Alternate History Scenario

[Tom_Holsinger]

15 years ago I played a fascinating PBEM game of Gary Grigsby’s Pacific War based on an alternate history background I wrote to maximize early game action, and present the latter here for use in WITP-AE. The major change is that I gave Japan extra oil production of about two million tons a year (40,000 barrels a day) from Nazi-style synthetic oil plants in Japan and Manchuria. Both sides also received significant early-game upgrades to ship-based anti-aircraft systems, and some increases to the numbers of fleet carriers. The Japanese also received far greater production of everything, plus they had much greater initial numbers of aircraft squadrons and, in particular, merchant vessels and tankers.

My friend Trent Telenko played the Japanese and I played the Americans for about 6-9 months of game time. We discovered in spades that logistics counted for everything – a stalemate quickly developed in the South Pacific with all-out fight for New Guinea which almost exactly mirrored the historic Solomons campaign. Basically both sides’ logistics petered out pretty close to where they did historically in terms of location even with the additional Japanese oil production & ensuing Preparation Points.

But we sure had fun. Here is the opening part of the alternate history background. I’d appreciate it if someone with more knowledge of WITP-AE would post some ideas on how to implement the additional Japanese oil production. My wild-assed guess is that Tokyo and Port Arthur should be made oil production and refinery bases with say, 30,000 barrels a day at Tokyo and 10,000 at Port Arthur. For comparison purposes, Goralski & Freeburg said in their Oil & War that Japan produced about a million tons of oil a year (20,000 barrels a day) from all oil sources combined on the island of Formosa.

Edit - I've been informed that I should upload the whole thing as one huge post, which follows.

[Tom_Holsinger]

I have been informed that, as my alternate history and 1941 orders of battle are all Word files rather than game files, I should just post them here normally. Here they are as one mammoth, 15,000 word, post.

ALTERNATIVE PACIFIC CAMPAIGN HISTORY

1898-1918

United States

The first major change from history occurs when the Imperial German Navy's squadron in the Philippines during the Spanish-American War engages in a brief skirmish with the U.S. one under Admiral Dewey. It ends when the British squadron fires warning shots at the Germans (this almost happened historically, but the British squadron deterred the Germans by moving to a position to support the U.S. squadron when the situation became dangerous).

The Germans historically had been trying to get the Spanish to sell the Philippines to Germany before the Americans under Dewey could occupy Manila. Vice-admiral von Diederichs, commanding the German Asian squadron, had been in constant communication with the Spanish in Manila as part of this, and additionally had his ships maneuver to interfere with American ships doing the same with the Filipino rebel army under Aguinaldo.

History changes after Dewey’s intemperate, and not legally justified, demand that von Diederichs permit American naval parties to inspect German warships entering Manila Bay. Von Diederichs is intemperate right back instead of standing on his legal rights, so Dewey forbids the Germans from landing parties in Manila unless American officers accompany those. Diederichs replies that this would be war, and Dewey agrees. Fortunately, both report this to the commander of the British squadron, who has his ships prepare to quickly intervene.

So, when American vessels try to block a German launch from going ashore, German vessels interfere and a brief engagement begins, but ends quickly when the British squadron moves between the combatants and fires warning shots at the Germans. The launch carrying a German diplomat is sunk by the Americans, with the entire German party killed. The Germans back off, snarling, and the Kaiser orders von Diederichs home, but American and German newspapers and politicians continue a war of words.

A naval race then begins between America and Germany. Tirpitz succeeds in diverting the German side of it to his more favored naval race with Britain, but the U.S. remains convinced it is in one with Germany. This results, among other things, in a 1901 Navy Law requiring de jure regular building programs of at least two battleships, two cruisers and several destroyers a year. Over time, this produces a significantly larger U.S. Navy plus speeded-up warship/naval technology development for two generations, though after World War One new American ships are not built in significant numbers. Construction of one light cruiser per dreadnought battleship does, however, produce a balanced U.S. Navy by 1920, which was not at all the case historically. The mistaken American conviction that they were in a naval race with Germany does result in emulation of useful German innovations, such as extensive (and expensive) destructive testing of protective arrangements.

President Theodore Roosevelt sends the Great White Fleet out eighteen months early, in the spring of 1906 after the Russo-Japanese War ends with an ahistoric early Japanese victory (TR led the peace negotiations here too). ). The battleship Maine (built after the one destroyed at Havana) blows up, with the loss of more than 500 men, from a luridly publicized turret accident caused by a well-known design flaw (single-stage turret hoists) during firing practice off Malta in early 1906. This is towards the end of the Fleet’s world circumnavigation. Historically the Maine’s sister ship Missouri almost blew up from such an accident on April 13, 1904.

A huge battle over reform of the Navy is then in progress. This disaster convinces Admiral of the Navy George Dewey, chairman of the General Board, to throw all of his prestige, tremendously enhanced by his battle with the German squadron, into reform. The heretofore-ambivalent President Roosevelt joins wholly on the side of the reformers against the Navy’s entrenched bureaucracy and their Congressional allies who are loathe to lose corruption & patronage opportunities. The reformers prevail with a combination of legislative and administrative regulation changes. Another major factor is the very effective backroom support of the influential Congressman Nicholas Longworth following his 1906 marriage to the President’s oldest daughter, Alice, particularly Longworth’s arrangement of quiet compromises to continue patronage & corruption in the naval budget.

Admiral Seaton Schroeder becomes the first Chief of Naval Operations in 1907, a policy of officer promotion by merit is established, and the Navy bureaus are significantly reorganized as well as stripped of their independence. Many elderly senior officers are forced to retire, and are replaced by young, vigorous and highly competent officers, making the Navy more effective & influential relative to the Army.

A newly promoted Admiral William Sims, jumped over several hundred senior officers, becomes the first chief of a new Bureau of Ships in early 1908, in which all ship design and construction functions are centralized. He serves there until late 1912. U.S. designs become almost as good as German in protection while retaining their historic firepower and habitability advantages.

Russo-Japanese War

The next major historical change occurs when Russian cruisers from Vladivostok do not sink the Japanese freighters carrying siege artillery to Manchuria in the middle of June 1904. This siege artillery produces the fall of the Russian fortress of Port Arthur by the end of August, while the Battle of Liaoyang is in progress, thereby freeing Japan’s besieging 3rd Army to move north five months earlier than happened historically. This provides the Japanese with temporary numerical superiority on the main front with the Russians, and they use it to consistently lever the Russians farther north with wide flanking attacks until the Russians asked for terms and a truce. The battle of Liaoyang is the only major Russian attack of the war – the Japanese held the initiative thereafter, and the constant Russian defeats have devastating effects on Russian morale in the field and at home.

The disastrous battle for Mukden in November 1904 is the last straw for the Russians – their Manchurian army is routed with the loss of 40,000 prisoners and capture of most of the army train. The Japanese immediately march on Harbin, whose capture would cut the Russians’ only rail line to Vladivostok and their Pacific coast provinces, and leave those completely vulnerable to Japanese piecemeal conquest. Widespread rebellion had already broken out in European Russia too. The prospect of losing Russia’s Pacific provinces is the decisive factor in Czar Nicholas’ decision to pay Japan a huge indemnity for peace.

Japan's post-war finances are far less strained so its dreadnought-type building programs are, ultimately, larger though slower starting for reasons described below. What is most important is that the lower war cost, and greater indemnity payments by Russia, cause the overall Japanese economy to grow much faster so it and Japanese forces are 25% larger by 1941, offsetting changes favorable to the United States. This is particularly so of industrial development in Japanese-occupied Manchuria, where Japanese aggression starts earlier, though it is limited to Manchuria.

Dreadnought Development Through World War One

Speeded-up American warship development results in the U.S. Navy being authorized to build semi-dreadnoughts in 1903 (laid down in 1904) and the first dreadnoughts in 1904 (laid down in 1905). This lets Admiral Fisher, First Sea Lord of the Royal Navy, push through his plans to lay down HMS Dreadnought in early instead of late 1905, plus the first of the Invincible class battlecruisers in late 1905. British dreadnought development and construction begins one year earlier than historically and accelerates faster – this is 2-4 years faster in the United States.

The Royal Navy much earlier adopts the central fire-control system, coupled with super-firing turrets as the concussive effects of super-firing turrets on the fire-control crew in the lower turrets is less important.

The Germans and Japanese are caught even more flat-footed than they were historically and follow similar paths in reaction, but with a much bigger fuss in Germany due to the Kiel Canal problem. Tirpitz is assured of financial support for that early, and so dumps several of the last class of now useless pre-dreadnought battleships before they are laid down to save money for a later frantic catch-up dreadnought program of laying down six dreadnoughts in 1907, five in 1908, and four each 1909-11 plus three in 1911, which is three more than the historic total. This inflames the British much more than it did historically, which results in Churchill earlier introducing, expanding and then improving the enormously successful Queen Elizabeth class instead of regressing with the historic “R” class. Nine Queen Elizabeth‘s are built instead of five, and are followed by five 35,000 ton, 27 knot, successors (“R”s) given the almost-as-large American dreadnoughts laid down 1912-15. The greater numbers of British fast battleships with 15" guns at Jutland result in the loss of the German battlecruisers Lutzow and Seydlitz in addition to the Derfflinger, plus far more serious damage to the vanguard of the German battleline during the run to the north.

Fisher is not recalled as First Sea Lord in 1914 (the first unjustified change from history - he dies or something), so his flimsy wartime battlecruisers are not built. The loss of six battlecruisers, but no battleships, at Jutland entirely discredits the former while the greater numbers and superior performance of British fast battleships confirm them as the battlecruisers' successors. This means that there are no battlecruisers to convert into aircraft carriers after World War One. The U.S. Navy lays down three 40,000 ton fast battleships in 1916, though their construction is halted by American entry into the First World War, and then by major design changes due to the lessons of Jutland. They are not completed until 1921-22.

