House Rules
These rules are completely optional.
They can be used as whole or in part.
They are designed to add historical barriers not experienced directly in the game.
These rules were developed in part from years of gameplaying and discussion by the PacWarLIST as well as observations made in regards to the new Matrix Games: Pacific War patches.
For every one Allied Rule there is a comparable Japanese Rule.
*With the exception of Allied Rule #9.
Allied Rules
1. Australian Militia LCU's assigned to SW Pacific may not leave Australian Territory. Australian territory includes all of New Guinea, New Britain, New Ireland, Soloman Islands, Gilbert Islands, or any base attached to ANZAC at the beginning of the game.
These units are...
a) 3rd Infantry Division (Australian, 3rd NZ Division is free to go anywhere)
b) 5th Infantry Division
c) 11th Infantry Division
d) 7th Infantry Brigade
e) 11th Infantry Brigade
f) 23rd Infantry Brigade
g) 30th Infantry Brigade
**AIF LCU's, 6th, 7th, 8th and 9th Infantry Divisions along with 1st Armoured Brigade, may serve anywhere, under any command as they do not face the same political restrictions as Militia units.
2. The size of Allied amphibious Landings per turn in the entire Pacific are limited as
follows: Start thru to December.
1942 one division
1943 two divisions
1944 four divisions
1945 no limit
**For the purpose of this rule 2 Brigades or 4 Regiments equal a Division.
**This rule is simply to take into account Allied shortages in landing craft until after June of 44.
3. Airgroup limitations:
a) USMC air groups cannot serve on US Army bases (SW Pacific, 6th Army, 8th Army 10th Army), or British bases (SEAC, 14th Army, India GHQ).
b) There are no limitations on USN Bases, or ANZAC and ABDA Bases or other air forces.
4. If MacArthur is in command of SW Pacific:
a) If MacArthur survives the 1941-42 Philippine campaign he must remain in command of Pacific until the end of the war.
b Luzon must be invaded before the Japanese Home Islands (including Okinawa) are attacked.
c Australian units cannot be used in the liberation of the Philippines.
**This rule takes into account MacArthur's political power and his intent on returning to the Philippines and his insistence that it be done solely by American units. He also was too politically powerful to remove from command once he left the Philippines. You have a choice on having MacArthur command SW Pacific or sit in a POW camp and have another, less capable commander command SW Pacific until better commanders arrive. Remember, the best statistic for a HQ commander is aggressiveness, as this is what builds up PP's fastest.
5. All USN Casablanca CVE's must use the FM2 Wildcat as their fighter and cannot be upgraded to F6F Helcat's or F4U Corsiar's. Other Allied CVE's are free to use any type of aircraft.
**These carriers were of limited size, and did not have the facilities to operate the newer and larger aircraft.
6. The following Divisions may not leave the base to Middle East until an Indian Base is invaded (i.e., Bombay, Madras, Cocanada, New Delhi, Colombo, Trincomalee, Addu I., Calcutta, Dimapur or Dacca).
a) 31st Indian Armoured Division
b) 2nd Indian Infantry Division
c) 6th Indian Infantry Division
**These divisions took part in garrisoning the Middle East, and may only move into India if an invasion is taking place.
7. Factories in "to Middle East" can only produce British aircraft.
8. Starting in 1942 at least one British Division must be in one of the Indian Bases
(Bases are, New Delhi, Cocanada, Bombay, Madras).
**This is to simulate the general unrest felt in India and the fact that the British had to increase the British Garrison. This usually results in the 70th British Division being immediately sent on Garrison duty in India.
9. Allied PBEM cheats are not allowed.
a) The Allied player cannot continually load up their PBEM save file as the routine supply occurs every time you load it, which can result in infinite amounts of supply being delivered each turn. So, the Allied player must limit loading their save file.
b) The Allied player cannot load a game, use SIGNIT, then reload and use SIGNIT on other bases and TF's.
**These, unlike other house rules, rely a lot on the honour system as they are hard to spot by the Japanese player.
Revised House Rules
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Jeremy Pritchard
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- Location: Ontario Canada
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Jeremy Pritchard
- Posts: 575
- Joined: Thu Sep 27, 2001 8:00 am
- Location: Ontario Canada
Japanese House Rules
Japanese Rules
1. The Indian National Army Divisions may only serve in the South East Asia theatre of command under 15th Army or Burma Area Army command.
a) 1st Indian National Army (INA) Division
b) 2nd Indian National Army (INA) Division
**Their purpose was to aid in the liberation of India from British rule, and they would never serve in a theatre of war that would not work toward this (i.e., they would never be based in the Philippines).
