Capturing Land Air Bases was THE CENTRAL STRATEGY of the Pacific War.
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Wilhammer
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- Location: Out in the Sticks of Rockingham County, North Caro
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1. Japanese central strategy was to create a perimeter, dploy air and submarine assets supported by flying boat bases, to dtetcec and attrit the US fleet on its way to the "Big Battle" that the Japanese would win.
2. US stategy, from December 1941 to about November 1942 was to stop the Japanese advance and secure the LOC/LOS to Australia.
3. After November 1942, both sides realized things had changed.
US strategy became a mix of pushing them back and moving to isolate Japanese bases to defeat them in detail, and later, to isolate ones like Rabaul.
The Japanese strategy became one of huddle down and inflict as many casualties as possible to break the American will to fight, a "spiritual' war.
The US strategy, with the well needed support if its Allies, was a 'business' approach to warfare. The goal was to deploy in such a manner as to isolate Japanese bases to defat them AND to develop staging areas both for fleet logisitics and strike advances.
The need for bases was obvious, so it became the focus of the operations; to secure bases for ease of logistics and to gain air/naval superiority in a region to cover the next offensive, while the Japanese strategy became one of prevention and infliction.
The Americans had no interest in running shoestring operations. It took 7 months to secure Guadalcanal, an operation that was an even match and resulted in it taking too long to complete. That just would not do.
2. US stategy, from December 1941 to about November 1942 was to stop the Japanese advance and secure the LOC/LOS to Australia.
3. After November 1942, both sides realized things had changed.
US strategy became a mix of pushing them back and moving to isolate Japanese bases to defeat them in detail, and later, to isolate ones like Rabaul.
The Japanese strategy became one of huddle down and inflict as many casualties as possible to break the American will to fight, a "spiritual' war.
The US strategy, with the well needed support if its Allies, was a 'business' approach to warfare. The goal was to deploy in such a manner as to isolate Japanese bases to defat them AND to develop staging areas both for fleet logisitics and strike advances.
The need for bases was obvious, so it became the focus of the operations; to secure bases for ease of logistics and to gain air/naval superiority in a region to cover the next offensive, while the Japanese strategy became one of prevention and infliction.
The Americans had no interest in running shoestring operations. It took 7 months to secure Guadalcanal, an operation that was an even match and resulted in it taking too long to complete. That just would not do.
Great Discussion
First of all, interesting thread. I've only skimmed the details so forgive me if I have missed some major points. Also, you'll have to excuse me for going right back to the start of the thread but I only picked it up this morning and it applies nicely to the game I was playing last night. Which I think fits nicely with Dgaad's three rules (which I endorse fully)
At any rate, in Mid August the AI has captured Lunga and has it up to level 2. I had retained Gili Gili early on with a little luck. It's up to size 5. I have also built a fighter strip at Rennell I. Because I have been conservative I have lots of LCU and lots of shipping. I have two objectives - occupy Dobadura so that I can build a bomber base in range of Rabaul. Try to retake Lunga before it gets any bigger.
I decided that a massive two pronged assault as follows
1. Convoy Aussie troops, engineers and supplies to Dobadura. These convoys to be protected by strong surface force to provide AA. And covered by LR CAP from Gili and Buna (also operating as a fighter base)
2. Invade Lunga. Invasion fleet covered by strong escort to provide AA and a bombardment force. US CV's (all 5 of them) to provide CAP as well as fighters from Rennell
The whole thing to be preceded by CV's attacking the base at Lunga and all B-25's, B-17's and Hudsons operating against Rabaul for a few days prior to the fleets coming in range.
Sounds just like what Dr. Dgaad ordered. Right.
I'll spare you the gory details, but the plan started to come off the rails when the IJN CV's put in an appearance (they had been conspicuous by their absence for several weeks). There ensued a large, entertaining, and largely indecisive carrier battle that left the IJN carriers licking their wounds and heading north, and the US with two CV's (Lex and big E) still operating a/c (although much reduced complements). Several of the aircraft from the other carriers ended up on Rennell.
On the other side of the map, the bombing offensive was delayed a little as Rabaul decided to have a go at putting Gili out of action. Fair enough, instead of bombing Rabaul into submission I move every available fighter to Gili and try to wear them down that way. Eventually I also move the bombers back in and start a series of daily 60 bomber raids on Rabaul.
