two Germans in the Pacific - Sc17

[xj900uk]

Tokyo Express in the last qtr of 1942 managed a few unchallenged runs to Guadacanal at night. The bigger the flotilla though, the more likely of being spotted/challenged by the US pickets
Even with the advange of radar, the US had great difficulty in distinguishing small fast Jap destroyers from the clutter of Slot islands

[RGIJN]

I agree it could a bit depend on the Commanders and their aggressiveness. And maybe the setup: if both TFs have orders "do not react" maybe its possible that they will exchange just flag or light signals instead of shells and torpedoes...[;)]

[xj900uk]

The Japanese were certainly masters of stealth & infiltration.  Running the Tokyo Express, their orders were always not to engage if possible even though Admiral 'Tiger' Tanaka, the architect behind them, was one of the most agressive leaders on the IJN staff.  They wanted the supplies to get through to their troops on Guadacanal,  not engage the USN in a shooting match.
Just been looking a few things up, at one point in October-November the supplies were coming in virtually daily,  individual fast DD's were almost impossible to detect (although they couldn't carry much, just a few oil drums filled with rice & ammo which they used to heave over the side & hope they drifted onto the Japanese-held beach) but when they sent through bigger fast convoys the US invariably got lucky and found them

[RGIJN]

Strange enough Tanaka Raizo was edged out by the Imperial High Command after the Guadalcanal campaign... Aside from his naval abilities he always put his mind straight out, but criticism certainly ruined your career in the closeminded Japanese system of hierarchy...

So dumbs like Kondo or Nagumo ruled over the fleets and brought them to the bottom. Command was assigned by seniority instead of skill. Quite foolish...
IMHO, even the "great" Yamamoto Isoroku wasn´t the genius he is claimed to be often. His complex & troublesome battleplans mostly depended on too much IFs and lacked some sense for the (expected) enemy strength, fitness and determination. He and Nagumo Chuichi along with some bad luck lost the battle of Midway. And bad luck was the scrawniest factor in this equation!

[xj900uk]

IMHO Yamamoto was a strategic genius,  there was nothing wrong with his idea to engage the USN in a 'decisive battle', although I grant you his complex plans and strategy were often too much that - ie too complex and inflexible.  Also they assumed to a high degree the US doing exactly as predicted (which they usually didn't) and the IJN commanders on teh ground (which wasn't actually Yamamoto's fault but rather the prodcut of poor training at IJN staff college which tended to mould officers in a particular way & rigid line of thinking and discouraged 'thinking off the cuff') being able to carry them out exactly as planned.
HOwever,  Yamamoto made one serious error during his career, and that was to get the IJN sucked into a war of attrition over Guadacanal.  THe Japs should have either gone in in strength at the very beginning, or else cut their losses & pulled out. The IJN (partly through faulty intelligence) at first committed troops piece-meal and failed to fully inform (as usual) the Army of what was going on. After that both sides took horrendous losses in the campaign,  but the US could afford & replace them (with difficulty) and the IJN couldn't.  Also after Santa Cruz he stripped the carriers of their remaining air-groups, virtually every last experienced pilot off them, and sent them to Rabaul in c. late November to reinforce air operations SE down the Solomons slot.  They accomplished little and lost heavily, mainly through non-combat operational losses (the weather at that time of year was bad, with loads of storms).  Thus the depleted carriers were forced to start training new air groups basically from scratch, with only a handful of experienced pilots (mainly those returning from injury) to assist with the advanced training (which the Japs always carried out near the front lines).
The results,  by the time of hte Marianas Turkey shoot in mid-'44,  were obvious for all to see, with the new IJN pilots not being a patch on the old and thus the USN could shoot them down in droves (which they did).  I honestly believe this strategic error can be firmly laid at Yamamoto's door.
 
