Dream on Terminus. I'll stake my rep against yours any time.
ORIGINAL: String
ORIGINAL: AdmSpruance
According to Jim Dunnigan and Albert Nofi from 'Victory at Sea", BB South Dakota had her AA complement upgraded in September 1942 from 16 5" guns, 28 1.1" guns, 6 20mm guns and 8 .50MGs to 16 5" guns, 16 40mm guns, 20 1.1" guns, and 36 20mm guns.
On October 26th, 1942 during the Batlle of the Santa Cruz Islands, BB South Dakota was attacked by at least 69 Japanese dive bombers and torpedo bombers and shot down 26.....by herself.
"The success of BB South Dakota on October 26th, 1942 was not only due to the volume of AA fire but to:
1)Effective radar fire direction
2)The resiliency and maneuverability of the ship
3)The intorduction of proximity-fuzed ammunition for her 5" guns"
Despite the performance of BB South Dakota at Santa Cruz, her volume of AA fire was considered inadequate.
In February 1943, her AA complement was upgraded to 16 5" guns, 68 40mm guns and 35 20mm guns. By March 1945, her AA had been upgraded to 16 5" guns, 68 40mm guns and 77 20mm guns.
And are those numbers supported by japanese records or are they just US claims?
ORIGINAL: Jim D Burns
ORIGINAL: witpqs
I saw the exchange. I then saw the information you presented, and it simply has too many assumptions in it.
I only made assumptions about the Coral Sea battle, and that was because hard data about the strike is hard to find. But I did post further info that cleared up some of those original assumptions. So what we’re left with is this:
Fact: 69 Japanese planes were in the strike package.
Fact: 27 of these planes were lost.
Fact: 4 of these 27 were lost to SBDs, regular Wildcat CAP played no role in shoot downs because they were out of position.
Fact: That leaves 23 that were flak losses.
So the only thing left we don’t know for a fact is how many of the 69 airframes were zeros. But even if we assume none were zeros and all 69 were strike aircraft, 23 out of 69 is a loss rate of 33%, well within the 30%-60% estimate I gave.
Of course I seriously doubt none of the 69 were zeros, so it was probably closer to 50% of the strike airframes being destroyed by flak. But I freely admit that is an assumption based on an educated guess.
However, nothing above is subjective opinion, it is all based on the actual numbers historically involved in the fight. And more than backs up what I said originally.
Jim
ORIGINAL: CV Zuikaku
So, still no any dedicated air combat testing?! [&:] I gave up! this thread may be locked as far as I am concerned...[:(]
ORIGINAL: Ron Saueracker
I'd love to see a few example where the various models are tested to their limits. Like a Turkey Shoot sized exchange. Let's just see what happens to airstrikes when they encounter the no longer uber CAP model.
ORIGINAL: mdiehl
"But I'm interested in large scale late war battles... just to see if there really aren't deathstars any more... "
I'm interested in what the expectations are . To a degree, late war allied "death stars" are completely consistent with historical outcomes. The IJN never came close to "air supremacy" in carrier operations. The USN achieved it, with the effect of gutting large well coordinated enemy airstrikes from mid 1944 onward.
ORIGINAL: mdiehl
Look, I agree it is a game.
There's no doubt that the Japanese had well trained pilots and *some* good tactical assets (and many absolutely miserably bad tactical assets). But the mantra that every Japanese combat unit was proportionally better at its job than every allied unit, at least through May 1942, is simply incorrect. People who've read ALOT about air combat and naval combat in the PTO, know damned well that from Dec 1941 through the end of 1942, "pilot experience" and "ship crew experience" had far less to do in determining the outcome of battles than did operational plans, logistics, fatigue, logistics, massive firepower, logistics, logistics, logistics, just plain rugged construction, and logistics.
ORIGINAL: hosho
ORIGINAL: mdiehl
Look, I agree it is a game.
