the IJN codes and were intercepting the IJN radio traffic and so would know exactly what was inbound.

However, I am not objecting to the fact that my search planes don't find them in time or to the fact that my bombers take too long to get to them or get creamed when they make their attack runs. My objection is quite simply that under the current phasing and movement arrangements aircraft are not even given the chance to respond and as a result the AI can make these attacks with impunity against any Allied base regardless of the level of air cover it has available.

In a real situation the bombardment group would have spent at least half the day under the Allied air Umbrella in broad daylight.

[Sonny]

Originally posted by Didz


Yes! but on the negative side lets also accept that the night is not going to be 12 hours long,...

This action takes place near the equator at which point there are always 12 hours of daylight and 12 of night (give or take a minute or two).

[Narlotep]

Didz,

and that as at Guadacanal the intelligence units had the IJN codes and were intercepting the IJN radio traffic and so would know exactly what was inbound.

That would have been very nice, but most tactical SIGINT was traffic analysis, i.e. studying the freqency and length of messages as well as the net structure to determine their meaning. This means actionable intelligence like the type you describe was very rare and keep in mind this analysis took time.

The IJN codes were broken several times during the war, but these were analyzed at a different location and disseminated through a fairly tight pipeline. Bottom line, this type of information also took time to process through the intel cycle and would not provide the tactical intel you describe.

The bottom line is the canal had to rely on search a/c and picket vessels to alert them to incoming raids. The Express did not run every night and keeping a/c on alert day after day, when other missions were also pressing just wasn't practical.

Narlotep

[Didz]

Originally posted by Narlotep
Didz,

and that as at Guadacanal the intelligence units had the IJN codes and were intercepting the IJN radio traffic and so would know exactly what was inbound.

That would have been very nice, but most tactical SIGINT was traffic analysis, i.e. studying the freqency and length of messages as well as the net structure to determine their meaning. This means actionable intelligence like the type you describe was very rare and keep in mind this analysis took time.

Narlotep

The above comment was prompted by a document I stumbled across on a US Military website which went into great detail about how the Us monitored the build up of IJN forces assembling prior to commitment to the Guadacanal battle and as such were able to fully brief commanders at Guadacanal on what to expect and what to target. BB Hiei for instance was designated a priority target for all naval forces.

As always, SOD's LAW dictates that every attempt to re-discover this document has failed otherwise I would have posted a link.

However, I did discover a secondary source which states

Halsey had an advantage that slowly became common to all U.S. operations in the Pacific: he had advance knowledge of unusual clarity regarding Japanese plans. When returning from a visit to Henderson Field, he was met by Captain Miles Browning, his brilliant, but arrogant and hot-tempered Chief-of-Staff, and informed about all details of Yamamoto's plan except for an incorrect estimate of five carriers with the IJN forces. At this point, it became clear to Halsey that everything was at stake in a crucial moment in which he was unable to sortie but a third of his forces in time. Enterprise and her screen, augmented by heavy cruiser Pensacola, departed Nouméa; but they would not arrive in time to stop the Japanese, for Halsey had waited too long. Admiral Turner's transports reached Guadalcanal in the early hours of 12 November, and commenced unloading rapidly.

http://www.microworks.net/pacific/battl ... anal_1.htm

Unfortunately this article doesn't quote its sources so I can't substantiate its claims. I also came across another personal website of a veteran from Guadacanal who was talking about something he called 'The Cactus Crystall Ball' which appeared to be some sort of radio listening post on Guadacanal that tracked IJN naval forces and decoded their messages but again no verification was listed.