Something of more concern

[Chiteng]

I am concerned about how the Land bases make a determination to attack.

Allow me to ask:

Why were the CV so much more powerfull than a land base
of equal size?

Because a CV can MOVE. The facts are that during the war it was very hard to beat a very simple tactic that the Navy used.

Because they KNEW where the Land base was, and DIDNT need
to waste time searching for it, they could use a night approach
and launch before dawn and strike the airbase.
That simple tactic was not available to the airbase. The airbase
HAD to search for the enemy before they could make an attack.

However I am beginning to wonder how the strike sequencing works in UV. I am beginning to think that the game doesnt
make that distinction. That worries me FAR more than say the
B-17 problem. I have NEVER caught LBA on the ground.
Maybe I am just not looking in the right place. Sure when the base was so damaged that the planes can not fly, THEN you
can catch them on the ground. But I have never seen that
when the base was operational. Especially not with the all
important fighters.

Now it is always possible that I am simply WRONG here.
In fact I am hoping I am.

[Rob Roberson]

Originally posted by Chiteng
I am concerned about how the Land bases make a determination to attack.

Allow me to ask:

Why were the CV so much more powerfull than a land base
of equal size?

Because a CV can MOVE. The facts are that during the war it was very hard to beat a very simple tactic that the Navy used.

Because they KNEW where the Land base was, and DIDNT need
to waste time searching for it, they could use a night approach
and launch before dawn and strike the airbase.
That simple tactic was not available to the airbase. The airbase
HAD to search for the enemy before they could make an attack.

However I am beginning to wonder how the strike sequencing works in UV. I am beginning to think that the game doesnt
make that distinction. That worries me FAR more than say the
B-17 problem. I have NEVER caught LBA on the ground.
Maybe I am just not looking in the right place. Sure when the base was so damaged that the planes can not fly, THEN you
can catch them on the ground. But I have never seen that
when the base was operational. Especially not with the all
important fighters.

Now it is always possible that I am simply WRONG here.
In fact I am hoping I am.

I dont think you are right about never catching enemy planes on the ground during airfield strikes..I can recall bombing Moresby and knocking out Havocs on the tarmac (much to my joy because they were killing me in my PBEM).

[dgaad]

Originally posted by Chiteng
I . . . attack . . . The facts . . . very hard . . . a simple tactic . . . to waste time.

. . .

However I am beginning to wonder how . . the game doesnt
make that distinction. That worries me FAR more than say the
. . . problem . . . I have NEVER caught.

Maybe I am just not . . . Sure when you . . .
can catch them. . .

But I have never seen that . . . I am simply WRONG here.

So Chiteng, you made a big deal about Fletcher sailing into CV CAG range of Rabaul . . . my map proved you wrong on that point . . . you continued to dissemble. Please don't jump in with clutter like that if you really don't know, and admit when you are incorrect.

[dgaad]

Originally posted by Chiteng
I am concerned about how the Land bases make a determination to attack.

Allow me to ask:

Why were the CV so much more powerfull than a land base
of equal size?

Because a CV can MOVE. The facts are that during the war it was very hard to beat a very simple tactic that the Navy used.

However, a land base cannot be sunk in a minute. A CV can. You can't use torpedos against a land base, but CVs are very vulnerable to torpedos, and a single torpedo can put a carrier out of action. CVs = highly vulnerable.

In a battle between a land base and a CV of equal size and capability, I'll take the land base. A few good hits on the CV and your base is gone. Takes much more than that to even impair operations at a land base.

[Rob Roberson]

Give me the carrier. You are right a land base cant sink. But lets face it at least early in this game carriers are way way more powerful. Land Bases are by in large small, lack good facilites, spare parts and not a bunch of aircraft. Carriers come with 60 to 90 planes, mechanics, good food and pretty superior facitiles overall. I guess it depends what is more important to you, offense or defense...

[Chiteng]

It will take time to get the correct date Dhaad. Something I cant do here. I must go to where I can find a copy of Morrison.
I havent conceeded anything at all.

