An incredible fact!

[miral]

Apropo of Germany's army in WWII in general and an astonishing fact. In Robert Citino's excellent book, The Defeat of the Wehrmacht, the German Campaigns of 1942 he points out that VERY FEW OF THE GERMAN GERMAN GENERALS OF WWII HAD EVER READ CLAUSWITZ!!!! When Basil Hart interviewed a number of them after the war he was told that they considered Clauswitz, 'old stuff, fit only for professors and such'. Astonishing! Rather like a writer saying, 'Shakespeare? Old stuff, fit only for professors and such.'

Citino's book is a very good explanation of the terrible weakenesses the Germans have always had in strategy and logicstis; they considered the Operational Level to be the sum of warfare. I believe that many of Citino's ideas could usefully be incorporated into WWII wargames.

[golden delicious]

To be honest, you could summarise what Clausewitz has to say usefully about 20th century operational warfare in about five minutes. The remaining 95% of the book is basically just a dry academic text- or else totally outdated by 1942.

I imagine the important bits were covered in the training manuals the Wehrmacht used. There's no real need to go through the whole damned book, even if it is less like swimming through treacle in the original German.

[miral]

Sorry, but I disagree entirely, as do Michael Howard and Paret, the translators of the best edition and a host of important contemporary military historians. In fact, Clauswitz says on the first page of his book the reason why the Germans lost WWII. Haven't time right now but later tonight I will put in a couple of quotes.

And dry, academic writing? Wait a bit and I will show you a Clauswitz quote or two that is brilliantly lyrical, as well as insightful. Clauswitz is the Einstein of military writers and as relevant today as he was he was when he wrote On War.

[miral]

Sorry for the delay. Let me say first that much of the problem people have with reading Clausewitz is that there are a lot very bad translations out there. That which I believe is considered the best by most professional historians is the 1976 edition of On War published by Princeton U. Press and translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret. Please that the translators are both very prominent historians; Howard wrote what I think is still considered the defineative history of the Franco-Prussian War and Paret is an expert on WWII armored warfare, particularly of the Germans. Ther is also a commentary by the military historian Bernard Brodie, the Continuing Relevance of On War.

I must confess that the quote I promised about the reason the Germans lost WWII is not on the first page of the text and am abashed that I cannot find its exact place in the text. But I did locate it in H.P. Willmott's book, The War with Japan: The Period of Balance May 1942-October 1943. He says: "No observation better defines what is usually the root casue of failure in war than Car von Clausewitz's, 'the first, the grandest, and most decisive act of judgment which the Stateman and General exercises is rightly to understand the nature of the War in which he engages, not to take it for something, or wish ot make of it something which it is not...and it is impossible for it to be.'" This describes Germany just as well as Japan in WWII. Germany tried to make of WWII a series of limited wars, even the invasion of the Soviet Union, rather than recognizing it as the total war it was.

Now, if prominent military historians are still quoting Clausewitz almost 200 years after his death I think this says something about his continuing relevance, especially since many of these historians are experts on WWII.

Of course, parts of Clausewitz are indeed dated. As Brodie points out in his essay, the long sections on how to march and billet Napoleonic era armies, for example, can be passed over much more rapidly than those sections that deal with the more enduring aspects of warfare. In particular, Clausewitz's insights on the great battle and on the psychological aspects of war are as valid as ever, because human psychology has changed little if at all and because warfare has not changed as much as is generally assumed from Napoleon's time to ours. The technology has changed greatly, of course, but not the many particulars of battle and strategy that Clausewitz writes about. I particularly like Book I, Part 17, 'The Superiority of Defense over Attack' and Book IV, Chapter 11, 'The Battle - Continued: The Use of the Battle."

Finally - know I've bored you to death but military buffs are, well, kinds of addicts - I would like to quote from the last mentioned section to show that Clausewitz's style is not dry or turgid.

"The major battle is therefore to be regarded as concentrated war, as the center of gravity of the entire conflict or campaign. Just as the focal point of a conclave mirror causes the sun's rays to converge into a perfect image and heats them to maximum intensity, so all forces and circumstances of war are united and compressed to maximun effectiveness in the major battle."