The relatively swift Japanese victory in the Russo-Japanese War leaves them with a more intact Russian Port Arthur fleet to salvage and less immediate need to build more capital ships. They are caught quite off-balance by the early 1905 laying down of the first American all big-gun ships, and find it as difficult as they did historically to secure large numbers of new 12” guns for their own proposed hasty dreadnought program. This coupled with the British introduction of turbine engines for its dreadnoughts convinces the Japanese to delay commencement of their first dreadnoughts until they can do it right. The historic Japanese desire to do as much building in their own yards is a factor here.

The result is that the Japanese do not build any of the six semi-dreadnoughts they historically did, and order their first two dreadnoughts from private British yards. One of each of the next three classes, of two ships each, is built in Britain and one in Japan from, initially, mostly British parts but with each class an increasing proportion of Japanese parts. Only one of their fifth dreadnought classes, the Kongo battlecruisers, is built in Britain, one is built of British and Japanese parts, and all of the other two are constructed entirely of Japanese parts. Japan having much greater foreign currency reserves due to the lesser expense of the Russo-Japanese War is critical to this, and its most immediately notable result is that Japan is almost able to match the pre-World War One American dreadnought programs, with eight Japanese first generation dreadnoughts to ten American, and twelve Japanese second generation to sixteen American. By 1914 the Japanese capital ship construction rate drops to 1 a year, but includes two 40,000 ton, 26.5 knot, 16” gun-armed Tosas laid down 1916-17.


INTER-WAR PERIOD

Post-World War One Naval Race/1921 Naval Limitations Treaty

The United States is thoroughly alarmed by the much more effective Japanese early dreadnought programs, lays down three dreadnoughts and three light cruisers each year yearly 1914 - 1916, then enacts a Navy Law calling for construction of four dreadnoughts and four cruisers a year commencing in 1917, double the early Japanese rate, but this is stopped in 1917-18 due to entry into World War One.

The long-lead time to build capital ship big guns and turret fittings leaves the British in 1919 with enough unused ones left over from planned pre-war building for two new ships, though all laid down before the war are completed (because Fisher's WWI battlecruisers are not built). Britain uses these to rapidly build two immediate post-war fast battleships to respond to the huge US/Japanese post-war building programs. British public out-cry about the expense of the really large proposed 1921-24 programs leads the British govt. to seek naval limitations just as happened historically. The Japanese are very receptive as they clearly cannot match American building.

The 1921 Washington Naval Limitations Treaty here adopts the historic 1930 capital ship limits (15 British & American, 9 Japanese, etc.) but is less strict on aircraft carriers. All capital ships under construction save the two new British are destroyed. None may be laid down until 1932, at which time new ones are restricted to 35,000 tons & 15" guns (instead of 14" because the latest British have standardized on 15"). Aircraft carrier limits are a bit higher; 145,000 British & American tons compared to 90,000 Japanese plus 50,000 each French & Italian, as a sop to the admirals who have no battlecruisers to convert and insist on being careful about a very untested type. The Japanese and Americans build up to their treaty limits on carriers (the Japanese cheated, of course) but the British do not.

The US Navy is significantly better off than historically in the inter-war years because it starts with a dozen new cruisers, built immediately after WWI, and optimized as fleet scouts for the Pacific, plus almost as many pre-war light cruisers less than ten years old, though somewhat worn from war service. None remains effective by 1939, but their interwar existence fosters development of fleet doctrine and helps refine later cruiser designs.

1930 London Naval Treaty & Later Negotiations

The 1930 treaty occurs about the same as historically save that the capital ship limits are already in place. This alternate history's 1921 Washington Treaty aircraft carrier limits are renewed through 1936. Limits on cruisers, destroyers and submarines are adopted, though with some (mostly minor) changes, also effective through 1936. The major difference is that Japanese militarists assassinate Premier Yamaguichi before the conference in an attempt to block Japan's participation (historically they only winged him after the conference in an attempt to prevent ratification of its treaty). His successor insists on a provision in the Treaty of London that no limitations shall be effective after 1936, and that there shall be no more limitations conferences. The British do not take this seriously, and fall for a 1935 Japanese ruse about subsequently changing their mind and offering a new post-1936 agreement. British 1937-38 designs and programs meet self-imposed limitations which the Japanese refuse to accept at the last minute in 1936, having planned to do so all along. The Roosevelt administration is aware of the Japanese ruse because it has broken the Japanese diplomatic codes (see below about Henry Stimson and Herbert Yardley), but a still-isolationist Congress imposes historic displacement limits on American battleship designs by statute . Everyone but the British prepare for the 1936 expiration of naval limitations well in advance, which in turn forces the British to make some preparations of their own, so there is a faster 1937-41 buildup by all major navies, and American cruisers laid down after 1936 are not subject to the 10,000 ton London Treaty limit. This means the historic Baltimore class heavy cruisers commence in 1937, and the historic Cleveland class light cruisers use the Baltimore’s displacement, hull size and machinery.

United States Politics 1921-41

President Harding does not die in 1923, but does not run for re-election due to scandal. Coolidge serves to 1932 instead of retiring in 1928. Hoover never becomes President – though he is the GOP nominee in 1932 and loses to FDR. These & previous changes result in small, regular, building and development programs 1923-32 because Coolidge wanted a strong navy while Hoover was such a pacifist that he starved the Navy as President. They also revolutionize American cryptography because, absent Hoover’s presidency, Henry Stimson does not become Secretary of State and terminate the Cipher Bureau, which historically led Herbert Yardley to reveal the extent to which Japanese diplomatic ciphers had been broken. Yardley instead remains in government service and continues his penetration of Japanese diplomatic codes, though he is sidelined after losing a major bureaucratic turf fight to William Friedman during FDR’s first term. The Japanese have no idea their codes have been broken.

Regular cruiser and destroyer building programs resume in 1932-33, followed by some aircraft carriers to bring the Navy to the limits authorized under the 1930 London Treaty. A major Navy Law is passed in 1936 as naval limitations expire, setting reasonable yearly building programs that will in time renew a large Navy, but it also imposes the historic treaty restrictions on ship design displacement on battleships laid down 1937-38 (but not thereafter, and not at all on cruisers).

The 1937 Panay incident differs from what historically occurred, causing a greater U.S. focus on the Pacific. Admiral Yamamoto and the Naval Ministry apologize and offer reparations immediately, as before, but there is a delay in the official Japanese government's confirmation of this while it is engaged in an internal debate on the subject. Worse, Japan's War Minister makes the mistake of urging the U.S. to entirely withdraw from China due to the "dangerous situation", which both the Japanese and U.S. press claim is a veiled threat. Much hostility is expressed towards the U.S. in Japanese newspapers, reciprocated by the U.S. press.

Congressional reaction to this and its discovery of Japanese duplicity in 1935-36 naval limitation negotiations (the President had known all along) is another Navy Law in 1938 which increases overall ship-building numbers by 20% while greatly speeding up construction in some categories (especially naval auxiliaries) to bring the fleet to better readiness, make Pearl Harbor a major naval base, fortify most Pacific possessions, and fund some additional troops, equipment and aircraft for the Army.

Still more ships and planes are ordered after the European war begins in August 1939. The Two-Ocean Navy bill passed in the Congressional panic after the fall of France opens the funding spigots all the way, as historically happened.

Heightened Pacific Ocean tension from all this and subsequent Japanese threats about the huge US construction programs results in President Roosevelt making Admiral Ernest King CinC of the Pacific instead of the Atlantic Fleet in 1941, while Admiral Kimmel becomes CinC of the Atlantic Fleet instead of the Pacific (opposite from history). King probably would not have become CinC US Fleet though, as Kimmel was.

Their historic appointments seem to have been made partly due to inertia (King was in the Atlantic 1940 - early 1941) while Kimmel was in the Pacific then, and that Roosevelt wanted King at the point of greatest danger, which he historically felt was the Atlantic. The presence of King in the Pacific means that his Anglophobia does not prevent the Atlantic Fleet from absorbing British ASW experience and making ASW a higher budgetary priority. He runs the Pacific Fleet differently from Kimmel, with results noted under the Pearl Harbor section below.

U.S. & Japanese Aircraft Carriers

The Japanese CVL Ryujo, their first purpose-built carrier, is lost in 1928 when a bomb detonates in its hangar, cracking aviation fuel lines/fixtures so fumes fill compartments, then detonate. All Japanese CV built after that have shock-resistant aviation gasoline systems with inert gas purging, making them much tougher in WW II. Their first two fleet carriers are 15,900 ton Soryu's in 1927-28 followed by three years of redesign culminating in four 20,000 ton ones 1931-34 comparable to the current US Enterprise class. The Japanese blandly announce that all six are 15,000 tons to stay within the 90,000 ton Washington Treaty Limit. They build four 32,000 tonners with armored flight decks starting in 1937 of which two are ready for operations in late 1941. These provide an eight carrier, 540 aircraft, Kido Butai to hit Pearl Harbor with.

The U.S. Navy first builds a 15,000 ton experimental purpose-built carrier in 1922, operates it for a few years, than based on this experience lays down a class of four 17,500 ton fleet carriers 1927-29 carrying @ 80 aircraft each. Enterprise class fleet carriers are laid down beginning in 1934 (historic), but there are seven of them to build up to the larger treaty limits of this alternate history. The Navy's battleship admirals try to strangle carrier building for a while but carrier officers succeed in arousing Congress in 1938 with the following: the British are building two carriers a year so they must be important, 1935-36 Japanese naval limitations duplicity temporarily froze US carrier building and designs, and rumors that current Japanese carriers are 32,000 ton monsters with armored flight decks. The US lays down the first of the Essex class fleet carriers in late 1939.

Both sides begin laying down lots of fleet carriers in 1940 to prepare for the obvious war coming. The US can do so faster given its far greater industrial capacity.