If you are NOT going to contribute to my threads please feel free to not respond.

You map proved nothing, I suspect you will escape on the grounds that the action was prior to Coral Sea. So be it.

Doesnt mean it didnt happen and it sure doesnt mean your correct.

I do admit when I am wrong, something you have yet to do.
And by my standards several people HAVE proven you wrong.

[Sabre21]

Oh boy here we go again:)

Hi Chiteng...having played both sides a lot I have seen planes of all types get destroyed on the ground....B17 drops on Rabaul taking out Bettys and Nells and Betty's from Rabaul taking out Hudsons and B25s/B26s. I play primarily against the AI (dont have time or the inclination for pbem) and tend to stick with the tactics used during that era...like B17's bombing from 20k or so against land targets and using my B25/B26's and Betty's in an anti shipping role..only on a couple occasions where I forgot to set the altitude and target did my B17's go after ships. Although I experimented with a few varying tactics like going in at 5000 feet on airfields, I never tried to manipulate the game in such a manor as to give me such one sided effects as hitting a CV group at 1000 feet. No commander during the war would have tried this knowing that it was suicide for the aircrews...fortunately we weren't put into a position to sacrifice crews in this way..but no telling what might have occured if Hawaii or the W Coast was seriously threatened.

Andy

[Capt Cliff]

I believe it was RADM Wilson Brown in the Lexington that attacked Rabaul on 2/20/42. He got within 400 miles of Rabaul and got jumped by 18 twin engine bombers, CAP got 16 of them. Since he was out of range for a counter strike and he lost surprise he retreated. See "How they won the War in the Pacific, Nimitz and his Admirals", E.P. Hoyt page 64. Also remember that Rabaul was not the base it was in February of 42 as it was in August of 42.

Back to the main thread, Chiteng is right there should be a difference in how a TF air group attacks a base and how a base air group attacks a TF. The TF air group attack should be easier, at least in finding the target, weather permiting. But from the others perspective the above historical example shows how LBA can thwart a TF's attack on a base.

[dgaad]

Originally posted by Rob Roberson
Give me the carrier. You are right a land base cant sink. But lets face it at least early in this game carriers are way way more powerful. Land Bases are by in large small, lack good facilites, spare parts and not a bunch of aircraft. Carriers come with 60 to 90 planes, mechanics, good food and pretty superior facitiles overall. I guess it depends what is more important to you, offense or defense...

The premise was stated by you guys a carrier of "equal capacity" with an airbase. Now you are changing the premise to a carrier with superior facilities, etc.

It has nothing to do with liking offense or defense. In a battle between a carrier and a land base, both having equal capacity, the carrier will lose operational ability after a few hits. The land base will continue to function after taking dozens of hits.

This is like a battle between an Elefant and a Stuart.

The only advantages a carrier has is mobility and stealth. Mobility would matter if the land base had to chase the carrier. It doesn't. Stealth gives the carrier potentially the advantage of first strike. Stealth is soluable with searches. Even if the carrier gets first strike, you are not going to knock out the airbase. Your planes will have to return to the carrier, giving away your position.

[dgaad]

Originally posted by Capt Cliff
I believe it was RADM Wilson Brown in the Lexington that attacked Rabaul on 2/20/42. He got within 400 miles of Rabaul and got jumped by 18 twin engine bombers, CAP got 16 of them. Since he was out of range for a counter strike and he lost surprise he retreated. See "How they won the War in the Pacific, Nimitz and his Admirals", E.P. Hoyt page 64. Also remember that Rabaul was not the base it was in February of 42 as it was in August of 42.

Chiteng said, in reference to the Battle of the Coral Sea, that Fletcher came within US CV Carrier Air Group range of Rabaul. Flether never manuvered the carrier group closer than 525 nautical miles of Rabaul during the period May 4th to May 9th.

Cliff, I believe you are correct, that Chiteng has confused the earlier raids with the Coral Sea battle. Also IIRC the approach to Rabaul was from the east northeast, not the south southeast as was the relative position on May 7. This may have been part of the whole Marshalls raiding operation at the end of January, early February, not sure. None of the bases were in the shape they would be in within several months. Do you have a map of the earlier raids?