Nagumo, on the other hand, was a wiley opponent,  but he characterised many of the Japanese admirals (in interesting contest to the foot-soldiers and actual pilots, who were full of the Banzai spirit) by being overtly cautious, almost timid.  He was over-cautious at Pearl Harbour by not sending out the 3rd strike (either to hit the shore installations, docks or search for the US carriers one of which he could have found and sunk, having virtually no defensive CAP), and at Midway (admittedly aided by faulty reconissance) he dithered and dallied too long at the wrong time before deciding not to send out any strikes against the Yorktown (which had finaly been spotted) but rather waiting for his initial Midway strikes to return & turn around.  Thus the IJN were always off-balance (and genuinely unlucky) in a battle they should have walked

[RGIJN]

ORIGINAL: xj900uk
IMHO Yamamoto was a strategic genius, there was nothing wrong with his idea to engage the USN in a 'decisive battle', although I grant you his complex plans and strategy were often too much that - ie too complex and inflexible. Also they assumed to a high degree the US doing exactly as predicted (which they usually didn't) and the IJN commanders on teh ground (which wasn't actually Yamamoto's fault but rather the prodcut of poor training at IJN staff college which tended to mould officers in a particular way & rigid line of thinking and discouraged 'thinking off the cuff') being able to carry them out exactly as planned.

and

Nagumo, on the other hand, was a wiley opponent, but he characterised many of the Japanese admirals (in interesting contest to the foot-soldiers and actual pilots, who were full of the Banzai spirit) by being overtly cautious, almost timid. He was over-cautious at Pearl Harbour by not sending out the 3rd strike (either to hit the shore installations, docks or search for the US carriers one of which he could have found and sunk, having virtually no defensive CAP), and at Midway (admittedly aided by faulty reconissance) he dithered and dallied too long at the wrong time before deciding not to send out any strikes against the Yorktown (which had finaly been spotted) but rather waiting for his initial Midway strikes to return & turn around. Thus the IJN were always off-balance (and genuinely unlucky) in a battle they should have walked

As for the overall strategy, I agree that the japanese were doomed to force the US into a decisive clash ASAP. And yes, Yamamoto was well aware of that fact. Even before the war broke out he was rather against one and he was quite aware of the overwhelming power the US had to their avail.
And very often the japanese war was an issue of zero synergy between IJN & IJA. Both branches even were at enmity, impossible to grasp for me today. I think Yamamoto fought as best as he could against such "inbuilt" troubles, but did not succeed very well in this.

But his genius failed extraordinary in the design stage of the MI operation. Aside from the countless ifs and expectations (as said before), he was just too overconfident to see the perils of that move. When the plan was exercised in a battle game in early April, the results were shocking. Even with a lot of the optimistic assumptions of the Americans applied, the IJN either lost badly or it came to a close call at the most. Though Y.I. sept aside any doubts, from that point on the commanding officer (Nagumo) lost any poise and spirit. The "decisive" battle was almost doomed at that time already. And after Coral Sea things worsened when KB was cut short of CarDiv 5 (SHOKAKU & ZUIKAKU) plus that they were certain to have sunk two US fleet carriers. But though a bold battle in a "decisive" manner actually demands bold perfomance (even more so considering the exercise games in April) the battle wasn´t postponed or the layout changed. Yamamoto even granted his fleet the luxury not to sail with ZUIKAKU. Though she was stripped of some A/C and pilots, spare AirGroups would have been available to substitute them at ZUIKAKU (at least temporarily).
But no, they got to sail into desaster undaunted.

"Shattered Sword" is one of the greatest books ever on this topic. It´s thoroughly researched and makes a clean sweep with many rumors and wrong "facts" around the Battle of Midway.

ORIGINAL: xj900uk


HOwever,  Yamamoto made one serious error during his career, and that was to get the IJN sucked into a war of attrition over Guadacanal.  THe Japs should have either gone in in strength at the very beginning, or else cut their losses & pulled out. The IJN (partly through faulty intelligence) at first committed troops piece-meal and failed to fully inform (as usual) the Army of what was going on. After that both sides took horrendous losses in the campaign,  but the US could afford & replace them (with difficulty) and the IJN couldn't.  Also after Santa Cruz he stripped the carriers of their remaining air-groups, virtually every last experienced pilot off them, and sent them to Rabaul in c. late November to reinforce air operations SE down the Solomons slot.  They accomplished little and lost heavily, mainly through non-combat operational losses (the weather at that time of year was bad, with loads of storms).  Thus the depleted carriers were forced to start training new air groups basically from scratch, with only a handful of experienced pilots (mainly those returning from injury) to assist with the advanced training (which the Japs always carried out near the front lines).
The results,  by the time of hte Marianas Turkey shoot in mid-'44,  were obvious for all to see, with the new IJN pilots not being a patch on the old and thus the USN could shoot them down in droves (which they did).  I honestly believe this strategic error can be firmly laid at Yamamoto's door.

