Capturing Land Air Bases was THE CENTRAL STRATEGY of the Pacific War.

[dgaad]

With all the hullabaloo about the effectiveness of level bombers at low altitudes, we tend to forget that the capture, use, or denial, of LAND airbases was the over-arching strategy of the Pacific war. This one tactical consideration DOMINATED the planning for ALL MAJOR OPERATIONS of the war.

There was a reason for it : By the time of May, 1942, the effectiveness of Land Based Aircraft against ships and other targets had been amply demonstrated dozens of times over, starting way back in 1919 with Billy Mitchell's demonstration attack on German battleships, and in 1941 the almost complete disabling of the Italian Navy in Taranto harbor by a few old British biplanes carrying torpedos, to the Pearl Harbor attack, then the destruction of Force Z on December 8th, 1941 by Japanese level bombers, the sinking of dozens of allied ships by air attack during the months of the battles in the ABDA zone, and so forth.

There were only 4 major carrier battles fought during the entire Pacific war which involved effective and opposing numbers of carriers with effective airgroups, all of them in 1942 : Coral Sea, Midway, Eastern Solomons, and Santa Cruz. All of them were fought over attempts to occupy land airbases.

By May 1942, it was considered folly to move groups of ships by day into areas where the enemy had significant land based air assets UNLESS : you had total air superiority AND alot of flak platforms, or you had by some means (usually but not always by air attack) decimated the enemy's airbase.

If these factors were generally in equilibrium, any significant offensive action by one side would bring on a carrier battle if carriers were available.

Because the new paradigm of air control of the sea was so patently obvious, the number of times commanders decided to move ships by day into areas where the enemy had significant useable air assets was reduced to practically nil. Commanders instead began to be split up groups of ships so they could not be easily detected, or they moved at night.

Nevertheless, occasionally a commander would deem it necessary to move ships by day in areas where they could not provide air cover or flak platforms, and the enemy had significant air assets, and the result was predictable : transports and escort hit, damaged and sunk in many many cases. For those of you who are not aware of the effectiveness of land based air I suggest you (and I mean this literally) go to the library and do some reading. Fire in the Sky has been mentioned many times by people fortunate enough to have it in their library, this book is totally focussed on the air war in the South Pacific, and would be very enlightening.

UV is not ahistorical. The very effectiveness of land based air against shipping in the game essentially proves it. A tactical consideration that ALL major commanders knew was DOMINANT in the Pacific does not get to be that way because it involves an ineffective tactic.

I will not concede anything to anyone on this point. What IS ahistorical is the way some players are using their fleets and shipping in near total disregard for LBA. That was grounds for cashiering in the real war.

LBA was effective against ships during the war, and commanders who failed to realize this did not last long; some of them did not live long either. Admiral Nagumo, the famous Admiral who commanded the Carrier Striking Force that attacked Pearl Harbor, and which was decimated at Midway, ended his days as the commander of the Saipan airbase under heavy American air and bombardment attack, in a small dusty bunker, far and away from his beloved fleet that he failed to use aggressively enough in most instances.

[dgaad]

"In the last days of the battle of Saipan, General Saito ordered the banzai attack. In his bunker during the evening of July 6th, he drew blood with his sword, which is a Japanese custom for the defeated commander, and then, the adjutant shot the general. This same fate was dealt the hand of Admiral Nagumo nearby. The American fleet had hunted the admiral, who destroyed Pearl Harbor, and settled the score."

From . . . Battle of Saipan - The Final Curtain
David Moore, Cdr. USN (Ret.)