The most important economic change, though, is that the earlier Japanese occupation of Manchuria, plus the long-term domestic consequences of the huge 1905 Russian war indemnity, result in a vastly expanded Japanese industrial base in Manchuria plus some Nazi-style synthetic oil/coal-gasification plants there and in the Home Islands which capable of producing material quantities of oil of sufficient quality to be refined into military POL, including aviation gasoline. Japanese wartime oil production includes two million additional tons of oil a year (40,100 barrels a day, about 1/3 of historic German WWII daily syn-fuels production) from these synthetic fuel plants, which is almost a 40% increase over historic Japanese production during the war, and concentrated in an area where American submarines could not attack its delivery to the Japanese home islands. This extra 40,000 barrels of oil a day for the Home Islands, for the entire war, is THE most important change for this alternate history. And it is quite arbitrary, as the Japanese Army was so narrow-minded that it would not have seen any point to the huge capital investment required for such syn-fuels production, and would have blocked in favor of having another 10-20 poorly-equipped infantry divisions trying to conquer China.

U.S. Anti-Submarine Warfare 1939-41

Some attention is given to this threat, as opposed to none pre-war historically, and not much during the first year of war, because Admiral King is not in the Atlantic to block it. 1 escort carrier is ready by December 1941, while 4 more escort carriers have been delivered to the British (as happened historically), but here significant numbers of escort carriers and ocean-going ASW craft are building, most for the British & Canadians, plus more than a hundred steel-hulled subchasers for the US (75 of the latter are ready, as opposed to six historically).

Most importantly, the Navy has control over its own land-based aircraft (though it does not yet have enough of them) and sole responsibility for patrolling the Atlantic, Caribbean and Gulf of Mexico by air and sea. It also makes plans in 1941 to initiate coastal convoys there at the onset of war even given the scarcity of escorts. The Navy gets land-based medium and even some B-17 long-range bombers in 1941 for patrol & ASW to supplement its PBY's. The British get all B-24 production for ASW.

These major changes from history are based on the absence of Admiral King from the Atlantic - he felt that poorly escorted convoys would result in higher losses than unescorted ships sailing independently, despite all the British experience in both World Wars. King's refusal to learn from the British was due to his insane Anglophobia.

The Navy basically ignored the potential U-Boat threat to the East Coast in 1940. Admiral King as historic CINC of the Atlantic Fleet in 1941 actively and successfully obstructed all efforts to prepare for this, while as CINC US Navy & then CNO he focused entirely on the Pacific in 1942 and paid little attention to the ongoing U-Boat slaughter of shipping from Trinidad north to New York.

Attempts by King's historic subordinates to prepare for the situation are here presented to the political authorities, notably President Roosevelt. He was responsible as Asst. Secretary of the Navy in World War One for production of the swarms of small anti-submarine vessels used at the time, and aware of the prospective need for them again. He also urged mass production of destroyer escorts in June 1940 (Commander In Chief p. 180). With King in the Pacific, the President's desires could start to be carried out.

U.S. Naval Aircraft and Anti-Aircraft

The historic 1920 law which gave the Navy control only over carrier and Marine aircraft plus amphibians, with all other land-based aircraft belonging to the Army, is changed. It now focuses on mission rather than aircraft type; if it supports naval operations, i.e., helps the Marines, finds or sinks ships, it is Navy and otherwise it is Army. The Army Air Corps does not have its historic coast defense mission.

The Navy and Marine Corps have responsibility for the anti-aircraft gun defense of their bases outside the continental United States. This occurs because it supports naval operations as per the revised 1920 division of aerial responsibilities between the Army and Navy, plus greater inter-service rivalry (i.e., the Navy does not trust the Army to protect naval bases).

The Navy begins in 1938 to replace the almost useless .50 caliber machine guns with 20mm Oerlikons as light AAA, and the unreliable & dangerous 1.1" pom-pom with 40mm Bofors as medium AAA. This change occurs because the higher naval budget 1929-32 would have allowed development of the 1.1" earlier, while the higher budget 1934-37 would have allowed target practice to reveal the its faults. Also the Navy historically somehow got the idea that the Oerlikon and Bofors patent holders wanted four times the licensing fee they really did. This silly error does not happen.

The Navy also has more and better aircraft than it did historically. It has more planes because its pre-WWII buildup starts from a higher base due to funding not being rock-bottom 1929-32, and because of the faster 1936-41 buildup. It has better planes because higher funding for aircraft development 1929-40 brings new types into service faster. This means in particular that all USN & USMC fighter & torpedo bomber squadrons are equipped with F4F Wildcats and TBF Avengers instead of some having Brewster Buffalos and Douglas Devastators.

Unavoidable U.S. Problems

The U.S. Navy's torpedoes, nightfighting and mine warfare capabilities, and most importantly its avoid-mistakes mindset are as bad as they were historically, other than that Admiral King would be kicking rears in the Pacific rather than Atlantic and produce better defensive readiness there. Even he could not instill aggressiveness though. Note that the torpedo reliability problem, the Navy's total disinterest in mine warfare and the careerist, avoidance of mistakes mindset of the surface and submarine forces made both almost useless initially.


PEARL HARBOR CHANGES

Nature of the Problem

The Navy's historic war plan for the Pacific (No. 46) called for the Pacific Fleet in Hawaii to immediately raid the Japanese-held Marshall Islands 2000 miles away in an attempt to lure the main Japanese fleet out into a major action. This was not only impossible given the shortage of tankers and other auxiliaries, but also suicidal given the paucity of carriers. The Navy Department had ordered the Pacific Fleet to remain on the defensive because so much of the available forces had been sent to the Atlantic. Admiral Kimmel could not stand that and insisted on devising an offensive war plan. The Navy Department then approved Kimmel's request for an offensive raid at the onset of hostilities. The source for this is War Plan Orange by Edward Miller. Kimmel then insisted on training for his self-imposed offensive mission to the exclusion of everything else, including defensive readiness.

These fatal errors were Kimmel's but the Navy Department should not have allowed it. They also deliberately withheld relevant information from him that might have changed his mind about the raid. Afterwards they blamed him alone to divert attention from their own failings.

I am satisfied, based primarily on Gordon W. Prange's At Dawn We Slept and Edwin Layton's I Was There, that the Navy and War Departments deliberately (as well as negligently) withheld vital, relevant information concerning Japanese intentions from the Pacific Fleet commanded by Admiral Kimmel and the Hawaiian Army Department commanded by General Short. I believe that Admiral Kimmel would have reacted much differently had he received the same information provided to the U.S. Asiatic Fleet. Kimmel would have moved almost all warships out of Pearl Harbor just prior to the Japanese attack had he known what the Asiatic Fleet commander knew.

My personal opinion is that nothing short of a burning bush talking to him would have changed General Short's actions, though. Prange has shown to my satisfaction that Short lacked a fundamental understanding of his mission - to protect the naval base at Pearl Harbor. He thought it was the Navy's job to protect his forces, not the other way around. All of General Short's actions make perfect sense once this is assumed.

He was a shortsighted, ignorant fool. He knew nothing of air power, refused to learn and focused on the imaginary threat of sabotage by the scores of thousands of Japanese on Oahu to the exclusion of all other actual and potential threats. This was in defiance of reports by the FBI plus Army & Naval Intelligence that the only threat posed by Hawaiian Japanese was espionage. The spies were actually Japanese diplomats, naval attaches, resident aliens and tourists, and they were really, really, dangerous.

Other major U.S. villains were Admiral Turner, the Director of Naval Operations whose bureaucratic empire-building almost single-handedly deprived the Pacific Fleet of the intelligence information it needed to perform its mission, and Admiral Bloch, the naval base commander at Pearl Harbor who ignored direct orders to coordinate defense plans with General Short and General Martin (Army Air Corps commander in Hawaii). Turner also approved Kimmel's insane plan for raiding the Marshalls.

None of this changes. King was as aggressive as Kimmel and more bull-headed, while this alternate history has enough US naval auxiliaries and carriers to support a raid into the Marshalls. WarPac Plan 46 therefore stands. And Washington would have withheld vital intelligence from Hawaii regardless of who was in command there.

Army-Navy Coordination in Hawaii

Admiral King would have coordinated some matters with the Army commander more carefully than Admiral Kimmel did. In particular, he would have better developed common alert levels and procedures. This would have entailed each having the same definitions of potential threats, alert status against them, knowing what the other's current alert status was, and dividing responsibilities between them for a particular alert status. Admiral Kimmel and General Short did this to some extent, but Admiral King would have been more thorough.

Potential Threats to Hawaii & Comparable Alert Status

The Pacific Fleet historically believed that the least the Japanese would do at Pearl Harbor upon commencement of hostilities would be to have a few submarines lurk outside the harbor to torpedo entering and leaving ships. They had an alert status to counter this threat. The Navy's duties in this contingency were to maintain a heavy surface anti-submarine patrol near Pearl Harbor, aerial surveillance of a somewhat wider area, and a heightened watch from the vessels in Pearl Harbor. Such an alert status interfered somewhat with destroyer and naval patrol aircraft training but not with anything else.

Submarines were no threat to the Army in Hawaii so it had no comparable alert status historically and no duties to perform. Army aircraft would have been useful in aerial surveillance though, especially close in to free the long-range naval PBY's for long-range patrol duties. However Admiral King was such a Navy chauvinist that he would have demanded operational control of supporting Army aircraft, which General Short would have denied. The anti-submarine alert situation would not have changed from what it was historically.

General Short and Admiral Kimmel agreed that the worst probable threat to their commands was sabotage of key installations by the scores of thousands of Japanese nationals in Hawaii, even though both branches of military intelligence and the FBI emphatically disagreed; feeling that espionage was the only threat posed by the many Japanese citizens. This had absolutely no effect on Kimmel and Short, whose alert status against the imaginary sabotage threat took all possible precautions against it. This made all land-based aircraft in Hawaii completely vulnerable to air attack as well as crippling ground-based anti-aircraft, whose guns and ammunition were locked up most of the time (for that matter, aircraft guns and ammunition were also locked up). Each service's duties in this alert status were to protect only their own bases, with no attempt at all at coordination. This alert status interfered only minimally with training. This situation would have remained the same as it was historically.