You´re right. They truly suffered tremendously... The valve for the lethal loss of blood later on was set in 1942 already.

[xj900uk]

In the run-up to the battle of Midway, the Japanese were suffering with what Yamamoto himself described as 'The Victory Disease' and were woefully overconfident. True they coudl have had the Zuikaku manned with scratch airgroups made up of the survivors of the Coral Sea, which may have tipped the balance but on the other hand could have made a disaster even worse if that too had been lost. Overall though the Japanese could have got her ready for the fleet to sail but decided they wouldn't need her - a sure sign of overconfidence.
It is true also that Yamamoto and Nagumo didn't get on. Both were pragmatic realists who knew the overall strength of the US would eventually crush the Japanese if not checked, however they went about it in vastly different ways. Yamamoto knew their ownly realistic hope was to knock the US carriers out ASAP then try to negotiate a peace (which the US would proably never have accepted anyway!) whilst Nagumo was so concerned about the building US strenght he was loath to commit any Japanese assets or forces in case they were lost. He wrote in his diaries a fascinating quote which sums up his whole attitude to the conflict : "It is my duty to protect the fleet for His Majesty, it will be invaluable in the long battles that lie ahead so it should not be thrown away in any kind of reckless gamble".
Nagumo both privately and publically saw Midway as just that - a reckless gamble - and the outcomes of the war-game/simulations experimented with in April which saw most of his ships lying on the bottom or else seriously damaged did little to improve his feelings about the outcome of the whole enterprise. Yamamoto was actually advised to relieve him of command (possibly to be replaced by the commander of the Hiryu who went down pointlessly with his ship at Midway, can't remember his name at the moment but he was certainly less cautious and served as Nagumo's 2nd-in-command during the battle) and after toying with the idea decided against it, as it would almost certainly dent the fleets morale somewhat

[RGIJN]

ORIGINAL: xj900uk

Yamamoto was actually advised to relieve him of command (possibly to be replaced by the commander of the Hiryu who went down pointlessly with his ship at Midway, can't remember his name at the moment but he was certainly less cautious and served as Nagumo's 2nd-in-command during the battle) and after toying with the idea decided against it, as it would almost certainly dent the fleets morale somewhat

Yamaguchi Tamon was the man. To be honest, I am not entirely sure what would have happen with him in command. But worse than with Nagumo certainly not. He was a guy full of fighting spirit and he was admired in the navy due to his capabilities. I think this fellow would have attacked with any plane available (no matter if bomb or torp armed) instead to sit and wait. But he could not even out the flaws of the general battle design either. Maybe he would have received some pounding too. Most probably I guess. But had he lost the entire KB?
Would be interesting though!

[xj900uk]

Thanks, I'd 4gotten his name.
There's an interesting note to the battle which has been largely overlooked, and Yamaguchi oddly enough could actually have rescued it for the Japanese before they'd thrown it away. The moment the third signal from the Jap spotter plane circling above TF 17 reached the bridge which caused so much consternation and confusion "Unidentified force appears to be accompanied by an aircraft carrier, bringing up the rear", it was also flashed across to Yamaguchi in the Hiryu (being 2nd in command, he also got all the important signals after they'd been received in the Akagi).
He immediately flashed back to Nagumo 'Permission to launch strike against unidentified target immediately' and was refused. At that time the Hiryu still had it's second strike of about 18 Vals and a dozen or so Kates sitting on the deck waiting to go and armed with torpedo's and anti-shipping bombs (they'd been unable to strike down because of landing/rotating CAP planes, which is why they'd been slow to obey Nagumo's order half an hour before to send down the 2nd strike to the hanger & re-arm with GP bombs to hit Midway again). Also Kaga still had a good number of planes equipped with torpedo's and anti-ship bombs on deck as it too had had to delay because of rotating CAP.
If Nagumo had said 'yes, go' at that time, Hiryu could have launched 30 strike planes and Kaga at least 20 for the Yorktown. At that time the US were still in the process of launching their strike at maximum range, but the Japs could have got something away to hit them just after 8.15, and if the Hiryu and Kaga had had empty decks then in theory the returning Midway strike could have been turned around quicker at least on those two carriers.
But Nagumo said 'no', because there were very few escorts that could be spared to accompany it. Also the Japs had just beaten off several heavy attacks from Midway island and inflicted heavy losses on the undescorted US bombers & torpedo planes, so Nagumo felt he was justifying in refusing Yamaguchi's request to launch a strike until escorts could be available to accompany it. This feelign of justification was probably compounded less than an hour later when the three US TBD squadrons hoved into view and were decimated, in fact at that time until the SBD's winged down from overhead the Japs were probably quite justified in thinking they had won the battle of Midway.