The upshot of all that, is that the invasions are delayed for a few days while the "wrinkles" are dealt with. In the end I end up with
- A invasion fleet headed for Lunga protected by CA's and DD's with about a CAP of about 25 provided by CV's and Rennell I. After pounding Lunga for three days with carrier strikes and a naval bombardment
- A troop convoy headed for Dobadura protected by CA's and DD's with a CAP of about 40 provided by Gili and Buna. After the Rabaul bombers have been in action for over a week against my strong defenses at Gili and have had their runways smacked for a couple days running by 60 Medium and heavy bombers.
In short, I managed to go some distance to fulfilling all three of the aforementioned conditions. The results:
Actaully not bad, after one lucky day where Rabaul was grounded by weather
the raids started. By and large the AI concentrated on the Lunga force. During the first day when the CAP was strong and Lunga was out of action, I think I only suffered a single DD torpedoed out of 5 strikes against the various forces.
On succeeding days things unravelled at little bit - fatigue due to LR CAP, other attrition, a surface combat group that decided to run for it and left the CAP umbrella (the usual stuff) and losses rose a little but I would say I averaged far less than 1 hit per air strike for five days running (the battle is actually still in progress).
Overall, I would say that it is proof of the positive side of the argument - that the LBA threat can be managed (using the approach recommended by Dgaad).
As to the negative argument - that LBA is too effective to begin with - I have much less to contribute there. I do not pretend to be an expert on the subject of how effective various tactics were or were not historically. I think it is valid to remember that the apparent ineffectiveness of LBA against shipping early in the war may have been due to tactical considerations other than just the effectiveness of the weapon (control of the air, availability of supply, flak, doctrine constraining attacks to certain altitudes etc).
It is also worth pointing out that we may (as war gamers) achieve ahistorical results simply because we have the benefit of hindsight and years of tactical analysis that commanders at the time did not. This is probably especially true for new tactics and weapons such as airpower vs shipping. Like it or not, we know what eventually worked and what didn't and we are more likely to adopt the eventually effective tactical approach from the beginning rather than by trial and error as the commanders of the time were forced to do. (For instance would commanders of the time committed their limited LBA resources FULLY to attacking any naval TF in range? Would they have implemented a doctrine of low level attacks irrespective of flak? etc.)
Perhaps the best argument in favour of this reasoning is that I tend to find that if I think and react along fairly historical lines, I tend to get fairly historical results. The game, does not, however force me to use these tactics and does not necessarily penalize me for not doing so. I
t is therefore possible to generate results which are "ahistorical" by trying "ahistorical" tactics. Does that mean the results are ahistorical? It could be argued (and will be) that it does. It also could be argued (and, no doubt, will be) that different tactics might have generated different results. I don't profess to be able to discriminate between the two...
I guess my bottom line is that the current system does generate results, which to my mind, are at least possible historically, if not probable. More than that, the game is a lot of fun to play.
The situation is US scenario 17. AI set to very hard. I also took a conservative approach and did not go after the IJN carriers early on. My strategy was to lure them into a confrontation with some LBA to try and wear them out somewhat before seeking an all out CV to CV battle - wasn't entirely successful (that's another story).1. Overwhelming CAP
2. Overwhelming FLAK
3. Action to nullify or reduce LBA effectivness (air attack on airbases, naval bombardment attacks, ground attacks).
At any rate, in Mid August the AI has captured Lunga and has it up to level 2. I had retained Gili Gili early on with a little luck. It's up to size 5. I have also built a fighter strip at Rennell I. Because I have been conservative I have lots of LCU and lots of shipping. I have two objectives - occupy Dobadura so that I can build a bomber base in range of Rabaul. Try to retake Lunga before it gets any bigger.
I decided that a massive two pronged assault as follows
1. Convoy Aussie troops, engineers and supplies to Dobadura. These convoys to be protected by strong surface force to provide AA. And covered by LR CAP from Gili and Buna (also operating as a fighter base)
2. Invade Lunga. Invasion fleet covered by strong escort to provide AA and a bombardment force. US CV's (all 5 of them) to provide CAP as well as fighters from Rennell
The whole thing to be preceded by CV's attacking the base at Lunga and all B-25's, B-17's and Hudsons operating against Rabaul for a few days prior to the fleets coming in range.
Sounds just like what Dr. Dgaad ordered. Right.