And on the next page, p.259.
"Battle is the bloodiest solution. While it should not simply be considered as mutual murder - its effect, as we shall see in the next chapter, is rather a killing of the enemy's spirit than of his men - it is always true that the character of battle, like its name, is slaughter (Schlacht), and its price is blood."

And last, on p.260.
"We are not interested in generals who win victories without bloodshed. The fact that slaughter is a horrifying spectable must make us take war more seriously, but not provide an excuse for gradually blunting our swords in the name of humanity. sooner or later someone will come along with a sharp sword and hack off our arms."

Now prose style is a matter of taste, but I don't find passages like this dry, turgid or stultifyingly academic.

Clausewitz remains the most important, and interesting, of all writers on warfare. He is well worth reading by anyone, and should be required reading, if he is not, at all our military academies. The Germans might have done a great deal better in WWII if they had bothered to read him, say, Book 7, Chapter 22, the Culminating Point of Victory, which says it as important to know when to stop (as in Before attacking Moscow late in the year) as when to continue an invasion.

Wonderful stuff, gives the same surge in the mind as Shakespeare.

[Anthropoid]

Wonder how applicable Von C is for "Fourth Generation Warfare?"

"The Sling and the Stone: On War in the 21st Century" (Paperback) by USMC, Colonel Thomas X. Hammes

[golden delicious]

ORIGINAL: miral

In fact, Clauswitz says on the first page of his book the reason why the Germans lost WWII.

I think you misunderstand me. I'm not dismissing Clausewitz- he is very important. But On War has very little to do with the prosecution of operational warfare in the early 1940s.

Anyway, wasn't it Rommel who said "Never mind what Clausewitz thought- what do you think?"

[golden delicious]

ORIGINAL: miral

Germany tried to make of WWII a series of limited wars, even the invasion of the Soviet Union, rather than recognizing it as the total war it was.

Yes. But this is a reason for Hitler to read Clausewitz- not mid-level German officers.

I'm being called away here. More later.

[noxious]

Miral, I'm sorry but everything you point out about Clausewitz and On War, especially your selection of quotes, can be said of Sun Tzu and the Art Of War...

That makes the Art of War the definite book on WW2 I guess (which it's not, even if you're restricting yourself to the emotions and philosophical ideas of warfare : its meaning and consequences, and not its actual conduct)

Btw, you are doing what you reproach of German and Japanese leaders and general staff with your wishing of the stature of a book or its importance in the face of reality, hehe
More reading, less fanboyism in all seriousness
Cheers !!

[golden delicious]

ORIGINAL: noxious

Miral, I'm sorry but everything you point out about Clausewitz and On War, can be said of Sun Tzu and the Art Of War...

This more or less illustrates my point. Both of these works were revolutionary for their times, both are very abstract and not really manuals for mid-level officers to study, and both have been incorporated into more recent works. So much study has come since Sun Tzu that it's largely a waste of time to try to learn anything about warfare from his works, but it's interesting from a historical perspective. This is not yet the case with Clausewitz.

[golden delicious]

ORIGINAL: miral

This describes Germany just as well as Japan in WWII. Germany tried to make of WWII a series of limited wars, even the invasion of the Soviet Union, rather than recognizing it as the total war it was.

You might chastise Hitler for not reading Clausewitz- but these kinds of decisions weren't made by the officers you refer to in your first post.

Now, if prominent military historians are still quoting Clausewitz almost 200 years after his death I think this says something about his continuing relevance, especially since many of these historians are experts on WWII.

I think it says something about the abundance of quotable phrases in the book. There are plenty of quotable writers who aren't significant. Of course Clausewitz is both.

The Germans might have done a great deal better in WWII if they had bothered to read him, say, Book 7, Chapter 22, the Culminating Point of Victory, which says it as important to know when to stop (as in Before attacking Moscow late in the year) as when to continue an invasion.

Yet this is the reverse of the point you refer to at the start of your post. Warfare isn't as easy as just following rules set down by a few writers. In fact that's a point that Clausewitz made himself, and was probably one of his most important remarks at the time.

