ASW: Will anything be done in AE to reduce the lethality of Japanese naval search and ASW AC?

[Lanconic]

It isnt that easy. Sure we can compare the historical level of effort Japan spent on ASW
(almost nill) to the 'what they could have done if they had cared'.....

But it doesnt end there.

In war, the people running the war look at results. After failure they 'usually'
attempt CHANGE, to be more effective. And that is where the above model will fail.

The Japanese, if you assume that they actually try to defend against US subs.....
Would realize that they were not effective, and thus try to be MORE effective.

Developing better weapons and tactics.

And no one, can predict what they would have done, and how effective they would have been.
Because they didnt do it.

To lock them into 1941 level effectiveness is just as unrealistic as it is to suggest
they are as effective as the UK in 1945.

All we can say is it is likely they would be MORE effective, than they were.

The Japanese did after all use air dropped magnetic mines in an ASW role.
They DID invent RADAR. They had great Seaplanes with great range and capacity.
They 'could' have done many things that they didnt do.
The designers must decide. That is their role.

But as a PLAYER, I can tell you I wont be happy with 1/2 my merchant marine sunk by
mid 43, with nothing I do able to mitigate.
All because the US player knows with 100% foresight how nasty his subs can be.
THAT is just as unrealistic.

[bradfordkay]

" All because the US player knows with 100% foresight how nasty his subs can be. "

Keep in mind that the game limits the effectiveness of US torpedoes to something approaching historical levels.

Using your theory of what they could have done if they cared, if the USN Ordnance Bureau had not had their heads in the wrong place maybe the US sub campaign could have been even more effective. Why is it okay to allow one side to improve their equipment over history but not the other?

[Lanconic]

ORIGINAL: bradfordkay

" All because the US player knows with 100% foresight how nasty his subs can be. "

Keep in mind that the game limits the effectiveness of US torpedoes to something approaching historical levels.

Using your theory of what they could have done if they cared, if the USN Ordnance Bureau had not had their heads in the wrong place maybe the US sub campaign could have been even more effective. Why is it okay to allow one side to improve their equipment over history but not the other?

Because the allied player doesnt need the edge?
First, CW and Dutch subs should NOT be using the bad torpedoes. If they are that is a design error.
Second NOTHING will change the mid-43 burial of Kido Butai at the hands of the
waves after wave of Essex class CV.

As a test case, I gave the Japanese:
All possible build regardless of reality.
Unlimited planes
And upgraded the Japanese flak to match the USA.

You know what happened? The Japanese fleet ended up at the bottom.
I sank ONE Essex class CV, Damaged a few, and lost more planes than I wanted.
Other than that, it set me back 3 months.

You enjoy facing hordes of Godlike USN Gato? Hey man thats great.
But NOT for me. YES, it IS a simulation, and it is ALSO, a game.
If it isnt fun, educational value is reduced to....'Why are we fighting these people?'

No offense.

[John Lansford]

The flaw(s) in the US torpedoes weren't understood at all and overlapped each other so badly it wasn't until late 1943 before they had them all figured out and fixed.  I see no reason to keep that hardwired into the game as long as the other Allied subs (and the S-class US subs) don't have that problem.  Same for the AI to not have cooperation between IJN and IJA units; they considered each other rivals for resources throughout the war and didn't start cooperating somewhat until late 1944.  There's a toggle on the game setup for "IJN Sub Historic Use" where their preference is to attack warships; why not put a toggle in there for "USN torpedoes fixed" and "IJN ASW upgraded" as well?  That way those of us who want to see an AI using historical limitations can do so, and those who want to see a "what if" campaign can do so too.

[Adnan Meshuggi]

Problem is,
 
if the japanese player takes ASW serious, the allied sub campagne will be less effective.

Now, if AE will "Improve" the US Subs to be superkillers for exactly this sitiuation (say the japanese side uses a lot dds, pc, pg, msw and the worthless army-bombers (well, they are useless cause the gameplay will cause this effect) then you will loose a lot players. Me too, even playing the allies.

Someone has to realize that japanese ASW (they had none untill latewar) will cause a lot more sunk/damaged allied subs, less sunk japanese ships.

Now, we have the "historical" players (as long as it is against "unfair" japanese hindsight) who cry about their fine toys. Well, yes. allied sub war is "useless" if the japanese side takes asw serious.