I'll spare you the gory details, but the plan started to come off the rails when the IJN CV's put in an appearance (they had been conspicuous by their absence for several weeks). There ensued a large, entertaining, and largely indecisive carrier battle that left the IJN carriers licking their wounds and heading north, and the US with two CV's (Lex and big E) still operating a/c (although much reduced complements). Several of the aircraft from the other carriers ended up on Rennell.
On the other side of the map, the bombing offensive was delayed a little as Rabaul decided to have a go at putting Gili out of action. Fair enough, instead of bombing Rabaul into submission I move every available fighter to Gili and try to wear them down that way. Eventually I also move the bombers back in and start a series of daily 60 bomber raids on Rabaul.
The upshot of all that, is that the invasions are delayed for a few days while the "wrinkles" are dealt with. In the end I end up with
- A invasion fleet headed for Lunga protected by CA's and DD's with about a CAP of about 25 provided by CV's and Rennell I. After pounding Lunga for three days with carrier strikes and a naval bombardment
- A troop convoy headed for Dobadura protected by CA's and DD's with a CAP of about 40 provided by Gili and Buna. After the Rabaul bombers have been in action for over a week against my strong defenses at Gili and have had their runways smacked for a couple days running by 60 Medium and heavy bombers.
In short, I managed to go some distance to fulfilling all three of the aforementioned conditions. The results:
Actaully not bad, after one lucky day where Rabaul was grounded by weather
On succeeding days things unravelled at little bit - fatigue due to LR CAP, other attrition, a surface combat group that decided to run for it and left the CAP umbrella (the usual stuff) and losses rose a little but I would say I averaged far less than 1 hit per air strike for five days running (the battle is actually still in progress).
Overall, I would say that it is proof of the positive side of the argument - that the LBA threat can be managed (using the approach recommended by Dgaad).
As to the negative argument - that LBA is too effective to begin with - I have much less to contribute there. I do not pretend to be an expert on the subject of how effective various tactics were or were not historically. I think it is valid to remember that the apparent ineffectiveness of LBA against shipping early in the war may have been due to tactical considerations other than just the effectiveness of the weapon (control of the air, availability of supply, flak, doctrine constraining attacks to certain altitudes etc).
It is also worth pointing out that we may (as war gamers) achieve ahistorical results simply because we have the benefit of hindsight and years of tactical analysis that commanders at the time did not. This is probably especially true for new tactics and weapons such as airpower vs shipping. Like it or not, we know what eventually worked and what didn't and we are more likely to adopt the eventually effective tactical approach from the beginning rather than by trial and error as the commanders of the time were forced to do. (For instance would commanders of the time committed their limited LBA resources FULLY to attacking any naval TF in range? Would they have implemented a doctrine of low level attacks irrespective of flak? etc.)
Perhaps the best argument in favour of this reasoning is that I tend to find that if I think and react along fairly historical lines, I tend to get fairly historical results. The game, does not, however force me to use these tactics and does not necessarily penalize me for not doing so. I
t is therefore possible to generate results which are "ahistorical" by trying "ahistorical" tactics. Does that mean the results are ahistorical? It could be argued (and will be) that it does. It also could be argued (and, no doubt, will be) that different tactics might have generated different results. I don't profess to be able to discriminate between the two...
I guess my bottom line is that the current system does generate results, which to my mind, are at least possible historically, if not probable. More than that, the game is a lot of fun to play.
Iain Christie
-----------------
"If patience is a virtue then persistence is it's part.
It's better to light a candle than stand and curse the dark"
- James Keelaghan
-----------------
"If patience is a virtue then persistence is it's part.
It's better to light a candle than stand and curse the dark"
- James Keelaghan
Good to hear from you, Iaian.
Seems the thread is starting to wander a bit, and I would like to try and refocus it. The issue was specifically, I believe, the effectiveness of B-17s at low altitude. I also believe that dgaad was continuing that discussion in the first post on this thread with his reference to "level bombers."
Those voicing concern over the effectiveness of the B-17 are concerned that it is either historically inaccurate to allow this and be as effective as it is or that there is some game imbalance (ineffective flak, etc.) that allows this to be more effective that it should be.
