Bombardments Again!

[Narlotep]

Didz,

Exactly my point. What your sources describe is accurate, but deliver operational and planning intelligence support. The problem with the tactical scenario you describe in your first post is timeliness. The ability of the SIGINT apparatus to disseminate such information in time to organize an intercept just wasn't there.

It could probably ID vessels operating in and around Rabaul. It could let you know general patterns of manuever. It could maybe let you know that something might be happening soon. What it could not do, AFAIK, is say, "2xBB, 3xCA, 6xDD heading South out of Rabaul at 1830 with Guadalcanal as target."

Narlotep

[CJ Martin]

Originally posted by Didz

From what I have read this is certainly not a historically accurate representation of what the 'Tokyo Express' was or the conditions that enabled the IJN to use this tactic for a short period after the capture of Guadacanal. And yes I did read about the japanese attempt to bombard Lunga with a BB task group and the fact that it was intercepted and heavily damaged after only managing to cause minor damage to Henderson Field.

Funny, my reading is quite the opposite. "The Bombardment" was the term used by those that lived through the first IJN bombardment of Henderson Field by Battleships...the damage was awesome. Henderson was virtually destroyed and more importently most of the av gas went up in flames.

Originally posted by Didz

The point was made also that this attempt was made before Henderson Field was fully operational for local air support. Once Henderson was fully operational the IJN had to abandon all attmepts because of heavy losses.

Define "fully operational".

P-400's, Wildcats, Dauntlesses, Avengers and even B-17's and PBY's were all flying from the field *before* the first BB bombardment.

Get the Frank book, it is an excellent account of this period.

Originally posted by Didz

Sorry! again I must disagree. Simple mathematic's will confirm that it is a physical impossibility.

Try telling that to the folks that lived through those shellings. They are documented, historical facts. I'm not sure how you can say they are a "physical impossibilty". Did the IJN ships always get clear? No. Did they take losses? Yes. But many times they did get clear and took no losses. What finally stopped them was the *combination* of surface actions that damaged (and thus slowed down thier withdrawal) and aircraft (which attacked the already damaged ships).

Based on my experiences in the game so far, this is very well modeled.

-CJ

[Didz]

Originally posted by CJ Martin


"The Bombardment" was the term used by those that lived through the first IJN bombardment of Henderson Field by Battleships...the damage was awesome. Henderson was virtually destroyed and more importently most of the av gas went up in flames.

-CJ

I think we are straying a bit off the point here. The issue is NOT whether the IJN bombarded Henderson Field or whether the bombardment was effective but whether the bombardment of Henderson Field is a valid example of an IJN Battlegroup using the cover of darkness to avoid interception by allied LBA's.

My point is that it is physically impossible for a ship with a maximum speed of 30 knots to cover a distance of 400 miles, bombard an allied base and travel 400 miles back again before dawn. The maximum distance it could possibly cover is about half that meaning that for at least half its approach and withdrawal it would be liable to interception by Land Based Aircraft.

If anything the naval battles around Guadacanal in August through November 1942 do more to support than undermine this augument.

From what little I have read it is clear that both the Japanese and the Allies were only too well aware that success or failure at Guadacanal hinged on the operational effectiveness of Henderson Field. The whole focus of the IJN's bombarment missions during this period was to disrupt the development of this airstrip and disable the facilities already in place. Whilst the Americans realised equally well that the island was terribly vulnerable until such time as it could provide its own air cover effectively.

From what I have been able to piece together this issue was not resoved until November 1942.

9th August 42 Battle of Savo Island Fought.

10 August first marine landings.

18 August "Tokyo Express" begins with first landing of Japanese soldiers.

On August 20th twelve SBD dive bombers of VMSB-232 and nineteen F4F fighters of VMF-223 flew off of the escort carrier Long Island and arrived at Henderson Field. They were warmly greeted by the ground Marines, who had felt abandoned ever since the American naval forces had left the area leaving them without any tangible air support.