The convoy-system in 1942 alone should reduce the losses by 80%. USN-Subs were not well suited for convoy battles and they got their toys (radar and stuff) late war. the big fat subs are easy kills for trained asw crews.
 
So hindsight allways will reduce the effectivity of allied subs. Cause the secrert to fight them is well known for any competent japanese player.
But - the same is true for the other side.
The allies know that defending the ressources (so they get damaged) or bomb em is the key. So - what is with that?
 
If the game would handle the codebreaking, it wouldn´t work. Cause the japanese player KNOWS that the allies know about their doing. So he will try to trick the allied player...
 
 

[Lanconic]

ORIGINAL: Adnan Meshuggi

Problem is,

if the japanese player takes ASW serious, the allied sub campagne will be less effective.

Now, if AE will "Improve" the US Subs to be superkillers for exactly this sitiuation (say the japanese side uses a lot dds, pc, pg, msw and the worthless army-bombers (well, they are useless cause the gameplay will cause this effect) then you will loose a lot players. Me too, even playing the allies.

Someone has to realize that japanese ASW (they had none untill latewar) will cause a lot more sunk/damaged allied subs, less sunk japanese ships.

Now, we have the "historical" players (as long as it is against "unfair" japanese hindsight) who cry about their fine toys. Well, yes. allied sub war is "useless" if the japanese side takes asw serious.

The convoy-system in 1942 alone should reduce the losses by 80%. USN-Subs were not well suited for convoy battles and they got their toys (radar and stuff) late war. the big fat subs are easy kills for trained asw crews.

So hindsight allways will reduce the effectivity of allied subs. Cause the secrert to fight them is well known for any competent japanese player.
But - the same is true for the other side.
The allies know that defending the ressources (so they get damaged) or bomb em is the key. So - what is with that?

If the game would handle the codebreaking, it wouldn´t work. Cause the japanese player KNOWS that the allies know about their doing. So he will try to trick the allied player...

The hindsight that you umbrage, is hardly Japanese only.
As an allied player, I will do whatever I can to start sinking those tankers.
Because I know he doesnt have that many.
You cant remove that knowledge from a players head.
Just like.....the allied player is happy to attrit planes because he knows that ANY
Japanese replacement is going to be MUCH worse than what he loses.

In part, the best way to mitigate the hindsight issue is to make the USN torps
useless until late 43. At that point, lets face it, the Japanese have other problems
far worse than sinking merchants.

In fact if the game system allowed it, it would see CV raids on Oil production centers
simply to make sure the Japanese dont have Oil.
Regardless of what Nimitz might actually think about the diversion of precious CV.

What you could do...and this is soley to address the issue of hindsight.....
Is allow variable Oil storage in Japan at the start.

If we assume that for whatever reason Japan actually hard much larger stores than they had
The USN player could knock himself out, trying to cut a pipeline, that the Japanese dont actually have 'at the moment' or possibly dont actually NEED, at the moment.

Another example is the glaring screams from USN players for more F6F....they distain
less lofty F4F and variety. In reality, the USN could hardly have placed all its eggs
in an untried basket. It is with hindsight that we know how good the F6F was.

Hindsight is a problem for historical accuracy. You cannot escape it.

[LargeSlowTarget]

ORIGINAL: AdmSpruance

ok....I havent posted here in a long time even though this is my thread but every time I do post I get shouted down by largeslowtarget. As Japan, I normally use my air force to shut down Allied airfields and create havoc in general but since I have been insulted and challenged by lst I find that I must respond. He talks about "bad player choices" but the only "bad player choices" I see is how he sets up his ASW aircraft efforts. He just doesnt "get" how to set up his naval search and ASW AC to sink Allied subs so he is very vocal about denying its existence and shouts down castor troy and myself.

