Scenario Design Questions Regarding Divisional Summaries

[vahauser]

Every scenario I play seems to evaluate divisional summaries differently. There seems to be as many different opinions about evaluating divisional summaries as there as scenarios. Even different scenarios designed by the same designer seem to evaluate divisional summaries differently.

Question #1:
Where can you find reliable historical documentation regarding divisional summaries?

Question #2:
Once you find reliable historical documentation, how can you interpret and evaluate that information consistently and accurately within the context of TOAW?

[vahauser]

What follows is a list of five depictions of the German 269th Infantry Division.  The 269th was chosen because it is the only division common with all five of the scenarios selected (actually, the 267th is depicted in the Operation Typhoon scenario instead of the 269th, but since they are both identical organizationally, then that's okay).  The five scenarios chosen are:  Soviet Union 1941, Operation Barbarossa, Directive 21, Russian War 1941-44, and Operation Typhoon.

The five scenarios were chosen using the following criteria:
1) Summer/Fall 1941 timeframe (EDIT: This was deliberate in order to achieve consistency and uniformity of the samples)
2) Recent scenarios that all use TOAW III (no 'older' scenarios were chosen)

[vahauser]

This is the 269th on 22 June 1941 as depicted in the Operation Barbarossa scenario:

[vahauser]

This is the 269th on 22 June 1941 as depicted in the Directive 21 scenario (note that the divisional HQ is separate from the rest of the division in Directive 21, so you are seeing the division "as combined").

[vahauser]

This is the 269th on 22 June 1941 as depicted in the Russian War 1941-44 scenario.

[vahauser]

This is the 269th on 22 June 1941 as depicted in the Soviet Union 1941 scenario.

[vahauser]

This is the 267th in October 1941 as depicted in the Operation Typhoon scenario (the 267th is identical to the 269th organizationally).

[vahauser]

As you can see from the above 5 depictions of the 269th Infantry Division, there are significant differences between them, even though it is the same division at the same moment in time. 
 
From a scenario-design perspective, what are the "good" features of these depictions?  What are the "bad" features?

[golden delicious]

ORIGINAL: vahauser

From a scenario-design perspective, what are the "good" features of these depictions?  What are the "bad" features?

A lot of it depends upon design philosophy, and other aspects of the scenario.

For example the division in Soviet Union 1941 has far more combat squads than the other divisions. This is a result of Bob's design philosophy and, frankly, it works very well for the strategic treatment he's given to the campaign in this scenario. It would be less appropriate at, say, 15km/hex

Clearly the division in Operation Typhoon has included a lot of machine guns which were in the TO&E, but are not in combat elements- a total of 376 machine guns excluding those which form part of the combat squads. If we are assuming the division is going to be hard pressed and constantly defending its own rear areas, this would be reasonable, but in the context of Barbarossa this is perhaps unrealistic.

Transportation is also subjective. While an infantry division contains numerous horses and motor vehicles, the impact that horse teams and trucks have on the performance of the unit can be dramatic. I'm going to guess that Operation Typhoon was designed for TOAW Volume I as the levels of transport in the division are boosting its movement up to far more than would ever be possible for leg infantry.

Where one can definitively say there is a problem is where there are artillery peices or AFVs which simply should not be in the unit, or which are missing. For example we can tell from the TO&E here;
http://niehorster.orbat.com/011_germany ... welle.html
that there are 67 37mm AT guns and 6 47mm AT guns in this division. This should be the basis for the unit's AT equipment, even if it is anticipated that the division's equipment might change over the course of a long scenario. Interestingly, not one of your 5 examples have hit the mark in this case, though a couple of them come close.

[vahauser]

golden delicious,
 
So, there is no "bad", only "good"?

[golden delicious]

ORIGINAL: vahauser

golden delicious,

So, there is no "bad", only "good"?

No. A lot of scenarios have badly designed OOBs with lots of glaring mistakes. However, I was just illustrating how two different scenarios might have the same unit with different equipment, and both would still be right for that scenario.

[vahauser]

ORIGINAL: golden delicious

ORIGINAL: vahauser

golden delicious,

So, there is no "bad", only "good"?

No. A lot of scenarios have badly designed OOBs with lots of glaring mistakes. However, I was just illustrating how two different scenarios might have the same unit with different equipment, and both would still be right for that scenario.

But in the example I've provided, there are five (not two) scenarios with five (not two) differing TOEs for the same division at the same moment in time.