[Burch]

Dgaad,
I agree completely, I do not see the effectiveness of LBA as a game buster or as unbalancing. It was the central ideal in the war plans in the Pacific. In fact I see it as an important factor that must be considered and planned for, used etc.
On a related note..
I posted in a couple of other threads regarding American heavy and medium bombers about jap fighters v. US bombers not being ahistorical. Given the bombing altitudes v. the fighter ceiling, armor/durability, and the fact that many US bombers were also very heavily armed I think the game works fine. (using the bombers at 1000ft where they are more effective exposes them to more flak and thus more loss) The Germans shot down these same bombers in droves with superior flak and fighters that were more durable and had heavier armourment. ei. BF-109 with 20mm cannon in nose.

ANother point just crossed my mind. We are using heavy bombers against TF's at low altitudes which is ahistorical for the most part. However, given the bomb loads of these aircraft, if in WW2 pilots had focused on naval attacks and flown at 1000ft I beleive they would have scored a comparable number of hits to what we see in the game. I use this analogy: It is easier to hit something with a shotgun than with a rifle.

[Black Cat]

exactly right Dgaad.

If I may add and perhaps paraphrase to your comments, this is a Game that attempts to aproximate the Pacific War in a local area in a long, though fixed time period.

The player is the Theatre Commander, although he can if he wants direct each ship & bomb Sq. I usually don`t chose to do this.

To me the Fun in the Game is about making Strategic decisions that take into account the enemy positions, strengths and capabilities, based on the assets the Game provides just like the real world Commanders of 1941 in the SP.

If the US has super powerful LBA, but weak Naval Forces find a way as the US player to use that effectively in defense or offense.

If the Japanese player has powerful Naval assets, including amphibious forces, find a way to use that.

Do you want to Crush the US in 1942 ? , Just inflict major damage on his units while preserving your forces ?, or essentially harrass him while building a defensive ring ( the Historical Japanese choice ) and get a minor win on points.

US player, do you roll the dice and seek an all out sea battle like Midway before the 4 big Japanese CV`s show up ?, just play for time while awaitng the massive buildup of forces while denying the Japanese Airbases within range of Australia and try for a minor win on points?

..and as in the real World only time and playing the Campaign Game _many_ times through from both sides will tell if you made the right choice and enable the player to see how the AI and the design decisions, including low level B-17s, play out.

IMHO with the Game only recently out to a large group, there sure seems to be a lot of people who want to second guess Gary Grigsby on making a Computer Wargame on the Pacific War

[Ron Saueracker]

Examples:

B 17s during Phillipines invasion. Colin Kelly an example.

Prince of Wales and Repulse. Sunk by "fabulously trained" IJN naval aviators in planes armed with ship killing torpedoes. A bomb hit was scored on Repulse but was not a factor in the outcome. Ships were led by a man who had little respect for airpower and had no aircover.

Early USN carrier raids on Japanese possesions. Any losses suffered by USN?

Land based attacks on Crace's cruiser force in Coral Sea battle. Any losses suffered by Allies?

Land based attacks by B 17s vs invasion fleet at Midway. Ineffective although "a" hit was scored.

Land based attacks by B26, TBF, and SB2U vs Nagumos force. Any hits?

Land based attacks on Mogami and Mikuma at Midway. Any hits other than the Vindicator crashing Mikuma? Damage meeted out by Navy aircraft.

Land based attacks vs US invasion fleet at Guadalcanal. Jarvis, Mugford and G.F. Elliot. only casualties. Try to reproduce this in UV.

Guadalcanal Campaign. Threat of LBA was more decisive than actual accomplisments.

Now. Granted, Allied LBA becomes overpowering beginning in 1943. More and better planes. More and better pilots. Improved weapons and tactics developed as a result of poor performance and combat experience. Lessened enemy air presence, both in quality and quantity. All these were a factor. This was not the case in early 1942, where the IJN carrier fleet in UV gets clobbered within LBA range as sure as Guinness stinks on the way out.

One other thing. If LBA is supposed to be so darned powerful, why does the AI ignore it, with Matrix standing by this annomally?

[dgaad]

Originally posted by Ron Saueracker
Examples:

B 17s during Phillipines invasion. Colin Kelly an example.

