Alternative history - No PH

[vettim89]

Hi all,

I am thinking about doing a campaign scenario based on a "what if" proposition that the Japanese did not attack US/US assets at all in 1941. I am thinking of doing two variants: one where the Japanese strike the USSR instead (assuming a deeper cooperative effort among the Axis) and the second one where the Japanese strike south but avoid any US forces at all. Before any of you say the second is not plausible, please remember merchant shipping traveled between the USA and USSR through the north Pacific through most of the war unabated as the Japanese were deeply commited to keeping Russia neutral

So my question for the board is this: how long do you think the US would have remained neutral in the absence of a PH attack? What events would you consider to likely trigger a US response other than outright attack/invasion by the Japanese? Would, for example, the US intervened if Australia or India was invaded? I think India likely not but what about Oz or NZ? WOuld love to here your input

[herwin]

See <tm.asp?m=1515389&mpage=1&key=&#1515389>

America was already co-operating with the Commonwealth and the NEI--the Asiatic Fleet was redeploying to Singapore to join Force Z--so it wouldn't have been very long at all. Allow a week or so.

[vettim89]

ORIGINAL: herwin

See <tm.asp?m=1515389&mpage=1&key=?>

America was already co-operating with the Commonwealth and the NEI--the Asiatic Fleet was redeploying to Singapore to join Force Z--so it wouldn't have been very long at all. Allow a week or so.

So you are saying option two would not be plausible. Option one does have some interest to me still. What if the German and Japanese high command actually viewed the Axis as a true Alliance? What if the Japanese and Germans coordinated the attack on USSR. A December 1941 start date would coincide with Operation Typhoon. Perhaps the Japanese realizing Stalin had pulled some units out of Siberia might decide to head north. Following this line of reasoning, I could pick some date where a "Lusitania" type incident occured in the North Atlantic. The USA declares war on Germany, Japan declares war on USA, USA and UK declare on Japan and we are on.

[ChickenOfTheSea]

IJA pushed very hard for a "go north" strategy (attack on the Soviet Union). The "go south" strategy was pushed by the IJN and the oil embargo was the tipping point.

The attack on the Soviet Union is certainly reasonable historically, but I am not sure how well the game engine handles it. With Japan going south, could they really ignore the B-17's being moved into the Philippines. However, Japan forgoing the attack on Pearl Harbor makes for a very interesting game situation. I think several months ago, Herwin proposed a "War Plan Orange" version of WITP based on such a situation.

[DuckofTindalos]

Without a PH attack, the Japs could expect the US to implement Orange, and work their way across the Pacific. If it were me, I'd start out by taking Guam, Wake and Midway and fortifying the hell out of them.

[vettim89]

Well my point would be this: Roosevelt wanted in the war. The isolationist and "Dove" factions still were quite strong in the US even in December 1942. There were many who still felt that the US should be "The Arsenal of Democracy" vice an active participant.

Within the Japanese high command, the Army faction largely felt that Bushido alone would guarantee a victory no matter what the Allies would bring. The Navy however, especially Yamamoto, had a better grasp on the industrial capabilities of the US. The motivation for PH was that the Navy knew that only near complete neutralization of the US Pacific Fleet could allow Japan to achieve its goals.

So what if the Navy Faction came over to the Army's side and went with the Go North prospect. The problem being that the US would still be looming out there. That said, if the pressure in the East succeeded in dividing the Soviets's efforts enough that say Moscow fell, what happens then? If the USSR was no longer in play, Germany could have taken North Africa in 1942. Then what? It is a very interesting idea.

The question is what if anything would have drawn the US into the war if there was no PH?