Mdiehl has argued that B-17s were used as skip-bombers or low altitude bombers, and they were effective. The relative lack of cites to this tactic indicates that it was used infrequently. So the question related to historical accuracy in allowing B-17 skip/low altitude attacks would seem to be: If they were as effective as mdiehl claims, why weren't they used more often? American (and other) commanders did not lack ingenuity, and so I for one have to believe that, if it would have been effective, they would have used it more than they apparently did. This could be due to strategic or grand tactical decisions such as "I would rather use B-17s to bomb airfields," in which case a UV game player should be able to make a different decision and use B-17s as murderously effective skip bombers. And/or the infrequent use of B-17s for these types of attacks may have been due to some other historical restraining factor that simply isn't reflected in the various game algorithms, in which case some tweaking is in order. This could be, for example, that the B-17 just was not maneuverable enough to hit fast-moving war ships so that it was only effective against transports. It seems to me that more historical research is in order.
The other question is whether the historical countermeasures to a B-17 skip bombing attack and other factors are programmed properly. Most of the players questioning this tactic have focused on flak and CAP, with the emphasis on flak. The CAP issue has been partly addressed with respect to small Betty raids against PM with overwhelming CAP airborne. A large number of people are comfortable explaining it as being small raid/big sky. Personally, I have a problem with this explanation when it comes to huge (spottable from great distance), lumbering (lots of time to react), and green B-17s not being seen against a uniformly blue or gray sea, but . . . With respect to flak, the question is whether the game properly accounts for all factors, such as size of the target, in the equation and that maybe tweaking the game would make flak more effective specifically against B-17s, thus providing a (historically accurate?) disincentive from using B-17s in this role. Could Ploesti provide any guidance (acknowledging the vast differences)?
dgaad's theorem is a good one, but it should work with respect to all LBA and, for that matter, all aircraft. The problem believed to be present by at least some players is that, when the dgaad factors are not present, B-17s seem to get a much larger benefit than any other classes or types of aircraft. The other thread on B-17s showed AARs in which Dauntlesses, which were designed and the crews trained for the sole purpose of bombing ships, were relatively ineffective while B-17s, attacking the same target at the same time, wreaked havoc. These results may be anomolous, but they are the issue. It does not appear that dgaad's theorem supplies the complete answer to the riddle, since one would expect both Dauntlesses and B-17s to be either effective or ineffective depending on the dgaad factors present.
Have we expended all that we have on the issue?
Seems the thread is starting to wander a bit, and I would like to try and refocus it. The issue was specifically, I believe, the effectiveness of B-17s at low altitude. I also believe that dgaad was continuing that discussion in the first post on this thread with his reference to "level bombers."
Those voicing concern over the effectiveness of the B-17 are concerned that it is either historically inaccurate to allow this and be as effective as it is or that there is some game imbalance (ineffective flak, etc.) that allows this to be more effective that it should be.
Mdiehl has argued that B-17s were used as skip-bombers or low altitude bombers, and they were effective. The relative lack of cites to this tactic indicates that it was used infrequently. So the question related to historical accuracy in allowing B-17 skip/low altitude attacks would seem to be: If they were as effective as mdiehl claims, why weren't they used more often? American (and other) commanders did not lack ingenuity, and so I for one have to believe that, if it would have been effective, they would have used it more than they apparently did. This could be due to strategic or grand tactical decisions such as "I would rather use B-17s to bomb airfields," in which case a UV game player should be able to make a different decision and use B-17s as murderously effective skip bombers. And/or the infrequent use of B-17s for these types of attacks may have been due to some other historical restraining factor that simply isn't reflected in the various game algorithms, in which case some tweaking is in order. This could be, for example, that the B-17 just was not maneuverable enough to hit fast-moving war ships so that it was only effective against transports. It seems to me that more historical research is in order.
The other question is whether the historical countermeasures to a B-17 skip bombing attack and other factors are programmed properly. Most of the players questioning this tactic have focused on flak and CAP, with the emphasis on flak. The CAP issue has been partly addressed with respect to small Betty raids against PM with overwhelming CAP airborne. A large number of people are comfortable explaining it as being small raid/big sky. Personally, I have a problem with this explanation when it comes to huge (spottable from great distance), lumbering (lots of time to react), and green B-17s not being seen against a uniformly blue or gray sea, but . . . With respect to flak, the question is whether the game properly accounts for all factors, such as size of the target, in the equation and that maybe tweaking the game would make flak more effective specifically against B-17s, thus providing a (historically accurate?) disincentive from using B-17s in this role. Could Ploesti provide any guidance (acknowledging the vast differences)?
