RHSMRAO: uploaded

[el cid again]

I was creating a start turn for RHSRAO with the new 7.942 file set

when I said "Why do things the same old way?"

First - my object was to do something unexpected. That led me to say "what if we use historical forces with the historical strategy, but
not the same operational details?"

I ran tests and concluded that other operations are feasible - but they won't be planned right if we use RAO as the foundation.

Second - I remembered the many years of pre war planning and the many months of planning for this operation. Most of that time both sides ran exercises and analysis based on what might be called a traditional approach by Japanese forces - from the mandates instead of out of the "empty sea" to the Northwest. Such an approach provides a number of advantages: there are more options for the raiding/invading forces - there is more immediate support for damaged vessels when bases are on the approach vector - and the varoius forces are more able to provide mutual support. It also means that USN thinking in the period would be more in sync with events: units sent out to prove (e.g. USS Farrugut) for enemy units "retiring on Jaluit" might be in a position more likely to find the enemy?

[el cid again]

The strategic mission of the Kiddo Butai was to prevent the United States Fleet from being available to interfere with operations invading the SRA. The usual outcome of the raid on Pearl is the sinking of one or two battleships, the damaging of most or all of the rest, and sometimes the sinking of USS Enterprise. The loss of US aircraft is significant in the short term, but not in the longer one: the planes are mainly used in the Central Pacific even if not lost - and any attack there simply generates a requirement for more planes in the area - it does not free them up for other operations.

Two days after PH Adm Yamamoto concluded that the operation should have been mounted differently. That would not mean sending an invasion group to occupy Oahu - or even the lower islands. Instead forces based on the Mandates would have attempted to secure the LOC between there and Hawaii - explicitly Johnston Island and Midway are mentioned, likely first one and then the other. Such operations would not eliminate the need to invade Wake and Guam - but might change the units tasked with their reduction. Wake - in particular - might have a higher priority - since it is needed to provide recon cover for a subsiquent invasion of Midway. In the context of the thinking of the time, such moves would attract the United States Fleet out to battle - battle it is likely to lose - particularly as it would be advancing into land based recon of Imperial forces - if the op did not disable these ships by a raid on PH itself at the start - which remains an option. In that case - the carriers do not need the same sort of tanker support - they would refuel at Saipan and Kwajalein en route - and the tanker force could be based on that vector - making it far less exposed to destruction than coming out of the "empty sea" does.

The most significant part of the United States Fleet is the carrier forces. It was always known these might be at sea - and in the event it was known they were at sea when the war began. They were at sea with two different missions - to deliver aircraft to advance bases - and to "probe for the enemy" on the expected approach vector - from his bases in the mandates. It might be better - from a Japanese point of view - to approach as expected - not only so that small invasion forces (the only meaningful IJA unit in the entire area is the 144th Regimental Combat Team = Nanyo Detachment = South Seas Detachment) are better covered - but also so the chances of encountering the carriers is greater. Engagement of carriers at 3:1 odds (on paper - worse if one measures number of planes - worse still if one considered plane qualities) is to the advantage of the Japanese. If the carriers are not found, the battlefleet in port can still be engaged. The chances of finding the carriers can be increased if ship and submarine recon (in particular in the Advance Force - the more than two dozen submarines at PH) are placed in a grid to make this more likely - and if this is supplimented by using patrol planes at the first opportunity at advance islands or islets.

It would not be clear to the United States if the Japanese intended to exploit these initial moves into the Central Pacific region along the lines of Yamamoto's thinking on 10 Dec (Tokyo time) - as a foundation for invading the lower islands - and then Oahu itself - or merely as outposts to detect and delay a US advance toward the Philippines? Another possibility open to players would be - once whatever islands they wish are secured and the enemy carriers sunk or fled - to swing into the Southwest Pacific - in an attempt to cut the SLOC to Australia - and possibly to size the valuabe mineral assets of New Caledonia - in a follow up operation. Wether opposed or not - it is hard to imagine effective opposition -
it would still prevent the US fleet (by sitting on its LOC) from interfering with operations in the SRA.