[miral]

I believe we are talking somewhat at cross purposes. If you read my original post I was pointing out that German GENERALS had not read Clausewitz. I said nothing about mid-level officers, although I think that they too would have benefited from reading him.

Must go now. A bit more later. A appreciate everyone's counter arguments, just don't agree. And Clausewitz is not quoted just because he is quotable, which runs counter to your argument about his turgid, treacle like style. But thanks to all for good arguments.

[miral]

Wanted to reply in a bit more detail to some of the responses. First, Noxious, if you think Sun Tzu did Clausewitz before Clausewitz then I suggest you have not read C. recently. No two military thinkers are more uttrely different. Sun Tzu taught that the Art of War was in winning without having to fight large bloody battles. This is an idea that was anathema to C., who attacks it literally dozens of times all through his book (see the quote above on having no use for bloodless generals). As far as being a fanboy of C., well...if by this you mean that I think he is an incredibly important writer who has been relevant since her wrote his book, then I am indeed a fan. If yuo mean that I think C. was the final word on War, never wrong, and everything he wrote to be accepted uncritically, then I am not a 'fanboy'. In addition to the dated areas of his work, an example of which I mentioned above, there are theorical areas in which I think he was wrong.

For instance, in the chapters in which he writes about the uses of victory he states that a victory is always to be followed by a vigorous pursuit. I think he was wrong. There is certainly a school of thought that says that, once you have won a hard fought battle on a bloody field, best leave well enough alone. There are many examples of generals who have won such, attempted a hard pursuit and gotten their noses bloodied right well by desperate rear guard actions by the retreating army, thus losing some of the lustre of their victory. Clausewitz is certainly not perfect, nor the final word.

golden delicious, you are obviously well read in Clausewitz, as your replies show, particularly the one where you comment that C. constantly warned against setting up iron clad 'rules' of war. Indeed. I think where you and I differ is in the degree to which we think war has changed from Napoleon to WWII and the degree to which Hitler is to held responsible for all, or most of the German debacle of the invasion of Russia.

I just don't think that the fundamentals of war have changed greatly from Bonaparte to WWII, that the contemplative guidelines (and this is all C. offers, not 'rules') of C. are, in many cases dealing particularly with Grand Strategy and with the Major Battle were just as relevant in 1941 as in 1805, or 1809, or 1813. And C. was, after all, both a theoretician and a veteran combat officer, who fought through some horrrendous battles. This change or not change in the nature of war can be discussed but I am not sure it can really be resolved.

Second, Hitler, the German generals and the Russian War. Because Hitler died and many of the important generals lived, and because of the cold war, antagonism to Russia, and the refusal of the Communists to release their war documents, it was easy for the German generals to shove all the blame off on Hitler. Here I would like to mention a series of books almost completed. I am sure many and maybe everyone on this forum knows of them but they are most relevant. The Institute for Military History in Potsdam has released about 10 vols. called German and the Second World War. They are written by groups of the most prominent German military historians of the War. Vol 4 is The Attack on the Soviet Union. I believe that they lay to rest forever the idea that Hitler is primarily to blame for the failure of the 1941 campaign and show clearly that the impetus for the late attack on Moscow came, not from him, but from a number of his generals, particulars von Bock, the C-C of Army Group Center and, particularly from Franz Halder, the Chief of Staff of OKH. It was these officers who proceeded far past the proper Culmination Point, in spite of almost unified cries of 'stop' from army and corps commanders actually at the front. It is people like these who should have read C. And Clausewitz laid down no hard rule of when to stop; in fact he said it was a damned difficult thing to gauge accurately.

