An improvement I think needs to be made to 1861 scenario

[herwin]

The underlying problem is that historically the army headquarters and logistic support was pretty well locked into an army zone with well-defined bases. Individual corps (sometimes divisions) then operated on a line of advance from those bases, although they could shift within the army zone. The AC was then attached to the HQ and the TC was responsible for supporting a number of army zones. Union army zones were associated with rivers, since most forward supply was delivered by ship or boat. Confederate army zones were associated with departments, since they were on the defensive.

[tbriert]

Actually, another idea just occured to me that might be simpler way to deal with the Army Commander issue.  In a future patch, could the designers consider adding a new 'army HQ' unit that the AC would be attached directly to?  If so, then what coudl be done is to attach the leader to the HQ, and then have the HQ only able to move tactically, rather than strategically.  Or, if it is moveable strategically, make the transport cost so high that while not prohibitive, it would severly impact the ability of the player to move other units, etc, if he decided to move the HQ.  This would go a long way towards modeling what a logistical nightmare it would be to move an army commander and his staff, and to gain familiarity with a new army, to the point that it would only rarely be done, and at a price.  Additionally, you could add names to these Army HQs, adding some historical flavor as well.
 
For the Union
1) Army of the Potomac
2) Army of the Tennessee
3) Army of the Cumberland
4) Army of the Ohio, Army of the West, or Army of the James
 
For the Confederate
 
1) Army of Northern Virginia
2) Army of Tennessee
3) Army of Mississippi
4) Army of the West, or Army of the Valley
 
This might be easily workable, and add to historic flavor and realism.

[herwin]

The problem with leaders starting out lower is the resulting casualties. You would need to assess some of the early commanders who died or were severely wounded on their potential for higher command. The adjustment in army mod with victories might be important. Call it command (in)experience. A question: I remember something about the army mod affecting corps commanders. Is that actually the case?

[GShock]

I think the Army mod affects all commanders in regards with the initiative rolls, and of course, gives an eventual penalty to the AC itself when committed. Such stat, as well as the att/def stats or training for instance, do not vary with experience. Only command does and i think it's proper.

To a higher degree of long-range thinking on lowering the CP to the leaders, do not forget the total number of troopers they can attach. Having more lower ranked, and possibly poor generals, emphasyzes the importance of a good corps commander. The tradeoff in CSC rule is that a 10 CP leader with a 4 CP subleader can still attach only 10 troops while, separated, they would make 14...quite a difference. I'm wondering if the number of activable leaders could also be modded. That, coupled with these reductions, would ensure you don't exploit the CSC rule by activating dozens of leaders only to discard them. 

The idea of the HQ unit wouldn't be so easy to achieve, but an easier step could be to reduce the number of MP the AC has and disable the strat MP totally (with the exception of the amphibious landings). Again ...easier is an euphemism in this field.

[tbriert]

Harry, I dont know the answer on the army mod affecting corps commanders.  At least initially, I have no plans to alter the army mods or other stats besides entry date and CP rating at this point.  Perhaps in the future, but in general, I dont find enough disagreement with the ratings the way they are to change them.
 
With regards to casualties, you raise a good point, and it is something I have been concerned with.  I want the historic leaders who rose to prominence to enter play as division leaders, and then rise to corps rank through action.  While I dont want to make them bulletproof, I dont want them to all die off to quickly too early, leaving the armies with no Corps Commanders either.  I imagine some play testing will be in order, but even then, it is going to be hard to figure in the plain luck factor on leader casualties.  I have seen Scott with an 18 survive the whole game, I have seen him die on the first turn.  How that might affect a Hancock with a 2 mortality as division commander, I dont know.  Does he get killed too often, before he can rise to corps command, or not?  How can you even tell, I am not sure.

[tbriert]

ORIGINAL: GShock

To a higher degree of long-range thinking on lowering the CP to the leaders, do not forget the total number of troopers they can attach. Having more lower ranked, and possibly poor generals, emphasyzes the importance of a good corps commander. The tradeoff in CSC rule is that a 10 CP leader with a 4 CP subleader can still attach only 10 troops while, separated, they would make 14...quite a difference. I'm wondering if the number of activable leaders could also be modded. That, coupled with these reductions, would ensure you don't exploit the CSC rule by activating dozens of leaders only to discard them. 

Question -- with the CSC rule on, would not the troops in the 10 CP leaders corps fight better than the ones in the individual 4 CP leaders division, because the ones the corps get both the corps leaders and CSC's inf skill bonus, while the ones in the separate division only get the bonus of its own leader? If so, this should be a disincentive to have an army of 30 seperate brigades and divisions, rather than one of 5-6 corps fully stocked with CSCs, which I believe is the intent of having that rule.