[Chiteng]

Oh there are alot of tactics that make the absolute statement
questionable. I would argue that a night approach
and launch then the carrier turns around and high tails it OUT of there. The strike force goes in, makes the attack,
we assume at least SOME effect on the base assuming they find it, and tries to catch up with the CV. The Base has the distinct
disadvantage of having two LONG routes to travel.

It isnt that easy.

[dgaad]

"While Halsey and Fletcher dealt blows to the Japanese in the Marshall and Gilbert Islands, Admiral Nimitz sent Lexington with two cruisers and seven destroyers on a far-reaching mission. Under the command of Vice-Admiral Wilson E. Brown Lexington would first escort the tanker Neosho to a rendezvous with Admiral Halsey’s returning force, then head south to escort a convoy to Canton Island. Leaving port on January 31, Lexington’s orders were changed only two days later, when her part in the Neosho escort was terminated upon determining that Halsey would go back to Pearl non-stop. Brown would head for Canton and establish offensive patrols there. Then, on February 6, new orders arrived on Lexington. From this day on Brown was to be part of the South Pacific force under Vice-Admiral Leary, under the direct control of Washington’s Admiral Ernest King. Brown, the senior Vice-Admiral, would command Lexington’s force at sea; Leary the remaining forces.

Brown’s plan was it to solve his take of covering the connection San Francisco – Australia by attacking the newly-captured Rabaul on New Britain, off the east coast of New Guinea. The only forces that Leary could add to Brown’s Task Force 11 were the four cruisers and two destroyers of the ANZAC Squadron under Rear-Admiral Sir John Crace RN, which however lacked the fuel oil to head north with Brown. The Admiral took off alone for his launching point north-east of Rabaul.

The forces defending the town were part of the Fourth Japanese Fleet, the South Seas Forces, possessed eighteen G4M Betty bombers and twenty-six fighters, as well as a search group of four Mavis flying boats.
Brown hat set his time of attack for February 21, but on February 20, Lexington still being on course north, the ship’s radar detected a single airborne contact. The Mavis, as it was identified, was quickly blown from the sky by combat air patrol fighters. Nevertheless, it wasn’t a good sign. Certainly, the Japanese would now send out their own forces to attack Lexington and her task force.

Indeed, at Fourth Fleet Headquarters in Truk, Vice-Admiral Inoue was less than pleased with the new situation. Readying his available units, prominently four heavy cruisers of the 6th Division, he ordered a strike conducted from Rabaul. Seventeen unescorted, bomb-laden Bettys launched.

When these attackers reached Brown at 1542, the Admiral had already decided to break off his attack. Now, his fighters led by radar intercepted the Japanese. Lieutenant Butch O’Hare shot down five of the attackers, others took down another ten; no hit was scored on Lexington, and O’Hare was awarded the Medal of Honor.
Not by a fair margin was this mission a Japanese success: Rabaul, at least in the South Pacific, was the most powerful base, and if Rabaul could not defend itself, little could be expected from other bases. The Bettys, shields of the defensive strategies against the American fleet, had been shot down with all too great ease. The lightning quick concentrations of aerial firepower, primary pillar of the perimeter defense, had not materialized. At the same time, losses incurred could only be replaced, and Rabaul not be brought up to its determined full strength. All of this were obvious signs for the coming months. "

Later, in March :

"Compared to Enterprise’s, the three weeks that Yorktown spent between February 16th and March 4th, were completely boring. Task Force 17, as the Yorktown formation was known, left Pearl Harbor on February 16 bound for Canton, to serve as a reserve for either Brown or Halsey.
There it remained until, on February 27, Fletcher received news that he was to meet with Task Force 11 and Vice-Admiral Brown north of New Caledonia. A second carrier was urgently needed in the South Pacific.

The originator of this deployment was Admiral Brown himself, who, after his aborted raid against Rabaul, cabled Nimitz that he advised against any further raids unless two carriers were available. Now, with two carriers, Brown amplified his message: two carriers were necessary, but he did not consider it wise to strike Rabaul at this time.