dgaad's theorem is a good one, but it should work with respect to all LBA and, for that matter, all aircraft. The problem believed to be present by at least some players is that, when the dgaad factors are not present, B-17s seem to get a much larger benefit than any other classes or types of aircraft. The other thread on B-17s showed AARs in which Dauntlesses, which were designed and the crews trained for the sole purpose of bombing ships, were relatively ineffective while B-17s, attacking the same target at the same time, wreaked havoc. These results may be anomolous, but they are the issue. It does not appear that dgaad's theorem supplies the complete answer to the riddle, since one would expect both Dauntlesses and B-17s to be either effective or ineffective depending on the dgaad factors present.
Have we expended all that we have on the issue?

Ammunition Expended on #3!
Hmmm... I did some more reading and I would agree that a great deal of ammo has been expended. I suspect that the ammo lockers are pretty deep though...
Actually, if I take off my player hat and put on my physicist hat I would say that what we have here is a classic case of a discrepancy between the model and the experiment.
If I read Joel's posts correctly, Gary has created a very detailed model of air combat for WWII era technology which is based on a certain (probably large) number of variable parameters. Each base, ship, aircraft is created by assigning it values for the relevant parameters and then the model is run to determine an outcome. Problem is, when you set the parameters certain model configurations (Betty's vs. ships, B-17's vs. land installations, etc. you get good agreement with the experimental results (historical experience) However when you set the parameters for historical B-17's vs. ships and run the model you get results that "don't agree with experiment". So we then have the classic conundrum of trying to adjust a model which theory says is perfectly good to agree with a limited set of experimental data...
So, now everyone - RELOAD! - 1 round Fire For Effect!
Actually, if I take off my player hat and put on my physicist hat I would say that what we have here is a classic case of a discrepancy between the model and the experiment.
If I read Joel's posts correctly, Gary has created a very detailed model of air combat for WWII era technology which is based on a certain (probably large) number of variable parameters. Each base, ship, aircraft is created by assigning it values for the relevant parameters and then the model is run to determine an outcome. Problem is, when you set the parameters certain model configurations (Betty's vs. ships, B-17's vs. land installations, etc. you get good agreement with the experimental results (historical experience) However when you set the parameters for historical B-17's vs. ships and run the model you get results that "don't agree with experiment". So we then have the classic conundrum of trying to adjust a model which theory says is perfectly good to agree with a limited set of experimental data...
So, now everyone - RELOAD! - 1 round Fire For Effect!
Iain Christie
-----------------
"If patience is a virtue then persistence is it's part.
It's better to light a candle than stand and curse the dark"
- James Keelaghan
-----------------
"If patience is a virtue then persistence is it's part.
It's better to light a candle than stand and curse the dark"
- James Keelaghan
-
Wilhammer
- Posts: 401
- Joined: Fri May 24, 2002 4:00 pm
- Location: Out in the Sticks of Rockingham County, North Caro
- Contact:
The air model sucks, because:
1. No Duck season. Really. Migratory birds must impede air operations at certain bases at some time in the year. In no way do I see UV modeling this.
2. No ability to launch medium bomber raids on one way trips from CVs. I mean, really. Doesn't anyone remember the Doolitle raid?
3. Lack of German ME-109s in the game. There are several cases when allied pilots reported ME-109s were engaged. I have yet to see any in the game.
4. I don't have a fourth item, so I am done, for now.

1. No Duck season. Really. Migratory birds must impede air operations at certain bases at some time in the year. In no way do I see UV modeling this.
2. No ability to launch medium bomber raids on one way trips from CVs. I mean, really. Doesn't anyone remember the Doolitle raid?
3. Lack of German ME-109s in the game. There are several cases when allied pilots reported ME-109s were engaged. I have yet to see any in the game.
4. I don't have a fourth item, so I am done, for now.
Looks like the fix is in on the "How to Correct the Over Effectiveness of Low Level Bombing" thread, and it probably spells an end to this debate.
Of course, it still doesn't answer the question of how effective B-17s will should be on skip-bombing missions (or maybe it does, I don't know), but at least it probably fixes the problem players were having with the AI.
are the three changes that I believe have been made to date in the next patch to be released.
1) Experience gain for pilots on transport missions has been greatly reduced.