Still, makes a fascinating question - what if Nagumo had agreed to Yamaguchi's request to launch early the moment a carrier was identified. As always though the cagey Nagumo played safe.
Incidentally, Yamaguchi did not survive the battle of Midway, he chose to go down with teh Hiryu despite the pleas of his officers and a huge sumo-wrestling champion petty officer threatening to bodily lift him up and carry him off the bridge, so popular he was with his men. He was last seen alone at the bow of the Hiryu just after it had been torpedo/scuttled by a Jap destroyer in the process of lashing himself to the anchor.

[RGIJN]

ORIGINAL: xj900uk

Thanks, I'd 4gotten his name.
There's an interesting note to the battle which has been largely overlooked, and Yamaguchi oddly enough could actually have rescued it for the Japanese before they'd thrown it away. The moment the third signal from the Jap spotter plane circling above TF 17 reached the bridge which caused so much consternation and confusion "Unidentified force appears to be accompanied by an aircraft carrier, bringing up the rear", it was also flashed across to Yamaguchi in the Hiryu (being 2nd in command, he also got all the important signals after they'd been received in the Akagi).

He immediately flashed back to Nagumo 'Permission to launch strike against unidentified target immediately' and was refused. At that time the Hiryu still had it's second strike of about 18 Vals and a dozen or so Kates sitting on the deck waiting to go and armed with torpedo's and anti-shipping bombs (they'd been unable to strike down because of landing/rotating CAP planes, which is why they'd been slow to obey Nagumo's order half an hour before to send down the 2nd strike to the hanger & re-arm with GP bombs to hit Midway again). Also Kaga still had a good number of planes equipped with torpedo's and anti-ship bombs on deck as it too had had to delay because of rotating CAP.
If Nagumo had said 'yes, go' at that time, Hiryu could have launched 30 strike planes and Kaga at least 20 for the Yorktown. At that time the US were still in the process of launching their strike at maximum range, but the Japs could have got something away to hit them just after 8.15, and if the Hiryu and Kaga had had empty decks then in theory the returning Midway strike could have been turned around quicker at least on those two carriers.

But Nagumo said 'no', because there were very few escorts that could be spared to accompany it. Also the Japs had just beaten off several heavy attacks from Midway island and inflicted heavy losses on the undescorted US bombers & torpedo planes, so Nagumo felt he was justifying in refusing Yamaguchi's request to launch a strike until escorts could be available to accompany it. This feelign of justification was probably compounded less than an hour later when the three US TBD squadrons hoved into view and were decimated, in fact at that time until the SBD's winged down from overhead the Japs were probably quite justified in thinking they had won the battle of Midway.

Still, makes a fascinating question - what if Nagumo had agreed to Yamaguchi's request to launch early the moment a carrier was identified. As always though the cagey Nagumo played safe.
Incidentally, Yamaguchi did not survive the battle of Midway, he chose to go down with teh Hiryu despite the pleas of his officers and a huge sumo-wrestling champion petty officer threatening to bodily lift him up and carry him off the bridge, so popular he was with his men. He was last seen alone at the bow of the Hiryu just after it had been torpedo/scuttled by a Jap destroyer in the process of lashing himself to the anchor.

Did I forgot to accent some? [;)] As always, the damn "what if" thing. Most exciting & interesting anyway.

Unfortunately, there is no Battle of Midway scenario available in UV to try out some concepts...! [:(]

[xj900uk]

Maybe there will be in another game one day. How about Carrier Strike, doesn't that have a Midway scenario? And there's always WiP...

[RGIJN]

ORIGINAL: xj900uk
And there's always WiP...

yeah, there are dozens and dozens of micro-midways each turn... [>:]

[;)]

[RGIJN]

last turn saw the 2nd US barge sunk by IJA patrol bombers, a failed US sub attack on one of my destroyers and a massive attack by US medium bombers at Irau.
Still vast amounts of ships in the Woodlark / GG area. Something is going on there.

