The Mother Load

[JWE]

Freddy Chin, from Mitsubishi, was smiling and dialing through the wartime shipyard records, and found several stacks of cartons, with silk ribbons and seals intact, going back to 1939. The carton indices are to shipyard build specifications for the periods noted.

Ohhh, needless to say, I sent Sammy’s email on to Parillo, Heald and Sutton, along with Sam’s contact info. Since these are original, pre-war and wartime documents, with seals intact, the Japanese Government will take charge of the boxes, but I’m sure Mark and/or David will be on the next plane out.

Expect a new book, or a revision of existing editions, in the near future.

[witpqs]

I've heard that details on Yamato are sorely lacking as records were deliberately destroyed. It is possible some Yamato data might be in that cache?

[JWE]

Doubt it. They were found in the 3d level basement of a Mitsui building that was an adjunct to what is now the Ministry of Trade and Industry, in Osaka.

Don’t think there will be many Naval details; never can tell though.

Obviously, if the cartons have any details of Japanese capital ships, the Internet will eventually be full of it.

[DuckofTindalos]

The Internet is already "full of it"...[:D]

[el cid again]

In 1968 - some USN sailors - exploring caves at Yokosuka (these were guarded as there is a secret electronic warfare center in them - they are huge - two story wooden buildings are erected - and are much smaller than the caves - and one cave tunnel was found with a blocked entrance. Some engineers were able to open a narrow passage - and four large wooden crates were found - containing similar cardboard boxes to thse described here. A joint JNSDF / USN committee was called to examine them - academics and technical guys mainly - and a preliminary report written. The plan was to turn them over to a Japanese archival facility - probably at the National Diet Library - but it didn't happen: the government was unwilling to have formal documentation of Japanese nuclear propulsion research (other than the original program document which was found in 1945 and published - among other places - in The Making of the Atomic Bomb and in The Day Man Lost) - and probably they were destroyed. While the original IJN nuclear program charter called for 'engines to propel battleships' it appears wartime work was focused on an SSN. [Heisenberg believed that atomic power for submarines was the only practical wartime goal of atomic research - according to one colleague] Like at least one post war program (French) - these submarines - unable to obain highly enriched reactor fuel nor the materials needed to contain high temperature and pressure steam products that would produce - these designs were based on natural uranium and heavy water (which was produced in very large quantities by Noguchi at Hungnam - unknown to Western Intelligence - and had been since the late 1930s) - producing a fairly low powered propulsion system (about 9 to 10 khp). There is a story from Hungnam that the prototype reactor was operated under Soviet supervision until 1948, and an unfueled production reactor was removed for examination by them - see Japan's Secret War. I started - but never completed - a paper on these matters documented to scholarly standards using materials not found in those boxes. There is consideral opposition to this sort of research in Japan - or was before the century turned anyway.

[JWE]

Woo, hoo, the constructor’s ledgers; weights, measurements, materials. Some of the cartons had been opened before; even some review notes on top of the documents in several cartons. Apparently the ledgers would only be of interest to marine architects, and the other records were so extensive anyway, that these were just stacked away.

Nothing specifically Naval, here, but the cover notes inferentially indicate review by Watts, Gordon, Stilles, Wolff, and the referenced ledger entries may provide the source data for the proposition that Taiho’s keel laying was arbitrarily delayed by about 5 months, for lack of appropriate slip availability at Kawasaki, Kobe; slip was being used for conversion of Izumo Maru to Hiyo which was delayed, in turn, by issues arising with the lead ship (Junyo) at Mitsubishi.

Oh boy, the devil’s in the details. Fun, fun, fun.

[Dili]

I like that kind of hidden stuff that suddenly surfaces. I am always thinking what we don't know because it is hidden in some collection.

[JWE]

Yeah, but what it mostly does is validate the why’s and wherefore’s of IRL timing. I know there’s websites out there with big, beautiful plans of a ‘what if’ IJN fleet with lots of carriers, big cruisers, yadda, yadda.

Point is, they know nothing about what it takes to build a ship, and even less about the actual facilities available to Japan to facilitate construction. All the pretty website timelines are worse than useless. You either have to be ‘real’ about the whichness of why, or else acknowledge you are talking about some other universe, somewhere, that has no bearing on objective reality.

[el cid again]

I have a system used in mechanical games which permits players to "buy" ships - but they must account for the steel, labor, slipway,
etc. I originally let players design their own ships - but I was forced to limit them to historical designs - or very carefully worked out variations - because players invariably put too much stuff to fit on every ship they design. It takes longer than construction time to build a ship - there are long lead items - so each ship has three time periods: long lead (no graving dock), in dock time and then post launch completion time. All these may be delayed by loss of power, damage from bombardment, lack of materials or labor, etc. If you really get a ship you planned game years later in time - you feel like you earned it. But it does allow for some uncertainties - games tend to be too rigidly tied to history so players can calculate too closely - unlike real admirals - who can not be sure what is coming down the ways next?