But Admirals Leary, King, and Nimitz prevailed: Brown would attack Rabaul at any rate, on March 10. An attack in the early hours of the day, before and during dawn, a specialty of the Pacific Fleet, would hit Rabaul and the airfield at Gasmata. Brown would approach from the South, hoping for better chances there.
However, as the combined fleet of Task Force 11 headed north through the Coral Sea, Brown received news of a Japanese landing on the Gulf of Huon near the cities of Lae and Salamaua. Those were dangerously close to the Allied New Guinean foothold at Port Moresby, though separated from it by the Owen-Stanley-Mountains.
Brown decided to hit this new target of opportunity, trusting the Japanese not to expect any sort of attack least of all a carrier attack across the precluding Owen Stanley ranges. He hoped to catch the Japanese flatfooted – and he was right.

From out of the restricted waters of the Gulf of Papua, off Port Moresby, the two carriers launched 104 planes at around 0800 on March 10. Heading through a pass through the almost impassable Owen Stanleys towards Lae and Salamaua, the air groups split into their squadrons. The Scouts would take Lae; Bombers and Torpedo Squadrons would take Salamaua, were the larger shipping concentrations were expected.

The Japanese were caught in the most complete surprise imaginable. Except for a few seaplanes, there was no CAP overhead. The two air groups, coming in at 15 minutes difference, sent three transports to the bottom and damaged most of the rest of the enemy fleet, at negligible losses. As Brown hurried out of the Gulf of Papua, he had won the materially most important victory of the Pacific Fleet to date.

Following these operations, the two carriers parted. Lexington, after two months at sea, headed for Pearl Harbor. Yorktown stayed in the South Pacific, there to cover the vital link between the U.S. and Australia.
As Lexington returned to Pearl Harbor, however, there was a rude surprise waiting for Brown: on the orders of Admiral King in Washington, now CNO besides COMINCH, he was relieved effective immediately of command of the Lexington group. Apparently, reasons of health were the prime consideration of King’s. "

This was not the Battle of the Coral Sea, and once again the carriers were OUT of range of Rabaul, remaining south of New Guinea.

We now have descriptions of three carrier actions in and around Rabaul from the period of February to May, 1942. At no time did US CV TFs come within CAG range of Rabaul, the closest approach being 400 miles in February, well outside US CV CAG range.

[dgaad]

Originally posted by Chiteng
Oh there are alot of tactics that make the absolute statement
questionable. I would argue that a night approach
and launch then the carrier turns around and high tails it OUT of there. The strike force goes in, makes the attack,
we assume at least SOME effect on the base assuming they find it, and tries to catch up with the CV. The Base has the distinct
disadvantage of having two LONG routes to travel.

It isnt that easy.

Carrier high tails it out of there after launching its planes? Just where are your planes suppose to go after they've made their attack? You have to stay in range to recover your strike.

Your returning planes give away your TF location. At best, you get one free strike. If you stay in range to recover your strike, which takes time, the land airbase will hit you. A few hits and the carrier TF is finished as a launching platform, and the battle is over.

Stop arguing about which is more powerful and test it.

Use the editor to create one land airbase with 100 aviation support, plenty of support and supplies, along with enough AA units to give it the AA capacity of a Carrier TF. The aviation support unit should probably also have radar, since the carrier does. Give that land airbase 90 planes : 36 fighters, 36 dive bombers, and 18 torpedo planes. Now create an enemy TF of one carrier supported by 2 destroyer divisions, one CA and one CL.

Land base will win, every time. Land base is usually hit first, but the carrier gets sunk or put out of action.

[Kingfish]

Seventeen unescorted, bomb-laden Bettys launched...When these attackers reached Brown at 1542, the Admiral had already decided to break off his attack. Now, his fighters led by radar intercepted the Japanese. Lieutenant Butch O’Hare shot down five of the attackers, others took down another ten; no hit was scored on Lexington,

Had this been UV you would have had 2 Bettys downed by cap, 2 more damaged by Flak, and Lexington limping away from 2 torp hits. :p

[dgaad]

Originally posted by Kingfish


Had this been UV you would have had 2 Bettys downed by cap, 2 more damaged by Flak, and Lexington limping away from 2 torp hits. :p

True. True.

