The First Team: Take Two!

[John 3rd]

Here is a screenshot of the Victory Table after the results of the day.

Good comments as always.

Nagumo's Orders:
1. I order the formation of the Bombardment TF of 2 BC, 3 CA, and 3 DD to hit Palmyra and stay there. That should help keep the Allies jumbled up as well as mess around with the CV planes now residing on the island.

2. Create several TF out of the remains of the invasion force. Stop the last 500 troops from offloading (triggering another Shock Attack) and only order ships with supplies to offload. The 2 Inf Brig have some supply and what we drop off tomorrow (only about 1300) should carry for a bit.

3. The 3rd Inf Brig will arrive off Palmyra in 2 days. I will wait until a couple of AK arrive to drop off supply prior to landing the last set of Infantry.

4. As noted below but I will repeat:
a. CarDiv1 heads for Canton to refuel. ALL their Vals and Kates are shifted to ASW Attack. There are enough Allied SS around here to keep ones feet from getting wet!
b. CarDiv2 and CarDiv5 move NE of Palmyra to finish off stragglers and cripples.

The island will fall quickly. There is only the CD unit and two Base Force present behind Sz-6 Forts.

[bigbaba]

gratz for a stunning victory, john.

it buys you time before the allied can launch another CV-attack.

[Panther Bait]

I don't know for sure, but I doubt the Wildcats (or the Seagulls) can make the hop to Hawaii or Johnston.  The SBDs and Avengers might possibly have the transfer range.

[Q-Ball]

I am also puzzled as to why they didn't have more LBA on the island. Maybe they were worried about them getting torched on the airstrip by BB's, not sure.

I am curious what Paul says when he gets the turn.

[frank1970]

ORIGINAL: John 3rd


Ship Damage:
BB Yamato 41B and 6 TT---SUNK!!! [:o]
CA Chikuma 3B--On Fire
CL Yura 3B--Heavy Damage
CL Kitakami 1 Torp--On Fire
DD Shigure 1B

Sometimes I hate it, when I am right.

[frank1970]

ORIGINAL: John 3rd



CVs Enterprise and Hornet SUNK
CAs Vincennes and San Fransisco SUNK
CLs Phoneix and Nashville SUNK

CAs New Orleans, Astoria, and Minneapolis heavily damaged
CL Honolulu is heavily damaged
2 DDs were hit by a single Torpedo as well and are presumed to in sinking condition.

Japanese Aerial Losses: 15 Zero, 2 Val, and 20 Kates

NO DAMAGE TO JAPANESE CVs!!!

On the other hand ....

Congratulations!

This one fired back on the Allies!

[John 3rd]

Paul might be contemplating heavy alcohol consumption right now!

If the Battle had stopped at Day One I would have been disappointed in losing Yamato but the losses sustained today--with more to come tomorrow--surely mark this as a big victory.  In being reduced to only 3 CVs, the Americans will have to be VERY careful in what they choose to do.  Conversely it allows us more freedom of movement.  Brad can keep his CVs over in the IO and try to sink the damned Royal Navy while I rotate the KB for the next two months.

The fear of a Central Pacific/North Pacific thrust has to be seriously downgraded too...

[ny59giants]

My big question would be why the Allies sent only 2 CVs to an area that may have contained most of the Japanese carrier strength?? At this stage in the war, I would still keep the American CVs in 5 separate CV TF with plenty of support ships. If KB did hit them, then only 1 TF would be the target. 

[Hornblower]

Thoughts and observations.
First of all congratulations on the Naval Battle of Palmyra.
I agree that the sinking of 2 of the 5 available CV’s seriously curtails any thoughts of a Central Pacific push – provided nothing occurs to even the score – until early ’43 when the Essex/Indy’s start to show.  Any advances he makes must now be under the B-25/26 Cover, and with all the bases seemingly in your hands, the CenPac/SouPac will be quite for a few months. 
 
The only area that he can use his LBA’s under fighter cover is the North Pacific.  I suspect that he’ll try to use the Aleutians with his LBA/Fighters and baby his CV’s.
 
The fact that there was no Infantry stationed at Palmyra, no LB’s and not a significant amount of fighters leads me to believe that it was never Paul’s intention to fight a pitched battle there.  There has been ample time to move a good number of the available fighters and bombers at pearl /west coast to there.   The fact that you’re not running into them makes me doubt that Palmyra was the line in the sand.
 
And he only hit you with 2 cv’s??  if he was going to commit the Fleet to a defense of the island, it wouldn’t be with just 2 CV’s.  he was trying a quick stab to knock you off balance, that was it..  

[John 3rd]

Both of you are correct and this might explain the 'Battle.'  It had to be a mistake.  Those CVs should ever have stayed there.  Additionally they were in one TF together.  There must have been the 2 CV, 8 CA/CL, and 8-10 DD.  That is a strenge combination of whips for this point in the war.

[Q-Ball]

That's a good point John; very strange TF config. With that many cruisers, easily could have been split into two, although might still have been same result.

The USN has lost 8 CA and 4 modern CL, that's quite a few cruisers.