Nice try. Note that what I've talked about involves the now famous "Dgaads Law of Two of Three Conditions to Nullify LBA" :

1. Overwhelming CAP
2. Overwhelming FLAK
3. Action to nullify or reduce LBA effectivness (air attack on airbases, naval bombardment attacks, ground attacks).

You must have two of these conditions present to move in open sea within LBA range. If these conditions are more or less in equilibrium, you have the potential for a carrier battle.

In 1941 at the PI, the Japanese attacked Clark Field, and also had overwhelming CAP.

Prince of Wales and Repulse. Sunk by "fabulously trained" IJN naval aviators in planes armed with ship killing torpedoes. A bomb hit was scored on Repulse but was not a factor in the outcome. Ships were led by a man who had little respect for airpower and had no aircover.

How many players are doing this in the game? Probably less now that the issue has been hashed over so much

Early USN carrier raids on Japanese possesions. Any losses suffered by USN?

The Marshalls did not have much in the way of Japanese LBA at that particular time. I believe the USN was aware of the lack of Japanese LBA at these bases. However, note also that this carrier group did NOT go to help out at Wake Island in December, 1941 precisely because of the threat of enemy LBA which could not be countered to reduce risk to acceptable levels. So, the Marines were left to die.

Land based attacks on Crace's cruiser force in Coral Sea battle. Any losses suffered by Allies?

Crace's surface force was spotted and attacked by bombers from Rabaul, but suffered little damage. This was an exception to the three conditions because essentially the Allies had no alternative. The mere presence of Crace's force did result in the turning back of the PM invasion force. After the indecisive carrier battle, the invasion force never turned around and headed to PM.

"Crace adopted a tight defensive formation as he knew he had been spotted. The scout plane overestimated the strength of his group as 2 battleships, 1 heavy cruisers and 4 destroyers which alarmed VADM Inoue who had now lost his covering carrier. Crace’s ships were ready when planes (probably B-26 Marauders) were sighted out of range on a parallel course. That afternoon TG17.3 was attacked in waves by Nell bombers, escorted by Zeros, from Rabaul. Ships took individual action and all weapons contributed to the fierce barrage - even the 8-inch guns fired off the Semi-AP rounds which had been loaded ready for surface action against the transports and escorts. All cruisers had extremely narrow escapes from torpedoes and Chicago had one pass beneath it. Australia and Hobart (nicknamed "The Flaming Angel") had learned well from past experiences of aerial attack, and despite the ferocity of the attack - just as severe as that which sank Repulse and Prince of Wales in December 1941 - there was little damage and few casualties. As the surviving torpedo bombers retired, the group came under heavy attack by high level bombers. Australia, perfectly straddled at the centre of the impact square of about 20 500-pound bombs, almost disappeared from view beneath columns of water. On Australia’s bridge, over 50 feet above the waterline, men were knocked to their knees by the weight of water raining down on them.

As those on Australia marvelled at their escape they saw another salvo of bombs fall about 800 yards ahead of them, narrowly missing Perkins. The attackers had a distinctly familiar appearance - they were B17s from Townsville! The ships monitored the radio reports of the B17s which claimed great success against a Japanese naval squadron. Photographs taken from the B17s, which had been flying above the Japanese planes, clearly showed Australia at the centre of the frame! Lieut.-Gen. Brett refused to acknowledge the mistake, despite the evidence, even though senior officers and records later referred to it. Shadowed during the afternoon, the squadron was spared further attacks as commanders in Rabaul had accepted pilots’ reports that the squadron had been wiped out. As night approached, Crace took the squadron south, then west."

Land based attacks by B 17s vs invasion fleet at Midway. Ineffective although "a" hit was scored.

However, here again the Japanese were engaging all three conditions : they had massive CAP, FLAK, and were using their Carrier and Invasion groups to rapidly nullify the LBA threat. It would have worked, except for Mr. McCluskey and his erstwhile group of Dauntlesses.

