Shattered Sword book reviewed

[witpqs]

ORIGINAL: Christof

After: today I think that the only piece of "luck" that day for the US was the fact that some SBD jockey managed to completly disable the Akagi with one single bomb hit - which in fact was almost a near miss...

I haven't yet had the pleasure of reading the book. How was it almost a near miss?

[spence]

Possibly - although the "the" strike was actually a series of air strikes, and only one of them "got lucky"* and got 3 CVs (the 4th was hit the next day)... The Japanese carriers were under more or less constant attack for several hours, leading up to the dive bomber attack that finally scored the fatal hits on 3 carriers... this was a different story than what had been believed in the Western literature (the Japanese had written about the discrepancies in fact long before Shattered Sword.

The book points out that luck was consistently running against the USN that day and debunks many of the myths that Fuchida told his interrogators after the war... he basically told the Allies what they wanted to hear.

*EDIT: To paraphrase a British Admiral commenting on another battle in another war: it is hard to characterize a concentrated effort on finally obtaining a desired objective as "luck".

Right on. On the morning of June 4th, the Americans put ~175 attack planes into the air to go after the KB. During the same time frame the Japanese put ah...none into the air to attack the American carriers. Consistently bad American luck allowed the Japanese CAP, which comprised the only effective active defense (IJN flak shot down only 3 planes that morning and one of those was a Zero), to deal with each of the raids successively and individually for over 3 hours. When the final two raids arrived simultaneously the IJN air defense system completely broke down. Not only was one of the raids undetected but the interception of the other (Yorktown's combined arms raid) was completely botched by the CAP. Half the available IJN fighters ganged up on the minimal (and effectively impotent)escort and the rest of the CAP intercepted only the TBDs, completely ignoring the SBDs.

[spence]

Lt Richard Best planted a 1000 lb bomb right smack dab on the midships elevator destroying both the elevator and the hangar deck CO2 fire suppression system. It was the perfect hit striking in the one place that guaranteed the carrier would be out of action at the very least. Since it also set several armed and gassed aircraft afire the consequences were virtually sure to be even more disasterous to the Japanese.

There is some speculation however, that one of Best's wingmen inflicted some unspecified damage to the steering gear with a near miss just to starboard of the ship's rudders. When the rudders were subsequently ordered hard over for evasive manuevers the rudders jammed. The crew was unable to restore the steering and the decision to abandon the ship and later scuttle it may have been influenced by this apparent inability (that the rudders jammed is not in dispute; only whether the near miss astern directly contributed to them jamming).

[Q-Ball]

If you like Shattered Sword (which I did), check out "Kaigun" by Nick Evans. Complete history of the IJN, with alot on it's tactical doctrine. A must for any hardcore Pacific War buffs!

[witpqs]

ORIGINAL: spence

Lt Richard Best planted a 1000 lb bomb right smack dab on the midships elevator destroying both the elevator and the hangar deck CO2 fire suppression system. It was the perfect hit striking in the one place that guaranteed the carrier would be out of action at the very least. Since it also set several armed and gassed aircraft afire the consequences were virtually sure to be even more disasterous to the Japanese.

There is some speculation however, that one of Best's wingmen inflicted some unspecified damage to the steering gear with a near miss just to starboard of the ship's rudders. When the rudders were subsequently ordered hard over for evasive manuevers the rudders jammed. The crew was unable to restore the steering and the decision to abandon the ship and later scuttle it may have been influenced by this apparent inability (that the rudders jammed is not in dispute; only whether the near miss astern directly contributed to them jamming).

Thanks. It's the kind of thing where, even if the rudder had responded properly, we will never know if she could have evaded the bomb or even if Best would have been able to adjust his aim.

[herwin]

ORIGINAL: Christof

Well honestly.

For me there was a "before" and "after" reading Shattered Sword...

Before: thought that the US had just been plain lucky winning this battle

After: today I think that the only piece of "luck" that day for the US was the fact that some SBD jockey managed to completly disable the Akagi with one single bomb hit - which in fact was almost a near miss...

Great book!

Near misses were usually more serious than direct hits--most cruisers were sunk by torpedoes or by the mining effect of near misses.

[IndyShark]

I LOVED Shattered Sword! It's a great book

Q-ball, please tell me more about Kaigun.

[marky]

ORIGINAL: John 3rd

ORIGINAL: marky

i saw it in barnes n noble but didnt snatch it up, and never got around to going back for it 

Marky--I love your shot of Enterprise!

thankyz, 1 of my favorite shots of her

[spence]

Thanks. It's the kind of thing where, even if the rudder had responded properly, we will never know if she could have evaded the bomb or even if Best would have been able to adjust his aim.

The bombs that Best and his wingman released impacted in essentially the same pattern as their formation with Best's bomb slightly "in advance of and in the center of" the two bombs dropped by his wingmen (which were both near misses ahead and astern) The bomb that near-miss impacted astern actually passed through the overhang of the flight deck being a slightly closer near miss than the one ahead. The Akagi continued to manuever after being struck by Best's bomb and that is when the rudder jammed. I believe Best is a named pilot in WitP; and IIRC, has a high experience rating. It seems that such is highly deserved from this one incident but also IIRC, is justified by his scoring a hit on Hiryu later that day.

