
Typhoon Cobra question
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- Footslogger
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Typhoon Cobra question
My father was in this TF in 1944. Is this the worst weather that the US Navy had in WWII? I have enclosed a picture of one of the ships in my father's TF.


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anarchyintheuk
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RE: Typhoon Cobra question
Probably. Halsey intercepted and attacked two hurricanes but I don't think any ships were sunk in the '45 one.
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mutterfudder
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RE: Typhoon Cobra question
ORIGINAL: mutterfudder
Which one was the Caine in?[;)]
Actually if you read the book Halsey's Typhoon the authors write that the Caine Mutiny was loosely based on Lt. Cmdr. James Marks, whose ship USS Hull floundered in the storm. Crazy enough as I'm reading some of the events on the Hull [minus a mutiny] I say to myself darn if some of this doesn't remind me of The Caine Mutiny, one of my favorite movies BTW.
Marks had a hatchet with him at the time he was rescued from the Pacific.
From page 230 in the book "he (Marks) had that hatchet to make sure nobody from his own crew would try to get rid of him"
[:D]
"There’s no such thing as a bitter person who keeps the bitterness to himself.” ~ Erwin Lutzer
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mutterfudder
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RE: Typhoon Cobra question
If you like the The Caine Mutiny movie, then you will love the book.

Beware the NWO!
RE: Typhoon Cobra question
ORIGINAL: Footslogger
My father was in this TF in 1944. Is this the worst weather that the US Navy had in WWII? I have enclosed a picture of one of the ships in my father's TF.
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Looks like "chain strain" to me!
x-Nuc twidget
CVN-71
USN 87-93
"Going slow in the fast direction"
CVN-71
USN 87-93
"Going slow in the fast direction"
RE: Typhoon Cobra question
Read "Down to the Sea" (I forget the author, and I'm too lazy at the moment to go to my office and check the bookshelf).
Marks is NOT well portrayed in that book either.
-F-
I checked it on Amazon. I don't think you could have a more potent recommendation (I have no reason to dispute the man's claim):
Patrick Douhan is listed as a survivor on p.348
Marks is NOT well portrayed in that book either.
-F-
I checked it on Amazon. I don't think you could have a more potent recommendation (I have no reason to dispute the man's claim):
Patrick Douhan is listed as a survivor on p.348
My name is Pat Douhan and I am one of the few survivors from the USS Hull DD350. After reading this book I can truthfully say that Bruce Henderson did an outstanding job of compilling
the true facts leading up to, during and after our loss in Typhoon Cobra. Being the reunion coordinator for the USS Hull reunions I am very close to most of my surviving shipmates as well as others that transferred prior to our sinking and this author has put together the true facts he obtained through research, interview, Naval records and ships deck logs, something than none of the previous authors accomplished. When reading this book you can see that our problems really begin when we had a change of command in October during our yard overhaul in Seattle. We destroyer sailors are close nit group and not too much was known about the loss of the three "tin cans" in the typhoon and we did not say much, but over the past few years this Naval tragedy has come to light and is getting some attention and as you can see by this authors writings you are not going to win when you are fighting mother nature. I will say again, after having been there,that this book "Down to the Sea" truthfully tells it like it was.
"It is obvious that you have greatly over-estimated my regard for your opinion." - Me