As far as Grand Strategy goes it is true that Hitler had the final say on the invasion of Russia. It is not true, as many German generals claimed after the War, that they objected or warned him against it. The Germans were suffering, as the Japanese were to later, from 'victory disease', caused primarily by the rapid demoliton of France. And from racism about the 'subhuman' slavs. As the Potsdam historians clearly show the Generals expected, just like Hitler, to beat the Soviets in a matter of weeks, or a very few months, with little difficulty. The pre-invasion estimate the Wehrmacht made was that the Russian campaign would take about as much ammunition and other munitions as did the French campaign!!! (Germany and the Second World War is particulary good on very detailed investigations of logistics and industrial production). Thus the high level German Generals, just like Hilter, would have benefited by a study of Clausewitz. Had they done so they would have been much less sanguine about the attack on the Soviet Union and might have tried to develope an overall Grand Strategy rather than a series of brilliant operational victories that led to ultimate defeat.

Sorry to go on for so long, but I live in a very sparsely populated rural place where I doubt there are three people, if that many, in the entire county, who know who Clausewitz is. Many of your replies are nutrious food for thought and, I admit, I did give the impression in my first post, of thinking C. the be all and end all of War Thinkers. I still maintain that he is, indeed, the Einstein of such; no one has equaled him. But has Einstein also not been proven wrong in a number of ways, without denting his overall dominance of his field? Thanks all.

[Anthropoid]

Nice essay Miral. Very convincing. Not being a miltary historian I cannot really disagree on a factual basis, but it is convincing stuff.
 
Curious though. Did you see my question above? What would you say is von C's releancy to modern 4GW warfare?

[Randomizer]

Hi Miral, I do not own this latest iteration of TAOW but TAOW CoW still sees frequent use at home.  Just wandered by and saw your posts, you raise some interesting debating points, please bear with a few unsolicited observations if I may.

It comes as no surprise to me that the Nazi hierarchy thought Clausewitz irrelevant, indeed I would have been shocked to learn otherwise.  The Kaiser's Great General Staff had been deeply inculcated into Clausewitzian military theory (as well as Jomani and Moltke the Elder) and the 1914 campaign was fully in accordance with Clausewitz's views 'On War' (even if the execution was a bit Frederick the Great).  By 1918, the German High Command was thoroughly traumatized by the Great War and whether serving Wiemar or Hitler, they took what worked and disgarded what did not.  Clausewitz manifestly did not work in the 20th Century.

Anthropoid poses a good question and while I'm not a fan of the G4W concept, thinking it rather more a PowerPoint gimmick for a shallow political audience than a cohesive military theory, he is correct in pointing out that Clausewitz is virtually silent on the problems of (for lack of a better buzzword) assymetrical warfare.  This is not hindsight, Clausewitz had a working model in Napoleon's 'Spanish Ulcer' and yet essentially ignores the political and civil ramifications of that campaign.  In the end, these proved to be the first nails in Napoleon's coffin.  That he omitted them indicates that he misread the military-political-civil dynamics that exsited even in his day.  One should not be too hard on him however, when he did most of his writing the modern nation state as we know it was still in the vestigial stages of development.

By focusing on battle as an end rather than a means, Clausewitz underplays the importance of civilian morale and the nation's will to fight.  Once again, he had some indicators available, it was the collapse of the will of the French people that caused Napoleon to flee after Waterloo.  That battle was a major tactical defeat but Napoleon had been beaten before and still had significant forces in the field in June 1815.  Waterloo was so decisive because it broke France's will to continue under a Bonaparte.  Von C is also virtually silent on expeditionary warfare which is a bit strange since his combat laboratory was coalition warfare with a non-continental linchpin - Britain.

Theories do not win wars or even battles, indeed one of the characteristics of the old Soviet Army was its deep and consistant theoretical base drummed into the highest command levels.  However, whenever they tried to superimpose theoretical solutions onto battlefield realities, they inevitably came to grief.  In the successful Red Army of 1945 pragmatism, experiance and a top-down cohesive doctrine had replaced theory but post war would see the theoretical (including some of von C) once again become dogma.

Nobody, not Sun Tzu, Moltke (Senior), Fuller, the Dupey Brothers, Frunze, Liddell-Hart or even Clausewitz has produced a magic bullet to win wars.
Just $0.02.  Cheers, keep reading and keep writing.

[golden delicious]

ORIGINAL: miral

I believe we are talking somewhat at cross purposes. If you read my original post I was pointing out that German GENERALS had not read Clausewitz. I said nothing about mid-level officers, although I think that they too would have benefited from reading him.