Just to prove a point I put a couple hundred IJA and IJN bombers on naval search and ASW to see what would happen:

OPERATIONAL REPORT FOR 03/23/42

Ki-48-I Lily reports periscope at 23, 34
Ki-21-II Sally sighting report: 1 Allied ship at 14,25 , Speed 11 , Moving West
Ki-15 Babs reports shadow in water at 24, 57
Ki-21-II Sally reports diving submarine at 50, 41
Ki-21-II Sally reports shadow in water at 50, 41
Ki-21-II Sally sighting report: 1 Allied ship at 16,25 , Speed 2 , Moving West
Ki-21-II Sally reports radio transmissions at 16, 25
Ki-49 Helen reports periscope at 50, 41
Ki-49 Helen reports periscope at 50, 41
Ki-49 Helen reports periscope at 16, 25
Ki-21-II Sally reports shadow in water at 16, 24
Ki-49 Helen reports shadow in water at 50, 41
Ki-49 Helen reports shadow in water at 50, 41
Ki-21-II Sally reports periscope at 50, 41
Ki-21-II Sally reports suspected submarine at 50, 41
Ki-21-II Sally reports diving submarine at 50, 41
Ki-21-II Sally reports shadow in water at 16, 24
Ki-21-II Sally reports radio transmissions at 16, 25
Ki-48-I Lily reports shadow in water at 50, 41
Ki-15 Babs reports shadow in water at 50, 41
Ki-15 Babs reports suspected submarine at 50, 41
Ki-51 Sonia reports suspected submarine at 50, 41
Ki-51 Sonia reports radio transmissions at 50, 41
G3M Nell reports shadow in water at 16, 24
G3M Nell reports diving submarine at 16, 25
H6K4 Mavis reports shadow in water at 23, 34
E13A1 Jake sighting report: 4 Allied ships at 21,3 , Speed 6 , Moving East
...
[snip]
...
Here is 4 ASW AC hits in one turn. Look at how many times each sub is spotted....sigh.....

Shouted down? If you cannot stand it that I am voicing an opinion which is contrary to yours, that's your problem.
Challenged? If you want to see this exchange as a contest - again, your problem.
Insulted?? Now wait - I did not use a single word that could be regarded as insulting - unless maybe you choose to read 'bad player choices' as 'choices made by a bad player' instead of what I intended to say - 'bad choices made by a player'.

Now look at your 4 ASW AC hits in one turn. You have put a couple hundred IJA and IJN bombers on naval search and ASW - so what did you expect? That all those planes find nothing and hit even less?
To get some sense out of your example, it would have been nice to describe the situation and to post the positions of all your subs that are withing enemy search range. The search results name the six same hexes time and again plus two solitary spottings. You do not have all subs and search planes concentrated in and around those eight hexes, do you? Why are there no sightings in the Pacific Ocean area or the SRA?
The positions of spotted subs are a bit odd - it seems that the Japanese dominate the Indian Ocean! 14,25; 16,24 and 16,25 are within three hexes of Ceylon - where are the Betties based which spotted those subs? The numerous sightings of the two subs (S-39 and Spearfish) at 18,3 are made by Vals, Jakes and Daves - which leads to the assumption that KB is operating a few hexes from Karachi! This is hardly a typical game situation, is it?
Furthermore, the second-most spotting reports are from 50,41 - which is the base of Wenchow. A sub in coastal waters and surrounded by numerous eenmy air bases - and you are wondering why it is spotted so often? And the spottings at 23,34 is a base hex as well (Port Blair). Putting subs in base hexes covered by enemy ASW efforts is what I call a 'bad choice'.

But well, since in your opinion you know all and I know nothing about ASW (you are probably right, I only started playing wargames 20 years ago), I get the feeling I am wasting my time here. Let's use the green button on each other and move on.

[tabpub]

Well, in my opinon, it's not the a/c that is overvalued, it's the late war PC's.

As to anything else...well, one is surprised about how much someone will beat their head agains the same wall so many times.......

[racndoc]

After a couple of days of bad weather across the SRA, the thunderstorms subside and 200 IJA and IJN bombers score another 4 hits on Allied subs:

OPERATIONAL REPORT FOR 03/26/42

Ki-48-I Lily reports shadow in water at 23, 34
Ki-21-II Sally reports periscope at 50, 41
Ki-21-II Sally reports shadow in water at 50, 41
Ki-49 Helen reports suspected submarine at 50, 41
Ki-49 Helen attacking Searaven at 50,41
Ki-21-II Sally reports suspected submarine at 14, 25
Ki-49 Helen attacking KXIII at 14,25
Ki-49 Helen reports shadow in water at 16, 24
Ki-49 Helen reports suspected submarine at 50, 41
Ki-49 Helen reports radio transmissions at 50, 41
Ki-21-II Sally reports shadow in water at 50, 41
Ki-21-II Sally attacking KXIII at 14,25
Ki-21-II Sally sighting report: 1 Allied ship at 16,25 , Speed 7 ,
Moving West
Ki-21-II Sally reports periscope at 16, 25
Ki-48-I Lily reports radio transmissions at 50, 41
Ki-48-I Lily reports periscope at 50, 41
Ki-48-I Lily attacking Searaven at 50,41
Ki-15 Babs reports shadow in water at 50, 41
Ki-51 Sonia reports suspected submarine at 50, 41
Ki-51 Sonia reports periscope at 50, 41
Ki-51 Sonia reports diving submarine at 50, 41
Ki-48-I Lily reports shadow in water at 23, 34
Ki-49 Helen reports shadow in water at 50, 41
G3M Nell reports suspected submarine at 14, 25
G3M Nell reports shadow in water at 16, 25
H6K4 Mavis reports shadow in water at 23, 34
E13A1 Jake reports shadow in water at 18, 3
G3M Nell reports periscope at 16, 25
G3M Nell attacking KXIII at 14,25
G3M Nell reports radio transmissions at 16, 25
G4M1 Betty reports periscope at 16, 25
G3M Nell attacking KXI at 16,25
G3M Nell reports suspected submarine at 16, 25
G4M1 Betty attacking KXIII at 14,25
G4M1 Betty attacking KXI at 16,25
G4M1 Betty attacking KXVII at 16,25
G4M1 Betty reports suspected submarine at 14, 25
D3A2 Val reports periscope at 50, 41
G4M1 Betty reports shadow in water at 14, 25
G4M1 Betty reports shadow in water at 16, 25
G4M1 Betty reports shadow in water at 16, 25
H8K Emily reports radio transmissions at 16, 25
H8K Emily reports suspected submarine at 16, 25
E7K2 Alf reports shadow in water at 50, 41
E7K2 Alf reports diving submarine at 50, 41
E7K2 Alf reports shadow in water at 50, 41
E7K2 Alf reports diving submarine at 50, 41
D3A2 Val reports suspected submarine at 18, 3
D3A2 Val reports periscope at 18, 3
D3A2 Val sighting report: 4 Allied ships at 21,3 , Speed 4 , Moving
East
D3A2 Val reports shadow in water at 18, 3
D3A2 Val reports shadow in water at 18, 3
E13A1 Jake reports suspected submarine at 18, 3
E8N Dave reports periscope at 14, 25
E13A1 Jake reports periscope at 18, 3
E13A1 Jake reports periscope at 14, 25
E13A1 Jake reports shadow in water at 14, 25
E13A1 Jake reports radio transmissions at 14, 25
E13A1 Jake reports periscope at 16, 24
E7K2 Alf reports radio transmissions at 16, 25
E14Y1 Glen sighting report: 1 Allied ship at 125,72 , Speed 14 , Moving
West
Ki-21-II Sally attacking Permit at 50,41
Ki-21-II Sally reports suspected submarine at 50, 41
PBY Catalina has spotted Asahisan Maru at 23,34
PBY Catalina has spotted Tama Maru at 23,34
Walrus sighting report: 10 Japanese ships at 16,3 , Speed 17 , Moving
West
Walrus sighting report: 10 Japanese ships at 16,3 , Speed 12 , Moving
West
LTJG Hanamoto O. of EI-1 Daitai is credited with kill number 2
FLT Baldwin B. of No.242 Squadron RAF is credited with kill number 2
PO2 Murakami P. of EII-1 Daitai is credited with kill number 2
PO2 Kojima F. of DII-1 Daitai is credited with kill number 3
PO2 Kojima F. of DII-1 Daitai is credited with kill number 4
FLT Boyd, J.L. of No.135 Squadron RAF is credited with kill number 10
WO Doikawa S. of DII-1 Daitai is credited with kill number 4
WO Doikawa S. of DII-1 Daitai is credited with kill number 5
PO2 Ibusuki L. of EIII-1 Daitai is credited with kill number 4
PO1 Inano V. of CII-1 Daitai is credited with kill number 3
PO1 Ogawa O. of DI-1 Daitai is credited with kill number 6
PO1 Kawakami N. of DI-1 Daitai is credited with kill number 4
FLT Hicks L. of No.258 Squadron RAF is credited with kill number 4
FLT Boyd, J.L. of No.135 Squadron RAF is credited with kill number 10
FLT Boyd, J.L. of No.135 Squadron RAF bails out WOUNDED and is RESCUED
H6K4 Mavis takes recon photos of Vizagapatam
Ki-46-II Dinah takes recon photos of Pamakasan
Ki-15 Babs takes recon photos of 23rd Chinese Corps