[Nikademus]

Originally posted by Chiteng
I am concerned about how the Land bases make a determination to attack.

Allow me to ask:

Why were the CV so much more powerfull than a land base
of equal size?

Because a CV can MOVE. The facts are that during the war it was very hard to beat a very simple tactic that the Navy used.

Because they KNEW where the Land base was, and DIDNT need
to waste time searching for it, they could use a night approach
and launch before dawn and strike the airbase.
That simple tactic was not available to the airbase. The airbase
HAD to search for the enemy before they could make an attack.

However I am beginning to wonder how the strike sequencing works in UV. I am beginning to think that the game doesnt
make that distinction. That worries me FAR more than say the
B-17 problem. I have NEVER caught LBA on the ground.
Maybe I am just not looking in the right place. Sure when the base was so damaged that the planes can not fly, THEN you
can catch them on the ground. But I have never seen that
when the base was operational. Especially not with the all
important fighters.

Now it is always possible that I am simply WRONG here.
In fact I am hoping I am.

I dont believe that this problem exists in UV the way it did in PacWar (air attacks in "general", not just carrier based) where it proved often virtually impossible to catch any player's planes on the ground.

I've done a couple "Indian Ocean" type forays deep into the Coral sea with my carrier forces and i've managed to do some serious damage to enemy air assets while they were still on the ground.

A big factor which helps here is the date.......early in the war, many if not all of these bases wont have radar set up yet so yes, it does allow a carrier to exploit it's "stealth/mobility" feature to good effect.

Another obvious advantage......Another equally vital component is if the CV group can shuttle in a numerically (and qualatively) superior air force to attack the enemy air base, it spells trouble for the airbase.

Early in UV (and if playing the hypo #17) the trouble is for the Allies who have scarce air assets (especially fighters) and only level bombers that dont carry torps (Level bomber acc problem aside) but things begin to get less secure for the IJN as time goes by and more and more planes are delivered.

But sticking to the question....yes, i have had sucess using my carriers to catch aircraft at their best state (for me that is!).....i.e, at rest.

Less success though using land based aircraft though, in part due to lesser #'s, thereby less of a "pulse" attack from an unexpected quarter.

[dgaad]

I often wonder why Japanese PBEM players are not somewhat more aggressive with their carrier groups, especially early in the war. There are huge gaps in Allied air defenses, particularly if you slip past the Luganville / Gili Gili area. You can't "switch around" land based air squadrons and expect to catch the Japanese TF, the act of moving the LBA fatigues them to the point of being unable to launch.

[Chiteng]

Well the problem with that:

It often happens with the Japanese that the Vals are in range or the kates are in range BUT the USA planes are not.

It always happens that the Japs launch some weak strike
and run smack dab into a CAP wall. Losing the strike
and getting the existing planes chewed up.

That is what happens if you are hyper-agressive.

You MUST be carefull. The replacement rate doesnt favor the Japs.

[HMSWarspite]

There has been an assumption that a CV can 'launch in the dark, and strike at dawn' since it doesn't have to search for the land base. This requires the CV to prepare the strike in the dark, launch and form up in the dark, navigate to target (in the dark, and radio silence). At UV stage in the war, night CV operations were not that advanced. In reality, the CV launches at dawn. It still gives a couple of hours head start on the land base, and the LBA will spot the CV just about the time its base gets attacked. However, unless extremely lucky, or VERY good, the CV strike will not knock out the base. The return strike will (in all probabilty) do severe damage to the CV group.

Course, all this is in RL, don't know what happens in fantasy land:)

Anyone who thinks CV outweighs LBA on equal basis is welcome to have a PBEM with me - sounds like fun!:D

[Chiteng]

Ever hear of Pearl Harbor?
That was a Carrier Strike.