[el cid again]

If such a scenario is interesting - I could issue it as 73: replacing RPO. Only one player wanted a Russian passive version of BBO - and as far as I know it is unused. Since there is no identified eratta - it would simply be another scenario in the 7.942 series - but possibly a more interesting one. It would be considered to be in the CVO family and it would be for human vs human games - based exactly on RAO with only minor changes to unit planning and objectives etc. [RAO is the Russian Active form of CVO]

[el cid again]

One concept - documented in Aircraft Carriers - which was not implemented - was KB planning to split the force into groups. This was to cause a wider area to be searched - but the groups were to be in mutual supporting range of each other. The wider search swath increased the chances of finding the enemy fleet - in theory - while the planes of most or all of the carriers would be available to strike immediately if they were found - and then all the carriers would launch follow up strikes. The only disadvantage is that the initial strikes would be separate. It was contemplated to sail in carrier divisions - not single carrier TFs - and to separate these by about two hexes in game terms.

[ChickenOfTheSea]

I, for one, think this would be an interesting variant. The initial challenges for both sides would be quite different from the usual start. I think a lot of players could have a lot of fun with this. If the Japanese player foregoes the PH strike and the US fleet comes out to fight. there would be a lot of early tension in this opening.

[bbbf]

You would have to place the Allied ships out of port and heading towards the Japanese.
 
No sane player is going to send the fleet out, as they know that they will just be targets.

[el cid again]

Count me among the insane.

For two reasons:

First - I think the mentality of the period was that the Fleet should sortee to meet the enemy at sea - Mahan was not just worshipped in Japan - he was a creature of the USN first of all. The doctrine is that Fleet Actions would decide the war. Americans could not bring themselves to concieve the Fleet was not superior - and indeed - it IS superior. If intel was any good at all - and it was - they would know most of the Fleet was in Japan or Formosa. How could a Fleet with nine effective captial ships fail to sortee vs one with as few as two - possibly four?
The commanders of the period were wholly ignorant of Long Lance oxygen torpedoes, and did not understand that the front line carrier fighter was not the Claude.

Second - I think sitting in port and having most or all the units knocked out during the critical early phase of the war is not efficient use of the assets.

Third - I think the enemy is more vulnerable to losses than the US is - and so the US should be willing to risk losses in order to cause them. Japan is not going to replace anything lost - and it will be severely hurt if anything valuable is damaged during the early period. So go sink and damage what you can. Failing that - send the fleet where it can be of use - under air cover. But hiding in port is way to passive for me.

My intent is to permit the Japanese to decide the details of their approach - keep one force or split up ? - what destination hexes?
But the Allies remain as intel shows them to be. The Allied player must decide after it is know there will be war what to do? But a Japanese player who assumes they will stay in port might be wrong - particularly if he is playing me.

[herwin]

ORIGINAL: el cid again

One concept - documented in Aircraft Carriers - which was not implemented - was KB planning to split the force into groups. This was to cause a wider area to be searched - but the groups were to be in mutual supporting range of each other. The wider search swath increased the chances of finding the enemy fleet - in theory - while the planes of most or all of the carriers would be available to strike immediately if they were found - and then all the carriers would launch follow up strikes. The only disadvantage is that the initial strikes would be separate. It was contemplated to sail in carrier divisions - not single carrier TFs - and to separate these by about two hexes in game terms.

This is how I prefer to use the KB (to reduce the DL).

[herwin]

ORIGINAL: ChickenOfTheSea

I, for one, think this would be an interesting variant. The initial challenges for both sides would be quite different from the usual start. I think a lot of players could have a lot of fun with this. If the Japanese player foregoes the PH strike and the US fleet comes out to fight. there would be a lot of early tension in this opening.

I might modify the War Plan Orange rules to allow naval operations against Hawaii (following the declaration of war) without triggering total war.

[ChickenOfTheSea]

ORIGINAL: bbbf

You would have to place the Allied ships out of port and heading towards the Japanese.

No sane player is going to send the fleet out, as they know that they will just be targets.

I am assuming that this doesn't happen on Dec 7 with surprise on. The hard coded aspects of the Dec 7 turn were intended to allow the PH or similar surprise attack by the Japanese. The allies completely lack intel from air, sea, or sub search and, for the first phase, any air cover from LBA. Essentially the allies are deaf, dumb, and blind. Also if the Japanese approach on the expected axis they almost certainly would have been detected in advance.