[Ellsid]

A big myth breaker for me was the only operational contegency planned for by the IJN was to not send a full all out load to hit Midway and placed a ready reserve of aircraft fully loaded in the hangardeck ready to meet any enemy fleet that might show up.  But it was known that it would take a  full air complement to knock down the Midway defenses.  

Another thing that raises an eyebrow about the Japanese battle plan was that of the B-17 attack on June 4, 1942 on the Midway invasion force.  You would think the Japanese would at least think that the jig was up on the surprise party!

But as a result of Midway I believe Nagumo performed much better at the Battle of Eastern Solomons and Battle of Santa Cruz Islands.  I don't think the Hornet CV air group ever achieved the proficiency of Saratoga, Enterprise or Yorktown.

[Local Yokel]

For me the book was revelatory insofar as it debunked several myths that I, probably in common with most westerners, had been brought up to accept.

Foremost of these was the notion that the fatal US strike caught the Japanese carriers with their own strike groups spotted for launch. Apparently Fuchida's promotion of this version of events had long since been discredited amongst Japanese-speaking historians. Inevitably that begs the question of whether conventional wisdom in the West about other facets of the Great East Asian War is ripe for a re-examination in which greater attention is paid to what Asian sources have to say.

Another significant myth debunked is the notion that AL was some sort of adjunct to MI that was calculated to assist in luring US naval forces into an unfavourable position. Since AL was, in fact, the quid pro quo demanded by the Naval General Staff in return for acquiescence in Yamamoto's Midway operation, there is a case for saying that the dissipation of forces inherent in the Japanese plans was more the outcome of rivalries between feuding constituencies in the naval hierarchy than a product of victory disease.

The book also provides a healthy reminder that the balance of forces was not weighted heavily in favour of the Japanese, a belief that has been encouraged by those suffering from 'incredible victory disease'. It's salutory to remember not only that about 250 Japanese aircraft were opposed by about 350 US aircraft, but also that this inferiority was a self-inflicted handicap on the part of the Japanese.

I didn't find the book's style particularly pedantic or bombastic, but I have become increasingly uncomfortable with its analysis of defeat, not least because such analysis must inevitably tend towards reductionist conclusions about the folly of Japan opting for war in the first place - a trite assessment that does little to acknowledge the near-impossibility of what the Japanese were attempting: luring a fleet of inferior strength into an encounter in which it is likely to be crushed. I suspect that this game frequently provides a clear illustration of just how difficult that can be.

I'm also uncomfortable about the double standards on occasion exhibited by the authors. For example, I don't think they are entitled to pooh-pooh the Combined Fleet instruction that a reserve of aircraft armed for naval strike was to be maintained at all times whilst insisting that the Japanese CAP should have operated under equally rigid instructions to stick a range of pre-assigned altitude bands irrespective of the tactical exigencies that might arise.

So, a useful book but one flawed by an excess of analysis, perhaps at the expense of detailed factual reportage. Personally, I should have liked to see even more detail of equipment and operational doctrine, procedures and methods. This is also a criticism I would level at the other recent work, 'Midway Inquest' by Dallas Woodbury Isom. Isom took the trouble to interview a number of surviving Japanese aircrew and maintainer personnel. How I would love to be able to read transcripts of such interviews, since they constitute vital primary source material of greater long-term value than the interpretations placed upon them by historians who may have an agenda of their own to serve! Will such transcripts ever find their way into the public domain? I can but hope.

[rtrapasso]

ORIGINAL: witpqs

ORIGINAL: rtrapasso

and got 3 CVs (the 4th was hit the next day)...

I thought that was an error in many US histories (and movies like Midway) that was corrected long ago. The 4th carrier (Hiryu) was actually sunk late on the same day.

i suppose it depends on what time zone you are observing from...[:D]

EDIT: Hiryu was in fact hit around 1700 local time on the 4th June... the Kaga, Akagi and Soryu were hit around 10:30 a.m., iirc. The actual time the ships SANK is in some dispute, iirc, but Hiryu and Akagi were scuttled on the 5th.

[mlees]

ORIGINAL: Local Yokel

So, a useful book but one flawed by an excess of analysis, perhaps at the expense of detailed factual reportage. Personally, I should have liked to see even more detail of equipment and operational doctrine, procedures and methods. This is also a criticism I would level at the other recent work, 'Midway Inquest' by Dallas Woodbury Isom. Isom took the trouble to interview a number of surviving Japanese aircrew and maintainer personnel. How I would love to be able to read transcripts of such interviews, since they constitute vital primary source material of greater long-term value than the interpretations placed upon them by historians who may have an agenda of their own to serve! Will such transcripts ever find their way into the public domain? I can but hope.