[Hornblower]

well as my golf buddy says "its sometimes better to be lucky, then good."  Normally he says then when he makes par.

[John 3rd]

The Battle closes with the death of the cripples from the previous day. It is quite a scorecard!

[Nemo121]

The TF composition, the fact that it stayed around for Day 2 and the fact that your opponent strategically dispersed and then tactically concentrated his CVs ( exactly the combination which lead the Japanese to disaster at Midway ) needs no other explanation than inexperience and poor play. There's no need to complicate it more than that.
 
This failure to concentrate at the correct point at the correct point is the stand-out error they ( and others in other AARs ) keep making. By not concentrating enough force at the crucial point they just provide nice morsel-sized forces to be gobbled up and swallowed...

[flaggelant]

inexperience & poor play could also be translated into a failed tactical manouvre
 
when you look at the 1 CV up north i'd say it was bait to lure the KB in, and away from Palmyra, creating a enviroment that would have
been fitting for the allied CV's to operate under.
 
 
John actually did mention that he was expecting the main push to come from the north if i'm correct.
And knowing Johns aggressive style, they must have guessed that KB would be moving in for the kill.
 
What they didn't know was that the next invasion was allready planned, loaded and on its way, this is what probably went wrong.
a misguess on the aggresiveness of the Japanese player (or on how impulsive the reaction to finally seeing an allied fleet would be).
 
 
 
 
 

[Nemo121]

Flaggelant,

If these opponents had shown themselves to be cunning, crafty and capable of putting synchronised operations together then I might grant you the possibility that they were also attempting maskirovka operations BUT these opponents have shown none of these things. The best they've shown was in their work in India where they retreated well but even there it was less their good plan than the Japanese messing up their breach and exploitation phase that allowed their good fortune.

It is a common error for many players to "see" strategic deception and strategic plans within plans when facing an opponent. WHat they are really doing is engaging in the normal human psychological strategies of projection and displacement. That it is a normal reaction doesn't make it correct though.

Your explanation assumes competence, strategic misdirection and a grasp of timing that these opponents haven't, yet, exhibited. My explanation requires only a coninuation of the lack of strategic concentration ( penny-packeting out CVs ), effective force utilisation and utter lack of deception operations which has been a hallmark of their play until now.

Objectively it is far more likely that they are just continuing to do what they've done all along ( play poorly ) than that they are suddenly turning over a new leaf and showing some hitherto unexpected strategic nous.

In life it has been said that one should never ascribe to deception and brilliance that which can be explained by sloth and incompetence. I would aver that what applies in life applies in-game. On almost every level my explanation is the simpler one and I think that when facing this calibre of opponent you would do well not to wrap yourself up in complicated explanations for every mis-step which can lead you to double-think yourself into impotence. Instead accept it for what it is and concentrate on playing as skillfully as possible yourself even against insipid opposition. After all the true challenge here is to play better than you did last week/month/game and not about the ephemera of "winning".

I'm not saying this to beat up on his opponents or anything. My only concern is that the spread of flawed analysis leads people to just sit in their current comfort zones of play and be happy with what they are achieving which then acts to prevent rigorous self-analysis and improvement. I think its a pity to see people creating comfort myths of brilliant opponent play which then, indirectly, leads them to say "I couldn't have done better against such a great opponent" and just sit, sedately, without improvement at their current level of ability.

[Hornblower]

Nemo makes some excellent points, however I’m inclined to lean more toward Flaggelant’s point of view.  Perhaps its me just giving the benefit of the doubt.  But I find it hard to comprehend that they would offer battle for an island that they apparently didn’t adequately beef up with Infantry and Air assets.  But then again, that could prove Nemo’s point..  [&:]

[Q-Ball]

I personally think they split the CVs in order to maximize the chance of "hit and run" pickoffs of isolated Japanese shipping. The first CV strike that sank Yamato had the flavor of a raid, as well as the one up north. I don't think it was anything more than that.

Not that it's a good idea mind you, I think it's a terrible one. Splitting CV's is almost always a bad idea. WITP is a game that really rewards mass more than RL, especially in CV battles.

[Nemo121]

Hornblower --- Ok, let's assume you're right. Does Palmyra LOOK like an island they beefed up to turn into a decisive fight? And if it does ( which by the look of things it isn't ) then why go into a decisive fight to hurt the Japanese with only a small portion of your CVs? If it was a decisive fight then they implemented it foolishly by making the island so easy to take ( 1 x CD unit and 2 x Base Forces is a pathetic defensive force ) , if it wasn't a decisive fight then their committment of CVs was foolish. Either way nothing they've done looks like anything other than poor play.
 
Q-Ball - IF they were trying a raid why did they hang around for Day 2? I can't come up with anything other than foolishness and poor play as the answer to that.

[Hornblower]

Nemo, I guess that’s the crux of the matter.  Was it a meant to be a decisive fight?    If it was, then I agree with you 100% on all your points.  I’m just not sure if it was “planned” to be decisive.   I guess only Q’s and John’s adversary can answer that.    Either way it sure makes for a damn good discussion.