[JWE]

Cool. Freddy sent some pages in pdf. If I'm reading the Japanese right they were hosed; limited slips, no space for expansion, nothing.

Woof. They were even worse off than we thought. Everything was down, every yard was at 150%, fixing crap. Word was out to Transport Ministry and Nav Bureau that it just ain't gonna happen - not this year, nor the next. Looks like IRL was really IRL, and probably a bit worse.

[DuckofTindalos]

Sort of like the peek we had behind the Iron Curtain after the Cold War, where the Red Army was revealed to be a completely rotten edifice...

[herwin]

ORIGINAL: Terminus

Sort of like the peek we had behind the Iron Curtain after the Cold War, where the Red Army was revealed to be a completely rotten edifice...

A few years ago, I went through all the ships built in Japan between about 1930 and 1945 and identified the yards, the time they were on the slip, and the time between launching and commissioning. There were these inexplicable gaps in slip usage (which seemed to be the primary constraint on getting ships built). Thanks for clarifying!

[DuckofTindalos]

Seems like they weren't terribly efficient in their use of very scant resources.

[herwin]

ORIGINAL: Terminus

Seems like they weren't terribly efficient in their use of very scant resources.

Neither were the British. For the British, the problem turned out to be very low managerial competence in the shipbuilding industry and in the mines. The workers didn't trust the managers, and their lack of trust was well-justified. It made increasing production very difficult. The cause was that the only training managers in those industries had was OJT.

[JWE]

ORIGINAL: herwin
A few years ago, I went through all the ships built in Japan between about 1930 and 1945 and identified the yards, the time they were on the slip, and the time between launching and commissioning. There were these inexplicable gaps in slip usage (which seemed to be the primary constraint on getting ships built). Thanks for clarifying!

Been researching the same thing with Schoffell and Wolff, under a grant from Mitsubishi and the Naval Institute, for the past two years. We would be extremely interested in your data. Attribution will be in accord with generally accepted standards. Please provide a sample of the data and sources, by email, I believe you have mine. After review, we will put you in touch with our editor at the Naval Institute Press.

David and I are both very excited at the prospect of a listing of "all the ships built in Japan between about 1930 and 1945 and identified the yards, the time they were on the slip, and the time between launching and commissioning". We have been working this for years, and would love to have your results and know your sources.

Ciao. John

[herwin]

ORIGINAL: JWE

ORIGINAL: herwin
A few years ago, I went through all the ships built in Japan between about 1930 and 1945 and identified the yards, the time they were on the slip, and the time between launching and commissioning. There were these inexplicable gaps in slip usage (which seemed to be the primary constraint on getting ships built). Thanks for clarifying!

Been researching the same thing with Schoffell and Wolff, under a grant from Mitsubishi and the Naval Institute, for the past two years. We would be extremely interested in your data. Attribution will be in accord with generally accepted standards. Please provide a sample of the data and sources, by email, I believe you have mine. After review, we will put you in touch with our editor at the Naval Institute Press.

David and I are both very excited at the prospect of a listing of "all the ships built in Japan between about 1930 and 1945 and identified the yards, the time they were on the slip, and the time between launching and commissioning". We have been working this for years, and would love to have your results and know your sources.

Ciao. John

My sources were all secondary--I don't read Japanese--so you probably started with them in your research. All I did was lay it out graphically, and I worked only with the warships and naval auxiliaries--I should have said that. Generally, a slip was unoccupied for at most two weeks, but there were inexplicable gaps from time to time.

[JWE]

Dang .. here we were all excited. Poo. Anyway, you have my contact info, wouldn't mind seeing what you got in any case. Maybe we could use some of it? Same Ts & Cs apply.

Ciao. John

[el cid again]

ORIGINAL: JWE

Cool. Freddy sent some pages in pdf. If I'm reading the Japanese right they were hosed; limited slips, no space for expansion, nothing.

Woof. They were even worse off than we thought. Everything was down, every yard was at 150%, fixing crap. Word was out to Transport Ministry and Nav Bureau that it just ain't gonna happen - not this year, nor the next. Looks like IRL was really IRL, and probably a bit worse.

For a good discussion of the shipbuilding industry, see The Japanese Merchant Marine and World War Two by Parillo. The scale of the problems is well defined. However, he argues, and I agree, that things were mismanaged, grossly compounding the problems inherant in the situation. Using POWs was not efficient - and led to sabotage. Each service had its own yards - but would draft skilled workers in a DIFFERENT service shipyards - no exemption from the draft of the "wrong" service. Allocation of materials - and eventually sheer availability of materials - were factors. Then there were operational factors: damage to yards and even workers from firestorms - which eventually consumed 5/6 of Japanese urban area (and would have consumed 100 per cent by November - the main reason for the USSBS estimate the war must end by then - and also Gen LeMay's personal estimate in summer 1945).