2. IJN Subs cannot be used to attack merchant shipping (i.e., sitting outside of Pearl Harbour or the US West Coast) but must be deployed to maximize enemy warship casualties.
**The IJN saw more honour in sinking enemy warships instead of merchant vessels and deployed their subs accordingly.
**This is difficult to implement, and may result in a significant number of Allied MCS being sunk even though deployment was meant to maximize warship casualties.
3. Airgroup limitations
a) IJAAF air groups cannot serve on IJ Navy bases (Combined Fleet, South Seas Fleet, North Seas Fleet, 8th Fleet).
b) There are no restrictions on IJ Army bases or IJNAF air groups.
4. All Central Pacific Islands must be under the command of the Japanese navy (i.e., Combined Fleet, South Seas Fleet, North Seas Fleet, 8th Fleet). This includes the Marshall Islands (with Kwajalien and Enewietok), Carolina Islands (with Truk), Marianas Islands (with Saipan and Pagan), along with Iwo Jima and Marcus Island (these include islands not mentioned but in the same island group as those mentioned). This region was in the sphere of the IJN, and holds to the same restrictions as IJN bases (i.e., no IJAAF). This sphere of influence extends to the Hawaiian Islands and their surriounding outpost islands (with Midway to Christmas Island). The South Pacific Islands are under the Japanese Army Sphere).
5. All IJN CVL and CVE are restricted to using only the B5N as their torpedo bomber.
**Future torpedo bombers were too large to operate on lighter Japanese carriers and used the B5N up until the end of the war.
6. The following units may not leave the base Zhanjiang until an Indo-China base is invaded (Bases are, Saigon, Phnomm Phen and Haiphong). They may then move into Indo- China.
a) 15st Infantry Division
b) 22nd Infantry Division
c) 11th Independent Mixed Brigade
d) 12th Independent Mixed Brigade
7. IJAAF Factories may only produce IJAAF aircraft, and IJNAF factories may only produce IJNAF aircraft.
8. Starting in 1941 at least one Japansee Division must be in one of the Indo-China Bases (Bases are, Saigon, Phnomm Phen and Haiphong).
**This is to simulate the occupation forces required to keep the Vichy Government in line. Historically this unit was the 21st Infantry Division.
**Formations attached to China Army do not count toward the garrison requirements.
1. The Indian National Army Divisions may only serve in the South East Asia theatre of command under 15th Army or Burma Area Army command.
a) 1st Indian National Army (INA) Division
b) 2nd Indian National Army (INA) Division
**Their purpose was to aid in the liberation of India from British rule, and they would never serve in a theatre of war that would not work toward this (i.e., they would never be based in the Philippines).
2. IJN Subs cannot be used to attack merchant shipping (i.e., sitting outside of Pearl Harbour or the US West Coast) but must be deployed to maximize enemy warship casualties.
**The IJN saw more honour in sinking enemy warships instead of merchant vessels and deployed their subs accordingly.
**This is difficult to implement, and may result in a significant number of Allied MCS being sunk even though deployment was meant to maximize warship casualties.
3. Airgroup limitations
a) IJAAF air groups cannot serve on IJ Navy bases (Combined Fleet, South Seas Fleet, North Seas Fleet, 8th Fleet).
b) There are no restrictions on IJ Army bases or IJNAF air groups.
4. All Central Pacific Islands must be under the command of the Japanese navy (i.e., Combined Fleet, South Seas Fleet, North Seas Fleet, 8th Fleet). This includes the Marshall Islands (with Kwajalien and Enewietok), Carolina Islands (with Truk), Marianas Islands (with Saipan and Pagan), along with Iwo Jima and Marcus Island (these include islands not mentioned but in the same island group as those mentioned). This region was in the sphere of the IJN, and holds to the same restrictions as IJN bases (i.e., no IJAAF). This sphere of influence extends to the Hawaiian Islands and their surriounding outpost islands (with Midway to Christmas Island). The South Pacific Islands are under the Japanese Army Sphere).