I think it was 'Midway Inquest' where the author discusses the rearming time of the torpedo carrying Kates, and says that Naguma had to have reordered the rearming by x time, or he would have had to wait hours longer (because of the returning Midway strike). Since he seemsed to have waited those extra couple hours, he must have not ordered the switch-er-oo in time. (Also, there was too few torpedo loading carts in the TOE of the carriers.)

[Q-Ball]

ORIGINAL: IndyShark

I LOVED Shattered Sword! It's a great book

Q-ball, please tell me more about Kaigun.

"Kaigun" is a complete pre-war history of the Japanese Navy, with a particular focus on how it's history formed it's doctrine, including decisions on weapons, ship construction, and attacking the United States.

It puts into an interesting perspective all the Japanese decisions that looked at through US eyes might seem short-sighted, but in reality were not. For example, sub doctrine. To paraphrase, some think the Japs were dumb to focus on warships and not merchant ships, when in fact this was entirely rational. Japan knew that the US was a 2-shore nation with railroads, so that Japan couldn't wage a war on commerce; the commerce could just go to a port on the Atlantic. In that context, focusing on warships is entirely reasonable. Now, Kaigun asks further questions, around a) why so many sub types and strategies, which hurt the IJN in practice and b) why, when they considered and rejected a war on commerce, they had a complete blind spot to how that strategy might be used on THEM.

Excellent book, a must-read.

[anarchyintheuk]

Kaigun's explanation/rationale re the IJN's reluctance to use subs in commerce raiding never held water w/ me (assuming the author believed it). IMO it's entirely irrational to think that you can't use subs to interdict LoCs given the US has the capability to move it to a port on the other side. Whether the US has that capability is completely irrelevant, it's getting it to the endpoint that matters. They gave the Allies a free ride to that endpoint in the Pacific. Considering the amount of manpower and material the Allies had to use in the Atlantic, the IJN should have looked a little more closely at the matter. They should have realized that precisely because it was a two front war that Allied shipping would be the fundamental constraint on their ability to mount defensive/offensive operations. Short-sightedly, they were looking at a quick war. However, the point is moot considering what the IJN consigned its subs to.

[bradfordkay]

The only thing that bothered me about Shattered Sword is the authors' insistence that they were debunking long-standing myths about Midway by proving that the Japanese strike was not on the deck being readied for launch, but was rather in the hangar being readied for a launch. In the long run, it doesn't matter whether they were on deck or in the hanger... the ordnance and fuel present still contributed heavily to the sinking of the ships. Indeed, being in the hangar may have made it all worse, since that internailzed many of the explosions.

Anyway, the allied strike arriving while the Japanese strike was being readied was the main cause of the cataclysm that struck the Japanese carriers - so the myth was not debunked, just proven to be slightly off...

As far as i am concerned, the myth they did debunk was the one that the land based strikes proved useless - the authors pointed out that the many piecemeal land based strikes were what prevented the Japanese carriers from getting their strike readied in time due to the constant need to defend against those LBA strikes.

[Tiornu]

The significance in correcting the mistake about planes on the flight deck is not so much about the location error but the foundation for the error, which is a lying source who has become a foundation in Western accounts of the battle. This is merely one of Fuchida's fables, though he has been regarded in the US as an unimpeachable reference.

[Panther Bait]

I would think a larger problem for the IJN waging a commerce war on the US with subs is that the West Coast is a loooong way from any realistic support base for the subs.  Kwajelein is even quite a distance away from Pearl Harbor.  So the embarkation ports were fairly safe.  The sea lanes are too vast to cover in the Pacific.  And even the destinations (other than the PI which they were planning to take early on) would be hard to patrol.  The various islands in the SLoC are fairly dispersed can all be approached from any compass direction for the final leg, so it takes a lot of subs to cover each one, unless you're willing to sit right on top of the island which is probably more dangerous than it appears in WitP.  Thinking about it that way, it almost makes sense to use your subs more tactically where you can concentrate for effect. 

[paullus99]

The myth was that the Japanese were only minutes away from launching a decisive strike against the American carriers & it was only the appearance of the Enterprise & Yorktown dive bombers at 10:20 that prevented the Japanese from winning.

In actuality, the Japanese were still perhaps an hour or more away from launching any sort of strike - they lost the battle as soon as the American carrier aircraft were in the air - at that point, nothing the Japanese could have done (as they did historically) would have changed the outcome.

[timtom]

ORIGINAL: bradfordkay

The only thing that bothered me about Shattered Sword is the authors' insistence that they were debunking long-standing myths about Midway by proving that the Japanese strike was not on the deck being readied for launch, but was rather in the hangar being readied for a launch. In the long run, it doesn't matter whether they were on deck or in the hanger... the ordnance and fuel present still contributed heavily to the sinking of the ships. Indeed, being in the hangar may have made it all worse, since that internailzed many of the explosions.

The point is that, unlike what Fuchida would want us to believe, with the aircraft below the Japanese were nowhere near launching a counterattack on the US carriers.

...beat me to it [:D]