However, if the KB spent Dec 7 supporting the Wake invasion or something similar, then US pre-war doctrine would send out air search, scouting subs, and scouting groups of DD's and CL's in advance of the main body.

If you are considering political realities at all, to flee in the face of an enemy viewed as inferior would be unacceptable and be grounds for a court martial. Sure, the Japanese are superior in many ways, but the allies don't know that yet. I think this scenario would require some pre-game agreements by the players involved concerning the opening, but I think it would be fun for both.

[el cid again]

Well - first turn surprise is a switch - so it is always an option for any scenario. It is a PLAYER option rather than part of the mod per se.

It depends on PLAYER choices and opinions - and I hate to tell players they must do this or can't do that - unless there is a structural reason
that it only makes sense to have such a rule.

I think most players - and I myself - assume that first turn surprise is a very good way to represent the command paralysis of a Navy and Army still in peacetime thought processes - and not really ready for war. According to Advance Force Pearl Harbor (whose author is curator of the US Army Aviation Museum on Oahu) the field of fire of coast defense guns was obstructed by things like trees and whole buildings - which had to be knocked down in order for the defenses to be functional. According to Army history, there was nothing close to enough manpower for all the 117 guns (which number I get from Gen Marshall) there: for which reason Gen Short cross trained aviation support personell: he reasoned the airfields would be knocked down by a serious attack - and then the men who had supported planes - and would be only marginal infantry - could best be used under control of HQ to load, and line up pointers, and pull the trigger when directed, for otherwise unmanned coast defense guns.

As well - we have the gross problem that in software naval search is hoplessly too effective. IF you turn off surprise there will be few undetected forces - and that in spite of the fact 180 search aircraft were required for a 800 mile daylight only search. I don't trust that my solution is widely used - limit search range in hexes to half the number of searching planes. I think first turn surprise accounts for strategic surprise more than operational surprise.

I think it is perfectly valid for players to set the option either way - and possibly it is interesting to do it both ways on different occasions.
I don't think this scenario needs to be played with it set one way. If I did - it would be with surprise on - because of lots of things in the hard code. IJN was - and today is still - the only navy in the world to train hard at night and in bad weather - so much so it costs lives - every year.
Japanese bombers over Clark were the most accurate of the entire war vs a land target; ditto for bombers over PH vs a naval target. It does not matter where you fight - code is going to give a one turn advantage to such attacks on the first turn - and that is far more realistic than not IMHO.

[ChickenOfTheSea]

I actually agree with what you say and I think your RHS rules are by far the most reasonable treatment of Allied options if the Japanese are doing a mega Dec 7 move. I also think the surprise option best mimics the air attacks of Dec 7 and almost always play with Dec 7 surprise on.

My concern was more with the Pearl Harbor fleet and the first turn code. If they sail on Dec. 7 with the Japanese waiting for them nearby they will be blown out of the water before they see anything coming whether surprise is on or not. I think to get an interesting opening naval campaign in the central Pacific the PH fleet would need to survive past Dec 7.

I also like your ideas about ways to make search more realistic. It takes some effort and agreeable players, but I think it is a very good idea for those looking to improve realism.

[el cid again]

The PH issue is far more complex in this scenario:

IF KB (or several Mini KB) are out hunting the fleet -

they likely will not reach launch position near PH OR - if KB divides - large fractions of it will not.

I always fear the ships might escape a pure port attack - by just sailing one hex - if all KB is set at default - to hit airfields and port -
then NONE are hit at all. So for me this is not new - I set - Attack ships first - THEN port or airfield - at least for some units.

But in this scenario - the point of the detection grid is to FIND naval targets (e.g. carriers we hope ) - and then engage. There are
so many ships at sea they are going to distract the inbound carriers - wether they are carriers or just transports -
and so it is going to vary a whole lot if the KB reaches launch point or not?