Land based attacks by B26, TBF, and SB2U vs Nagumos force. Any hits?

Nope, a bunch of near misses. Note, Midway was a very carefully planned operation to take a defended LBA airbase. Note the results.

Land based attacks on Mogami and Mikuma at Midway. Any hits other than the Vindicator crashing Mikuma? Damage meeted out by Navy aircraft.

Midway LBA cannot be counted as "effective" LBA in any case. Too few aircraft, small airbase, etc.

Land based attacks vs US invasion fleet at Guadalcanal. Jarvis, Mugford and G.F. Elliot. only casualties. Try to reproduce this in UV.

I don't understand the point here.

Guadalcanal Campaign. Threat of LBA was more decisive than actual accomplisments.

And therein lay the essential dilemma. The threat of LBA was dominant in tactical minds throughout the war. The mere threat of LBA caused massive changes, mods, alterations to plans. Why? Because no one would seriously consider using fleets in the open sea against effective LBA unless there was no alternative to accomplishing the tactical goal.

[dgaad]

Here is a picture of the Midway base, just before the outbreak of the war :



Seems like a he11 of a battle to be fought over such a small place.

[dgaad]

Now, lets make this thread even more interesting.

I invite all Japanese players to do the following :

Follow Dgaad's Law (above) and report the results. Try something new or novel, something that hasn't been mentioned or talked about yet, and report the results. Use LR Cap with 2 or 3 groups of zeros on Rabaul to guard transport TFs, and have those TFs loaded with high aa value destroyers, and tell us whether the transport got though. Try something other than sending lightly guarded transport groups willy nilly in LBA range. Try forming up what I call a "starshell" :

1. A transport group that has adequate flak.
2. A surface group to protect the transport and all other groups.
3. A bombardment group.
4. A carrier group with the fighters set to Escort / CAP 90% (this means 90% of your planes are guarding the hex and NOT escorting bombing group attacks).
5. Form a couple of transport groups with 1 or 2 low value ships loaded up with supplies only. These are your distraction forces, you care NOT whether these groups are attacked.
6. Form a bait group of PCs to go in front of your starshell.
7. Optional = a minesweeper group.

Set groups 2-5, and 7, to "follow" group 1. Set group 1 to a tactically viable target or standoff point. Set group 6 to travel 2-3 hexes in front of the starshell (this takes some guesswork).

If you have LB CAP, set at least one fighter group to fly cap over your carrier group (it will add CAP protection to everything in the hex over and above what is already provided by your carrier group).

How effective are B-17s against your "starshell" ?

If you are frustrated that this seems to be the only way to get through enemy LBA, welcome to the Frustrated Historical IJN Commanders Club, aka The Lonely Ships Club.

And if you are in fact going to do any of the above, do so honestly, do your best to succeed. Don't set your operation up to fail just to prove your point.

[Ron Saueracker]

If it was UV, the Australia's keel would be in the picture, not her as designed to float profile.

Not enough LBA or overwhelming CAP the reason for Midway LBA to fail. Remember to read and quote ALL the posts, not just the ones which PROVE your hypothesis. Many players have highlighted occasions which have occurred in UV where "packets" of three LBA bombers (either side) avoid 100+ CAP and smite the enemy. Not so at in real life at Midway.

What I meant by my Guadalcanal comment (Jarvis, Mugford GFElliot hit, try this in UV) is that in UV, the IJN LBA consistantly does better than historically. I find IJN LBA a little too vicious as well.

CAP seems to do little vs Allied level bombers. LBA just blasts through, usually taking down more CAP fighters than they loose, even unescorted. What does CAP have to do with anything?

I agree with your third law, dgaad, but the first two sound good but have little use vs Allied LBA as it stands now.

