Royal Navy in the Pacific War

[DuncanLang]

Attached (if I figure out how to do it) is an article from Strategy & Tactics Magazine #238, September 2006 entitled:

"Not Their Finest Hour: The Royal Navy’s Efforts in the Pacific War." Thought some might find it interesting.

[JeffroK]

A bit harsh,
 
The RN was a newbie at Pacific style carrier warfare, the USN had spent 3+ years at it.
 
Given time (ie Operation Olympic/Corent) the RN would have had played a significant role (for its size).

[Feinder]

Well, obviously my sig will betray the further content of my post but...

For the most part, the author is "in the ballpark". But he has certainly over-simplified and trivialized much of the BPF's contribution. And if I may say so, it's a very myopic American perspective (and yes, I'm an American).

1. As indicated, the RN was basically chased out of the Pacific after April 42. And due to commitments elsewhere (Europe), did not have the resources to commit to the Pacific until late 1944.
2. When the RN did arrive in force, the USN was already driving straight for Japan. Even contributing 16x RN flight decks, compared to the 50 or so flight decks the USN, the contrution -was- small in relation, but not in sacrifice (it represented everything they had).
3. The US wanted to concentrate operations on what would bring the war directly to Japan. Certainly a useful (and winning) strategy. Given the location of British bases, their contribution is necessarily limited to strikes against Malaya and Java (as the whole of the SRA stood between them and Japan). The BPF had to sailed all the way to Oz, and then up the staging base north of Rabaul (cant remember the name, starts with M, I think), in order to take part in the strikes on Okinawa.
4. The RN very much viewed the Pacific as their war as well. They had suffered many casualties, and taken with the thier current and former colonies of India, Australia were a major commitment to the Pacific. The US generally viewed the Pacic as "their war", as indeed they had been footing 90% of the bill for the last 3 years (and there many in the US that had wanted to focus primary resources on Japan, not Germany).
5. However, bearing in mind the physical location and logical targets for the RN, it became a Catch-22. The US did not want to be seen as propping up (or restoring colonial regimes). However, the only logical places that the RN could intitially strike, was vs. targets in their own and Dutch colonies.
6. While the RN was willing and eager to participate in the Pacific war by end of 1944, the USN was already very good at it's craft. There was certainly a lot of "Um. If you want to help, we can put you to good use, but stay out of our way" by the US. A lot politics went back forth.
7. Without a doubt, for the RN, there was some intent to restore the national prestige, esp forward thinking that post-war, a strong RN might serve to demonstrate strength to colonies that were already on the verge of separation before the war. But I do believe this be a fringe politcal benefit and not the primary goal of deploying the BPF in 1945.
8. The RN -was- short legged. It did have serious logicistical problems that the USN basically said that, if it was going to help in the Pacific, it was going to have to solve for itself (fair also, given the huge fleet train the USN required of itself). Fortunately, the RN borrowed a very resourcesful USN logistics Adm (forgot his name), and he helped to create the RN fleet train. But consider that that most of the RN ships were designed and built for operations in the Atlantic and Med. It took almost 6 months to "tropicalize" a ship for the rigors of the Pacfic (another reason in delays to RN in the Pacific). The main issue the RN ships had was ventilation. The Pacific is HOT compared to the Atlantic, and pumping in fresh air ended up being a major task in the refit process.
9. I strongly question the authors sources on his statistics that the RN suffered 50% casualites vs. the USN 20%. My sources show about 25% casualties, which is in-line with a navy that was learning the trade of large fleet carrier ops. And again, regards to the use of the American planes - they -were- better than the RN FAA. The FAA had always been the wayward step-child, and simply got toss-overs conversions from the RAF. However, given the US obvious experience (and production capabilities) it made sense to use US aircraft. GB did end up offering the Firefly, a very capably aircraft, but again, the suitability and availably of American aircraft, made their use a pragmatic choice.

[pasternakski]

Excellent points, Feinder. Who bit off that other finger, anyway?

Way back when, I was a subscriber to S&T in its SPI incarnation. While not everything was completely baked, the people responsible for its content were pretty good, and it showed in the finished product.

This later permutation under the aegis of Decision Games seems to be a bit more - shall we be kind and say - freewheeling and provocative.

Not that there's anything wrong with that. It just reflects the movement in the nature of the wargaming hobby in recent times. Even a cursory look at these forums reveals that the preference of the consumer these days is for games that are consonant with the buyer's beliefs (no matter how superficial or ill considered) and that allow that buyer considerable control over the design in the way of "modding."

The piece in question here engages in a lot of questionable blaming based on hindsight that may be more myopic than 20-20, but it's not the kind of writing that tells me its author would be interested in hearing "contrasting ideas."

*sigh* Toto, I don't think we're in Kansas anymore...