RE: Typhoon Cobra question
ORIGINAL: anarchyintheuk
Probably. Halsey intercepted and attacked two hurricanes but I don't think any ships were sunk in the '45 one.
Much of the problem in COBRA was that the ships were not properly ballasted (apparently partly due to orders from Halsey)... apparently he had learned his lesson by the next big event TYPHOON VIPER - he tried to sidestep it (he didn't for COBRA) but he still lost 3 DDs in this storm as well (3 in COBRA), but the death toll was lower in VIPER... VIPER did manage to break USS Pittsburgh in two... i think you'd have to look up millibars etc. to see which was more powerful.
BTW - my father was "volunteered" to pick up some guys off an island using a open landing craft during the storm... we was utterly convinced he was going to be killed during the height of the storm, and attributes his survival to a miracle... he described seeing PITTSBURGH and its other broken off part being towed by the next morning, and was even more convinced of a miracle.
RE: Typhoon Cobra question
The ballasting of the destroyers was a career catch-22 (plus a little background).
Halsey had already taken a lot of flak over charging north in Leyte Gulf. To Halsey's defense, he was caught in the decision to maintain the pressure on the PI airfields, or the looming threat of a storm.
However, he was warned. "Most" indicators were that a pretty bad storm, possably a typhoon, was heading for his launch point, and gaining in strength. However, you also have to consider that "most indicators" were litterally weather stations on Guam and Midway (quite far away), weather reports from ships in the area of low-pressure, and TBM Avenger patrols (torpedo pilots) sent to take weather measurments locally. This was reported back to PH, which would then report to him. This informatino gets reported to the fleet weather officer, who with his staff makes a recommendation to Halsey, who then makes the final call a takes responsibility.
That being the background, stay on station to cover assault in PI, and certainly nebulous weather information (something very big, and very bad is around here "somewhere"). He and the staff decided to go with the "almanac results": the historical probablility that the storm would proceed NE instead of NW.
So on to the ballasting.
Halsey was already running late to the launch point. Many of the DDs were low on fuel already running light (which would cause them to roll more in the storm). He wanted to press on to the launch area (again the flogging he recieved over Leyte), and refuel the DDs when got there. At this point he was moving NW towards PI, and the storm was essentially chasing him.
The weather gets worse, and some of the DDs are really running low on fuel, and may not make the launch point anyway. Politically, there is also considerble finger-pointing at the inexperience of several of the captains at this point, saying they're not handling their ships well, thus forcing the refuel to begin with (and will not handle their ships well in the storm to come). A refueling point is designated due south of the fleet for DDs that need to take on fuel, and the rest of the fleet will proceed towards launch point.
However, because nobody wants to actually be DD captain that couldn't keep station with the fleet, or worse holds up the fleet for any reason. So several elect to either take on minimal fuel or none at all (basically enough to get to the launch point, but not enough to actually act as safe ballast). It then get to the point where seas are so rough, that you -can't' refuel, even if you wanted to (you've passed point of no return at this point).
Unfortunately, the refueling point is littlerally right in the path of the storm, and 3 DDs end up foundering.
Several DDs with less ballast made it thru the storm. This can be partially attributed to better sea-handling by their skippers, and also to just dumb luck and/or providence.
A disaster is hardly ever just one screw up. It's a chain of events that lead to disaster (see above).
The book "Down to the Sea" is not terribly sympathetic to Halsey about the events leading up to, and including the storm. However, I think it does objectively portray the situation. I think getting into Cobra was a blunder that could/should have been averted, but given all the events going on, I think it could have happened to anyone (and statitically, was bound to happen eventually).
Frankly, what really concerned me was the actions (or lack thereof) -AFTER- the storm.
Basically, very little effort was made to rescue the survivors for about 24 hours after contact was lost. Yes, the storm continued (the backside of a hurricane is bad, but it's nothing compared to the front). Indeed, the DE Tabberer came across survivors of the Hull within 4 hours. She fought the storm -and- rescued survivors. She reported the loss of Hull, and stayed on station to rescue surviors.
She was ordered to return to port for repairs, about 6 hours after having found (and continued to find), survivors.
But she "couldn't make out the transmission" and stayed in the area, and continued to rescue survivors.
She was finally joined by 2x more DEs, almost a day after notifying fleet that the Hull had gone down, and she was picking up surviors.
From the accounts of the surviors for all three ships, half or more of the men actually got off the ships. However, many men were lost within the first 24 hours to wounds/sharks/delerium.
Instead of 60% getting off, and 50% of them being rescued (it's a typhoon afterall).
There was only about a 10% survival rate, which probably could have been about 25% - 30% had rescue efforts beebn made more timely.
-F-
Halsey had already taken a lot of flak over charging north in Leyte Gulf. To Halsey's defense, he was caught in the decision to maintain the pressure on the PI airfields, or the looming threat of a storm.
However, he was warned. "Most" indicators were that a pretty bad storm, possably a typhoon, was heading for his launch point, and gaining in strength. However, you also have to consider that "most indicators" were litterally weather stations on Guam and Midway (quite far away), weather reports from ships in the area of low-pressure, and TBM Avenger patrols (torpedo pilots) sent to take weather measurments locally. This was reported back to PH, which would then report to him. This informatino gets reported to the fleet weather officer, who with his staff makes a recommendation to Halsey, who then makes the final call a takes responsibility.
That being the background, stay on station to cover assault in PI, and certainly nebulous weather information (something very big, and very bad is around here "somewhere"). He and the staff decided to go with the "almanac results": the historical probablility that the storm would proceed NE instead of NW.
So on to the ballasting.
Halsey was already running late to the launch point. Many of the DDs were low on fuel already running light (which would cause them to roll more in the storm). He wanted to press on to the launch area (again the flogging he recieved over Leyte), and refuel the DDs when got there. At this point he was moving NW towards PI, and the storm was essentially chasing him.
The weather gets worse, and some of the DDs are really running low on fuel, and may not make the launch point anyway. Politically, there is also considerble finger-pointing at the inexperience of several of the captains at this point, saying they're not handling their ships well, thus forcing the refuel to begin with (and will not handle their ships well in the storm to come). A refueling point is designated due south of the fleet for DDs that need to take on fuel, and the rest of the fleet will proceed towards launch point.
However, because nobody wants to actually be DD captain that couldn't keep station with the fleet, or worse holds up the fleet for any reason. So several elect to either take on minimal fuel or none at all (basically enough to get to the launch point, but not enough to actually act as safe ballast). It then get to the point where seas are so rough, that you -can't' refuel, even if you wanted to (you've passed point of no return at this point).
Unfortunately, the refueling point is littlerally right in the path of the storm, and 3 DDs end up foundering.
Several DDs with less ballast made it thru the storm. This can be partially attributed to better sea-handling by their skippers, and also to just dumb luck and/or providence.
A disaster is hardly ever just one screw up. It's a chain of events that lead to disaster (see above).
The book "Down to the Sea" is not terribly sympathetic to Halsey about the events leading up to, and including the storm. However, I think it does objectively portray the situation. I think getting into Cobra was a blunder that could/should have been averted, but given all the events going on, I think it could have happened to anyone (and statitically, was bound to happen eventually).
Frankly, what really concerned me was the actions (or lack thereof) -AFTER- the storm.
Basically, very little effort was made to rescue the survivors for about 24 hours after contact was lost. Yes, the storm continued (the backside of a hurricane is bad, but it's nothing compared to the front). Indeed, the DE Tabberer came across survivors of the Hull within 4 hours. She fought the storm -and- rescued survivors. She reported the loss of Hull, and stayed on station to rescue surviors.
She was ordered to return to port for repairs, about 6 hours after having found (and continued to find), survivors.
But she "couldn't make out the transmission" and stayed in the area, and continued to rescue survivors.
She was finally joined by 2x more DEs, almost a day after notifying fleet that the Hull had gone down, and she was picking up surviors.
From the accounts of the surviors for all three ships, half or more of the men actually got off the ships. However, many men were lost within the first 24 hours to wounds/sharks/delerium.
Instead of 60% getting off, and 50% of them being rescued (it's a typhoon afterall).
There was only about a 10% survival rate, which probably could have been about 25% - 30% had rescue efforts beebn made more timely.
-F-
"It is obvious that you have greatly over-estimated my regard for your opinion." - Me