5. All IJN CVL and CVE are restricted to using only the B5N as their torpedo bomber.
**Future torpedo bombers were too large to operate on lighter Japanese carriers and used the B5N up until the end of the war.
6. The following units may not leave the base Zhanjiang until an Indo-China base is invaded (Bases are, Saigon, Phnomm Phen and Haiphong). They may then move into Indo- China.
a) 15st Infantry Division
b) 22nd Infantry Division
c) 11th Independent Mixed Brigade
d) 12th Independent Mixed Brigade
7. IJAAF Factories may only produce IJAAF aircraft, and IJNAF factories may only produce IJNAF aircraft.
8. Starting in 1941 at least one Japansee Division must be in one of the Indo-China Bases (Bases are, Saigon, Phnomm Phen and Haiphong).
**This is to simulate the occupation forces required to keep the Vichy Government in line. Historically this unit was the 21st Infantry Division.
**Formations attached to China Army do not count toward the garrison requirements.
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Jeremy Pritchard
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- Location: Ontario Canada
General House Rules
General Rules
1. Singapore and Bataan may not be attacked through amphibious assault or be bombarded by naval TF's unless the attacker actually controlls the base.
**It is assumed that if these bases are captured, new guns are put in the existing positions.
2. To simulate the small size and barren condition of coral atolls
(terrain type 1) the follow applies:
(a) Garrisons of coral atolls are limited to one Division, (or equivalent numbers of smaller units).
(b) SBF and engineer units may be added on over the garrrison limit.
(d) Landings on Coral atolls may be made only one division at a time. Example: in 1943 a landing of up to two divisions is possible (see rule 3 above). At a coral atoll however these two divsions must be landed from different TF's. Thus one at a time even though its the same turn.
(e) Divisions used to conquer an Atoll can only remain on the island for approximately 2 turns after all enemy resistance is eliminated.
**For the purpose of this rule 2 Brigades or 4 Regiments equal a Division.
**I always felt there should be some limitaion on the number of troops a Coral atoll can support, both as garrision and for attack. This rule is an attempt at making those limitations. I don't know if it will work. Atolls were usually a series of small islands, which could usually hold up to around a maxiumum of a division on all of the islands.
3. The "Get Transport" command may not be used.
4. The "pool" command may only be used between ships in the same port or at Player national bases (i.e., Home Island bases for Japan, US West Coast bases, Australia bases, Colombo and Calcutta).
5. Monsoon, for the following bases, no offensive action can take place during the months of June-November: Any base in India, Dacca, Imphal, Diampur, Mandalay, Lashio, Rangoon, Bangkok. Units can move, but, cannot be in the same base as an enemy LCU (Must be moved back to closest friendly base if the LCU does not have posession of base).
6. TF's of more then 6 CV/CVL are not allowed. Combat Air Patrol is not affected by command penalties as Carrier Strikes are. Having TF's of 7+ carriers can result in a virtually impregnable wall of CAP. This is due to limitations in the game. CAP should have the same command limitations as carrier strikes.
7. If a transport TF is turned away from a base that is being amphibiously attacked and is still at the base on the players next turn, they cannot unload the unit at the base. They can, however, redirect the TF back to that base in order to make another amphibious assault attempt.
**Many players would simply drop off their troops after they have technically been turned away by enemy aircraft/surface forces but did not have enough movement points to return to base.
8. Production upgrades will be placed on computer control. Factories cannot be changed to produce different types of aircraft (i.e., you cannot change a P-39 factory to produce P- 40 aircraft).
**This stops the unhistorical maximizing of production by using holes in the production methods of Pacific War.
1. Singapore and Bataan may not be attacked through amphibious assault or be bombarded by naval TF's unless the attacker actually controlls the base.
**It is assumed that if these bases are captured, new guns are put in the existing positions.
2. To simulate the small size and barren condition of coral atolls
(terrain type 1) the follow applies:
(a) Garrisons of coral atolls are limited to one Division, (or equivalent numbers of smaller units).
(b) SBF and engineer units may be added on over the garrrison limit.
(d) Landings on Coral atolls may be made only one division at a time. Example: in 1943 a landing of up to two divisions is possible (see rule 3 above). At a coral atoll however these two divsions must be landed from different TF's. Thus one at a time even though its the same turn.
(e) Divisions used to conquer an Atoll can only remain on the island for approximately 2 turns after all enemy resistance is eliminated.