[m10bob]

One must keep things in perspective. Current magazines, (in this case, revisioinst writers), are in the business of selling magazines, and must expound new and "fascinating" theories, (for want of a more accurate word in a kid friendly forum).

During the war, the Americans found themselves woefully shy of flat-tops in early '43 and were grateful to have the company of HMS Victorious at New Caledonia, to work with the Saratoga.

http://www.fleetairarmarchive.net/Ships/Victorious.html

[Jim D Burns]

ORIGINAL: Feinder
4. The RN very much viewed the Pacific as their war as well. They had suffered many casualties, and taken with the thier current and former colonies of India, Australia were a major commitment to the Pacific. The US generally viewed the Pacic as "their war", as indeed they had been footing 90% of the bill for the last 3 years (and there many in the US that had wanted to focus primary resources on Japan, not Germany).

This isn’t completely accurate. While Britain had suffered in the opening months of the war, their policy was to allow the US to do most of the fighting after mid 42. They were not as blatant about it as China, but they definitely had other interests that over-rode their willingness to fight in the Pacific.

Read The Stilwell Papers for a great insight into the political backsliding and outright obstructionism the British and Chinese were engaged in regarding the Pacific war. It's a collection of the Generals personal diaries and is quite a facinating read. Both Britain and China had policies of allowing the Americans to win the war in the Pacific, and while they publicly agreed to every offensive operation put forward by Stilwell, they backdoored them in the end with delays, obstructions and outright political intrigues.

The only thing Britain and China did agree on was to somehow try and get Stilwell removed from command so they could get a less aggressive officer appointed to the CBI (China, India, Burma) theatre.

Britain wanted to retain control of Burma, and they knew if offensive operations launched from their sphere of influence in the CBI were successful, then Burma would be the first country liberated and the US would then demand it be liberated from colonial rule.

China had no interest at all in helping Britain maintain its sphere of influence in Southeast Asia, but more importantly China knew it had a larger war to fight after WWII was over. Chiang Kai Shek's policy was one of graft and corruption. He wanted to get as much free aid out of the US as possible for use in his war against the communists after the war.

Even when Stilwell finally got Chiang to agree to provide the men for his two 30 division plans, Chiang insisted the British outfit the divisions with British lend lease aid in India. Of course this almost saw the end of the plan as Britain then refused of course.

In the end after months of struggle with threats of resigning his command, Stilwell was finally able to get Chiang to give him personal command of just 3 of the Chinese divisions, which he then used with great affect in liberating Northern Burma. The British offensive to the south near Imphal was a total failure.

Of course with this kind of success using just 10% of the force Chiang had been insisting was needed to retake Burma, Chiang lost huge face. Britain too had lost face and voiced their displeasure to Washington loudly about Stilwell. Publicly Chiang forced Stilwell’s resignation by sending a demand to Roosevelt stating it was due to personality differences. Privately Britain too had a hand in the dismissal.

Of course the point is Chiang never thought that the British would agree to arm the 30 divisions, and when they were finally armed due to Stilwell’s insistence which forced Britain to act, Chiang tried everything he could to sabotage their ability to be used offensively. He never thought just 3 divisions could accomplish anything, so releasing them to Stilwell’s personal command was in reality just another attempt to obstruct any real Chinese involvement in the war.

Of course no more *real* progress was made in the CBI theater after Stilwell’s recall, even though 1944 had seen stunning successes. For political reasons neither Britain nor China wanted to truly commit to the war in the Pacific. With the removal of Stilwell, there was no more driving personality left to see to US interests, so Britain and China saw to it no more headway was made.

Jim

[DuckofTindalos]

Wow, what a huge, steaming load that was. While Chiang was corrupt and more interested in his inevitable post-war clash with Mao, claiming that the British did nothing major without Stilwell is a horrible piece of revisionist claptrap. Just awful.

[JeffroK]

Only betterd by Wedermayer's self serving autobiography

[Minedog]

gee.. I've never actually seen someone actively defend Stillwell before..

for a US General with a very limited command of US troops and mostly allies, Stillwell did an exceptional job of ostracising every person he met. The British detested him, the Chinese obviously used him for their own ends, and were horrified by his actions in 1942. He seemed to have no political grasp at all, and was openly contemptuous of his allies. Considering his position as an equvalent to Eisenhower & MacArthur, admittedly with less resources, this has to be considered as exceptionally poor "Allied" leadership and the failures to coordinate the CBI command in action within the limitations of those allies must come back to the inablity of Stillwell to lead a composite Army, and a failure to move adroitly in a political environment. One has to wonder what would have happened if Chennault had been put in charge, since he was clearly more politically able in getting Chinese and British cooperation for his plans.