RE: Typhoon Cobra question
According to one source for COBRA:
"Three destroyers had been sunk; Hull, Spence and Monaghan, along with the loss of 146 combat aircraft. Some 793 sailors had lost their lives besides damaging 37 warships. All due to Halsey insisting the task force maintain its position."
Apparently, rescue efforts were better for VIPER:
"Viper was faster catching up with Halsey's force 300-mi southeast of Okinawa from 4 June through the 5 June 1945. This time he lost three destroyers, 76 fighter planes, and lives of six men and had 36 of his 48 ships damaged to some degree."
The "box score" on the ships was almost exactly the same (3 sunk/37 damaged vs. 3 sunk 36 damaged), but the deaths were radically different (793 vs. 6).
"Three destroyers had been sunk; Hull, Spence and Monaghan, along with the loss of 146 combat aircraft. Some 793 sailors had lost their lives besides damaging 37 warships. All due to Halsey insisting the task force maintain its position."
Apparently, rescue efforts were better for VIPER:
"Viper was faster catching up with Halsey's force 300-mi southeast of Okinawa from 4 June through the 5 June 1945. This time he lost three destroyers, 76 fighter planes, and lives of six men and had 36 of his 48 ships damaged to some degree."
The "box score" on the ships was almost exactly the same (3 sunk/37 damaged vs. 3 sunk 36 damaged), but the deaths were radically different (793 vs. 6).
RE: Typhoon Cobra question
I boggles my mind when we have those fools who see a Cat-3 hurricane on the radar heading right for them, and decide to "ride it out". It's "only" a Cat-3!
You live in a house made of wood, stucco and concrete.
The USS Pittsburg displaces 14,000 tons, and is made of steel.
This what the USS Pittsburg looked like after catching the edge of a Hurricane, what do you think your house is gonna look like?
-F-