There's no doubt that the Japanese had well trained pilots and *some* good tactical assets (and many absolutely miserably bad tactical assets). But the mantra that every Japanese combat unit was proportionally better at its job than every allied unit, at least through May 1942, is simply incorrect. People who've read ALOT about air combat and naval combat in the PTO, know damned well that from Dec 1941 through the end of 1942, "pilot experience" and "ship crew experience" had far less to do in determining the outcome of battles than did operational plans, logistics, fatigue, logistics, massive firepower, logistics, logistics, logistics, just plain rugged construction, and logistics.
Ok, we agree on one thing. It`s a game.
However, I can`t agree that pilot and crew experience doesn` t count. Here is my arument for it:
* The Corsair, as mentioned, had begun its first combat deployment, to Guadalcanal, in early 1943. The first recorded combat engagement was on 14 February 1943, when Corsairs of Marine Squadron VMF-124 under Major William E. Gise assisted P-40 Warhawks and P-38 Lightnings in escorting B-24 Liberators on raids against the major Japanese base at Bougainville at the northwest corner of the Solomons. Japanese fighters contested the raid and the Americans got the worst of it, with four P-38s, two P-40s, two Corsairs, and two Liberators lost. No more than four Japanese Zeroes were destroyed. A Corsair was responsible for one of the "kills", but it wasn't anything to boast about, since it was due to a midair collision. The fiasco was referred to as the "Saint Valentine's Day Massacre".
For more details please look at this link: http://www.vectorsite.net/avf4u.html
This site claims that 11:1 ratio for Corsair is a bit of exaggeration.
Also I believe that Corsair`s Operation losses should be higher than those of F-6F or P38-s because it was really so hard to fly. It wasn`t named "the ensign eliminator" for nothing.
And another thing for the AE team. "I get the feeling" that when you have radar your CAP is always spot on and in great numbers. I do not have the time to research this but I must say I am concerned that this is a bit of exaggeration. We are talking about 1940s and not about E-2 Hawkeye or AEGIS systems. Can the AE simulate the "surprise low altitude strike with for e. 25 nicks" at 100 feet? IMHO there is no way that radar technology in 1940s could spot these fast raiders, at least not from a distance. Germans did something similar in the Battle of Britain with ME-109 coming in low, bombing and turning away at high speed. The radar towers were pretty much useless against this type of attack. With the radar the CAP should be more efficient but up to a degree. Again this is more an inquiry and not a complaint. Thanks in advance.
P.S. Sorry if this radar detection thing was mentioned before, I didn` t see it.
I am interested abot battles of highly experienced daitais od Zeroes against average Hellcat squadrons.
And I'm talking about leakers. Because IRL many Japanese kamikazes and bombers managed to break through CAP and hit ships. Just look what happenned at Okinawa. Yes, americans had air superiority, but they just could not be everywhere everytime!
And with the current "Death star" concept, Priller's beach dash woul'd be impossible!
ORIGINAL: mdiehl
I am interested abot battles of highly experienced daitais od Zeroes against average Hellcat squadrons.
I would expect highly similar results as were obtained in the battle of the Phillippine Sea. An average Hellcat pilot in a well maintained Hellcat was a more formidable weapon than even the best A6M2 pilot in a well-maintened Zeke.
And I'm talking about leakers. Because IRL many Japanese kamikazes and bombers managed to break through CAP and hit ships. Just look what happenned at Okinawa. Yes, americans had air superiority, but they just could not be everywhere everytime!
True enough. I was thinking of the Marianas Turkey shoot, or Phillippine Sea (contrary to some claims, late war IJN CV pilots in that battle were rather well trained, but they were hopelessly outclassed vis command and control, air combat tactics, and equipment).
And with the current "Death star" concept, Priller's beach dash woul'd be impossible!
Priller never got near to doing anything of significance on that flight. So I'm not sure why it matters. If he'd managed to get near a ship, he'd have been intercepted or shot down by flak.
Midway had nothing to do with "leakers." Midway happened as a nearly inevitable result of the clash of a very robust US plan that succeeded despite consistent, freakishly bad American luck, and a Japanese plan that was the mother of all lousy operational plans, that could not have succeeded unless the USN had simply failed to appear.
ORIGINAL: mdiehl
...I was thinking of the Marianas Turkey shoot, or Phillippine Sea (contrary to some claims, late war IJN CV pilots in that battle were rather well trained...