With few supplies and very little help from the outside world, the Marines really were "on their own". Everything depended on the aviators and aircraft stationed at Henderson Field to protect the Marines on the ground. Therefore the first planes to arrive simply could not be spared for Naval Search or attack duties and were concentrated on CAP and ground support roles.

Even though VMF-223 was reinforced by Major Robert E. Galer's VMF-224 on August 30th, the F4F Wildcats were nearly always outnumbered by Japanese fighters, even with the addition of the USAAF's 67th Fighter Squadron's P-39 Airacobras.

The men on Cactus soon settled into what was to become a familiar routine. Japanese aerial attacks on Henderson Field were an almost daily occurrence. Bombing raids by Japanese "Betty" bombers, escorted by Zero fighters, would be sent down the Slot from their base at Rabaul. All the Catus Airforce could do was keep the bombers from disabling their base there was no doubt that the IJN enjoyed total air superiority over the slot at this time.

On Sept 11th another fighter squadron: (U.S. Navy) VF-5 with 24 Wildcats arrived from the carrier Saratoga. The Saratoga had been torpedoed by a Japanese submarine, and it sent most of its air group to Guadalcanal while it was out for repairs, however; out of the 24 F4Fs that arrived on September 11th, only 5 remained five weeks later.

Through the entire month of September the Tokyo Express runs, made by destroyers, went unopposed by anything but sporadic air attacks from Henderson Field.

Another group of reinforcements arrived on October 9th, when Major 'Duke' Davis' VMF-121 came to Cactus with 24 much-needed Wildcats. However, by early October VMF-223 and VMF-224 were largely a spent force and were withdrawn.

11th-12th October The Battle of Cape Esperance fought

13-14 October bombardment of Henderson Field, by battleships Kongo and Haruna, had a devastating effect on the local air units, which lost most of their fuel and half of their planes, with more damaged.

15 October: yet another 8” bombardment, this one by cruisers Myoko and Maya, hit Henderson, but it neither turned the tide of operations. Henderson remained more or less operable, although the amount of planes it housed had considerably decreased

24-27 October Battle of Santa Cruz. Japanese launched their offensive on Henderson Field. In a battle lasting three days and nights, the Sendai Division hurled itself into the southern side of the U.S. perimeter, while IJN forces moved into support range to Guadalcanal's north, expecting the battle to be successful and hoping for a crack at the elusive U.S. Navy forces.

Thus even as late as 26 Oct the total compliment of operational aircraft was only numbered 29 (12xF4F, 11xSBD's, 3xP400 & 3xP39's) due mainly to supply difficulties and damage inflicted by IJN naval bombardment. However, the strip was never fully disabled and the planes were used to support ground operations during the day.

13-14 November Despite the tactical victory Japan scored in the Battle of Santa Cruz, it had not by any means secured a major advantage over the enemy. At Santa Cruz the U.S. Navy lost the service of both of its carriers, with Enterprise damaged and Hornet sunk, the planes from both carriers found refuge on Guadalcanal. Had the Japanese followed their success off Santa Cruz with a bombardment of Henderson Field, there might very well might have remained close to no opposition to further Japanese reinforcement runs.

In an final attempt to achieve victory the IJN decided to repeat the October bombardment in two steps: after a two day offensive by units of the 11th Air Fleet, the battleships Hiei and Kirishima would smash Henderson with concentrated gunfire a day before the arrival of Tanaka's convoy. Then, the day of Tanaka's arrival, Admiral Mikawa would pulverize the remnants of Henderson Field's air units with 203mm fire, leaving no opposition to Japanese reinforcement attempts.

However, the attack failed and the next dawn saw airplanes being readied frantically at Henderson Field to pursue the fleeing enemy, and Marine dive bomber squadrons were astonished to find a victim such as Hiei so close. She had suffered underwater damage to her steering gear, which flooded, preventing a swift escape. Aircraft attacked frequently and effectively in preventing the battleship's men from concentrating their efforts.