**For the purpose of this rule 2 Brigades or 4 Regiments equal a Division.
**I always felt there should be some limitaion on the number of troops a Coral atoll can support, both as garrision and for attack. This rule is an attempt at making those limitations. I don't know if it will work. Atolls were usually a series of small islands, which could usually hold up to around a maxiumum of a division on all of the islands.
3. The "Get Transport" command may not be used.
4. The "pool" command may only be used between ships in the same port or at Player national bases (i.e., Home Island bases for Japan, US West Coast bases, Australia bases, Colombo and Calcutta).
5. Monsoon, for the following bases, no offensive action can take place during the months of June-November: Any base in India, Dacca, Imphal, Diampur, Mandalay, Lashio, Rangoon, Bangkok. Units can move, but, cannot be in the same base as an enemy LCU (Must be moved back to closest friendly base if the LCU does not have posession of base).
6. TF's of more then 6 CV/CVL are not allowed. Combat Air Patrol is not affected by command penalties as Carrier Strikes are. Having TF's of 7+ carriers can result in a virtually impregnable wall of CAP. This is due to limitations in the game. CAP should have the same command limitations as carrier strikes.
7. If a transport TF is turned away from a base that is being amphibiously attacked and is still at the base on the players next turn, they cannot unload the unit at the base. They can, however, redirect the TF back to that base in order to make another amphibious assault attempt.
**Many players would simply drop off their troops after they have technically been turned away by enemy aircraft/surface forces but did not have enough movement points to return to base.
8. Production upgrades will be placed on computer control. Factories cannot be changed to produce different types of aircraft (i.e., you cannot change a P-39 factory to produce P- 40 aircraft).
**This stops the unhistorical maximizing of production by using holes in the production methods of Pacific War.
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Jeremy Pritchard
- Posts: 575
- Joined: Thu Sep 27, 2001 8:00 am
- Location: Ontario Canada
As it said at top, these are optional.
However, it also says that the rules correlate...
Allied Rule #1 is similar to Japanese Rule #1, and if one is used, so should the other (still, this is optional).
Some of these correlated rules are more devestating then their counterparts, but can be equalled out by choosing other house rules that even up the difficulty.
General rules apply to both sides.
Are there any additions or clarifications about these rules?
Also, using these rules against the computer might make for a more challenging game, as you get all of these restrictions on you!
However, it also says that the rules correlate...
Allied Rule #1 is similar to Japanese Rule #1, and if one is used, so should the other (still, this is optional).
Some of these correlated rules are more devestating then their counterparts, but can be equalled out by choosing other house rules that even up the difficulty.
General rules apply to both sides.
Are there any additions or clarifications about these rules?
Also, using these rules against the computer might make for a more challenging game, as you get all of these restrictions on you!
2. IJN Subs cannot be used to attack merchant shipping (i.e., sitting outside of Pearl Harbour or the US West Coast) but must be deployed to maximize enemy warship casualties.
**The IJN saw more honour in sinking enemy warships instead of merchant vessels and deployed their subs accordingly.
**This is difficult to implement, and may result in a significant number of Allied MCS being sunk even though deployment was meant to maximize warship casualties.
I have a question about this rule. Why is a restriction on US West Coast and Pearl HArbor when Allied player would probably use this bases to repear his damaged ships? And in any case new ships has to be transfered from initial port to front line... In my PBEM game as Japanese I was delighted to see one of my subs sink US Carrier early in a war which made a BIG difference in next major carrier battle (there were 3 US CVs against mine 5 CVs). My point is that usually in this waters is a good probability to catch some of a warships...
**The IJN saw more honour in sinking enemy warships instead of merchant vessels and deployed their subs accordingly.
**This is difficult to implement, and may result in a significant number of Allied MCS being sunk even though deployment was meant to maximize warship casualties.
I have a question about this rule. Why is a restriction on US West Coast and Pearl HArbor when Allied player would probably use this bases to repear his damaged ships? And in any case new ships has to be transfered from initial port to front line... In my PBEM game as Japanese I was delighted to see one of my subs sink US Carrier early in a war which made a BIG difference in next major carrier battle (there were 3 US CVs against mine 5 CVs). My point is that usually in this waters is a good probability to catch some of a warships...