You live in a house made of wood, stucco and concrete.
The USS Pittsburg displaces 14,000 tons, and is made of steel.
This what the USS Pittsburg looked like after catching the edge of a Hurricane, what do you think your house is gonna look like?
-F-

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"It is obvious that you have greatly over-estimated my regard for your opinion." - Me

RE: Typhoon Cobra question
ORIGINAL: Feinder
I boggles my mind when we have those fools who see a Cat-3 hurricane on the radar heading right for them, and decide to "ride it out". It's "only" a Cat-3!
You live in a house made of wood, stucco and concrete.
The USS Pittsburg displaces 14,000 tons, and is made of steel.
This what the USS Pittsburg looked like after catching the edge of a Hurricane, what do you think your house is gonna look like?
-F-
I live in a soviet built concrete commieblock! Not even a cat5 will bring this one down [:D]
Surface combat TF fanboy
RE: Typhoon Cobra question
My stepfather rode the storm out in a DD. He was severly wounded (lost his arm) by a kamakaze attack later in the war but said that the fear and stress of sitting through that storm was far worse than any ordeal of air attack.
I spent ten years at sea on merchant ships. Everybody who has been to sea for a long time is going to have a nasty storm story to tell. (I won't bore you with mine [>:]) That typhoon was nasty but there have been worse. It just famous to us because so many ships were concentrated in one area and there was a war going on.
I spent ten years at sea on merchant ships. Everybody who has been to sea for a long time is going to have a nasty storm story to tell. (I won't bore you with mine [>:]) That typhoon was nasty but there have been worse. It just famous to us because so many ships were concentrated in one area and there was a war going on.
I am the Holy Roman Emperor and am above grammar.
Sigismund of Luxemburg
Sigismund of Luxemburg
RE: Typhoon Cobra question
Anytime tragic circumstances rear their ugly head, incredible people show their courage, skipper of the USS Tabberer Lieutenant Commander Henry L. Plage was one of those gentlemen.

from the webpage-
http://www.geocities.com/de418/
Check the Fletcher class DD on this page[X(][X(][X(]
http://mighty90.com/Typhoon_COBRA.html


On 17 December, as Tabberer was steaming in company with the 3d Fleet fueling group to the east of the Philippine Islands, rising wind and a choppy sea forced her to break off preparations to take on fuel. The barometer dropped precipitously as the weather grew worse. By evening, the little warship was fighting a full typhoon. During the night, Tabberer lost steerageway and could not fight her way out of the deep troughs. She frequently took rolls up to 60 degrees and, on several occasions, approached an angle of 72 degrees from the vertical.
The high winds and seas continued to batter her on the 18th. By 1830, her mast and radio antennae were gone. At 2130, a signalman trying to rig an emergency antenna sounded the "man overboard" alarm. Tabberer rushed to the rescue Once on board, the sailor reported that he was from Hull (DD-350) and that his ship had gone down about noon that day. Thus, she was the first ship of the 3d Fleet to learn of the tragedy of 18 December 1944. Though unable to call for help, she immediately embarked upon a search for other survivors. Her rescue efforts continued through the night, all day on the 19th, and into the 20th. In all, she saved 55 officers and men both from Hull and Spence (DD-512). Later, Tabberer was relieved by other units of the fleet, and they rescued an additional 36 men, a few of whom belonged to the crew of the typhoon's third victim Monaghan (DD 354). Outstanding rescue efforts during the storm won several members of Tabberer's crew Navy and Marine Corps medals, Lt. Comdr. Plage, the Legion of Merit, and the ship, the Navy Unit Commendation.
from the webpage-
http://www.geocities.com/de418/
Check the Fletcher class DD on this page[X(][X(][X(]
http://mighty90.com/Typhoon_COBRA.html

"There’s no such thing as a bitter person who keeps the bitterness to himself.” ~ Erwin Lutzer