Wake Island: Fear of LBA may have been one thing, but other elements were present. Complete lack of intel made risking only fleet units worth anything on an operation and objective which could not be sustained anyway utter folly. The fact that there was a change in command of the Pacific Fleet (Kimmel got the political yardarm) at that very moment also had more of an impact than LBA threat. Hiryu and Soryu were enroute to cover the second attempt on Wake as well, far more deadly than LBA. Lack of confidence in the Navy equipment and training could also be sighted. Hit and run raids were done primarily to blood the air groups. One can only guess the result of of a CV battle between 3 US carriers with prewar size airgroups of F2A Buffaloes and F4F3s and pilots with no combat experience vs 2 IJN carriers still pumped from Pearl Harbor!:eek:

By citing the lack of LBA in the Marshalls during the raids, one can't use this conversley to explain Midway's LBA failure in favour of LBA.

B 17s at Midway were not fighting off massive CAP, unless of course the Zuiho was much more powerful a carrier than is generally thought.

Have not tried to figure out how to apply quotes etc into my posts so excuse the lack of style.:p

[Didz]

Originally posted by Ron Saueracker
Examples:

Prince of Wales and Repulse. Sunk by "fabulously trained" IJN naval aviators in planes armed with ship killing torpedoes. A bomb hit was scored on Repulse but was not a factor in the outcome. Ships were led by a man who had little respect for airpower and had no aircover.

I am not sure which man you refer to above but I am told that the Admiral Tom Phillips commanding Force Z not only realised he was sailing to his death but wrote his son a farewell note informing him of his regret at being forced to undertake such an ill conceived mission.

The Prince of Wales and Repulse were in fact ordered to sea by the British Government notably Churchill against the better judgement of the men on the ground.

In that respect there were definite similarities to the opening stages of the Falklands conflict where the military and Naval commanders were driven by political rather than military goals.



And as usual when these decisions lead to fatal consequences it is the man on the ground who gets the blame rather than the man or woman who gave him his orders. Particularly when the man on the ground has made the ultimate sacrifice on behalf of his political masters.

[dgaad]

Originally posted by Ron Saueracker
If it was UV, the Australia's keel would be in the picture, not her as designed to float profile.


Have not tried to figure out how to apply quotes etc into my posts so excuse the lack of style.:p

Ron : I can't go over every consideration and every factoid in every post. I believe quoted everything you said. I generally respond to poster who argue historically and / or logically.

[Sabre21]

Seems as if the debate on this subject could go on and on. Dgaad, you bring up many good points, but on just a couple issues I would disagree.

Your statement about the Lexington not going to the aid of Wake Island due to LBA is not correct. There were a series of events that took place that eventually doomed the 4th Marine Def Bn, none of which had anything to do with Japanese LBA.

US TF 14 with the Saratoga was late arriving from the west coast and was the CV assigned to assist in the relief of Wake. TF 11 with the Lexington was enroute to raid the Marshalls. These missions were conceived by Admiral Kimmel prior to his relief on 17 Dec. After Admiral Pye took over (awaiting Nimitz arrival), he recalled the Lexington on the 20th and ordered it to link up with the Saratoga. The Tangier, loaded with munitions and supplies, and TF 14 was already half way to Wake. That same day Admiral Kajioka departed Kwajalein with his patched up invasion force that included 2 of Nagumo's carriers. They just happened to beat the Americans to Wake and when Pye learned that Jap CV's were in the vicinity, ordered the Sara and Lex to engage the enemy CV's while the Tangier went in to evacuate the Marines. TF 14 was 600 miles east of Wake at the time refuelling and TF 11 was even further east. On the 22nd at 7 am Major Devereux radioed Pearl that "the enemy is on the island issue in doubt". TF 14 was still 400 miles away when the Marines surrendered 30 minutes later. Both TF's were then ordered to return to Pearl.

Japanese LBA was not a factor here.