I always send new ships to Maui or Johnston, and ALWAYS with escorts. Their 30 + speed gets them there in 1 turn then off to the front.Originally posted by boba
2. IJN Subs cannot be used to attack merchant shipping (i.e., sitting outside of Pearl Harbour or the US West Coast) but must be deployed to maximize enemy warship casualties.
**The IJN saw more honour in sinking enemy warships instead of merchant vessels and deployed their subs accordingly.
**This is difficult to implement, and may result in a significant number of Allied MCS being sunk even though deployment was meant to maximize warship casualties.
I have a question about this rule. Why is a restriction on US West Coast and Pearl HArbor when Allied player would probably use this bases to repear his damaged ships? And in any case new ships has to be transfered from initial port to front line... In my PBEM game as Japanese I was delighted to see one of my subs sink US Carrier early in a war which made a BIG difference in next major carrier battle (there were 3 US CVs against mine 5 CVs). My point is that usually in this waters is a good probability to catch some of a warships...
Still playing PacWar (but no so much anymore)...
Well yes, but they must leave from ports in US... So there is a chance to catch them with subs. That actually happend in a case I was describing. My subs patrolig in front of LA catched a US CV, heavily escorted with DDs, but menaged to hit CV with 2 torpedos and sunk it. So it's a possibillity at least to catch capital ships at these ports...Originally posted by Ranger-75
I always send new ships to Maui or Johnston, and ALWAYS with escorts. Their 30 + speed gets them there in 1 turn then off to the front.
Yes, but that leaves only one chance not two of spotting a TF, and I don't think the Japanese AI ever deploys subs that far out, so not going to Pearl really helps the evade the subs.Originally posted by boba
Well yes, but they must leave from ports in US... So there is a chance to catch them with subs. That actually happend in a case I was describing. My subs patrolig in front of LA catched a US CV, heavily escorted with DDs, but menaged to hit CV with 2 torpedos and sunk it. So it's a possibillity at least to catch capital ships at these ports...
You can bet your bottom dollar that if Japanese subs were found lurking near the west coast there would have been a lot of "live fire training" missions being flown from the west coast of the US and the Japanese subs would have gotten their a$$es handed to them in no time. Remember, even the Germans were smart enough to stay out of land based air range.
Still playing PacWar (but no so much anymore)...
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Jeremy Pritchard
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- Joined: Thu Sep 27, 2001 8:00 am
- Location: Ontario Canada
I think that the sub rule needs some work... Subs did have limited action against the US West Coast, but this was in 1941 or early 1942 when US Coast protection was pretty unorganized.
Another house rule, under Allied Aircraft Limitations should be the USN is restricted from assigning the F4U Corsair to Carrier Squadrons until 1945. The USN refused to have the F4U on its carriers as it did not believe that they were suited for carrier duty (due to some specific reason that fails me). The British put F4U's on their Carriers and showed the USN that it can be done, to good effect, so that some CVE's eventually had them. However, until this time F4U's were strictly USMC aircraft.
Another house rule, under Allied Aircraft Limitations should be the USN is restricted from assigning the F4U Corsair to Carrier Squadrons until 1945. The USN refused to have the F4U on its carriers as it did not believe that they were suited for carrier duty (due to some specific reason that fails me). The British put F4U's on their Carriers and showed the USN that it can be done, to good effect, so that some CVE's eventually had them. However, until this time F4U's were strictly USMC aircraft.
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IntellWeenie
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- Joined: Tue Jun 25, 2002 6:41 pm
In the 1st half of 1942, just over 200 ships were sunk in what the Germans considered US coastal waters (less than 200 miles from shore). This was well within aircraft range , but the US ASW effort was really poorly coordinated then.
The Japanese did operate some off the US west coast and even made some special subs (I-400 class, IIRC) that had an enlarged sail that was a hangar for 2 aircraft. It was specifically designed for raids on the west coast, Panama canal, etc. The main obstacle to effective operations liek these was, of course, distance.
While I'm thinking about it, could Kaiten be included in 3.1? They were basically manned torpedoes that were launched off the deck of a submerged sub. Subs usually carried 4 of them and they were first used in Nov 1944.
I read somewhere that the F4U had something of a tendency to bounce on landing making it easy to miss the arrestor wires. Also, the forward visibilty while landing was awful because of the long nose making it hard to see the LSO (Landing Signals Officer).