The worst conceivable threat to Hawaii was a full-bore Japanese amphibious invasion. Both services had plans and alert statuses to deal with such a threat which were reasonably coordinated with each other. This alert status would have completely curtailed training by both services. The possibility of a Japanese invasion attempt was deemed impossibly remote. This situation would have remained the same as it was historically.

The Army Air Corps and Naval Air Service commanders in Hawaii (General Martin & Admiral Bellinger) historically agreed on the form a Japanese air attack on Hawaii would take. Their joint report of March 31, 1941, to Admiral Kimmel and General Short predicted the historic aircraft carrier attack of December 7 almost exactly and suggested plans for dealing with such a threat. Kimmel and Short did not believe that the Japanese had the capability to conduct such an attack and deemed the possibility of an air raid to be impossibly small. I don't know what the historic contingency plans for air attack were, but I can make educated guesses.

First, the long-range naval patrol aircraft would have been used exclusively for long-range patrols, which would have totally curtailed their training. Shorter-range land-based naval aircraft, including that of the Marines, would have been used for sea patrol closer in to Pearl Harbor, especially in anti-submarine work. Marine aircraft not used for aerial surveillance would have been reserved for attack on the Japanese carriers. Army bombers would have been assigned the same mission. Naval carrier task forces would sail to positions from which to attack the Japanese carriers. Army fighters would have been mostly assigned to air defense. All ground-based aircraft would have been widely dispersed. Naval vessels would have remained at sea as much as possible. Army anti-aircraft units would have been deployed at all Navy, Marine and Army bases.

Admiral King commanded aircraft carriers in one or more surprise mock raids on Pearl Harbor during fleet exercises, one of which took place on Sunday, December 7, 1932. He knew far better than Admiral Kimmel what carrier aircraft could do and lacked Kimmel's racist illusions about inferior Japanese capabilities. The opinion of Kimmel and Short was that alert against air attack was to be ordered only when it was clearly known to be imminent. King would have insisted on another alert status in which surprise air attack was possible though not probable.

Putting all this together, his alert stages would have been:

Alert Stage 1: Japanese invasion expected, accompanied by sabotage attempts from local Japanese. All training and leave ceases. Pacific Fleet sorties for fleet action, attempts to find and attack the enemy. Heavy aerial long-range reconnaissance and anti-submarine patrols. Army anti-aircraft batteries and radar units deploy for round-the-clock operation. All ground-based aircraft are armed, disperse and prepare for immediate takeoff (this required that pilots be ready as well as the planes). Ground forces deploy to repel invasion. This was the historic all-out contingency plan of both services.

Alert Stage 2: Japanese air raid and submarine attacks expected, accompanied by sabotage attempts from local Japanese. All training and leave ceases. Naval carrier task forces sail to positions from which to attack the Japanese carriers. All other naval vessels remain at sea as much as possible, entering Pearl Harbor only at night for fuel, provisions, and necessary maintenance. Ships in harbor remain ready for air attack as much as possible. Heavy aerial long-range reconnaissance and ASW patrols. Army anti-aircraft batteries and radar units deploy for round-the-clock operation. All ground-based aircraft are armed, disperse and prepare for immediate takeoff (this required that pilots be ready as well as the planes). Ground forces disperse from barracks to reduce casualties from air attack, with some ground forces deploying to repel sabotage. This plan actually existed but was not used.

Alert Stage 3: Japanese submarine attacks expected, accompanied by sabotage attempts from local Japanese, with general precautions taken against other contingencies, most likely an air raid. Naval Actions: All Naval air and Marine air training ceases. Substantial interference with ship training. Heightened aerial long-range reconnaissance and anti-submarine patrols. Some Marine and naval ground-based aircraft are maintained on ready alert, including aircrew. The rest are dispersed but do not prepare for immediate takeoff. Aircrews for some of them are maintained on standby alert. Ships are rotated in and out of Pearl Harbor every day so a minimum are present and vulnerable at the same time. Ships in harbor remain ready for air attack as much as possible (i.e., lookouts, AA fire control and some AA guns are manned all day, watertight integrity is not compromised, etc). Army Actions: Army anti-aircraft batteries and radar units cease all training & deploy for dawn to dusk operation. Some aircraft, mostly fighters, are maintained on ready alert, including aircrew. The rest are dispersed but do not prepare for immediate takeoff. Aircrew for some of them are maintained on standby alert. Some ground forces deploy to repel sabotage. Some interference with training of army ground and air units.

Alert Stage 4 (the historic one): Japanese submarine attacks expected, accompanied by sabotage attempts from local Japanese. Some interference with training of naval patrol aircraft and destroyers. Heightened anti-submarine patrols. Ground-based aircraft are concentrated. AA battery ammunition locked up. Complete vulnerability to surprise air raid.

November 27, 1941, War Warning Reaction

Admiral King would have ordered a Stage 3 Alert following receipt of the historic November 27, 1941, war warning and that all suspicious incidents be brought to his attention immediately, whether or not they were confirmed. He would have inspected the fleet, seen that its ships were extreme fire hazards from thick, unnecessary paint, wood decking and wooden furniture, seriously overweight for those and other reasons, and ordered them readied for action.

He would also have cancelled peacetime manning practices like standing down for weekends, especially on Sundays (having personally raided Pearl on a Sunday) and increased defensive readiness standards in general. This would have made him the most disliked Pacific Fleet commander ever, but that was why President Roosevelt sends him there in this alternate history.

King would either have forced Admiral Bloch to keep constant track of exactly what steps the Army was taking on alert or replaced him with someone who would. King's reaction to General Short ordering only an anti-sabotage alert would have been an historic inter-service fight. It is likely that King's rage would have only made Short resist him more. Then King would have complained to Washington.

I don't know how fast it would have taken Washington to respond to King's complaint. Historically they did nothing when Short reported that he had ordered an anti-sabotage alert in response to the war warning as it apparently did not occur to them that this was all he did. Admiral King would not have complained to Washington at once, so my guess is that it would have gotten to them about the middle of the first week of December, followed by a delay while they decided what to do. Given the abysmal historic bad luck, I feel that a reply would not have arrived in time to make a difference.

For purposes of this alternate history scenario, let's say that King's complaint arrives in Washington on the evening of Tuesday, December 2; a reply ordering General Short to go to a Stage 3 Alert arrives in Hawaii on Friday afternoon, December 5, and only a little is done to comply with it on Saturday, December 6, because the Army there is still on peacetime status and most of its personnel are off for the weekend.

The Days Immediately Before December 7

The major point bothering Admiral Kimmel just before December 7 was lack of air cover for the fleet at sea when all its aircraft carriers were away delivering two of the three Marine fighter squadrons in Hawaii to Wake Island and Midway. His reaction was to have all ships not on duty elsewhere (such as with the carrier groups) be present in Pearl Harbor on the weekend of December 6-7 so their air defense could be provided by the Army. This was a mistake in hindsight. It was the right decision based on the information he had at the time. They needed air cover and he thought he had that from the Army Air Corps. This was not in fact true, but Admiral Kimmel did not know that. He should have - the true facts were available.

His major, and fatal, errors here were to not make adequate reconnaissance during the relatively brief period his carriers were gone or to ensure the Army provided effective anti-aircraft and fighter defenses. The latter was a coordination problem. It may seem contradictory that Kimmel otherwise minimized the air attack problem but that in fact shows how confused and inconsistent he was.

King would have faced the same problems, though he would have more carriers and land-based squadrons. Four of his six fleet carriers would go to Midway and Wake, (the planes delivered to each island here include a dive-bomber squadron so two carriers each are required), leaving two carriers to cover the bulk of the Pacific Fleet, their normal mission. This would not have been deemed enough given that the norm was 4-5 carriers. Pearl Harbor's air defense is not entirely up to the Army at this point, though.

The Navy historically had only two fighter squadrons in Hawaii on December 7, 1941 (1 each Navy & Marine), with about 36 fighters, plus 2 obsolete Marine dive-bomber squadrons, compared to 99 obsolescent P-40 and 39 obsolete P-36 Army fighters with some obsolete bombers.

Here the Army has 144 obsolescent P-40 fighters, 72 A-20 light and 36 B-25 medium bombers (all modern), plus spares. The problem is that General Short's anti-sabotage alert makes them almost useless because most of their guns, ammunition and bombs are locked up in armories and bunkers (historic).

The Navy and Marines by contrast here have a land-based combat wing each totaling 54 F-4F Wildcat fighters, 72 x SBD Dauntless dive-bombers and 18 x TBF Avenger torpedo bombers plus spares. Adding two carrier wings brings those totals to 90, 144 and 54 respectively, which is adequate for both air defense and a strong counter-attack.

I believe that Admiral King would have done one vitally important and different thing than Admiral Kimmel did upon being ordered to ferry Marine squadrons to Midway and Wake Island with the bulk of his carriers. King would have ordered a temporary all-out effort at aerial reconnaissance, pending return of the bulk of the fleet's carriers in 3-5 days. This would not have significantly affected PBY training so the Pacific Fleet could still have carried out WarPac 46's hair-brained offensive raid against the Marshalls. Concentrating the remaining Pacific Fleet in Pearl Harbor would then have made sense, even with Short's known refusal to provide air defenses, given a total of 90 operational Navy and Marine F-4F fighters.

The Japanese Attack on Hawaii

US battleships at Pearl are the Pennsylvania in drydock (which it historically was), the Arizona, California, Colorado, Maryland, Tennessee and West Virginia (two modernized WWI fast battleships are at sea with the carriers delivering planes to Wake & Midway). Carriers are the Constellation, in drydock, and the older Bunker Hill. All lookouts, AA fire control equipment and 25% of AA guns are fully manned during daylight. 36 F-4F's plus some Navy/Marine bombers are ready for takeoff at all times, with the others being dispersed, the other 54 F-4F's all having standby crews available.