Another issue is the title of this thread....that all the Pacific operations were based on gaining airfields for LBA. This isn't true either. Although many of the operations were in fact for that...Saipan for bombing Japan, Pelilieu for supporting the invasion of the Philipines...many were conducted to deny the use of airfields...such as Guadacanal...while others were politically motivated...such as the retaking of the Philipines. Ulithi was taken for it's natural harbor and made into a huge fleet support base. Okinawa was taken as the last stepping stone for the invasion of the home islands, and although airfields play an important role, it was the proximity to Japan as an assembly point for the million plus troops needed for the invasion is why it was taken.

Anyways..I just wanted to point out a few descrepancies.

As for the LBA in the game, I too am in the opinion that the low altitude effectiveness of allied B17 LBA is too good for this time frame. I read thru your thread above and that is a good story and shows how effective air can be. It's just that the B17's are over rated in the game and too many ppl are taking advantage of it when doing ppem.

Sabre21

[Ron Saueracker]

I must agree that this LBA issue is at an impasse and is leaning towards belaboured. It was kinda fun though, Humphrey! Like most grognards, you sure stick to your guns. I do too, but I'd have to fetch more ammo. But hey, what good is flak anyway?:D

Keep up the inciteful and cogent posts.
RON

[dgaad]

Originally posted by Sabre21

Another issue is the title of this thread....that all the Pacific operations were based on gaining airfields for LBA. This isn't true either. Although many of the operations were in fact for that...Saipan for bombing Japan, Pelilieu for supporting the invasion of the Philipines...many were conducted to deny the use of airfields...such as Guadacanal...while others were politically motivated...such as the retaking of the Philipines. Ulithi was taken for it's natural harbor and made into a huge fleet support base. Okinawa was taken as the last stepping stone for the invasion of the home islands, and although airfields play an important role, it was the proximity to Japan as an assembly point for the million plus troops needed for the invasion is why it was taken.


Sabre21

Guadalcanal was a battle started by the attempt of the Japanese to capture a suitable location for an airbase and build it. This attempt failed.

The tactics of the retaking of the Phillipenes involved, howver, first taking Saipan and Guam, and THEN taking Leyte, and the purpose of taking Leyte was to provide land based air cover for the main invasion of Bataan - Lingayen Gulf which occurred several months later. Lets not start a debate about the wisdom of going after Formosa without first getting airbases in the PI.

Okinawa was also going to be a gigantic airbase from which the landings in *southern* Japan could be covered by land based air. After these landings, *southern* Japan airbases, now flying US LBA, would then be expected to provide LBA cover for the landings near Tokyo scheduled for later in 1946.

In every campaign, the central tactical consideration was the possession, use or denial of land airbases.

No one in their right mind would think of capturing something that was ONLY an anchorage or assembly area which could NOT be converted into, or covered by, airbases with LBA.

[Ron Saueracker]

Well done, as always.

[Chiteng]

Actually Dhaad you are incorrect:

During what we have come to call the Battle of Coral Sea:

Fletcher took BOTH CV w attendant ships into CV strike
range of Rabual. In doing so, he came within EASY range of
Nells and Bettys. So how did he survive? They didnt see them.
It is that simple. They didnt detect the US CV.

The Raid from the CV had to fly over the mountains to get there
but they did it.

Of course they accomplished nothing at all. But they still did it.

[DSandberg]

Originally posted by dgaad


... purpose of taking Leyte was to provide land based air cover for the main invasion of Bataan ...

Okinawa was also going to be a gigantic airbase from which the landings in *southern* Japan could be covered by land based air. After these landings, *southern* Japan airbases, now flying US LBA, would then be expected to provide LBA cover for the landings near Tokyo scheduled for later in 1946.

In every campaign, the central tactical consideration was the possession, use or denial of land airbases.

I have to wonder if this is in part a non sequitor. You give a number of examples of the strategic importance of airbases for LBA as a justification for LBA being so effective against naval shipping. Your position seems to indicate that the primary need for LBA was to oppose the operations of enemy task forces, as opposed to enemy air forces, ground units, support, etc. But it seems to me that all of the examples you gave position LBA assets as an important component for supporting LAND-BASED combat, not just (or even primarily I suspect) naval actions.