Ki-15 Babs takes recon photos of 23rd Chinese Corps
E7K2 Alf takes recon photos of 23rd Chinese Corps
Ki-48-I Lily attacking O19 at 23,34
Ki-21-II Sally reports shadow in water at 14, 25
Ki-21-II Sally reports shadow in water at 50, 41
Ki-21-II Sally reports suspected submarine at 50, 41
Ki-21-II Sally reports suspected submarine at 50, 41
Ki-21-II Sally reports shadow in water at 16, 25
Ki-21-II Sally reports periscope at 16, 25
Ki-49 Helen reports suspected submarine at 50, 41
Ki-49 Helen reports periscope at 50, 41
Ki-21-II Sally reports suspected submarine at 16, 25
Ki-21-II Sally reports shadow in water at 16, 25
Ki-49 Helen reports suspected submarine at 14, 25
Ki-49 Helen reports shadow in water at 16, 24
Ki-49 Helen reports shadow in water at 16, 25
Ki-21-II Sally reports shadow in water at 16, 24
Ki-21-II Sally reports shadow in water at 16, 25
Ki-21-II Sally reports periscope at 16, 25
Ki-49 Helen reports radio transmissions at 50, 41
Ki-49 Helen attacking Sargo at 50,41
Sargo is reported HIT
Ki-49 Helen attacking Searaven at 50,41
Searaven is reported HIT
Ki-21-II Sally reports shadow in water at 50, 41
Ki-21-II Sally reports suspected submarine at 50, 41
Ki-21-II Sally reports suspected submarine at 50, 41
Ki-21-II Sally reports suspected submarine at 14, 25
Ki-21-II Sally reports periscope at 16, 24
Ki-21-II Sally reports periscope at 16, 25
Ki-48-I Lily reports suspected submarine at 50, 41
Ki-48-I Lily attacking Searaven at 50,41
Searaven is reported HIT
Ki-15 Babs reports radio transmissions at 50, 41
Ki-51 Sonia reports shadow in water at 50, 41
Ki-48-I Lily attacking O19 at 23,34
O19 is reported HIT
Ki-49 Helen reports shadow in water at 50, 41
Ki-49 Helen reports shadow in water at 50, 41
G3M Nell reports shadow in water at 14, 25
G3M Nell reports shadow in water at 16, 25
G3M Nell reports suspected submarine at 16, 25
E13A1 Jake reports periscope at 18, 3
E13A1 Jake reports periscope at 18, 3
F1M2 Pete reports radio transmissions at 18, 3
G3M Nell reports radio transmissions at 16, 25
G3M Nell reports periscope at 16, 25
G3M Nell reports diving submarine at 16, 25
G4M1 Betty reports shadow in water at 16, 24
G4M1 Betty reports diving submarine at 16, 25
G3M Nell reports shadow in water at 14, 25
G3M Nell attacking KXVIII at 16,24
G4M1 Betty reports radio transmissions at 14, 25
G4M1 Betty reports diving submarine at 16, 25
G4M1 Betty reports radio transmissions at 16, 25
G4M1 Betty attacking KXIII at 14,25
G4M1 Betty reports radio transmissions at 16, 25
G4M1 Betty reports periscope at 16, 25
E7K2 Alf sighting report: 1 Allied ship at 81,83 , Speed 12 , Moving
West
D3A2 Val attacking Searaven at 50,41
G4M1 Betty reports radio transmissions at 14, 25
G4M1 Betty reports shadow in water at 16, 24
G4M1 Betty reports radio transmissions at 16, 25
G4M1 Betty reports suspected submarine at 16, 25
H8K Emily attacking KXIII at 14,25
H8K Emily reports shadow in water at 16, 25
D3A2 Val reports radio transmissions at 18, 3
D3A2 Val reports suspected submarine at 18, 3
D3A2 Val attacking Seadragon at 18,3
D3A2 Val reports periscope at 18, 3
D3A2 Val reports radio transmissions at 18, 3
D3A2 Val reports periscope at 18, 3
D3A2 Val reports shadow in water at 18, 3
D3A2 Val reports shadow in water at 18, 3
D3A2 Val reports shadow in water at 18, 3
E13A1 Jake reports shadow in water at 18, 3
E13A1 Jake reports shadow in water at 18, 3
E13A1 Jake reports shadow in water at 16, 24
E13A1 Jake reports suspected submarine at 16, 25
E8N Dave reports radio transmissions at 14, 25
E7K2 Alf reports suspected submarine at 16, 24
Ki-21-II Sally reports shadow in water at 50, 41
Ki-21-II Sally reports suspected submarine at 50, 41
PBY Catalina sighting report: 1 Japanese ship at 23,34 , Speed 4 ,
Moving Northeast
SBD-3 Dauntless sighting report: 1 Japanese ship at 125,70 , Speed 9 ,
Moving West
SBD-3 Dauntless attacking I-26 at 125,70
Ki-46-II Dinah takes recon photos of Pamakasan
Ki-15 Babs takes recon photos of 23rd Chinese Corps
Ki-15 Babs takes recon photos of 23rd Chinese Corps
Ki-15 Babs takes recon photos of 78th Chinese Corps
Rockhampton expands airfield to size 4
Rockhampton expands port to size 4