[Erik Rutins]

ORIGINAL: Winfield S. Hancock
Question -- with the CSC rule on, would not the troops in the 10 CP leaders corps fight better than the ones in the individual 4 CP leaders division, because the ones the corps get both the corps leaders and CSC's inf skill bonus, while the ones in the separate division only get the bonus of its own leader? If so, this should be a disincentive to have an army of 30 seperate brigades and divisions, rather than one of 5-6 corps fully stocked with CSCs, which I believe is the intent of having that rule.

That's correct. Having a well-commanded Corps structure is potentially much better than having individual divisions/brigades in terms of combat performance.

[tran505]

GShock:

In the "Southern Victories on Northern Soil" thread I started, I noted that rewarding the South to play more aggressively may also make the Northern player play more aggressively as well. The best way for the North to avoid Southern Victories on Northern Soil is to attack and capture all zones in Southern territory that are adjacent to Northern Territitory. The best defense REMAINS a good offense. And if that works..., why not move "On to Richmond" ??

If my ramblings had anyting to do with this mod..., I am honored! And I can't wait to see what you guys come up with!! [:D]

- P

[heroldje]

I had this exact same thought and spent too much time modifying the leader sheet only to realize that i simply didnt have the knowledge or time to do as thorough of a job as i would like.  if you finish this i would love to see the results.
 
i would also suggest further modifying the game (as i did) to knock the start date back to april 1861.  this simplifies the "what generals are available when/where" question, and incidently leads to a much more diverse early game. 
 
(i actually completed this with historic troop levels, and found the results quite good... my only issue being that it needed more testing/tweaking and i have been so unbelievably busy lately i cant even play the game, let alone tweak it)

[GShock]

There can never be a leader shortage. Wounded ones come back and even captured ones of the caliber of R.E. Lee come back sooner or later. Problem of "no corps commanders due to losses" is impossible with this high number of ** at least for the Union. Could be an issue with the CSA but as i said we need to do something with that promotion button. A hard-coded limiter forcing no CP increases to leaders who have reached a certain peak (according to their rank) would really feel good right now.

[SteveLohr]

Regarding the Army of the Potomac remaining static in Virginia:  First of all, I need to inform ya'll that I'mve very new at this game, so possibly what I have to say is wrong.  With that disclaimer out of the way, here is a possible solution for the static AoP problem.  Political considerations were a big driver in the AoP making the initial Bull RUn attack, and were likewise behind its operations in 1862.  Could the game have a political point loss for the Union, increasing each turn, for the AoP not invading Northern Virginia?  The PP loss would stop after either a major engagement was fought, or a province was captured.  The PP loss would again resume after X number of turns of inactivity.

[Pford]

ORIGINAL: SteveLohr
Could the game have a political point loss for the Union, increasing each turn, for the AoP not invading Northern Virginia?  The PP loss would stop after either a major engagement was fought, or a province was captured. 

You mean up to a certain date, right? For example, a Union yearly pp deduction if a Strategic battle does NOT occur in Virginia. Call it the 'Lincoln's Impatience' optional rule. For one thing , the Northern player will have to bite the bullet and do a Bull Run on the first turn.

[SteveLohr]

Pford-yeah, something like that.  I haven't thought out the  acutal dates the rule would be in effect, but it would work something like this:
Beginning July 61- X  political points lost per turn, increasing by y points each turn with no major battle or capture of a N. Virginia province.  Upon a major battle or province being captured, the political point loss ceases for Y number of turns.  The rule would cease, probably around Spring 1863

[jimkehn]

Doesn't the game do something like that now?? Doesn't the North lose PP's each turn, and they have to make them up by capturing regions?? I thought I read that. However, the regions can be captured....if I'm right....in MO, or KY or WV. I do like your idea of mandating a resonably large victory in VA, though.

[Pford]

ORIGINAL: JimKehn

I do like your idea of mandating a resonably large victory in VA, though.

Virtually nothing occurred in the eastern theatre between Bull Run and McClellan's amphibious campaign but it wasn't from lack of pressure from the administration and the Northern press. Mandating a Union victory in 1861 or 1862 in Vir is a lot to ask, in my opinion. The Yanks face daunting odds. That's why I propose that, to avoid penalties, a Strategic level battle merely take place.

Now, given the political vacuum in the game, the Union AI consolidates north of the Rappahannock and invades in 1863. Very wise on its part given the reverses and collapse in confidence in '62 until Antietam. This deprives the Confederates of their historical counterpunch and fosters conservatism on their side as well.