Furthermore, in the operations you mentioned, it seems to me that the primary job of LBA in naval actions would be to protect the invasion fleet from attacks by enemy aircraft. I don't think anyone is protesting the value of long-range CAP over an invasion fleet ... but once again, it doesn't necessarily support an inevitable conclusion that LB level bombers were expected to be of great value against enemy fleets.

It might be interesting to see the number of LBA sorties by level bombers flown against land assets (airfields, troops, port facilities, etc) versus those flown against actual embarked shipping during the UV period.

- David

[Ron Saueracker]

Dgaad is ex USAAF! Must be.

[dgaad]

Originally posted by DSandberg


I have to wonder if this is in part a non sequitor. You give a number of examples of the strategic importance of airbases for LBA as a justification for LBA being so effective against naval shipping. Your position seems to indicate that the primary need for LBA was to oppose the operations of enemy task forces, as opposed to enemy air forces, ground units, support, etc. But it seems to me that all of the examples you gave position LBA assets as an important component for supporting LAND-BASED combat, not just (or even primarily I suspect) naval actions.

Furthermore, in the operations you mentioned, it seems to me that the primary job of LBA in naval actions would be to protect the invasion fleet from attacks by enemy aircraft. I don't think anyone is protesting the value of long-range CAP over an invasion fleet ... but once again, it doesn't necessarily support an inevitable conclusion that LB level bombers were expected to be of great value against enemy fleets.

It might be interesting to see the number of LBA sorties by level bombers flown against land assets (airfields, troops, port facilities, etc) versus those flown against actual embarked shipping during the UV period.

- David

No one said that airbases did not have more than one purpose : dominating the sea in addition to providing ground support, CAP, and what not. The premise holds that the primary tactical consideration for all major operations was the capture and use of, or denial of, airbases.

If you could dominate the air, you could largely determine the course of the campaign and its success on land, sea and in the air.

Take note of the concept of Island Hopping, which was the main concept behind all allied operations in the South Pacific from April 1943 to Mid-1944 (Operations Toenails, Cherry Blossom, Cartwheel, and the "Elkton Plan"). The purpose of all these operations was to capture or support the capture of useable airbases, deny enemy airbase facilities, and cut off enemy land units from supply by sea or air by dominating the airspace and therefore the sea. It was ultimately successful. Rabaul and other Japanese bases in the area were cut off and essentially useless for the rest of the war after the completion of Cartwheel in early 1944.

The bottom line is this : airbases, for whatever need or purpose, were the central tactical and strategic consideration in the Pacific War. If you had sufficient air assets, you could very nearly prohibit enemy surface or transport activities by making the return on their operations very small in comparison to the risk and loss of ships. There would have been an exception to this had Japan actually been invaded, because then the emphasis of operations would have been on dominating a relatively large landmass, and to dominate landmasses in that period you need large land forces, air support to land forces was an important but secondary consideration. The atomic bomb, and perhaps the wisdom of some Japanese leaders who saw the futility of continuing the war, obviated the need for this campaign.


(Ex Army. But my tank column was strafed by two A-10s in a field exercise, so I became pro-air )

[dgaad]

Originally posted by Chiteng
Actually Dhaad you are incorrect:

During what we have come to call the Battle of Coral Sea:

Fletcher took BOTH CV w attendant ships into CV strike
range of Rabual. In doing so, he came within EASY range of
Nells and Bettys. So how did he survive? They didnt see them.
It is that simple. They didnt detect the US CV.

The Raid from the CV had to fly over the mountains to get there
but they did it.

Of course they accomplished nothing at all. But they still did it.

Fletcher never got closer than about 550 nautical miles from Rabaul, well outside US CV CAG range.