[el cid again]

It is true FDR wanted war - and sooner than planned too. War Dept planning assumed war in mid 1942 - but FDR was commissioning (3) special operations vessels to start one in December. USS Isabel was the only one to attempt it before war happened anyway. [See The Cruise of the Lanokai - but her captain - LT - later RADM Vince Trolly - USNI]

The problem with "strike North" is oil. It was a conundrum IJA could not figure a way out of. The oil of Sakhalin is not enough to run Japan. Japan has a 30 month clock ticking - its oil stores - and in fact it consumed them faster than planned. It needs to strike South in time to secure the oil and SLOC. This is problematical in 1942 - and a lot harder if the Allies have time to build up. Nor is the SLOC to Indochina secure if Luzon air bases are operational.

[Capt. Harlock]

The problem with "strike North" is oil. It was a conundrum IJA could not figure a way out of. The oil of Sakhalin is not enough to run Japan. Japan has a 30 month clock ticking - its oil stores - and in fact it consumed them faster than planned. It needs to strike South in time to secure the oil and SLOC. This is problematical in 1942 - and a lot harder if the Allies have time to build up. Nor is the SLOC to Indochina secure if Luzon air bases are operational.

Excellent point. I've always thought that the Japanese should have persuaded their German Allies to have the puppet Dutch government turn over some key bases in the DEI to Japan. Britain would certainly have declared war to assist the Free Dutch, and the U.S. would likely have followed suit. (Tensions were very high following the Japanese takeover of Indochina, and this last would have been more than FDR could concede without completely losing respect and credibility.) The airfields in the PI could have been quickly neutralized without the advantage of surprise -- that's pretty much what happened anyway. And since the U.S. was perceived as having declared war first, the rapid and complete mobilization of the American economy and manpower would not have been politically possible.

[DuckofTindalos]

This is just another way of showing how unrealistic it is for some alternate history writers to envision a full cooperation between Japan and Germany. It didn't happen, and it couldn't happen, because the two countries were incapable of trusting one another.

[el cid again]

The IJA wanted to "strike North" - but could not solve the oil problem once the embargo on oil, iron ore (and scrap iron), and rubber was imposed by NEI, British CW and USA. I don't think there IS a solution UNLESS militants think the war can be won very fast - and it cannot be if you use a realistically large Soviet Army and rough terrain (as in RHS) - where mountains really are mountains.

The US, Dutch, Australians, NZ and British - counting India as British (something difficult to do in Indian eyes - Indians wanted to support the Allies but were upset they were not asked - and almost all Indian politicians spent the war in prison as a result) - were really allied already. FDR was trying to start the war before it began - see The Cruise of the Lanokai (written by her captain - LT - later RADM Vince Trolly). USS Isabel actually made one of the patrols supposed to start the war (a sort of early "Tonkin Bay Incident" but failed to find enemy ships to tangle with. The RN had secretly coordinated with the Asiatic Fleet before the war - just days before - and agreements were firm: any attack on NEI, British CW or US territory would bring in the others IMMEDIATELY (call it one day).

To which add that the US on the Japanese LOC would not work - and no sane Japanese would try a campaign allowing the Philippine bases to be unmolested and even to build up.

[Blackhorse]

Both scenarios are reasonable to contemplate . . . the Germans were urging the Japanese to attack Russia.

According to Costello's The Pacific War, Roosevelt had drafted a speech asking Congress to DOW against Japan, to be delivered after Japan's expected attack on British posessions and the DEI. IMHO, Roosevelt would have had a hard time getting Congress to declare war. In September, after a lot of arm-twisting, the Congress agreed not to abolish the military draft by only a *single* vote. So if the Japanese had "gone south" it might have been several months before Roosevelt found a way for the US to intervene.

"Go North" and "Go South" are not mutually exclusive options. No matter what, Japan *had* to go south in a matter of months to secure its oil supplies. If the Japanese had attacked Russia, Britain might have declared war against Japan -- Churchill was gallant, and not always a practioner of realpolitik.

In terms of gameplay, if the US is not involved, there won't be much of a contest if the Japanese are fighting only the Russians or only the Commonwealth/Dutch. So why not combine the Go North/South strategies into one?