[Nikademus]

I have not read that the British had any hand in Stillwell's removal. He did a good job of that all by himself.....which is not to say he was a bad general. He simply was too no-nonsense and apolitical for the situation in which he was placed. He wasn't a diplomat...he was a solider, and as a soldier he wanted results and he grew frustrated at Chiang's complacency and subterfuge politics. He ended up getting the boot because Chiang complained to Washington and the Roos administration, still bent on making China one of the "Big partners" of the war, (with a consequent increase in Chinese commitment to fighting Japan) gave in.
Max Hastings does point out though that it wasn't all Chiang bad.....Stillwell good either. Situation was far far more complicated than that. In a way Stillwell's dilemma was a rife example of the misperception Washington had of the China situation. Chiang had his agenda which was'nt simply "Chiang's" but also "China's" while Stillwell and Washington had their agenda which was "American" in terms of point of view and objective. It was interesting to note in Hasting's book "Retribution" that even some modern Chinese historians do not totally demonize Chiang for his actions despite being a Nationalist.

On the British, Stillwell had no great love for them, and the feeling was recipricated though IIRC, Slim didn't have a bad opinion of him.

[tocaff]

I remember many years ago reading that when the RN was sending it's ships to the Pacific the USN had a major problem with the RN's short legs as their ships were designed for Atlantic use so their range was short compared to the USN's vessels.

[Nikademus]

The RN traditionally relied on having an extensive network of bases to help offset the huge distances that encompassed their Empire. Part of that network of course was dismantled in 42 courtasy of the Japanese. Range was a problem and made for a convenient excuse for King to try to exclude RN participation in the final defeat of Japan. The USN was greatly served by being backed by the richest economy in the world at the time, one of the items produced being a far more efficient powerplant for US capital ships that allowed them to have great range without sacrificing too much displacement. The RN tried to do the same but came up short for example with their KGV class in comparison to the NC/SoDak's. The range ended up being "disapointing." The bugaboo could be partially made up by advancements in replenishment at sea.

[anarchyintheuk]

Chennault had problems enough within his own service to be appointed to a cinc of a theatre. He was a fine air commander, but not being able to see that if you launch air offensive in China that the IJA will just take those bases isn't a strong recommendation of his strategic ability or grasp of reality.

[philabos]

I have to agree with Terminus here. Nothing happened after Stilwell left?
The British 14th Army drove from India to Rangoon - an event even an American, Gerhard Weinberg in a World aT Arms author, called the 14th Army's Jungle Blitzkrieg one of the impressive achievements of the war. The Army was made up of the 2nd Infantry Division from the UK, Several African Divisions, Indian Divisions, and Ghurkas. Raised from a defeated army, Slim was able to make an overland attack in one case taking 200 miles of jumgle from the masters of jungle warfare in 30 days. By the end, at least according to wiki, 14th Army was the largest in the Empire and in the world with a half million troops under Slim. Sounds like a serious effort to me.
Known (if at all) as Britain's forgotten army.

[JeffroK]

Stillwell was far to complex a person to be in the position he found himself in (made for himself?)
 
It may have been interesting to see him perform as OC 10th Army in an Invasion of Japan. Could he have worked with some commanders equally stubborn but with a long trail of victory behind them.
 
His command in the field was uninspiring, and downright dangerous at times. His mad rush on Mytkinya destroyed "Merrills Marauders" and he treated the Chindits similarly at Moguang.
 
But, too many views are taken of people/organisations with the advantage of 100% hindsight, as with the article on the BPF. Maybe some of those denigrated did the best possible with the people (Stilwells staff weren't angels), weapons (How would you get the Chinese to fight?) and opportunities the enemy allows.
 
I dislike "Histories" written on the spot, but detest those written 50+ years later with a view to "twist/spin" what happened.

[spence]

It should be noted that the RN (and many naval units of the RCN, RAN, RNZN) had a lot more real experience of naval warfare than any unit of the IJN. It had been fighting real battles both in daylight and at night against both the Italians and Germans (and French) and had performed quite credibly if not brilliantly. It seems that the single incident wherein the Bismarck sank the Hood in short order is somehow deemed by many to be representative of the RN. Like the Bettys and Nells of the IJN I would contend that the Kreigsmarine had ONE GOOD DAY against the RN. The most remarkable thing about either Axis success is that the same ship, Prince of Wales, was involved in both incidents.

There is no denying that the IJN trained hard and in bad weather but the IJN also scripted their exercises (and their prospective enemies) to a remarkable degree which didn't really serve them that well. In 1941-42 they managed about 50% wins in surface actions. It didn't get any better thereafter. When their battlefleet finally actually went in to action at Leyte Gulf its performance was pretty abyssmal given the overwhelming weight of firepower it possessed. The IJN was more advanced when it came to the employment of carrier airpower. The carrier vs carrier battles between the IJN and USN in 1942 demonstrated that the RN had made some bad guesses during that time when no navy really knew what they were going to do with their carriers in a shooting war. But by then (1945) they could only do what they could do with what they had.