Note however that shipyards WERE expanded and new ones - dedicated to automated serial production of standardized designs - WERE built.
If one picks the right location one should be expanding yards there. There were vastly more shipyards than most people realize - particularly small ones - to the extent one of the limitations is on engine production capability (sheer floorspace). These factors conspire to make JF Dunnigan's position probably correct: if you are managing Japanese economic production, you should focus on merchant ships. These need less hp per ton, and if you are in a game where you can pick your classes - it is better to put those hp into wooden sea trucks than into virtually useless 8 knot "sub chasers" or similar products. More strategically - defending the sea lanes - using more efficient routings (carry cargo both directions - or triangle route) - traveling in convoys - devoting air and ship assets to defending those convoys - has the effect of losing shipping slower - and for that reason delivering more resources and oil (and products forces need) over time.

There is no more challenging strategic problem than to try to manage Japan vs the US and its several allies. You are almost doomed - although such wars can be won. [For a Japanese case in the 20th century see the Russo Japanese War - which was well managed - right up to committing the last class of reservists for the last major battle - then implementing the war termination plan - which ironically won a Nobel Peace Prize for Teddy Roosevelt for the Treaty of Portsmouth, which he brokered). Understanding the shipyard and related industrial issues lies at the heart of the problem - and the more detailed the model - the more you can do. It is all about efficiencies. Given Japans vast distance from the USA or other major economic competators - it has an inherant advantage (USN estimates it at 2:1 - we need two ships to keep one on station in the Western Pacific compared to IJN only one - on average). The problems are large - but wars are most often lost rather than won. If you manage well the Allies have the opportunity to screw it up (lose so much they are driven from the field by political factors). IRL Japan defeated itself. It squandered the considerable anti colonial good will it enjoyed - it drove even its political allies into opposition or death (the Chief Justice of the Philippine Surpreme Court was pro Japanese - but executed because he had served a colonial regime - and was for that reason a tritor in the view of an IJA staff officer) - and generally mismanged their assets. [Late in the war, Japanese backing of anti-colonial forces was a strategic success - insuring Dutch and French forces never had a chance to re establish their colonies long term. In what became Indonesia - the opposition even had an air force.]

[el cid again]

ORIGINAL: herwin

ORIGINAL: Terminus

Seems like they weren't terribly efficient in their use of very scant resources.

Neither were the British. For the British, the problem turned out to be very low managerial competence in the shipbuilding industry and in the mines. The workers didn't trust the managers, and their lack of trust was well-justified. It made increasing production very difficult. The cause was that the only training managers in those industries had was OJT.

In some ways the USA was as bad. Merchant ships were managed in both USA and Japan by three different administrations: Army, Navy and Maritime - pretty much without regard for each other - and at the expense of each other at times. In Japan this practice continued longer. But in both countries it was eventually appreciated it was a gross cause of inefficiency. Similarly - neither country was very good at unified commands. We NEVER DID get one for Alaska - and the "front" was long divided between competing commands led by MacArthur and Nimitz. On the other side eventually there were steps taken to be more joint and unified - but they too never really got there. One thing not appreciated outside Japan is how extraordinarily divided the country was - and our assumptions that a dictatorship at war must be unified were at least 179 degrees out of phase with reality. There were people in government and the military passionately opposed to even getting into the war with the USA - or even the war with China that led to the war with the USA - even including those who had more or less forced Japan to go into Manchukuo believed it was a dangerous and disasterous idea many years before we got into it. The way decisions were made were often more about illusion than about reality. In a game - you can truly be a unified commander in a sense not culturally an option - for either side - but in particular for Japan.

[el cid again]

ORIGINAL: herwin

ORIGINAL: Terminus

Sort of like the peek we had behind the Iron Curtain after the Cold War, where the Red Army was revealed to be a completely rotten edifice...

A few years ago, I went through all the ships built in Japan between about 1930 and 1945 and identified the yards, the time they were on the slip, and the time between launching and commissioning. There were these inexplicable gaps in slip usage (which seemed to be the primary constraint on getting ships built). Thanks for clarifying!

So did I - decades ago. There are other issues - for example no less than ten submarines were allegedly built in different yards - the same sub - but two or three yards built it!!! So in some cases there may have been shadow programs. This is somewhat corobborated by some operational mysteries: An IJN sub must have been to Panama in July 1945 - but which one? All we know about could not have been. Yet it left a recon vessel on the beach - a variant of kaiten itself "never built" according to offical records. Shipped to PH - kept in custody for decades by a US museum there - it now is on display in Japan. [It is described in Advance Force Pearl Harbor written by the curator of the US Army Aviation Museum - Burl Burlingame - who was originally refused publication by USNI because he wanted more pictures and maps - but eventually reprinted by them - according to his personal account of events.] I was able to build a model of what graving docks (or other facilities) were at what shipyard - and who contracted with it - so we can model the shipbuilding industry as a whole - also including things like enging producing facilities by type, size, etc.