[Joel Billings]

Historically Bull Run was not large enough to in game terms rate as a strategic victory. It wasn't until the Pennisula campaign that the forces involved got large enough to yield a strategic battle in game terms. We have at times considered a rule to force an attack in Virginia. We're open to the idea, but haven't come up with the exact rule that we'd want to add. Perhaps something like a 2 point Union loss in PPs per turn until a strategic battle is fought in Virginia would work, however in game turns this would mostly likely result in the Union player losing some points and could potentially alter game balance. Another idea is to insist on an attack into Virginia with at least 15 units in 1861, or a strategic battle of some kind in 1862, or there is a small loss of points each turn. I like the idea I read above that it would reset after a period of inactivity. Perhaps in return for this new rule, we could lower the per turn Union PP loss to offset the game balance hit on the Union. Like I said, we're open to ideas as long as they don't alter game balance a lot.

[herwin]

ORIGINAL: Joel Billings

Historically Bull Run was not large enough to in game terms rate as a strategic victory. It wasn't until the Pennisula campaign that the forces involved got large enough to yield a strategic battle in game terms. We have at times considered a rule to force an attack in Virginia. We're open to the idea, but haven't come up with the exact rule that we'd want to add. Perhaps something like a 2 point Union loss in PPs per turn until a strategic battle is fought in Virginia would work, however in game turns this would mostly likely result in the Union player losing some points and could potentially alter game balance. Another idea is to insist on an attack into Virginia with at least 15 units in 1861, or a strategic battle of some kind in 1862, or there is a small loss of points each turn. I like the idea I read above that it would reset after a period of inactivity. Perhaps in return for this new rule, we could lower the per turn Union PP loss to offset the game balance hit on the Union. Like I said, we're open to ideas as long as they don't alter game balance a lot.

There was a reason that Meade didn't go on the offensive after Gettysburg. It wasn't until then that the War Department was willing to face facts.

[herwin]

ORIGINAL: Joel Billings

Historically Bull Run was not large enough to in game terms rate as a strategic victory. It wasn't until the Pennisula campaign that the forces involved got large enough to yield a strategic battle in game terms. We have at times considered a rule to force an attack in Virginia. We're open to the idea, but haven't come up with the exact rule that we'd want to add. Perhaps something like a 2 point Union loss in PPs per turn until a strategic battle is fought in Virginia would work, however in game turns this would mostly likely result in the Union player losing some points and could potentially alter game balance. Another idea is to insist on an attack into Virginia with at least 15 units in 1861, or a strategic battle of some kind in 1862, or there is a small loss of points each turn. I like the idea I read above that it would reset after a period of inactivity. Perhaps in return for this new rule, we could lower the per turn Union PP loss to offset the game balance hit on the Union. Like I said, we're open to ideas as long as they don't alter game balance a lot.

You might increase the PP loss per turn and offset the increased loss with increased region values in the area between Washington and Richmond. There was a strategic balance on the line of the Rappahannock.

[Doc o War]

I would argue that while Bull Run does not count in numbers of troops as a strategic Battle- it was something so powerful in its affect to the Nations involved- that it was a strategic Battle in its effect- and it should happen- or something like it should happen somewhere in Virginia proper on the 1st turn- the nation and Congress were screaming and pushing the army and Lincoln to Do Something in Virginia- he had to act.
 
The Union could have done nothing at first- but that would have encountered bitter political reaction from those forces within the Congress and the national government who opposed Lincoln. In July 61 Lincoln was operating with a cabinet made up of men who by and large thought very little of Lincoln and some were pretty active in trying to bring him down or possibly even replacing him as commander of the actual war effort.
 
THe pressure to march down to Richmond and end the rebellion was strong. To have not done something would have been politically terrible. Further the three month enlistments of the original militia volunteers who had rushed to defend Washington was about to run out and a good part of the existing force in Washington would return home- Somthing had to be done before they left- Lincoln really had no choice- nor did McDowell. He marched south from DC to Bull Run/Manassas. And th eshock of that defeat, and the victory for the south- set in motion all th eevents that followed- that effect I would argue was larger than just the size of the Battle.
 
From this first clash came a belief in the South that their men were somehow the better men, this feeling that one reb could lick his weight in Yankees lasted nearly 2 years - until mid 63.  and it started a long string of basic defeats for the Union.  Some say learning defeat early in the Army of Potomac made its future commanders tougher and more determined than ever to fight on until they did win. They were stubborn lads.