Perhaps "mid-level" was the wrong term. All the points you have made are about German strategy at the highest levels- essentially, the domain of Hitler and maybe one or two of his most favoured Generals. Certainly not divisional or corps officers.

[golden delicious]

ORIGINAL: miral

It was these officers who proceeded far past the proper Culmination Point, in spite of almost unified cries of 'stop' from army and corps commanders actually at the front.

It'd be your corps and army commanders who had never read Clausewitz. They made up a large body of Generals.

It is people like these who should have read C. And Clausewitz laid down no hard rule of when to stop; in fact he said it was a damned difficult thing to gauge accurately.

Precisely. Weren't the Germans just continuing vigorous pursuit after their victory...? Which rule to follow is only clear in hindsight.

As far as Grand Strategy goes it is true that Hitler had the final say on the invasion of Russia. It is not true, as many German generals claimed after the War, that they objected or warned him against it.

One can hardly blame them. From their point of view, they had just beaten one of the finest armies in the world in six weeks, and now had to take on an army which has just struggled to overcome Finland. No impartial observer expected Russia to last out the first campaign, and had the Germans treated the occupied territories less callously, perhaps they would have been right.

Sorry to go on for so long, but I live in a very sparsely populated rural place where I doubt there are three people, if that many, in the entire county, who know who Clausewitz is.

Not at all- it's a good discussion. My post would have been longer but this forum likes to time me out while I'm typing responses.

[golden delicious]

ORIGINAL: Randomizer

Clausewitz manifestly did not work in the 20th Century.

Mmm. One could argue that the First World War was won by the side which was capable of more fully mobilising its population for warfare. That's pretty much straight out of Clausewitz.

This is not hindsight, Clausewitz had a working model in Napoleon's 'Spanish Ulcer' and yet essentially ignores the political and civil ramifications of that campaign. In the end, these proved to be the first nails in Napoleon's coffin.

Again- few are the cases where unconventional forces have defeated a regular army singlehandedly. All have had the backing of a modern state or states and nearly all have only been able to achieve ultimate victory by the deployment of large scale ground forces.

Naturally, guerrilla or similar forces have their moments- but they're only an attractive option to states if conventional military solutions are out of the question.

By focusing on battle as an end rather than a means, Clausewitz underplays the importance of civilian morale and the nation's will to fight.

Dunno about that. As I recall, national morale is one of his three pillars on which he hangs victory and defeat. The other two being the physical expanse of the country and the armed forces.

[Randomizer]

Golden Delicious wrote:

Mmm. One could argue that the First World War was won by the side which was capable of more fully mobilising its population for warfare. That's pretty much straight out of Clausewitz.

Victory or defeat in WW1 is far too complex to be addressed in a couple of aphorisms. In the event however, defeat was the lot of Clausewitz' heirs who's grand strategic goals were entirely in keeping with 'On War'. However those whom had little direct knowledge of his work forced Germany to armistice implementing their strategy in a manner that had much to do with economics and little to do with military theory. Theories do not win wars.

Golden Delicious wrote:

Again- few are the cases where unconventional forces have defeated a regular army singlehandedly. All have had the backing of a modern state or states and nearly all have only been able to achieve ultimate victory by the deployment of large scale ground forces.

Naturally, guerrilla or similar forces have their moments- but they're only an attractive option to states if conventional military solutions are out of the question

And in Spain the Guerillas had both military and financial support of a Power (England) and a government in exile that held enough loyalty in the countryside to negatively impact the occupiers. There was many lesson in the Peninsula for Clausewitz to cull, my reading is that he essentially missed them all.

Golden Delicious wrote:

Dunno about that. As I recall, national morale is one of his three pillars on which he hangs victory and defeat. The other two being the physical expanse of the country and the armed forces.