[el cid again]

Most of the work went into seaplane groups (including single plane elements) - sea plane carriers and other ships which carry them -
and creating a detection grid. A number of seaplane tenders (3) and a seaplane carrier were moved from Japan to the Central Pacific area
- and also 1 CS to Truk which presumably faces SE - to facilitate exploiting any islands or bases captured to facilitate moving forward the small numbers of flying boats. The area of focus is from Layton Island to Johnston Island to a point just East of the lower Hawiian Islands -
a fairly large area - but the chance of detection inside that area is significant. It is not unity - and if players range limit searches per my suggestions - it is considerably less than if they use standard search values at max search ranges. But either way - there is a very good chance of carrier vs carrier action on the first day - and if KB divides - the chance goes way up - but the action scale goes way down.

I also moved submarines. 5 were moved to South China Sea. 6 were moved to North America - from Alaska to Panama. 4 were moved to Truk. [9 because they are short range; 6 because they are very long range; none with aircraft] The airplane subs were set to form a detection grid West of the lower islands. The attack boats are set to attack at points like Midway, Johnston, Palmyra, and all the other islands.
The idea is to set up a USS Yorktown (sink the damaged carrier or ship) or USS Saratoga (damage the inbound reinforcement carrier or ship) to the degree possible.

I did not move in a lot of things - nothing Army to the area at all except Nanyo Detachment and the ships bearing it - and it starts at the same point. Small squadrons of fighters, bombers and recon planes were moved to Truk - and one unit at Tokyo is preparing to replace the nanyo Detachment for its Guam assignment. The Guam bound bombardment force replaces one at Bako which in turn is moved to Kawajalein. You have the parts to build 3 carrier mini TFs and 1 SAG - or 6 micro carrier TFs - or one somewhat stronger KB - or any combination. If you leave things as I set them you get KB and the SAG as single units - the KB bound for a point West of Oahu - the SAG bound for Johnston Island to bombard it prepratory to a landing attempt. It is my intent to set players up so that Midway can be taken in a subsiquent move by the force which is tasked for Wake - which force being the Nanyo Detachment - assuming its transports don't get too badly cut up by the coast guns at either point - or by subs - or even carrier air strikes.

[el cid again]

I have built the scenario using 69 as the working slot number for now - on the basis that "69 is almost 70" -
which this is.

Testing indicates that Japanese ideas about how to use the Sixth (submarine) Fleet in cooperation with the
First Air Fleet - and also about the value of seaplanes for search (it was a "secret weapon" accoring to Capt Orita
in Japanese Submarine Captain) - were fairly valid - if applied in strength. [Part of this was to use cruisers,
submarine tenders and raiders as well as island bases and islets with seaplane tenders - and even some seaplane
tenders able to fly while underway - which Matrix gave us in the case of Kimikawa Maru class - to create a
search grid likely to contain the enemy fleet elements of interest] It also shows that these recon elements
are at grave risk individually - as are any landing parties sent farther East than Wake.

Recon was ever thus:

there is a Russian language joke or saying by Bear crews:

"We have sighted the enemy - Dosvidania"


Another thing that is likely - if the KB is broken into parts - is that one or more carriers may be damaged or even sunk
when/if enemy carriers are found - or even if clever land based air attack are mounted. Less than six carriers flying CAP means
penetration is almost certain in RHS. Players have to balance the possibilities when they consider their moves - and the Japanese
player must consider the trade offs between concentration and spreading power over a wide enough area to insure the enemy fleet
elements at sea (whatever they are) don't evade. If he spreads out enough detection and engagement are almost insured: but the
risk of losing ships to enemy air strikes - or even surface action engaements - is much higher. And the American's do not know what chioices the Japanese made - just what the possibilities are. The interesting thing is that this scenario aligns the possibilities more closely to what the Americans really were thinking in terms of IRL than the raid "out of the empty sea" does. And Nugumo may have been right to run - the carriers are indeed vulnerable. This scenario may show that the raid as conducted was a better idea than the long chain of concepts which preceeded it - particularly if less than 6 carriers are sent (which indeed players have the option to do: from Kwajalein you can send a carrier TF to SE Fleet area immediately - if you want to]

[el cid again]

After taking time for a test run -

RHSMRAO is released in its working form (Scenario 69) - it may one day be renumbered as 73.

This is a fairly interesting start - making players think quite a bit. It also is more like what Allied
planners expected than what happened.