2) Repair times for level bombers have been increased, especially for heavy bombers.
3) The Norden bombsight modifier for US aircraft has been limited below 6000 feet and totally taken away below 4000 feet (it had a minimum altitude that was not being accounted for which Mike just realized that Gary had not accounted for).
In addition, Gary is going to make a change that will reduce morale for level bomber units that have a large proportion of their planes damaged and are set for low level bombing (probably under 5000 feet). Along with the changes above, this should cut down on the ability to keep bombers flying low level missions day after day (as well as their effectiveness). xt patch to be released.
Of course, it still doesn't answer the question of how effective B-17s will should be on skip-bombing missions (or maybe it does, I don't know), but at least it probably fixes the problem players were having with the AI.

. . . . And I agree with Wilhammer's post on the migrating flocks. In the Department of the Army's "Influence of Natural Occurrences on Military Operations" (from the famous Green Book collection), Robertson refers to several aerial attacks that were largely decimated by inadvertently colliding with migrating birds. One attack of 37 B-17s and 24 P-38s completely disappeared. The assumption was either that they got lost and crashed or that they were abducted by aliens ala Flight 19. Divers in Truk lagoon, however, found the flight at the bottom of the lagoon - almost still in formation - and have determined that massive bird strikes brought the entire flight down along with a number of interceptors.
Hillary, in his book "Destroyer Operations in the Pacific: January 1942- February 1942" recounts that the U.S.S. Smithsonjensen almost capsized when a flock of birds broadsided the ship in heavy fog.
Probably the funniest/saddest stories I can remember reading as a child was when a flight of B-24s released just over a heavy flock. The bombs detonated upon impacting the birds, which created a carpet of exploding bombs just below the bombers. Two of them sustained so much damage from the premature detonations that they crashed. Coincidentally, the two bombers were named Tweety-Bird and Bird Watcher (the latter being a double entendre with the nose art being a guy peering at a shapely lass through a spy glass).
Yes, fiction can be stranger than truth, and I think there should be some kind of random migratory bird flocks that move. I see it working kind of like the weather function.
Hillary, in his book "Destroyer Operations in the Pacific: January 1942- February 1942" recounts that the U.S.S. Smithsonjensen almost capsized when a flock of birds broadsided the ship in heavy fog.
Probably the funniest/saddest stories I can remember reading as a child was when a flight of B-24s released just over a heavy flock. The bombs detonated upon impacting the birds, which created a carpet of exploding bombs just below the bombers. Two of them sustained so much damage from the premature detonations that they crashed. Coincidentally, the two bombers were named Tweety-Bird and Bird Watcher (the latter being a double entendre with the nose art being a guy peering at a shapely lass through a spy glass).
Yes, fiction can be stranger than truth, and I think there should be some kind of random migratory bird flocks that move. I see it working kind of like the weather function.

If you are serious, then you have my sympathy.Originally posted by byron13
. . . . And I agree with Wilhammer's post on the migrating flocks. In the Department of the Army's "Influence of Natural Occurrences on Military Operations" (from the famous Green Book collection), Robertson refers to several aerial attacks that were largely decimated by inadvertently colliding with migrating birds. One attack of 37 B-17s and 24 P-38s completely disappeared. The assumption was either that they got lost and crashed or that they were abducted by aliens ala Flight 19. Divers in Truk lagoon, however, found the flight at the bottom of the lagoon - almost still in formation - and have determined that massive bird strikes brought the entire flight down along with a number of interceptors.
Hillary, in his book "Destroyer Operations in the Pacific: January 1942- February 1942" recounts that the U.S.S. Smithsonjensen almost capsized when a flock of birds broadsided the ship in heavy fog.
Probably the funniest/saddest stories I can remember reading as a child was when a flight of B-24s released just over a heavy flock. The bombs detonated upon impacting the birds, which created a carpet of exploding bombs just below the bombers. Two of them sustained so much damage from the premature detonations that they crashed. Coincidentally, the two bombers were named Tweety-Bird and Bird Watcher (the latter being a double entendre with the nose art being a guy peering at a shapely lass through a spy glass).
Yes, fiction can be stranger than truth, and I think there should be some kind of random migratory bird flocks that move. I see it working kind of like the weather function.
If you are not serious, then I laugh with you.
Last time I checked, the forums were messed up. 