[DuckofTindalos]

I'd say "Strike North" and "Strike South" are mutually exclusive. Japan could never have supported both drives.

[Blackhorse]

ORIGINAL: Terminus

I'd say "Strike North" and "Strike South" are mutually exclusive. Japan could never have supported both drives.

I agree. I wasn't clear in my post above.

I was suggesting that *if* the Japanese chose to Strike North, the Commonwealth might declare war against Japan, forcing them into a war both North and South.

For gameplay, if the US is going to be on the sidelines for some months, the scenario would be far more competitive (and, therefore, interesting) if the Japanese had to fight the Russians and the Commonwealth.

[el cid again]

ORIGINAL: Blackhorse


Both scenarios are reasonable to contemplate . . . the Germans were urging the Japanese to attack Russia.

According to Costello's The Pacific War, Roosevelt had drafted a speech asking Congress to DOW against Japan, to be delivered after Japan's expected attack on British posessions and the DEI. IMHO, Roosevelt would have had a hard time getting Congress to declare war. In September, after a lot of arm-twisting, the Congress agreed not to abolish the military draft by only a *single* vote. So if the Japanese had "gone south" it might have been several months before Roosevelt found a way for the US to intervene.

"Go North" and "Go South" are not mutually exclusive options. No matter what, Japan *had* to go south in a matter of months to secure its oil supplies. If the Japanese had attacked Russia, Britain might have declared war against Japan -- Churchill was gallant, and not always a practioner of realpolitik.

In terms of gameplay, if the US is not involved, there won't be much of a contest if the Japanese are fighting only the Russians or only the Commonwealth/Dutch. So why not combine the Go North/South strategies into one?

There are no forbidden ideas.

And the problem of the Peace party in Congress (it was not a party - it was all those who agreed for different reasons not to get into a war acting as if they were a party) was very real.

It was to that end that FDR came up with the secret orders to start a war given to Adm Hart. Instead of asking Congress to go to war if the Japanese attacked an ally - he hoped to ask Congress after Japan attacked a "USN warship." To this end three small vessels were assigned - the Isabel - technically built as a minesweeper but later the Presidential Yacht - and two actual yachts - including Lanokai - a sailing schooner. They needed three things only - a gun (3 inch) - a radio (to report "we have been fired upon") - and a US flag. The gun and the flag were to remain hidden - and the vessels were to break the rules of the road until warned off - or actually hit - by enemy gunfire. THEN they were to run up the flag - uncover the gun - and radio they were engaged in "battle" with an enemy that had "started it." In the event only one was ready before war started on its own - USS Isabel actually made a patrol looking for trouble but failed to find it - in spite of sailing in sight of Indochina. War might have come in a different way - but these three vessels out actually looking for an incident likely could have got the Japanese to shoot at them - particularly as they did not fly US flags until AFTER the incident began.

The problem for Japan remains - how to get fuel? UNTIL July 1941 - they could buy it. AFTER July 1941 - a 30 month clock was ticking - at best. Total time for mobilization and fighting before bingo fuel = 30 months. During that time - Strike South permits capturing it. Going North does not.

[el cid again]

ORIGINAL: Terminus

I'd say "Strike North" and "Strike South" are mutually exclusive. Japan could never have supported both drives.

It is somewhat unusual - but I must agree with Terminus. A general war North and South is in the ALLIES interests. To this end much US thinking in 1941 and 1942 was about just that. The ALCAN was built - as was the CANOL pipeline - with a view to facilitating a major RR line to Nome. This in turn to support an offensive from the North - using in particular bases on Russian soil. As it was - the closest point to Japan was Adak - and this is why surrender instructions were broadcast from there.