SS Sargo is hit once by AP bombs and sinks immediately. SS Searaven is hit twice and will probably sink tomorrow.

[Kull]

Some interesting observations culled from "Eagle against the Sun:

1) As recently as the Spring of '41, the US was still categorically opposed to "unrestricted submarine warfare". The provisions of the 1930 London Disarmament Conference (of which both the US and Japan were signatories) made it almost impossible to sink merchant ships without putting those crews at risk. As 1941 advanced, top level strategic plans began to incorporate the unrestricted warfare concept, but on the very eve of Pearl Harbor, the operating instructions still told commanders that submarines "may not sink, or render incapable of navigation, a merchant vessel without having first placed passengers, crew, and ship's papers in a place of safety. For this purpose the ship's boats are not regarded as a place of safety unless the safety of the passengers and crew is assured in the existing sea and weather conditions". Given this stringent requirement, it's little surprise that both nations trained their submarines to attack enemy warships instead.

2) During war games, the artificial nature of the exercises made it much easier to detect submarines, and thus the US Navy believed submarines were much more detectable than proved to be the case in war. In the calm seas of the training zones, subs were easily spotted at periscope depth, and thus doctrine often called for submarines to launch attacks at greater depth (100'), using the much "safer" strategy of "sounding" their targets with sonar instead.

3) Another result of these exercises was that serious, career-impacting reprimands went out to the commanders of submarines who were "sunk" (or even spotted) during war games. Thus in late 1941, the vast majority of US sub commanders were a very cautious group indeed. With the result that 30% of all sub skippers were removed from duty as "unfit" during 1942.

4) Much has been made of the failures of the Mark-14 torpedo, and it WAS a nightmare. Not only were there at least three separate problems (faulty depth control mechanism, faulty magnetic exploders, and faulty contact exploders), but these issues were unrecognized at the start of the war. The Mark-14 was a "marvel of sophisticated engineering", with the result that they cost $10,000 each. Which also meant they were too expensive to actually test with live warheads in peacetime! The issue was compounded because problem reports (and proofs) were funneled into the same organization that had designed and built the Mark-14 (the Bureau of Ordnance), and they simply refused to believe them.

5) A key factor in late-war US submarine success was the reliance on intelligence arising from the compromised Japanese Merchant Shipping codes. This had a twin impact, because not only did it allow US subs to "know" the location of their targets (as opposed to randomly sailing and searching), but over time the US sub skippers came to recognize the Japanese merchant shipping patterns, and could rely on that knowledge even when intel intercepts weren't immediately useful. The US did not have this advantage in the early stages of the war.

6) And finally, as the war wound down, the US subs had access to harbors that were closer and closer to the Japanese Home Islands, and this greatly reduced the transit times in and out of the target areas (which by definition had also gotten smaller and smaller). Unlike effective intel, the US DID have this advantage in the opening months of the war, but all the problems noted above kept it from being a factor. As any WitP player well knows, the US had "the greatest concentration of submarines in the world" at Manila, yet they did nothing to impede the invasion of Luzon.