The Japanese did operate some off the US west coast and even made some special subs (I-400 class, IIRC) that had an enlarged sail that was a hangar for 2 aircraft. It was specifically designed for raids on the west coast, Panama canal, etc. The main obstacle to effective operations liek these was, of course, distance.
While I'm thinking about it, could Kaiten be included in 3.1? They were basically manned torpedoes that were launched off the deck of a submerged sub. Subs usually carried 4 of them and they were first used in Nov 1944.
I read somewhere that the F4U had something of a tendency to bounce on landing making it easy to miss the arrestor wires. Also, the forward visibilty while landing was awful because of the long nose making it hard to see the LSO (Landing Signals Officer).
Well put - the Germans called this their 2nd "happy time"Originally posted by IntellWeenie
In the 1st half of 1942, just over 200 ships were sunk in what the Germans considered US coastal waters (less than 200 miles from shore). This was well within aircraft range , but the US ASW effort was really poorly coordinated then.
The Japanese did operate some off the US west coast and even made some special subs (I-400 class, IIRC) that had an enlarged sail that was a hangar for 2 aircraft. It was specifically designed for raids on the west coast, Panama canal, etc. The main obstacle to effective operations liek these was, of course, distance.
While I'm thinking about it, could Kaiten be included in 3.1? They were basically manned torpedoes that were launched off the deck of a submerged sub. Subs usually carried 4 of them and they were first used in Nov 1944.
I read somewhere that the F4U had something of a tendency to bounce on landing making it easy to miss the arrestor wires. Also, the forward visibilty while landing was awful because of the long nose making it hard to see the LSO (Landing Signals Officer).
But, as soon as adm King got his head out of his a$$, and 1: instituted a convoy system and 2: deployed coordinated ASW air patrols, the German subs went back to the GIUK gap.
Still playing PacWar (but no so much anymore)...
Or to put it another way, as soon as Adm King 1) had enough escorts available to make a convoy system possible (there was a severe, even crippling, shortage of available escorts in 1941-2) and 2) was allowed by the Army to institute ASW air patrols (By law, this was the Army's responsibility, and the Army wasn't willing to suffer the prestige hit of giving it up to the Navy. Unfortunately, the USAAF lacked the training and equipment for the mission, not to mention any desire to "waste" their long-range bombers on ASW patrol.), the U-boats were driven back out to sea.Originally posted by Ranger-75
Well put - the Germans called this their 2nd "happy time"
But, as soon as adm King got his head out of his a$$, and 1: instituted a convoy system and 2: deployed coordinated ASW air patrols, the German subs went back to the GIUK gap.
Some days you're the windshield.
Some days you're the bug.
Some days you're the bug.
Put it any way you want to, but King was suffering from some serious CRI. To quote his daughter: "My father is very even tmpered - he is always in a rage".Originally posted by CynicAl
Or to put it another way, as soon as Adm King 1) had enough escorts available to make a convoy system possible (there was a severe, even crippling, shortage of available escorts in 1941-2) and 2) was allowed by the Army to institute ASW air patrols (By law, this was the Army's responsibility, and the Army wasn't willing to suffer the prestige hit of giving it up to the Navy. Unfortunately, the USAAF lacked the training and equipment for the mission, not to mention any desire to "waste" their long-range bombers on ASW patrol.), the U-boats were driven back out to sea.
The lack of action was inexcusable, it caused a serious tanker shortage for the rest of 1942 through 1943 - a lot of the ships being British - who were not amused. Kink laid one excuse after another afterwards - all of them lame when examined.
Still playing PacWar (but no so much anymore)...
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Jeremy Pritchard
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- Joined: Thu Sep 27, 2001 8:00 am
- Location: Ontario Canada
The British gave a very good example about how to fight an ASW war. The US did not set up a convoy system in their waters until months after the war began. Canadain and British escorts were required to go down and train US crews and lead Convoys in US waters. They also did not invoke blackouts, which gave excellent profiles to subs attacking ships off the coast at night.
Preparations for an inevitable war were not done until it was too late. The Atlantic theatre did not require the US to devote a lot of Destroyers for Fleet Duty. In 1941 there were around 80 Destroyers of all types in the Atlantic alone (only a few were sent to the Pacific after war broke out) yet they still did not form convoys. At this time all they had to do was to patrol the US Eastern Coast, the RN and RCN patrolled most of the northern Atlantic between Canada and England. They did so with very few Destroyers (probably around 100). So, the US had fewer destroyers, but their area of patrol was smaller as well. However, convoys were not put together until they reached Commonwealth ports.