A good deal (almost universal) of nonsense has been written about how utterly impractical this was due to the weather.
But it isn't so. There are problems - to be sure - but these mainly relate to lack of proper surveys - mountains and fog.
The US eventually solved them by a systematic aireal mapping program. The ALCAN itself was built in only six months - although it never did complete to Nome - stopping at Fairbanks - and it never has been upgraded to a rail line (although the last Premier of the USSR has proposed it be done - in retirement). The reason is Stalin was unwilling to contemplate it. But what if he had a different view - or if some sort of deal could have been cut? The DOD analysis was it would cut 1 to 2 years off the war. The reason is it puts Japan's heartland at contest far sooner - and it renders no "safe sector" for Japanese forces - which then must be spread far too thin.

What was really done - instead - was far less practical. We invested heavily in logistic terms for an offensive out of China - and it was utterly defeated by IJA. ALL the bases were overrun - most of the munitions were destroyed to prevent capture - and the air offensive out of China never was worth the cost - because of the excessive effort of flying everything over the hump - after being hauled all the way to India. The other drive - across the islands - turned out to matter more - but it was very expensive - in particular in terms of the lives of assault troops. There was no finesse - the Japanese could read a map - and were able to concentrate forces for each engagement - making the cost very high indeed.

[Capt. Harlock]

We invested heavily in logistic terms for an offensive out of China - and it was utterly defeated by IJA. ALL the bases were overrun - most of the munitions were destroyed to prevent capture - and the air offensive out of China never was worth the cost - because of the excessive effort of flying everything over the hump - after being hauled all the way to India.

I can't fully agree. Yes, the air offensive out of China was a waste. But some of the Chinese units (the Communist ones) gave the IJA a hard time. And after the Burma Road was finally re-opened, the Nationalist Chinese started doing better as well.

[Dili]

I'd say "Strike North" and "Strike South" are mutually exclusive. Japan could never have supported both drives.

I disagree. Without Philiphines and Solomons Japan gets much more resources to fight North. And if the Southern drive was solely for resource grab instead of "co-prosperity" they would have even more for example getting on Timor spending Infantry Divisions.

[el cid again]

ORIGINAL: Capt. Harlock

We invested heavily in logistic terms for an offensive out of China - and it was utterly defeated by IJA. ALL the bases were overrun - most of the munitions were destroyed to prevent capture - and the air offensive out of China never was worth the cost - because of the excessive effort of flying everything over the hump - after being hauled all the way to India.

I can't fully agree. Yes, the air offensive out of China was a waste. But some of the Chinese units (the Communist ones) gave the IJA a hard time. And after the Burma Road was finally re-opened, the Nationalist Chinese started doing better as well.

I did not mean to say that China was not a vital front. China was the REASON for the war - if we were not supporting China - why embargo Japan - knowing it would force their hand?

The LAND war in China was worth doing - probably - if you can get past KMT and CCP trading in strategic materials with the Japanese. It is the AIR war that was a mistake. And here too it was only the immense heavy bomber campaign - needing big air bases and vast amounts of fuel - that was a bad idea. Sending smaller planes to help China would have been worthwhile.

[el cid again]

ORIGINAL: Dili

I'd say "Strike North" and "Strike South" are mutually exclusive. Japan could never have supported both drives.

I disagree. Without Philiphines and Solomons Japan gets much more resources to fight North. And if the Southern drive was solely for resource grab instead of "co-prosperity" they would have even more for example getting on Timor spending Infantry Divisions.

OK - enlighten us - and explain how the historical Japanese were wrong? HOW do you fight without replacing the oil (unless of course you don't need the oil because you play a version of WITP with so many "free supplies" from resource centers you don't need to make them and export them). IRL how can Japan keep fighting without oil once its stocks run out?

[Dili]

HOW do you fight without replacing the oil

maybe you should read fully including this: "And if the Southern drive was solely for resource grab instead of "co-prosperity""

How many troops were wasted in Solomons, Philipines, Timor, Burma and some useless Pacific Islands? I can count about a dozen of Divisions and more than thousand of planes with the added bet of not provoking clearely USA. So even if War occurs USA would have a less willing populace to go to war with consequences in productivity and moral.