The Kido Butai with its eight fleet carriers and 540 carrier aircraft is not spotted on December 6 because it is covered by a storm front, even with PBY's searching out to two day's ship travel distance - 700 miles. The PBY's which spot it on December 7 do so in one of the following ways, in order of probability: as the first attack wave is taking off at dawn, about 6:00 a.m.; spotting the first wave in the air and/or being attacked by it about 6:30 - 7:30 a.m., or spotting the Kido Butai about 7:00 - 7:30 a.m. after the first wave is gone.

Admiral King would have been notified of the first submarine sightings about 4:00 that morning per his express orders, based on the following warning in the historic Bellinger/Martin report of March 31, 1941, report at part 3(d): "Any single submarine attack might indicate the presence of a considerable undiscovered surface force probably composed of fast ships accompanied by a carrier." All submarine sightings after receipt of the November 27, 1941, war warning would have been treated with the utmost seriousness.

King would have been in his office to receive either the first possible PBY report of spotting the Kido Butai arriving about 6:15 a.m., the destroyer Ward's 6:30 a.m. report of sinking a submarine just outside the entrance to Pearl Harbor, or the ultimate 6:30 - 7:30 a.m. reports from the PBY's of Japanese carriers and/or aircraft heading for Hawaii. The Ward report would have resulted in King ordering a Stage 2 Alert (air attack expected, all ground-based aircraft prepare for immediate launch, ground AA installations manned, etc.). PBY reports of actually seeing Japanese carriers and/or planes would have caused him to additionally order an air raid warning sounded (all planes take off, ships go to battlestations, etc.)

King would in any event have called General Short and asked him to order a Stage 2 alert. Short would have refused if King's only evidence was the Ward report of sinking a Japanese submarine, and complied if notified of PBY sightings of Japanese carriers and/or aircraft. If the former, PBY reports would have arrived shortly so it would not have made much difference. Either way it would have been too late. Few of the Army fighters were ready for combat with almost all pilots gone for the weekend and difficult to recall on short notice. Most aircraft machine guns and ammunition are locked up.

Radar would have been ineffective in any event. The Army radar operators who historically picked up the Japanese cruiser-based floatplanes over Oahu and the first carrier attack wave do so again. They report the latter to their duty officer. He is more diligent than he was historically and checks the flight plan for the B-17's. He asks the radar operators for the bearing of the planes coming in, which is almost exactly the vector shown on the B-17 flight plan (this was historically true), which confirms to him that it is the B-17's. The radar operators tell him that it is a really large blip, more than 50 aircraft. Their duty officer asks them if it could be a smaller number of really large planes, like B-17's, and they reply that they don't know, but it could be so. The duty officer had just been assigned to the job the night before so he has either not heard of the orders issued to report suspicious incidents issued that Saturday or those orders have not percolated down to his level yet.

Only @ 30-40 of the 144 Army fighters are launched before the attack begins, few with full guns or ammunition. Some of the Army AA batteries at Army ground and air bases are readied in time though.

@ 90 Navy/Marine and @ 30-40 Army fighters intercept the Japanese initial strike of @ 270 aircraft (@ 60 Zero fighters). @ 20-30 US and @ 60-70 Japanese aircraft are lost in the first wave of air-to-air combat.

Commander Fuchida sees that surprise has been lost and orders that the Japanese level and dive-bombers attack first to soften up the US warships for the more vulnerable torpedo bombers. Unfortunately they also concentrate on the two US carriers per their historic instructions (plus the old battleship/target ship Utah which looks like a carrier), hitting all three hard but not suppressing battleship AA in the least. The Japanese torpedo bombers (@ 60 in the first wave, before being thinned out by US interceptors) then swoop in on a totally prepared battleship row defense. Even the otherwise useless naval .50 caliber machine guns are effective against such low, slow targets. Only 11 Japanese torpedoes hit. Only 10 Japanese torpedo bombers return to their carriers.

The carrier Bunker Hill is hit by many bombs and a magazine explodes before the death ride of the torpedo bombers. It turns on its side, fills and burns out but is raised after months of salvage work. Repairs take another year. The Utah takes three torpedo hits and capsizes.

The Arizona and West Virginia are hit by three torpedoes and several bombs each, settle in place due to counter-flooding, but do not fill up afterwards or burn out so no vital equipment is damaged. They are pumped out and raised within 10-20 days when cofferdams are installed. They leave for the West Coast to be modernized a few weeks later when patched sufficiently for safe passage.

The California is hit by two torpedoes and several bombs but does not settle even with counterflooding. It leaves for the West Coast as soon as patched. The carrier Constellation is seriously damaged by three bombs, but is already in drydock so repairs are complete in two months. The Tennessee and Maryland are inboard of the Arizona and West Virginia, cannot be hit by torpedoes and are only lightly damaged by bombs. Ditto for the Pennsylvania in drydock. Several other ships are somewhat damaged.

First wave Japanese attacks on Army airfields occur pretty much as they did historically, though some Army fighters get off just before the attack and some AA batteries are ready. At least a hundred Army planes are destroyed or damaged on the ground. Naval and Marine airfields are only lightly damaged due to their ferocious AA fire. Few of their planes on the ground (all in revetments) are damaged.

Counterattack by @ 250 Army, Navy and Marine aircraft is totally screwed up by Japanese operational surprise causing piecemeal assembly and takeoff disorder, complicated by doing all this under constant air attack. US pilot inexperience brings on straggling, inability to organize in the air and even inability to find the target. Not one US squadron makes a coordinated strike. Even so the 60 Zero fighters protecting the Kido Butai are overwhelmed when @ 200 US aircraft attack in small groups and individually over a two hour period.

One Japanese carrier is not hit at all, three take one bomb hit or close near miss causing damage each, two take two hits and the remaining two take 3-4 hits each, knocking the latter out of action at least temporarily. This forces @ 50 returning Japanese aircraft to be pushed over the side or ditched, though almost all their aircrew are saved. 5-8 US torpedoes hit but none detonate properly (either the magnetic exploders go off too soon or the contact exploders fizzle), so all Japanese ships get away.

The second wave of the Japanese attack accomplishes little beyond disorganizing the US counterstroke because even the Army AA gunners are ready by the time they arrive. All Japanese officers concur in Admiral Nagumo's decision to retreat at once rather than make a third strike. The Japanese lose @ 200 aircraft of 540 available plus @ 150 irreplaceable aircrews. @ 1,200 Americans are killed, half on the Bunker Hill, and another 1,200 wounded. @ 100 US aircraft are destroyed in the air and @ 50 on the ground.


OTHER EARLY CAMPAIGNS

General Short is summarily relieved of command (the Japanese clearly would have been massacred at little loss to the US if Army planes had been as ready as the Navy/Marine ones) but not Admiral King. Wake Island fights off the first Japanese attack, as it did historically. King sends the historic relief force under command of either Admiral Fletcher or Halsey.

The slow seaplane tender historically carrying the reinforcements tries to sneak into Wake under cover of darkness but is spotted by Japanese long-range reconnaissance aircraft the day before. Japanese land-based aircraft are waiting for it at dawn at Wake, but American carriers provide air cover so it manages to close on the island. The seaplane tender is run aground per plan but is then pounded from the air, even with carrier air cover. Most of the men and some of the equipment are landed after a terrific air battle.

The second Japanese invasion force is alerted to the presence of American carriers by this and pulls back before attempting a landing. How long Wake could have held out after that would depend on how much heavy equipment was landed. There might even have been a carrier battle with the least damaged Japanese carriers squaring off against the four intact American ones. Historically two intact Japanese carriers supported the second Wake invasion force after being detached from the Kido Butai. My suspicion is that the U.S. carriers would have been kept well to the east of Wake, staying out of range of Japanese land-based aircraft, with the Japanese carriers staying well to the west of Wake (which they did historically), so no carrier battle would have happened.

The additional fortifications and troops on U.S. Pacific possessions would have made Japan's conquests of them more costly and time-consuming but not changed the outcomes, with the possible exception of Wake Island which might have been able to hold on. MacArthur would have screwed up with additional forces as badly as he did with the historic ones. The Philippines and Guam are just too isolated and close to Japanese air bases to hold out.

The Malayan & East Indies campaigns do not change much. The Allied failures there were due to command incompetence rather than material disparity (though one wonders what might have happened had US Asiatic Fleet commander Hart been given naval command of ABADA). At the very most, increased Japanese airpower, merchant vessel & warship numbers made available at the beginning of the war by the 25% greater industrial strength resulting from the Russo-Japanese War changes would more than offset changes from history favoring the Allies.

The Kido Butai's Indian Ocean raid does not take place, though, because of the Pearl Harbor damage to its carriers. On the other hand the obsolete British light carrier Hermes and heavy cruiser Dorsetshire cover the advance of the Prince of Wales and Repulse into the South China Sea off Malaya on December 10, 1941, and are sunk with them by Japanese land-based air from Indochina (which this time includes Zero fighters because there are more of them).

The greater numbers of U.S. warships in this alternate
history, and carriers in particular, would make 1942 less desperate for the U.S. in the Pacific even with greater Japanese power because of the Japanese mindset. They consistently failed to understand the need to concentrate attacks with all available forces to win with minimal losses, or to minimize minor on-going attrition losses. Some of the former may have been due to justified regard for limited Japanese resources, and even inability to obtain adequate intelligence about enemy forces, but at least as much if not most was due to racially prejudiced underestimation of their adversaries. The latter seems to have arisen from a cultural focus on pitched battle, possibly as emotional catharsis. In any event, Japanese attacks were constantly piece-mealed, failed to stretch defenses to the breaking point allowing defeat in detail, and actually maximized Japanese losses through attrition. Avoidable attrition hurt Japan's war effort terribly.

Furthermore the Japanese did not understand until too late the importance of such matters as conservation of scarce trained aircrew and training of new aircrew, coordination of merchant traffic to avoid dead-heading, commerce attacks, ASW, etc. Japan in this alternate history has approximately the same strategic reach as it did historically. It deploys more combat power in that area but the inherent Japanese mindset and other limitations cause its effectiveness to fall off so sharply at the periphery that the greater numbers of US carriers and other warships are able to hold them there more easily.