Basically the US did everything they could to make sinking ships off their coast extremely easy. They had plenty of examples on what to do, and had 2 years of watching the British fight and win their War in the Atlantic.
However, since this is a Pacific War area, it does not really matter that much.
Preparations for an inevitable war were not done until it was too late. The Atlantic theatre did not require the US to devote a lot of Destroyers for Fleet Duty. In 1941 there were around 80 Destroyers of all types in the Atlantic alone (only a few were sent to the Pacific after war broke out) yet they still did not form convoys. At this time all they had to do was to patrol the US Eastern Coast, the RN and RCN patrolled most of the northern Atlantic between Canada and England. They did so with very few Destroyers (probably around 100). So, the US had fewer destroyers, but their area of patrol was smaller as well. However, convoys were not put together until they reached Commonwealth ports.
Basically the US did everything they could to make sinking ships off their coast extremely easy. They had plenty of examples on what to do, and had 2 years of watching the British fight and win their War in the Atlantic.
However, since this is a Pacific War area, it does not really matter that much.
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IntellWeenie
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- Joined: Tue Jun 25, 2002 6:41 pm
To bring this back to the Pacific...
I don't know of any reported merchant sinkings off the West Coast by Japanese subs. They did send some patrols there at the beginning of the war, but did not really hinder US shipping. I know they shelled some shore installations and at least once launched a floatplane that dropped some incendiary bombs (in the forest to try and start a fire).
Conclusion: Since subs in Pacwar can't do either of these things, House Rules should dictate not sending Japanesse subs to the US West Coast (unless maybe Hawaii is taken).
I don't know of any reported merchant sinkings off the West Coast by Japanese subs. They did send some patrols there at the beginning of the war, but did not really hinder US shipping. I know they shelled some shore installations and at least once launched a floatplane that dropped some incendiary bombs (in the forest to try and start a fire).
Conclusion: Since subs in Pacwar can't do either of these things, House Rules should dictate not sending Japanesse subs to the US West Coast (unless maybe Hawaii is taken).
IJN Sub rules of engagement
I think the sub rule is misguided. One of the beauties of PacWar is that it allows the testing of alternate strategies.
From what I have read, the goal of IJN sub campaign was to inflict direct damage on warships and not one of inflicting economic damage. I believe this was due, in part, to Japanese culture. More prestige would be gained from sinking an inconsequential capital ship than would be gained from sinking a transport carrying supplies. Consequently, the IJN directed their efforts at warships. I would imagine that these attitude would be reflected by the crews as well - given the choice of popping a destroyer or a tanker, the Captain will take the shot at the DD.
Again, from what I have read, the warrior tradition hurt the IJN in other ways as well. On ships, the most prestigious jobs were the gun crews and the jobs in CIC - the radar and sonar operators - were relatively low prestige. So, unlike the USN were the best and the brightest went to the "tech" jobs, the IJN actually put their worst sailors in the jobs that required the most skill. (NOTE: Anyone else read anything on this?)
So, getting back to the point... the lack of sinkings along the West Coast was caused by 2 factors: A) the extreme distance from bases that reduced the effectiveness of the subs b) the warships were not along the West Coast but around Pearl and in the Solomons.
From what I have read, the goal of IJN sub campaign was to inflict direct damage on warships and not one of inflicting economic damage. I believe this was due, in part, to Japanese culture. More prestige would be gained from sinking an inconsequential capital ship than would be gained from sinking a transport carrying supplies. Consequently, the IJN directed their efforts at warships. I would imagine that these attitude would be reflected by the crews as well - given the choice of popping a destroyer or a tanker, the Captain will take the shot at the DD.
Again, from what I have read, the warrior tradition hurt the IJN in other ways as well. On ships, the most prestigious jobs were the gun crews and the jobs in CIC - the radar and sonar operators - were relatively low prestige. So, unlike the USN were the best and the brightest went to the "tech" jobs, the IJN actually put their worst sailors in the jobs that required the most skill. (NOTE: Anyone else read anything on this?)
So, getting back to the point... the lack of sinkings along the West Coast was caused by 2 factors: A) the extreme distance from bases that reduced the effectiveness of the subs b) the warships were not along the West Coast but around Pearl and in the Solomons.