At 1015, TBFs from Enterprise, launched by Rear-Admiral Kinkaid to supplement the Marines at Henderson, attacked the damaged battlewagon, and throughout the next four hours the intensity of air attacks increased. Abe had hoped to move Kirishima back under cover of darkness to tow Hiei, but abandoned his efforts to save the ship, ordering her abandoned and scuttled. Admiral Yamamoto cancelled the scuttling order, instead wanting to retain her as a decoy to distract enemy planes from the rest of his fleet.

But Hiei did not accept this honor bestowed upon her, as she foundered during the next night. Abe retired northward, meeting Admiral Kondo's battleships north of the Solomons.

I have been unable to determine exactly when Henderson Field received its first long-range bombers but according to the journal of the Engineering unit responsible the Bomber1 and Bomber2 strips were not started until December 1942.

Therefore, it appears to me that the Allies never had a valid air umbella over the slot during the period between the withdrawal of the carriers in August until the arrival of the first long range bomber squadrons at Henderson Field possibly in December.

As a result the USN had no choice but to rely on the sacrifices of its surface ships to disrupt the IJN's attempts to land troops and destroy the airfield and the IJN were able to run the slot with their ships safe in the knowledge that there was no LBA umbrella to oppose them. Hence, IMO Guadacanal is NOT evidence of the ability of fast surface ships to avoid detection by LBA aircraft but is actually a demostration of why LBA air cover is so vital in preventing just such tactic's and the price that must be paid in surface vessels should it not be available.

It seems to me that had Henderson Field been fully operational in August 42 then, a) the marines would never have got ashore in the first place and b) the "Tokyo Express" would have been bombed to oblivion as it came up the slot.

Which is of course exactly the issue I have with the BB bombarment of Gilli Gilli which has a fully operational LBA umbrella and no supply problems and yet is being denied the opportunity to use them.

With thanks to: http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USMC/US ... canal.html

[strollen]

My point is that it is physically impossible for a ship with a maximum speed of 30 knots to cover a distance of 400 miles, bombard an allied base and travel 400 miles back again before dawn. The maximum distance it could possibly cover is about half that meaning that for at least half its approach and withdrawal it would be liable to interception by Land Based Aircraft.

You'd be right but they didn't need to sail 400 miles to be out of US LBA, 250 was just fine. My understanding is that both the Bombarding TF and Tanaka's Tokyo express standard procedure was to reach a point about 270-250 miles from Guadacanal in the late afternoon say 3 PM. They than sailed at full speed. (I've actually scuba dived in Ironbottom sound, the Slot is pretty much coral reef free certainly possible for a 32+ KT ship to average 30KT).

They arrived at midnight and bombard/unloaded for a relatively short time. Bombardments I know were only 30-45 minutes and the landings not much longer. IIRC (it has been a while since I read Morrison or Frank) almost all the naval battles were around midnight. Which means that by 12:30 to 1:00 the ships were on the way home. Shortly before 6:00 the US launched the search planes. They don't fly much faster the 150-180 MPH so if you are lucky they find the IJN force by 7 AM and it is 180-200 miles out. At which point an air strike is possible but since it is at extreme range probably not very effective.

Also I believe that most of the Tokyo express unloading where done at Tassafronga (sp) which is the hex next to Lunga, increasing the distance they could retreat by daylight.

In game terms, I think you have a point the way Fast TFs and Bombardments work gives the ship guy an extra couple of hexs or range they they didn't have in real life. I am not sure if Bombarding or unloading cost operation points. But if they don't Gary could change it to make these TFs use OPs points, which would decrease the effective "stand off" range of the ships.

In the game and in real life I think there are only two ways to stop the express. Either station carriers so they can attack the the Bombard/Fast transport TFs, or put medium bombers on the base.

[Didz]

Originally posted by strollen


You'd be right but they didn't need to sail 400 miles to be out of US LBA, 250 was just fine. My understanding is that both the Bombarding TF and Tanaka's Tokyo express standard procedure was to reach a point about 270-250 miles from Guadacanal in the late afternoon say 3 PM. They than sailed at full speed. (I've actually scuba dived in Ironbottom sound, the Slot is pretty much coral reef free certainly possible for a 32+ KT ship to average 30KT).