The US changes from history would have made a big difference in the Atlantic, however. Losses to U-Boats on the East and Gulf coasts would have been reduced because of the quick use of convoys plus greater numbers of small escorts. Losses could have been substantially reduced if there were enough medium bombers to patrol the Atlantic coast, the Caribbean and the Gulf of Mexico during the first six months of 1942. Additionally the Maritime Commission's running start based on the massive 1939-40 orders for naval auxiliaries and mercantile types might have produced a lot more merchant tonnage earlier when it was most needed.



MAJOR SURFACE WARSHIPS OF THE US NAVY IN DECEMBER 1941



Years Completed Aircraft Carriers

1937-41
Seven x CV Type C - historic Yorktown class (Constellation). 19,800 tons, 32 knots, @ 80 aircraft. 3 centerline elevators to two unenclosed hangar decks. 8 x 5" 38 caliber DP in unenclosed single mounts below the flight deck, AAA = 24 x 40mm Bofors & 24 x 20mm Oerlikon. 3" lower hangar deck armor (more over aviation fuel storage, engines & magazines), small 3" belt covering engines/magazines, some side splinter protection, some torpedo protection. Shock-mounted avgas fittings + purge system. Bonhomme Richard, Constellation, Enterprise, Hornet, Intrepid, Ranger, Wasp.

1930-32
Four x CV Type B - Lexington. 17,500 tons, 30 knots, @ 80 aircraft. 3 centerline elevators to two unenclosed hangar decks. 8 x 5" 25 caliber AA in unenclosed single mounts below the flight deck, AAA = 16 x 40mm Bofors & 16 x 20mm Oerlikon. 2" lower hangar deck armor (more, etc.), small 2" belt covering magazines/engines, some side splinter protection, poor torpedo protection, vulnerable avgas system. Obsolescent. Lexington, Bunker Hill, Saratoga, Yorktown.

1925
One x Kitty Hawk. 15,000 tons, 30 knots, @ 70 aircraft. 2 centerline elevators to unenclosed hangar. 12 x 3" AA in unenclosed single mounts below the flight deck, AAA = 12 x 1.1" & 16 x 0.50 caliber machine guns. 1" hangar deck armor, no other protection. Obsolete.

1941
One x Alamo (modified historic Independence class) CVL. 14,500 tons, 32 knots, @ 48 aircraft. 2 portside elevators to unenclosed hangar. AAA = 16 x 40mm Bofors & 16 x 20mm Oerlikon. 2-3" total armor on hangar & main decks, 4" belt covering engines/magazines, small torpedo bulges. Shock-mounted avgas fittings + purge system. Alamo.

1941
5 x historic Bogue class CVE. 11,000 tons, 18 knots, turbine engines. @ 28 aircraft, 2 elevators, 2 catapults. 1-2 x 5" 38 caliber DP in unenclosed mounts at stern below flight deck, AAA = 8 x 40mm Bofors & 12 x 20mm Oerlikon. No armor or torpedo protection, unenclosed hangar with raised forecastle, avgas system extremely vulnerable to shock (cast-iron fittings) but has nitrogen/CO2 purging.

Six x historic Long Island class CVE. @ 9,000 tons, 17 knots, diesel engines, @ 20 aircraft. One centerline elevator to unenclosed hangar. 3 x 4" AA, AAA = 8 x 40mm Bofors & 12 x 20mm Oerlikon. No protection.

1923
One x historic Langley class (CVE equivalent). 11,500 tons, 14 knots, @ 30 aircraft. 1 elevator to unenclosed hangar deck. 4 x 5" 25 caliber low-angle in single unenclosed mounts, AAA = 8 x 1.1" & 12 x .50 caliber MG. No protection. Obsolete.

Building: 2 Gettysburg large CV (historic Midway), 12 Essex CV, 6 Alamo CVL, 25 Bogue CVE. 2 x Essex CV, 2 x Alamo CVL & 10 x Bogue CVE ready in 1942 (the other 15 x Bogue CVE have or will go to the British); 2 x Gettysburg, 4 x Essex & 4 x Alamo in early 1943; 6 x Essex in late 1943.


Battleships

1941
Two x historic South Dakota class (Alabama). 38,000 tons, 28 knots. 9 x 16" 45 caliber, 16-20 x 5" 38 caliber DP in twin turrets, AAA = 48 x 40mm Bofors + 48 x 20mm Oerlikon (increased by 1941). Armor = 7" decks( ), 12.2" belt, 18" turrets, torpedo bulkheads: 1 x 25mm & 2 x 19mm. 3 seaplanes.

Two x historic North Carolina class. 38,000 tons, 28 knots. 9 x 16" 45 caliber in triple turrets (2 forward, 1 aft), 20 x 5" 38 caliber DP in twin turrets each side, AAA = 48 x 40mm Bofors & 48 x 20mm Oerlikon. Armor = 7" decks, 12" belt, 16" turrets, 1 x 25mm torpedo bulkhead & 2 x 19mm + double bulge each side. 3 planes.

1921
Three x alternate history “fast” battleships, all completely modernized as 46,000 tons, 30 knots (electric drive removed, all new engines & boilers with boiler & engine rooms alternated to minimize chance of a single hit crippling all power). 9 x 16" 45 caliber, 16 x 5" 38 caliber DP in four twin turrets each side, AAA = 32 x 40mm Bofors & 36 x 20mm Oerlikon. 3 seaplanes. 6" decks, 12.2" belt, 16" turret faces, 1 x 25mm torpedo bulkhead & 2 x 19mm + internal & external torpedo bulges each side. Maine,

1917-18
Three x modified historic Maryland class. 1 slightly modernized in service as 37,000 tons & 21 knots( ). 8 x 16" 45 caliber in four twin turrets, 10 x 5" 51 caliber in casemates, 8 x 5" 25 caliber AA in unenclosed single mounts, AAA = 16 x 40mm Bofors + 24 x 20mm Oerlikon. 4 seaplanes. 7" decks, 13.5" belt, 18" turret faces, three x 19mm torpedo bulkheads + double bulges. Obsolete.. Two being modernized as 38,000 tons, 21 knots, 16 x 5” 38 caliber DP in four twin turrets each side, AAA = 32 x 40mm Bofors & 36 x 20mm Oerlikon, same armor & bulges.

1916-17
Three x heavily modified historic Tennessee class. Two in service as somewhat modernized with 36,500 tons, 21 knots (electric drive never installed so boiler & engine rooms are alternated). 12 x 14" 50 caliber in triple turrets, 10 x 5" 51 caliber in casemates, 8 x 5" 25 caliber AA in unenclosed single mounts, AAA = 16 x 40mm Bofors + 32 x 20mm Oerlikon. 4 seaplanes. 7" decks, 13.5" belt, 18" turret faces, three x 19mm torpedo bulkheads + external bulge each side. Obsolete. One being modernized as West Virginia but with its existing 14” main battery.

1915 Two x heavily modified historic New Mexico class. 35,000 tons, otherwise as somewhat modernized Tennessee.

1914
Two x modified historic Pennsylvania class. Somewhat modernized as 33,500 tons, 21 knots. 12 x 14" 45 caliber in triple turrets, 10 x 5" 51 caliber in casemates, 8 x 5" 25 caliber AA in unenclosed single mounts, AAA = 16 x 40mm Bofors + 32 x 20mm Oerlikon. 4 seaplanes. 7" decks, 13.5" belt, 18" turret faces, three x 19mm torpedo bulkheads + single bulge each side. Obsolete.

1913
Two x Nevada. Somewhat modernized as 29,000 tons, 21 knots with turbine engines. 10 x 14" 45 caliber in twin turrets superimposed over triple turrets fore & aft, 10 x 5" 51 caliber in casemates, 8 x 5" 25 caliber AA in unenclosed single mounts, AAA =164 x 40mm Bofors + 32 x 20mm Oerlikon. 4 seaplanes. 5.5" decks, 13.5" belt, 18" turret faces, three x 19mm torpedo bulkheads + single bulge each side. Obsolete.

1912
Two x old dreadnoughts, demilitarized in 1922 but not scrapped, then somewhat modernized in 1938-39. 27,000 tons, 21 knots with turbine engines. 10 x 12" 50 caliber in four superfiring centerline turrets, twin turrets superimposed over triple turrets fore & aft, 8 x 5” 51 caliber in casements, 6 x 5” 25 caliber AA, 16 x 1.1”, 24 x 0.50 caliber MG. 4” decks, 11" belt, 12" turret faces, 2 x 19mm torpedo bulkheads + single bulge each side. Obsolete.

Building: 2 x Iowa ready in 1942, 4 x Iowa in 1943, 2 x Iowa in early 1944.



Heavy Cruisers

1940-41
Four x Type D (historic Baltimore class). 14,000 tons, 33 knots. 9 x 8", 12 x 5" 38 caliber DP in twin turrets fore & aft superimposed over main battery turrets plus two each side. AAA = 32 x 40mm Bofors & 24 x 20mm Oerlikon. 3" deck, 6" belt & main turret faces. 2 planes.

1937-39
Six x Type C (historic New Orleans class). 10,000 tons, 32 knots. 9 x 8" in triple turrets, 8 x 5" 38 caliber DP in unenclosed single mounts, AAA = 16 x 40mm Bofors & 24 x 20mm Oerlikon. 3" deck( ), 5" belt & turret faces. 4 seaplanes.

1933-36
Five x Type B (historic Northampton). 9,500 tons, 31 knots. 9 x 8" in triple turrets, 8 x 5" 25 caliber DP in unenclosed single mounts on each side, AAA = 16 x 40mm Bofors & 24 x 20mm Oerlikon. 2.5" deck, 4" belt & turret faces. 4 seaplanes.