All this is worth noting, because it certainly implies that it would be IMPOSSIBLE for US submarines to just "turn it on" from day one of the war. WitP Allied commanders will always operate with the benefit of 20-20 hindsight, but that doesn't mean their "tools" should be instantly effective. I would add the same caveat to Japanese ASW. However, those who feel it was completely ineffective must be unaware that 22% of US submariners who made at least one war patrol, were KIA. By far the highest casualty rate for any branch of service.

[John Lansford]

My campaign vs the AI is now in early 1944, and I've noticed that every time the Japanese ASW forces find one of my subs, they get hits on them with their depth charges.  Not only do they get hits every time they find a sub, they hit my subs with EVERY DEPTH CHARGE.
 
Now, to be fair, the same thing has happened when MY anti-sub forces find one of their's, but since I have so many more subs on patrol than the AI does (it's lost over 80 subs so far), the attacks against my subs are coming more often.  I've lost three subs and had two others badly damaged in the first three months of 1944 from these automatic hits; has anyone else seen this happen?  I'm using the latest update patch, too.

[akdreemer]

ORIGINAL: mdiehl

It has been pointed out that any competent Japanese player is going to use his aircraft extensively for asw patrol and will form convoys that are well protected by escorts.

So long as their ASW exp is set to the correct historical low values, say, 2-3%, and as long as wear and tear on engines and fuel consumption are set to the correct historical values, everything should be OK. I have no problem with the Japanese player trying to gin up a capability that the Japanese never had so long as the costs generally greatly outweigh the added success.

This is the main problem I have seen. Historically only the Japanese Naval airforce was trained for over water searches/attacks. The Japanese Army airforce was tied almost exclusively to close support of the Japanese Army. Thus all those Helen's, Lilly's, and such should have really low naval/asw search capability, at least early war. Indeed I would argue that they should not even have that capability as the air crews were not even trained for naval search, and the Army doctrine would not encourage it.

[TheElf]

ORIGINAL: AlaskanWarrior

ORIGINAL: mdiehl

It has been pointed out that any competent Japanese player is going to use his aircraft extensively for asw patrol and will form convoys that are well protected by escorts.

So long as their ASW exp is set to the correct historical low values, say, 2-3%, and as long as wear and tear on engines and fuel consumption are set to the correct historical values, everything should be OK. I have no problem with the Japanese player trying to gin up a capability that the Japanese never had so long as the costs generally greatly outweigh the added success.

This is the main problem I have seen. Historically only the Japanese Naval airforce was trained for over water searches/attacks. The Japanese Army airforce was tied almost exclusively to close support of the Japanese Army. Thus all those Helen's, Lilly's, and such should have really low naval/asw search capability, at least early war. Indeed I would argue that they should not even have that capability as the air crews were not even trained for naval search, and the Army doctrine would not encourage it.

This is all true. But...this is a game. Players will do what players do. You can't fault the system.

[rockmedic109]

And it is outside the scope of AE to create the IJA/IJN war.

[Shark7]

While I am currently playing against the AI, I can tell you this.  As of April 1942, I have sunk 11 Allied subs.  And even doing all the stuff that I know I should do you know where the vast majority were sunk at?
 
Tied to a pier.
 
As far as it goes, I have sunk 8 at their moorings (Kido Butai and Ni Butai seem to be very good at it early in the war), 2 via Depth Charges (both from the same APD), and 1 from a LBA attack.
 
I probably have 300-400 A/C on ASW or Naval Search spread over a large area, SRA, South China Sea, Phillipine Sea and Sea of Japan.  I'm getting around 12-20 contacts per turn, and maybe 1 attack with an extremely rare hit (as I've pointed out, exactly 1 hit in 5 months of game days).
 
My opinion is that we are finding too many and not making enough attacks.  If there were any reduction it should be in the spotting portion, but every spotted sub should be attacked, even if unsuccessfull. That would be a good compromise.  Subs tended to surface at night to charge their batteries when they were harder to spot...if they were on the surface during the daylight hours it was either a poor choice by the commander, or the sub was transiting friendly 'safe' waters, or the sub was having some difficulty or rescuing a downed pilot.
 
I happen to agree with LST on this part of it, my crews who were ordered to hunt and destroy subs should be intelligent enough to actually attempt to sink one when they find it.  It sure doesn't appear that way in its current form.  Just an appearance but it does give the impression that the attacks are not taking place.
 