They arrived at midnight and bombard/unloaded for a relatively short time. Bombardments I know were only 30-45 minutes and the landings not much longer. IIRC (it has been a while since I read Morrison or Frank) almost all the naval battles were around midnight. Which means that by 12:30 to 1:00 the ships were on the way home. Shortly before 6:00 the US launched the search planes. They don't fly much faster the 150-180 MPH so if you are lucky they find the IJN force by 7 AM and it is 180-200 miles out. At which point an air strike is possible but since it is at extreme range probably not very effective.

I would be perfectly happy if the bombardment TF's began their run within 6 hours sailing distance of the target and ended the mission 5 or 5.5 hours out from the target or vice versa.

It would still make it difficult to catch them with your LBA but at least it wouldn't be impossible.

I still suspect though the the tactic's used at Guadacanal only worked because the LBA at Henderson did not have any long range strike planes and was not capable to paying naval operations thier full attention.

One good thing to come out of this debate is that I now know far more than I did a few days ago about the Battle of Guadacanal:)

[Sonny]

Originally posted by Didz


..............

On August 20th twelve SBD dive bombers of VMSB-232 and nineteen F4F fighters of VMF-223 flew off of the escort carrier Long Island and arrived at Henderson Field. .......

This is really what you should be complaining about - the Long Island in the game has a capacity of only 16 planes and yet almost twice that many were on board August 20th. We want a L.I. with more capacity!!!

[NorthStar]

Actually, Sonny, carriers can be loaded up above their capacity. If they are loaded above 110% (17 - 18, depending on rounding rules, for the L.I.) the planes can only fly transfer missions, which is what the description is.

I'm not sure what the absolute upper limit is though, as I don't have my manual handy at work.

[Didz]

Originally posted by NorthStar
Actually, Sonny, carriers can be loaded up above their capacity. If they are loaded above 110% (17 - 18, depending on rounding rules, for the L.I.) the planes can only fly transfer missions, which is what the description is.

I'm not sure what the absolute upper limit is though, as I don't have my manual handy at work.

I've noticed that already. In fact its quite a neat trick.

Unload your Navy Squadrons from thier carrier and let them sit at a land base for a few days. Magically the aircraft compliment is increased to anything up to 36 planes per squadron.

Now transfer them back to the carriers. Quoila! Over stuffed carriers great for when you need those extra few planes.

[Sonny]

Originally posted by NorthStar
Actually, Sonny, carriers can be loaded up above their capacity. If they are loaded above 110% (17 - 18, depending on rounding rules, for the L.I.) the planes can only fly transfer missions, which is what the description is.

I'm not sure what the absolute upper limit is though, as I don't have my manual handy at work.

Not the L.I. - I've put 17 planes on it before and they disappeared.

[Didz]

Originally posted by Sonny


Not the L.I. - I've put 17 planes on it before and they disappeared.

Well I can't comment cos I've never actually found any reason to use it.

It just sits in Noumea gathering barnacles. I tend to fly my planes from base to base instead.

[Erik Rutins]

The best use is probably as a shuttle between Australia and Noumea. Many of the fighters don't have the distance to make this transfer and you may end up with a glut in SWPAC or SOPAC. Rather than build intermediate bases, just park the Long Island with a few DDs halfway between. Fly your fighters to it, then from there to their final destination.

I also often send it back fairly early when I need every fighter I have, so that it can upgrade it's anti-aircraft guns to Oerlikons.

Also, although it is a slow ship but not slower than most transports. You can base some fighters on it (F4Fs and such) and stick it in a Transport squadron you're sending in to reinforce a base near the enemy's air range. The extra CAP is often quite helpful.

I have been fortunate to not lose planes on it as yet. We're still looking for some saved game files with that problem, send them zipped to me at erikr@matrixgames.com if you have a repeatable save of the "Long Island Triangle" reported bug.

Regards,

- Erik