1927-32
Six x Type A (historic Indianapolis). 9,000 tons, 30 knots. 9 x 8" in three triple turrets (2 forward & 1 aft), 6 x 5" 25 caliber AA in unenclosed single mounts on each side, AAA = 16 x 40mm Bofors & 16 x 20m Oerlikon. 2" deck, 3" belt & turret faces. 3 seaplanes. Obsolescent.

Building: Six Baltimore, 3 ready in 1942, 3 in 1943.



Light Cruisers

1940-41
Ten x Type G (heavily modified historic Cleveland class - 20% greater displacement for stability plus more powerful engines). 14,000 tons, 33 knots. 12 x 6" in four triple turrets, two forward & two aft, 12 x 5" 38 caliber DP in twin turrets fore & aft superimposed over main battery turrets plus two twin turrets each side, AAA = 24 x 40mm Bofors & 20 x 20mm Oerlikon. 3" deck, 5" belt & main turret faces. 2 seaplanes.

1941
Four x Type H (Oakland- improved Atlanta class anti-aircraft cruiser - bigger, faster, longer range, better AA control, better torpedo protection, less heavily armed). 7,500 tons, 36 knots. 12 x 5" 38 caliber DP in six superfiring centerline twin turrets, three forward & three aft. AAA = 24 x 40mm Bofors & 24 x 20mm Oerlikon. 3" belt & deck armor, 2" turret faces.

1938-40
Six x Type F (modified Atlanta – anti-aircraft cruiser). 5,200 tons, 33 knots. 8 x 5" 38 caliber DP in four superfiring twin turrets, two forward & two aft, AAA = 24 x 40mm Bofors & 24 x 20mm Oerlikon, six torpedo tubes in triple wing sets. 2" belt & deck armor, 1" turrets.

1936-39
Six x Type E (heavily modified Brooklyn). 9,100 tons, 33 knots. 12 x 6" in four triple turrets, two forward & two aft, 8 x 5" 38 caliber DP in unenclosed single mounts on each side, AAA = 16 x 40mm Bofors & 16 x 20mm Oerlikon. 3" deck, 4" belt & turret faces. 2 seaplanes.

1934-35
Three x Type D (Detroit). 8,200 tons, 33 knots. 9 x 6" in three triple turrets, two forward & one aft, 6 x 5" 25 caliber DP in unenclosed single mounts on each side, AAA = 12 x 40mm Bofors & 12 x 20mm Oerlikon, 8 x 21" torpedo tubes in quadruple wing sets. 2" deck, 3" belt & turret faces. 2 seaplanes.

1925
One x Type C. 7,400 tons, 33 knots. 8 x 6" in four twin turrets on the centerline (2 forward & one aft), 4 x 3" AA, 8 x 21" torpedo tubes in quadruple wing sets. AAA = 12 x 1.1" & machine guns. 1.5" deck, 2" belt & turret faces. 2 seaplanes. Obsolescent & flimsy – insufficient reserve buoyancy.

1923-24
Four x Type B. 7,500 tons, 35 knots. 6 x 6" in twin centerline turrets (2 forward & 1 aft), 4 x 3" AA, 8 x 21" torpedo tubes in quadruple wing sets. AAA = 6 x 1.1” & machines guns. 1" deck, 2" belt & turret faces. 2 seaplanes. Obsolescent & flimsy – insufficient reserve buoyancy. Used for training.

Building: 10 Cleveland, 4 Oakland. 4 Cleveland & 2 Oakland ready in 1942, 6 Cleveland & 2 Atlanta ready in early 1943.



Destroyers

1941
48 x Type H (modified historic Fletcher class. 2250 tons, 34 knots. 5 x 5" 38 caliber DP, 2 quintuple torpedo tube sets, AAA = 8 x 40mm Bofors & 8 x 20mm Oerlikon. Boiler rooms and engine rooms are alternated. Longer range than even Type G.

1940
36 x Type G (modified Benson). 1900 tons, 35 knots. 4 x 5" 38 caliber DP, 2 quadruple torpedo tube sets. AAA = 8 x 40mm Bofors + 6 x 20mm Oerlikon. Boiler rooms and engine rooms are alternated. Longer range than type F.

1938-39
40 x Type F (heavily modified Livermore). 1700 tons, 35 knots. 4 x 5" 38 caliber DP, 2 quadruple torpedo tube sets. AAA = 8 x 40mm Bofors + 6 x 20mm Oerlikon. Mk. 37 fire-control system introduced. Boiler rooms and engine rooms are alternated.

1937
4 x Type E - modified historic Sampson class. 2100 tons, 37 knots. 8 x 5" 38 caliber DP in four twin turrets, 2 quintuple centerline torpedo tube sets with reloads. AAA = 8 x 40mm Bofors + 8 x 20mm Oerlikon. Intended as destroyer leaders.

1936-37
16 x Type D - modified historic Sims class. 1620 tons, 37 knots. 5 x 5" 38 caliber DP, two in single turrets forward & the rest in unenclosed single mounts aft, 2 quadruple centerline torpedo tube sets, AAA = 4 x 40mm Bofors + 6 x 20mm Oerlikon.

1934-35
8 x historic Benham class. 1500 tons, 35 knots. 4 x 5" 38 caliber DP in single turrets forward & unenclosed mounts aft, 4 quadruple wing torpedo tube sets. AAA = 4 x 40mm Bofors & 4 x 20mm Oerlikon. Boiler rooms and engine rooms are not alternated, so one hit can deprive the whole ship of power.

1934-35
8 x modified historic Porter class destroyer leaders. 1850 tons, 37 knots. 8 x 5" 38 caliber DP surface only guns in four twin turrets, 2 quadruple centerline torpedo tube sets with reloads. AAA = 4 x 40mm Bofors & 4 x 20mm Oerlikon. Boiler rooms and engine rooms are not alternated, so one hit can deprive the whole ship of power.

1933
8 x modified historic Farragut class. 1400 tons, 36 knots. 5 x 5" 25 caliber DP, two in single turrets and the rest unenclosed aft, 2 quadruple centerline torpedo tube sets. AAA = 2 x 40mm Bofors & 4 x 20mm Oerlikon. Boiler rooms and engine rooms are not alternated, so one hit can deprive the whole ship of power.

1921-32
12 x various development prototypes. Vary from 1,300 to 2,000 tons, generally about 35 knots. 4" guns on the smaller ones, 5" 25 caliber DP on the larger. 8-16 x 21" torpedo tubes in quadruple sets. AAA = an odd mix of any or all of a few 40mm Bofors, 1.1”, 20mm Oerlikon & machine guns. Obsolescent.

1918-19
@ 60 historic four-stackers from World War One. @ 20 more in reserve, worn-out & useful only for training. 50 given to Britain as part of the historic Destroyers For Bases agreement. 1,200 tons, 35 knots. 4 x 4", 1 x 3" AA, 12 x 21" torpedo tubes in quadruple sets, one centerline & 2 wing. AAA = machine guns (some also have 1.1"). Obsolete.

Building: 96 Fletcher DD.

TOTALS

Built: 25 aircraft carriers (11 fleet, 1 light, 11 escort & 2 obsolete), 19 battleships (4 modern, 3 modernized, 3 being modernized, 9 obsolete), 21 heavy cruisers (15 modern, 6 obsolescent), 32 light cruisers (19 standard, 10 AA cruisers, 3 obsolescent/¬obsolete), @ 200 destroyers (8 leaders, 120 other modern, 12 obsolescent, @ 60 obsolete).

Building: 14 fleet carriers, 6 light carriers, 25 escort carriers (10 for British), 8 battleships, 6 heavy cruisers, 10 light cruisers (6 being AA cruisers), 96 destroyers.


Major Surface Warships of the Japanese Navy in Service 1941

or Laid Down 1922-41 and Noteworthy


Aircraft Carriers
Years Laid Down/Conversion completed - statistics as modernized/converting on December 7, 1941

1919
1 x historic Hosho (CVE equivalent). 7,500 tons, 25 knots, 21 aircraft. 1 elevator to unenclosed hangar deck. 1941 guns =46 x 3" AA, 8 x 25mm AAA. No armor or torpedo protection, unprotected aviation gasoline storage & delivery system. Obsolete & used only for training.

1922
1 x historic Ryujo, CVL Type A. @ 8,000 tons, 29 knots. @ 37-48 aircraft (37 actual, 48 nominal), 12 x 4.7" AA, other details unknown. Unstable & unsatisfactory. Lost in accident 1928, proving need for shock resistant avgas system fittings and inert gas purging of their lines. 250 kg. bomb detonates on hangar deck during exercise, cracking open avgas fuel lines/fixtures. Fumes fill a machinery compartment, then detonate. This happens several times in succession and vessel is lost. All Japanese CV built after that have shock-resistant avgas systems with nitrogen and/or CO2 purging. The US historically learned this lesson from the sinking of the Lexington at the battle of the Coral Sea.

1927-28
2 x historic Soryu, CV Type A. 15,900 tons (announced as 15,000), 34.5 knots. 63 aircraft, 3 elevators, 2 forward catapults. 1941 guns = 12 x 5" 40 caliber DP in twin turrets below flight deck edges along each side, 32 x 25mm. Lower hangar deck armor = 2" over magazines & 1" over engine/boiler rooms, side splinter protection, splinter torpedo bulkhead, enclosed hangars but no separate ventilation, unprotected avgas system.

1931-34
4 x CV Type B (Amagi). 20,000 tons (announced as 15,000), 32 knots. @ 63 aircraft, 3 elevators, 2 catapults. 12 x 5" 40 caliber DP as Soryu, AAA = 36 x 25mm. Armor reported as Soryu, but really 3" elevators/upper hangar deck, 1" lower hangar deck armor over avgas/magazines/engines/boilers, 3" belt for magazines/engines, etc., plus splinter protection on sides below lower hangar deck, 1" torpedo bulkhead with internal bulge, unenclosed upper hangar, enclosed lower hangar but no separate ventilation system, shock-mounted avgas fittings + purge system.