[RGIJN]

overall situation unchanged.

But due to the quite numerous barge losses, my skippers of these nutshells got new orders: FIGHT BACK!

wondering what impact these marvellous 25mm "gun" made this time? (I think another barge killed one of Franks subs already very early in our game) [&:]




(four hits were achieved, actually)

[fuelli]

This time the sub survived. With 1pt. of sys damage. Beside this the war is limited to barge hunting. Last turn saw a whole barge fleet getting strafed by Hudsons. Rossel will have to wait for its supplies a little bit longer.

[RGIJN]

ORIGINAL: fuelli

This time the sub survived. With 1pt. of sys damage.

sad! Maybe even the ammo suffers from this war of attrition...

Meanwhile, Frank ordered another INF echelon to drop into death for pure intel reasons. I guess he´s still evaluating over the next place to contest... [X(]

[RGIJN]

war situation unchanged. Minor moves on both sides, mostly of economical nature. Daily usual barge kill, levelling around 1...5 wrecks each turn.
Few days ago, Frank bombed a FT try into the middle Solomons. These morons decided to unload in broad daylight... Even more sad since these two DDs were brandnew deliveries from Japan, "wharf-fresh" and equipped with some radar sets [:@]

No hide underneath the clouds anymore....

[RGIJN]

despite severe pounding both victims survived. These patrollers at 100 feet are quite a pesky annoyance!
Though I have some experienced (>80) squadrons on search too, their success is very meager if any. Two or three hits so far in the whole campaign... [:(]





Air attack on TF


Allied aircraft
Hudson x 3
Beaufort x 31
A-20G Havoc x 1


Allied aircraft losses
Beaufort x 1 damaged

Japanese Ships
DD Makinami, Shell hits 12, Bomb hits 3, on fire, heavy damage
DD Onami, Shell hits 12, Bomb hits 2, on fire, heavy damage

Japanese ground losses:
Men lost 21

Attacking Level Bombers:
4 x Beaufort at 100 feet
1 x A-20G Havoc at 100 feet
4 x Beaufort at 100 feet
4 x Beaufort at 100 feet
0 x A-20G Boston at 100 feet
4 x Beaufort at 100 feet
2 x Beaufort at 100 feet
0 x A-20G Havoc at 100 feet
3 x Hudson at 100 feet
3 x Beaufort at 100 feet
4 x Beaufort at 100 feet
1 x Beaufort at 100 feet
0 x Beaufort at 100 feet
0 x A-20G Boston at 100 feet
4 x Beaufort at 100 feet
0 x A-20G Havoc at 100 feet
1 x Beaufort at 100 feet

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

[RGIJN]

today, the rate of loss was eight barges due to direct attack on them in "The Slot". Seriously I cannot LRCAP such barge convoys. This sound too ridicoulous to me. Or should I?

Furthermore 91 medium bombers visited Irau...





AFTER ACTION REPORTS FOR 09/27/43

Weather: Partly Cloudy

Air attack on Irau , at 42,43


Allied aircraft
B-25J Mitchell x 91


no losses

Japanese ground losses:
Men lost 236

Port hits 4
Port fuel hits 1
Port supply hits 4



--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Air attack on TF, near Posarae at 31,35


Allied aircraft
Hudson x 28
Beaufort x 37
A-20G Havoc x 15
A-20G Boston x 5


no losses

Japanese Ships
AG 5089
AG 5033, Shell hits 20, Bomb hits 14, heavy damage
AG 5030, Shell hits 8, Bomb hits 4, on fire, heavy damage
AG 2068, Shell hits 12, Bomb hits 4, on fire, heavy damage
AG 5052, Shell hits 8, Bomb hits 7, on fire, heavy damage
AG 5068, Shell hits 8
AG 5069, Bomb hits 4, on fire, heavy damage
AG 5048, Bomb hits 10, heavy damage
AG 5087, Shell hits 16, Bomb hits 5, on fire, heavy damage
AG 5050, Shell hits 4


--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

[RGIJN]

turn 520 - 1st of October 1943.

Over the past few turns I felt some inkling that proved to be right today. So I ordered Recon missions over Noumea, which revealed the absence of some US CVs. And just they came up to a point SSE of Guadalcanal... I guess there is something fancy going on.