Here is my goal for this thread: to provide readers with reasons for doing things one way or another. It won't do to merely say, "Well, it's right for that scenario." No. That won't do at all. There must be reasons. Why is it right for that scenario?

[vahauser]

If I had to choose, I'd say that the TOE given for the 269th in Directive 21 got it closest to being an accurate depiction on 22 June 1941.  I'd rank the 267th in Operation Typhoon second.  The 269th in Russian War 1941-44 and Operation Barbarossa tied for third.  And the 269th in Soviet Union 1941 fifth.

EDIT: There are some aspects of each of those TOEs that I find praiseworthy. Other aspects not so much.

EDIT2: I've already changed my opinion regarding how I would rank those five TOEs. Stay tuned for my reasons why. In the meantime, disregard my first attempt at ranking the five TOEs.

[golden delicious]

ORIGINAL: vahauser

Here is my goal for this thread: to provide readers with reasons for doing things one way or another. It won't do to merely say, "Well, it's right for that scenario." No. That won't do at all. There must be reasons. Why is it right for that scenario?

...there are reasons, but I've only played two of the five scenarios above, so I'm unable to comment on the design of the others. Russian War was designed for Volume I, hence the excess transport. As it is intended to cover a three year period, it's unsurprising to see the units set up in a very rough way, but it would have been quite easy to get closer to the initial organisation of the division in terms of the more measurable items.

Bob has expressed his own "count everything" design philosophy here and while I disagree with it in some cases it works excellently for a scenario where attrition is emphasised. Again the exact numbers of some types of equipment are wrong and could be corrected.

So if you want hard rules for designing a unit;
a) Get a good source for what was actually in the unit and make sure you're reading it right (i.e. not double counting). Put the artillery (including AA and AT) and AFVs in as per this source, except where these are transport vehicles
b) Decide what your design philosophy is for combat squads and light support weapons and vehicles. Do you follow Bob Cross' approach or are you more inclined to follow the formal structure of the TO&E and represent just the actual line infantry? Whatever you do, justify to yourself (and ideally record in the briefing) your reasoning, and apply it consistently with regard for conditions
c) Figure out how fast the real unit would have covered ground. Add transport to reach this level. If part of the unit's transport was made up of APCs, decide whether you want to put in the full number of APCs and make up any extra transport with trucks, or instead use some kind of ratio. Again, be consistent.

The fact is scenario design is subjective. You will never reduce it to a science. If it were possible to do so, we would not still have an active scenario design forum for TOAW some eleven years after the game was released.

[golden delicious]

ORIGINAL: vahauser

If I had to choose, I'd say that the TOE given for the 269th in Directive 21 got it closest to being an accurate depiction on 22 June 1941.  I'd rank the 267th in Operation Typhoon second.  The 269th in Russian War 1941-44 and Operation Barbarossa tied for third.  And the 269th in Soviet Union 1941 fifth.

EDIT: There are some aspects of each of those TOEs that I find praiseworthy. Other aspects not so much.

EDIT2: I've already changed my opinion regarding how I would rank those five TOEs. Stay tuned for my reasons why. In the meantime, disregard my first attempt at ranking the five TOEs.

I won't give a ranking- but here are the highlights from my perspective;

The TO&E from Soviet Union 1941 is good within the context of the design of the scenario. As far as my own design philosophy goes, the Operation Barbarossa TO&E is probably closest to what I would actually put in the unit if it were my scenario. Directive 21 gives the infantry too much firepower, Russian War makes some basic mistakes with the equipment of the division, while both Typhoon and Soviet Union 1941 have far more combat squads than I would put in the division.

[vahauser]

What follows are some source documents...

[vahauser]

This is taken from the Handbook on German Military Forces (a generic, "standard" German infantry division):

[vahauser]

This is taken from theeasternfront(dot)co(dot)uk:

The German Infantry Division between 1939 and 1942 was comprised from a Divisional HQ, which was formed from a Divisional staff Company and a mapping Platoon. The Division itself was comprised of three Infantry Regiments and various integral support elements. These included a reconnaissance Battalion consisting of a mounted Squadron, a bicycle Squadron, an armoured Section, equipped with 2 SdKfz 221 armoured cars and a heavy Squadron, formed from an anti-tank Platoon equipped with 3 x 37mm Pak 36 and an infantry gun Platoon equipped with 2 x 75mm leIG 18 guns. Other Divisional support elements included an artillery Regiment which comprised of a Regimental staff, an observation Battalion, three medium Battalions each consisting of three batteries, equipped with 4 x 105mm leFH 18 guns and a heavy Battalion consisting of three batteries equipped with 4 x 150mm sFH 18 guns. All guns were usually horse drawn, as towing vehicles were reserved for Panzer and Motorized Divisions. The Divisions engineer Battalion consisted of an HQ platoon, three pioneer Companies and a motorized bridging Column. The final support element within the Division was the anti-tank Battalion, which was formed by an HQ Platoon, a heavy machine gun Company, equipped with 12 x 20mm AA guns and three anti-tank gun Companies, each equipped with 12 x 37mm Pak 36 guns.
The infantry Regiments within the Division were comprised of three infantry Battalions, each formed from three rifle Companies and their integral support elements. These consisted of a machine gun Company equipped with 8 x MG's on sustained fire mounts and 6 x 81mm mortars and an infantry gun Company equipped with 2 x 150mm sIG 33 and 6 x 75mm leIG 18 guns.
Each infantry Battalion consisted of an HQ Platoon of 30 men and three rifle Companies. Support elements within the Battalion were provided by a support Company consisting of three Platoons. These were an HQ Platoon of 8 men, an MG Platoon of 30 men, equipped with 6 x MG's on sustained fire mounts and a mortar Platoon of 30 men with 6 x 81mm mortars. Each of the rifle Companies was comprised of an HQ section of 12 men and 3 rifle platoons. These were in turn each formed from an HQ section of 6 men and 3 rifle sections, each of 10 men. Support elements within the Company consisted of a heavy weapons Platoon with an HQ section of 4 men, a mortar Section of 9 men, equipped with 3 x 50mm mortars and an MG section with 12 men, equipped with 3 x MG's on sustained fire mounts.

[vahauser]

This is taken from dasheer(dot)org(dot)uk

The following figures and statistics are only a general guide as they do vary depending on the source used.
The Infantry division in 1939-41 averaged 16,860 men. This was made up of the following:
Officers NCOs Other ranks Beamte (Officials)
518 2,573 13,667 102
However, only about 64% of these were actually combat troops – the rest were support elements that the division could not function without. On the ‘march’ the division took up 40 kilometres of road space. As the war turned in the Allies’ favour and German losses rose the number of men in a division was reduced.
Combat elements (men that would normally close with the enemy):
Three infantry regiments comprising of:
Officers NCOs Other ranks Beamte
75 493 2,474 7
  (Also included in this were staff and intelligence units)
Reconnaissance (Aufklarungs) Battalion 623 Officers and men
Anti-tank (Panzerjager) Battalion 550 Officers and men
Engineer (Pionier) Battalion 520 Officers and men
 
Between the front and rear lines:
Artillery (Artillerie) Regiment 2,872 Officers and men
Light (Leichte) infantry ‘column’ 30 men
Signal (Nachrichten) Battalion 474 Officers and men

Rear or logistical support elements:
Supply services (Versrgungsdienste)   226 Officers and men
The above included the rations platoon, baker company, butcher platoon, Military Police and Feldpost platoon
         Logistics column / supply ‘train’         (3 motorised, 3 horse drawn) 180 Officers and men
Petrol, oil and lubricants column 35 Officers and men
Workshop company (Mechanics, carpenters etc) 102 Officers and men
Transport company 245 Officers and men
Veterinary company 235 Officers and men , 890 horses
Medical contingent* 616 Officers and men
*This consisted of 2 Medical Companies, 1 Field Hospital and 2 medical transport platoons.
Weapons:
Below is a table showing various weapons (apart from rifles, submachine guns etc) that equipped a 1939 infantry division.
Light machine guns 378
Heavy machine guns 138
Anti-tank rifles 90
50mm mortars 93
81mm mortars 54
20mm AA guns 12
37mm Anti-tank guns 75
75mm Infantry guns 20
105mm howitzers 36
150mm howitzers 18

EDIT: There is a typo concerning the strength of the pionier battalion above. The strength is given as 520, but should actually be 820 (you can crosscheck this with the Handbook on German Military Forces data). This raises the overal strength of a generic "standard" division to 17,000+ men, thus bringing it more in line with the Handbook.

[vahauser]

The following is taken from bayonetstrength(dot)150m(dot)com
 
While the above organisation was officially in use from February 1941 until the end of 1943, the realities of war, especially on the Eastern Front, brought about many changes.  No hard and fast rules can be applied to units amending their authorised establishment in the light of circumstance, but some general observations can be made.
Weapons such as the 5-cm mortar and the anti-tank rifle quickly proved to be more of an encumbrance than a valuable means of fire support, and were often discarded. [My italics.]