Re: Revised House Rules
This is an excellent rule, but I would add the following at a minimum the amphibious assault capacity is unavailable in the turn after an assault.Originally posted by Jeremy Pritchard
House Rules
These rules are completely optional.
They can be used as whole or in part.
They are designed to add historical barriers not experienced directly in the game.
2. The size of Allied amphibious Landings per turn in the entire Pacific are limited as
follows: Start thru to December.
1942 one division
1943 two divisions
1944 four divisions
1945 no limit
**For the purpose of this rule 2 Brigades or 4 Regiments equal a Division.
**This rule is simply to take into account Allied shortages in landing craft until after June of 44.
This allows for the landing craft to get back to their home port.
Jeff
Additional Amphib Limits
It is my understanding that the Brits had virtually no amphibious capability until very late in the war. Most (all?) of the British landing craft were held in Europe until late 1944. Consequently, the prospect of sizeable UK amphibious operations prior to January 1945 is doubtful. To reflect this, consider the following rule....
A. Any amphibious operation where at least two-thirds of the transport capacity is US is a US operation. The amphibious limits given above are used. The nationality of the troops being landed has no effect on this rule.
B. Any amphibious operation where less than two-thirds of the transport capacity is US is a CW operation. The following limits shall be used and are independent of the troops being landed...
1941-1944: 1 Regiment (approx 1/4 division) per turn.
January through March 1945: 1 Brigade per turn.
March 1945: 1 Division per turn.
April 1945: 2 Divisions per turn
May 1945 through end: 3 Divisions per turn.
Just a thought.
Jeff
A. Any amphibious operation where at least two-thirds of the transport capacity is US is a US operation. The amphibious limits given above are used. The nationality of the troops being landed has no effect on this rule.
B. Any amphibious operation where less than two-thirds of the transport capacity is US is a CW operation. The following limits shall be used and are independent of the troops being landed...
1941-1944: 1 Regiment (approx 1/4 division) per turn.
January through March 1945: 1 Brigade per turn.
March 1945: 1 Division per turn.
April 1945: 2 Divisions per turn
May 1945 through end: 3 Divisions per turn.
Just a thought.
Jeff
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Originally posted by CynicAl
Or to put it another way, as soon as Adm King 1) had enough escorts available to make a convoy system possible (there was a severe, even crippling, shortage of available escorts in 1941-2) and 2) was allowed by the Army to institute ASW air patrols (By law, this was the Army's responsibility, and the Army wasn't willing to suffer the prestige hit of giving it up to the Navy. Unfortunately, the USAAF lacked the training and equipment for the mission, not to mention any desire to "waste" their long-range bombers on ASW patrol.), the U-boats were driven back out to sea.
King bears the responsibility here. He made the same mistake the Admiralty did in WWI. He was too nationalistic to listen to British advice here. The British experience had proved that convoying was a useful technique even in the face of inadequate or no escort. The ocean is a big place. A convoy can escape detection about as well as an individual ship. But an individual sub can only sink a couple or three ships at a time. One ship meets one sub, down goes the merchant ship. 30 ships meet 6 subs and you will have quite a few losses, but most will get away. Any escort, even an inadequate one dramatically improves the effect of a convoy.
Originally posted by CynicAl
Or to put it another way, as soon as Adm King 1) had enough escorts available to make a convoy system possible (there was a severe, even crippling, shortage of available escorts in 1941-2) and 2) was allowed by the Army to institute ASW air patrols (By law, this was the Army's responsibility, and the Army wasn't willing to suffer the prestige hit of giving it up to the Navy. Unfortunately, the USAAF lacked the training and equipment for the mission, not to mention any desire to "waste" their long-range bombers on ASW patrol.), the U-boats were driven back out to sea.
King bears the responsibility here. He made the same mistake the Admiralty did in WWI. He was too nationalistic to listen to British advice here. The British experience had proved that convoying was a useful technique even in the face of inadequate or no escort. The ocean is a big place. A convoy can escape detection about as well as an individual ship. But an individual sub can only sink a couple or three ships at a time. One ship meets one sub, down goes the merchant ship. 30 ships meet 6 subs and you will have quite a few losses, but most will get away. Any escort, even an inadequate one dramatically improves the effect of a convoy.