Fuel Supplies

[Q-Ball]

I am curious on how fuel will be handled in WITP. In UV, there are ports with unlimited stocks of fuel. Though this is probably a realistic approach for the Allies, who really did not have any fuel problems, I would like to see a more real-life approach for the Japanese. This would mean having Palembang and Borneo as the only signficant sources of fuel. Doing that would produce historical actions; the IJN working hard to get that fuel to Japan, the Allies working to interdict it. During the later part of the war, a significant part of the Combined Fleet was in Singapore, mostly because it could then be close to sources of fuel. As we know, the lack of fuel was a critical limiting factor to IJN naval operations, particularly late in the war. Modeling this way would also make it absolutely imperative that the Japanese player clear the Dutch East Indies quickly in 1942, just like real life where that was the #1 objective early in the war for the IJA and IJN.

Anyone agree with that approach? Matrix, is that how it will be modeled?

[Joel Billings]

Fuel resources will be converted into fuel points that can then be transported by tankers. It will definitely limit IJN operations. At least that's the goal.

[wpurdom]

If the only renewable source of fuel for the Japanese is going to be where it is drilled, Japan will need very large stocks to begin with.

[CynicAl]

No larger than they historically started the war with, I should think - and that was less than two year's worth at peacetime consumption rates. Needless to say, that stockpile evaporated considerably faster in wartime.

[Fred98]

Just to clarify.

The Japanese went to war with the US for one reason. Oil.

The US had placed an oil embargo on Japan in retaliation for the war in China. A lot of Americans said “to hell with the Chinese, lets sell oil to the Japanese and create jobs in America”.

But Roosevelt said no.

On Dec 7th there was a 2-pronged attack. One against Pearl Harbour. This was supposed to stop the US enforcing its embargo.

And the other was to the south via Malaysia. This was to secure the oil reserves in Indonesia. And secure the flank against the British.

The whole Pacific war was about oil.

Out of interest, in 1990, Saddam Hussein attacked Kuwait for oil. The US immediately placed an embargo on oil to Iraq……………

[corbulo]

In 1942 IJN was having trouble keeping oil in Kavieng/Rabaul. Before battle of Tassafaronga the Japanese commander drained the oil bunkers of the cruisers so the destroyers would have enough fuel.

[wpurdom]

Tassafronga is a year after Pearl. My impression is that oil constraints did not affect IJN operations for the first 8-9 months or so. Normally in these type games, stockpiles dissipate fairly quickly. That's what I mean by the need for "very large" stockpiles - enough to carry on ops without too much concern about replacement for the first 8 months or so.

[CynicAl]

Ah, I see what you're saying now. Yes, that'd be about right.

When I read your earlier post, I saw the words "very large" and made a worst-case assumption that you were asking that the Japanese be provided with several years' worth of oil reserves. Sorry for the misunderstanding.

[Ranger-75]

Originally posted by wpurdom
Tassafronga is a year after Pearl. My impression is that oil constraints did not affect IJN operations for the first 8-9 months or so. Normally in these type games, stockpiles dissipate fairly quickly. That's what I mean by the need for "very large" stockpiles - enough to carry on ops without too much concern about replacement for the first 8 months or so.

Sorry to dissappoint you, but the Japanese were running low on fuel by mid-late 1942. Their consumption was higher than they projected, and their projections failed to take into account non-warship usage (the merchant / tanker fleet) and industrial production requirements. This combined with their dismal performance in actually producing oil from the captured areas made Japan continually short of oil, although not cripplingly short until mid 1944.

It is the factory / heavy industry requirements that cause Japanese oil reserves to drop sharply and hover around 4-5,000 points during the war, because once a base gets low on fuel, 1,000 oil is used up to supply that base / city with fuel (a 1 oil for 4 fuel ratio - hey i'd like those odds today!). Also HI and industry in general uses up lots of oil, 25 at a whack for HI.

[jjjanos]

Originally posted by Ranger-75


Sorry to dissappoint you, but the Japanese were running low on fuel by mid-late 1942. Their consumption was higher than they projected, and their projections failed to take into account non-warship usage (the merchant / tanker fleet) and industrial production requirements. This combined with their dismal performance in actually producing oil from the captured areas made Japan continually short of oil, although not cripplingly short until mid 1944.

The dismal performance in producing oil from the captured areas....

I remember reading that the Japanese had a shortage of qualified personel in managing oil fields. Part of this was the lack of oil in Japan, part of this was because the IJN transported most of their engineers to Indonesia on a single transport/merchant ship and, darn, if that ship didn't get sunk by a sub and most of the engineers were killed.

[Ranger-75]

correct on both counts, there were few technically able folks in Japan for this type of work and thet sinned big time by putting most of them in a single ship, which was sunk.

But since we can't have the HMS Ark Royal or HMS Hood because they were sunk, then that's the way it is.

[Sabre21]

Hey Joe..

I would have to say that the Japanese did not go to war with the US for 1 reason as you stated. Economics played a major part in leading up to the war, with oil as the predominant economic factor...but the rubber, tin, and food available in the southern areas also had a major impact. The Japs were importing a lot of scrap metal along with other essentials along with oil products from the US.

But really, the ultimate reason for going to war was power. The loss of face the Japanese military would have incurred by withdrawing from China as a result of meeting US demands for a continual supply of imports was unthinkable. Many a Japanese politicians met their death at the hands of army right wing radicals at the even mentioning of any troop withdrawals. The mililtary was gaining political power in Japan and was not about to concede it. The only way to keep that power was to look elsewhere for resources...north to Siberia or south to the pacific. We know the choice they took.

As for many Americans wanting to continue providing exports to Japan..it was quite the opposite. The stories coming out of China...especially the rape of Nanking...was hardening American attitudes towards Japan. It was Roosevelt...despite many of his advisors and public opinion saying otherwise, that continued the exports. This was a political and not economic decision. The Brits were on the verge of defeat in 40 and the last thing that was needed was to start a war with Japan..it was Roosevelt with the urgings of Churchill to continue the exports. It wasn't until the Japanese occupied French Indochina that even Roosevelt had had enough and finally imposed a complete embargo. The Japanese by then though had already determined their course of action and knew sooner or later the US what cut off supplies.

So yes...economics played a role (especially oil), but the over riding factor was political power.

Andy

[Ranger-75]

Japan went to war with the west in order to secure oil / resources so that they could continue to proescute their war with China - They couldn't win a war against a non industrial nation like China so they went to war with the two biggest industrial nations in the world.

Doesn't make any sense does it - try telling that to the Army (and lesser extend Navy) leaders who had been running Japan for decades.