A few other points:

• Large Subs in shallow water should be easier to detect, only smaller 'coastal' subs that are designed for that type of warfare should do well in a coastal hex.
• Choke points are just that.  Transiting these areas entail risks.
• Crew and commander experience should also play a part in wether a sub gets detected or not, both the hunter and the hunted's stats should play a part.

Just my humble opinion on the matter.

[Splinterhead]

In my opinion, the Japanese should have to pay PP to assign non patrol or non CV based aircraft to ASW in the early years of the war to reflect the cultural restrictions faced by the Japanese commanders.

The Japanese failed to carry out effective ASW not because they were too stupid to know their ships were being sunk but because of the way their society was structured, much as the American torpedo problems were not as much technological as bureaucratic.

I don't see that happening though, if only because it would be too late/too difficult to code.

[esteban]

ORIGINAL: Splinterhead

In my opinion, the Japanese should have to pay PP to assign non patrol or non CV based aircraft to ASW in the early years of the war to reflect the cultural restrictions faced by the Japanese commanders.

The Japanese failed to carry out effective ASW not because they were too stupid to know their ships were being sunk but because of the way their society was structured, much as the American torpedo problems were not as much technological as bureaucratic.

I don't see that happening though, if only because it would be too late/too difficult to code.

I'd agree to this, as long as the Allied player would have to pay PP to assign PB4Y Liberators to base bombing missions, and PP to set his Army Air Force bombers to naval search/ASW.

The war in WitP is not going to go exactly like it did in the real thing. For example, in the real war the Prince of Wales and Repulse would never leave the troops in Malaya "on the beach" by bugging out of Malayan waters--at least not without a demonstrated mortal threat to these ships. In game, the first thing the Allied player does is pull these ships out of Singapore and back to Java or Ceylon.

[Splinterhead]

You're right about the P4BYs perhaps but USAAF bombers did fly search and ASW historically and the Force Z raid was due to the decision of Churchill. He could have decided otherwise with no repercusions. By contrast, Yamamoto knew that Nagumo was the wrong man to command KB after Pearl Harbor but could not remove him easily.

The Japanese interpretation of honor crippled them to some extent.

But, as I said, even if everybody agreed that my idea was the best idea ever, it's to late to do anything about it, but the numbers of Japanese aircraft used on ASW by players (including me) is somewhat gamey.

[Kull]

ORIGINAL: Splinterhead

You're right about the P4BYs perhaps but USAAF bombers did fly search and ASW historically and the Force Z raid was due to the decision of Churchill. He could have decided otherwise with no repercusions. By contrast, Yamamoto knew that Nagumo was the wrong man to command KB after Pearl Harbor but could not remove him easily.

The Japanese interpretation of honor crippled them to some extent.

But, as I said, even if everybody agreed that my idea was the best idea ever, it's to late to do anything about it, but the numbers of Japanese aircraft used on ASW by players (including me) is somewhat gamey.

We'll have to see how things actually "play out" with AE, but two things that have been revealed could ameliorate the lethality (such as it is) of Japanese ASW aircraft:

1) Aircraft Damage: Elf and others have indicated that the days of 100% aircraft readiness are over. So by definition, that means there will be fewer planes available to fly each mission. Maybe not a huge factor, but definitely a factor.

2) Different kinds of Experience: This could be huge. With current WitP, my veteran Chinese-ground-war-experienced IJA Marys are born sub killers. In AE, my guess is that their experience in that type of warfare will be "zero". Assuming that holds true with every IJA air unit, the Japanese player is going to face a long struggle in training these units up to an effective experience level (which I find to be 80+). The only question is, how long will it take to build experience up from zero, and what actually drives the increase in experience? Is it missions flown or related to subs spotted and/or attacked?

[mdiehl]

In my opinion, the Japanese should have to pay PP to assign non patrol or non CV based aircraft to ASW in the early years of the war to reflect the cultural restrictions faced by the Japanese commanders.

That doesn't jib with my recall. Japanese CVs a.c. were largely strike oriented. They did not, as I recall, regularly conduct ASW patrols. They didn't even conduct regular naval search when going into combat. ASW was the job of escorting ships and search was the job of the hybrid CAs. Japanese ground based aviation conducted more extensive ASW patrols, but generally only with a limited number of a.c. types. In all cases, one would have to rate Japanese ASW pilots as decent enough at spotting but not particularly well equipped with munitions or ability to stay on location.