Sorry, I need to digress a bit here. At the time when Clausewitz wrote there were, for all intents and purposes, only two real nation states as we think of them today, the United States and France. The US was still an experiment that was finding its way and would not solidify itself until after its Civil War. It's unlikely it even appeared on Clausewitz' radar. As for France, having gotten a taste of Republicanism and deciding that she liked it, she was once again a monarchy but any ruler of France knew that revolution lay just below the surface.

I would submit then that Clausewitz' definition of National Will (NW) is somewhat different than what we think of it today. The words might be similar but in the context of the day, the meanings are completely different. I believe that he meant NW to mean the support of the moneyed classes (including the small-holders and under represented but growing middle-class) and aristocracy and not the popular will as we think of it today. At that time On War was published the civil disorders of 1848 and the industrial revolution had not yet taken place so in Clausewitzian terms, the mass of the people (the peasants by another name) were irrelevant. This worldview implies that a conflict which supports the aims of the ruling elite and their supporters must be good for masses as a whole. The 20th Century provided a lot of evidence to the contrary.

Indeed Clausewitz writes that if Prussia's armies had reached Paris in 1794, the French Revolution would have been brought to an end. This is evidence that he really had no understanding of the social dynamism of revolution and the masses' potential to quit or prolong a war. In 1870 the Prussians did reach Paris and the Revolution, in the form of the Commune and against Clauswitzian precepts, continued prosecuting the war. Although some consider Clausewitz' take on NW to be prescient, I am more inclined to believe that that interpretation is more of a shallow coincidence.

Clausewitz has become a collection of blinding glimpses of the obvious and quaint but supercilious quotes used by Talking Heads to lend themselves an air of credibility. There may very well still be concepts and maxims therein that can be applied in some circumstances but it hardly makes the work relevant to the Nazi experience in WW2 which was the OP's contention.

Edited slightly for content

[Anthropoid]

The other thing I'd like to know is: what sense would Clausewitz have made of the protracted Franco-American-Indochina War and its ultimate outcome?

[golden delicious]

ORIGINAL: Randomizer

Victory or defeat in WW1 is far too complex to be addressed in a couple of aphorisms. In the event however, defeat was the lot of Clausewitz' heirs who's grand strategic goals were entirely in keeping with 'On War'. However those whom had little direct knowledge of his work forced Germany to armistice implementing their strategy in a manner that had much to do with economics and little to do with military theory.

Knowingly or not, the Britain and France took war to its natural conclusion. This is Clausewitzian.

Sorry, I need to digress a bit here. At the time when Clausewitz wrote there were, for all intents and purposes, only two real nation states as we think of them today, the United States and France.

I find it hard to accept the notion that Britain was not a nation state as of 1830. In fact, Britain in the 19th century is virtually the definition of a nation state.

At that time On War was published the civil disorders of 1848 and the industrial revolution had not yet taken place so in Clausewitzian terms, the mass of the people (the peasants by another name) were irrelevant.

I don't think so. Clausewitz was very interested in the way that first Napoleon, and then the other states of Europe, mobilised these people in order to win the war. I'd say it's his consideration of this element as a pivotal part in any major war effort that makes him a revolutionary writer.

This worldview implies that a conflict which supports the aims of the ruling elite and their supporters must be good for masses as a whole. The 20th Century provided a lot of evidence to the contrary.

Mm. National Socialism was hardly a middle class or aristocratic movement. Whilst it had the support of a subset of the wealthy, its constituency was the working class. If you like, it turned out that the aims of the masses were disastrous for the middle classes. One could say something similar about Stalin's Russia, although this is more blurred.

The picture's a little less clear with the First World War, but it was hardly a war for the benefit of the ruling classes. It was the populist papers which fueled the international tensions before the war- not academic study by the educated classes.

In 1870 the Prussians did reach Paris and the Revolution, in the form of the Commune and against Clauswitzian precepts, continued prosecuting the war.

But ultimately the Commune was crushed by military force and a constitutional, middle-ground Republic was formed.

Clausewitz has become a collection of blinding glimpses of the obvious and quaint but supercilious quotes used by Talking Heads to lend themselves an air of credibility.

That's how I'd describe Sun Tzu. I don't think Clausewitz is quite so decrepit yet. Time will tell if he falls to the same fate.