Originally posted by HMSWarspite
Missed this the first time. What this says isn't that the Japanese abandoned the Tokyo Express because it didn't work, they abandoned it because you couldn't get enough troops, and any heavy equipment ashore. If they had merely wanted to bombard, they could have continued, however, the few infantry they could deliver were no help to the land battle.
Yep! The actual explanation given is that the growth in numbers and in effectiveness of the aviation on Henderson Field, together with the growing size and aggressiveness of the Navy's surface task groups, forced the Japanese to resort to an inadequate and unsatisfactory system of supply and reinforcements for their troops on Guadalcanal.
Of course the bombardment missions were intended to suppress the development of Henderson Field. In fact the Japanese bombardment on the 12 October was so effective it prevented the use of Henderson Field for two days but the Japanese failed to follow through with a major landing on the island.
Yamamoto tried to repeat the exercise on the 12 November with Battleship Div 11 commanded by Rear Adm Abe consisting of the battleships.
 Hiei - Capt Massao Nishida
 Kirshima - Capt Sanji Iwabuchi
And Destroyer squadron 10 Rear Adm Kimura
Light Cruiser - Nagara and 11 DD's
But a coastwatcher on Buin-Faisi had already warned the US on the 10 November that a group of combat and transport vessels consisting of no less than 61 ships, including six cruisers, 33 destroyers, 17 transports, one large cargo liner, and smaller craft was visible off-shore.
Then, on the morning of 11 November an Air Strike in two waves was made on Henderson field and again on 12 November there was a heavy air raid on the shipping in the area, during which 30 of the 31 attacking enemy planes were shot down.
The US were also warned of the attack by MAGIC intelligence and reconnaissance reports and this enabled an American force of five cruisers and eight destroyers, to take up station in "Ironbottom Sound" in order to interdict the attack.
On 12 November, enemy ships were seen approaching the island by search planes, it was discovered that in addition to the combat craft, a group of supply ships and transports was also in motion in the same direction.
A confused naval battle ensued in the darkness early on the 13 November which left the Hiei crippled within 20 miles of Henderson Field. She could only limp along at 5 knots and had lost the use of her rudder. She was attacked all the next day by planes from Henderson Field and B17's other bases nearby.
This confusion caused by this battle delayed the rest of the mission for a day but during the night of the 14th, a number of fast cruisers, led by Chokai approached Guadalcanal from the northwest and subjected the airfield to a bombardment which lasted for about an hour
The next morning at about 0830, these ships were seen again together with the rest of the fleet, once more on the move toward Guadalcanal. A short time later they were taken under a preliminary and unsuccessful attack by two search-planes from the Enterprise, operating to the south of Guadalcanal.
The aircraft from the Enterprise had been landed on Henderson Field in order to allow the parent ships to retire beyond danger of air attack but in spite of difficulties arising from lack of equipment on the field, they took an active part in the subsequent action.
The main attack against the approaching transports began at 1300 when 40 Marine Corps planes from Henderson Field found the enemy force in the vicinity of the Russell Islands. The ensuing action was a slaughter. Planes were armed and fueled at the field for the relatively short run to the scene of the engagement, released their bomb-loads, and returned for new supplies. By 1500 planes from the Enterprise were making similar sorties, as were Army planes stationed on the field and B-17's from bases outside the island area.
The Japanese escort craft left the scene early in the engagement abandoning the transports to their fate. There was no Japanese air cover, and the only thing stopping the US planes annihilating the force was time--(the attacks continued until nightfall)--and the fact, that mud and lack of equipment on the field slowed up rearming of planes.
Well! This is about the best I can make of the various accounts I have come across on the net. Whether the successful bombardment on the 14th November was the result of poor naval search operations from Henderson Field or the fact that the entire strength of the base was being used to finish off the Hiei is not made clear but I suspect little air search would be conducted when an enemy BB was a sitting duck on your doorstep.
Certainly, the bombardment group didn't escape undetected the next morning and one can only speculate what would have happened had the bomber pilots not been presented with a sea full of juicy transport ships to aim at.