1934-36/39
3 x CVL Type B (conversions - Chitose). 12,000 tons, 29 knots. @ 30 aircraft, 2 elevators, 1 catapult. 1941 guns = 8 x 3.9" DP in twin turrets below the flight deck, AAA = 24 x 25mm. 2" hangar deck armor (3" over magazines/engines, etc.), splinter side protection, 19mm torpedo bulkhead, single unenclosed hangar with shock-mounted avgas fittings + purge system. Secret violation of naval limitation treaties. Announced as seaplane tenders but designed for prompt conversion to light carriers. Conversions begun in 1937 and completed by 1939.

1937-40
4 x CV Type C (Shokaku). 34,000 tons, 32 knots, alternating boiler & engine rooms so one hit cannot knock out all power. @ 75 aircraft, 3 elevators, 2 catapults. 16 x 3.9" DP in twin turrets below the flight deck (one at each stern corner), AAA = 48 x 25mm. 3" armored flight deck & elevators, 1.3" lower hangar deck (more over avgas/¬engines/¬boilers/-magazines), 3" belt for magazines/engines plus splinter protection on sides below lower hangar deck, 2 x 1" torpedo bulkheads + internal bulge, unenclosed upper hangar, enclosed lower hangar with separate ventilation system, shock-mounted avgas fittings + purge system.

1940
2 x CVL Type C (Ryuho). 13,000 tons, 30 knots. @ 33 aircraft, 2 elevators, 2 catapults. 8 x 3.9" DP in twin turrets below the flight deck, 24 x 25mm AAA. 2" hangar deck armor (3" over magazines/engines, etc.), splinter side protection, 1" torpedo bulkhead, single unenclosed hangar with shock-mounted avgas fittings + purge system. Designed and built as CVL.

1934-35/42
2 x CVL Type D (modified historic Zuiho class conversions). 11,300 tons, 28 knots. @ 30 aircraft, 2 elevators, 2 catapults. 8 x 3.9" DP in twin turrets below the flight deck, 24 x 25mm AAA. Minimal armor, compartmentation & torpedo protection. Single unenclosed hangar with shock mounted avgas system.

1938-40/41-42
3 x CVE Type B (modified historic Kaiyo class conversions). 17,800 tons, 21 knots. @ 27 aircraft, 2 elevators, one catapult. 8 x 3.9" DP in twin turrets below the flight deck, AAA = 24 x 25mm. No armor or torpedo protection. Single unenclosed hangar with shock mounted avgas system.

1939-42
8 x CV Type D (Unryu). 25,000 tons, 32 knots (alternating boiler/engine rooms). @ 75 aircraft, 3 elevators, 2 catapults. 16 x 3.9" DP in twin turrets below the flight deck (one at each stern corner), AAA = 48 x 25mm. Armor = 3" upper hangar deck/elevators, 1.5" lower hangar deck over aviation fuel storage, engines & magazines, 3" belt for magazines/engines plus splinter protection on sides below lower hangar deck, 2 x 1" torpedo bulkheads with internal bulge, unenclosed upper hangar, enclosed lower hangar with separate ventilation system, shock-mounted avgas fittings + purge system. Selected because Type C's too expensive and take too long to build with war looming.

1939/42
2 x CV Type E (modified historic Junyo class conversions). Converted in 1940 from passenger liners then under construction. 24,000 tons, 25 knots. @ 54 aircraft. 16 x 3.9" DP in twin turrets on either side below the flight deck, AAA = 32 x 25mm. Minimal armor, compartmentation & torpedo protection.

1941-42
4 x CVE Type C (Taiyo). 10,000 tons, 18 knots. @ 20 aircraft, 1 elevator, 1 catapult. 6 x 3.9" DP in unenclosed mounts below the flight deck, AAA = 24 x 25mm. No armor or torpedo protection. Single unenclosed hangar with shock mounted avgas system. Designed and built as CVE.



Battleships

1910-11
4 x Kongo class battlecruisers as completely modernized in alternate 1941, three having previously been demilitarized training ships 1922-36: 32,000 tons, 30 knots. 8 x 14" 45 caliber in twin turrets (only forward two superfiring), 16 x 5” 40 caliber DP in twin turrets each side, AAA = 36 x 25mm. 4" decks, 8" belt, 10" turret faces, 3" torpedo bulkhead + bulge each side. Obsolescent.

1912
2 x Fuso class as completely modernized in alternate 1941: 35,000 tons, 25 knots. 12 x 14" 45 caliber in twin centerline turrets, 16 x 5" 40 caliber DP in twin turrets each side AAA = 36 x 25mm. 4" decks, 12" belt, 12" turret faces, 3" torpedo bulkhead + torpedo bulge each side. Obsolete.

1913
2 x Hyuga class as completely modernized in alternate 1941. 36,000 tons, 25.5 knots. 12 x 14" 45 caliber in twin centerline turrets, 16 x 5" 40 caliber DP in twin turrets each side, AAA = 36 x 25mm. 4.5" decks, 12" belt, 12" turret faces, 3" torpedo bulkhead plus bulge each side. Obsolete.

1914-15
2 x Nagato class as completely modernized in alternate 1941. 38,000 tons, 26 knots. 8 x 16" 45 caliber in twin centerline turrets, 16 x 5" 40 caliber DP in twin turrets each side, AAA = 36 x 25mm. 5.5" decks, 12" belt, 14" turret faces, 3" torpedo bulkhead plus bulge each side. Obsolescent.

1916-17
2 x Tosa class as completely modernized to fast battleship status in 1941. Note that a complete 16" turret (Q aka No. 3) is removed and replaced with boilers & engine rooms. 45,500 tons, 30 knots. 8 x 16" 45 caliber in twin turrets, two each superfiring fore & aft, 20 x 5" 40 caliber DP in twin turrets each side, AAA = 48 x 25mm. 6" decks, 12" belt, 14" turret faces, 3" torpedo bulkhead + internal bulge each side.

1937-40
4 x modified historic Yamato class. 64,000 tons, 27 knots. 9 x 18" 45 caliber, 20 x 5" 40 caliber DP in twin turrets, AAA = 72 x 25mm in blast-proof mounts, 4 aircraft. 10" deck, 16" belt, 20" turret faces, 1 x 3" & 2 x 1" torpedo bulkheads plus internal bulge each side. Much of the material ordered & some manufactured 1933-36 to speed construction. This plus increased industrial capacity from the Russo-Japanese War changes allow completion dates of one in 1941, two in 1942 and one in 1943.



Heavy Cruisers

1922
2 x Type A (historic Furutaka class). @ 8,100 tons, 33 knots. 6 x 8" in three twin centerline turrets, two superfiring forward & one aft, 8 x 3.9" DP in unenclosed single mounts on each side, AAA = 18 x 25mm, 8 x 24" torpedo tubes in four twin sets, two on each side. 1.4" deck, 1" turrets, 3" belt. 1 seaplane. Obsolescent.

1923
2 x Type B (historic Aoba class). 9,000 tons, 33 knots. 6 x 8" in three twin turrets, two superfiring fore & one aft, 8 x 3.9" DP in unenclosed single mounts on each side, AAA = 18 x 25mm, 12 x 24" torpedo tubes in four triple sets, two on each side. 1.4" deck, 1" turrets, 3" belt. 1 seaplane. Obsolescent.

1924-26
6 x Type C (Myoko). 13,000 tons, 34 knots. 10 x 8" in five twin turrets (three forward, two aft), 8 x 5” 40 caliber DP in unenclosed single mounts, AAA = 24 x 25mm, 12 x 24" torpedo tubes in four triple sets, two on each side. 2" deck & turret faces, 4" belt. 2 seaplanes.

1927-28
4 x Type D (Takao). 13,500 tons, 33 knots. 10 x 8" in five twin turrets (three forward, two aft), 8 x 5” 40 caliber DP in unenclosed single mounts, AAA = 24 x 25mm, 12 x 24" torpedo tubes in four triple sets, two on each side. 2" deck & turret faces (5" over magazines), 4" belt. 3 seaplanes.

1931-33
6 x Type E (equivalent to historic Mogami class). 12,400 tons, 35 knots. 1941 Guns = 10 x 8" in five twin turrets (three forward, two aft), 8 x 5" 40 caliber DP in unenclosed mounts, AAA = 24 x 25mm, 12 x 24" torpedo tubes in four triple sets, two on each side. 2" deck & turret faces (5" over magazines), 4" belt. 3 seaplanes.

1934-35
2 x Type F (historic Tone class). 11,200 tons, 35 knots. 8 x 8" in twin turrets (all forward), 8 x 5" 40 caliber DP in two twin turrets on each side, AAA = 18 x 25mm, 12 x 24" torpedo tubes in four triple sets, two on each side. 2.5" deck (5" over magazines), 1" turrets, 4" belt. 6 seaplanes.


Light Cruisers

1918
3 x Type A (Tenryu). 4,000 tons, 34 knots. 1941 Guns = 8 x 5” 40 caliber DP in four twin turrets, two each superfiring fore & aft, AAA = 12 x 25mm, 8 x 24" torpedo tubes in two quadruple centerline mounts. 2.3" belt, 1.1" deck, 1" turret faces. Obsolete.

1919-22
9 x Type B (Kuma). 5,500 tons, 35 knots. 1941 Guns = 8 x 5” 40 caliber DP in four twin turrets, two each superfiring fore & aft, AAA = 16 x 25mm, 12 x 24" torpedo tubes in four triple wing sets. 2.3" belt, 1.5" deck, 1" turret faces. 1 seaplane. Obsolescent.

1923
2 x Type C (Kitikami). 5,700 tons, 35 knots. 1941 Guns = 8 x 5" 40 caliber DP in three twin turrets, two superfiring forward & 1 aft, AAA = 16 x 25mm, four triple wing. 2.3" belt, 1.5" deck, 1" turret faces. 1 seaplane. Obsolescent.

1924-25
4 x Type D (Nagara). 5,900 tons, 35 knots. 1941 Guns = 8 x 5” 40 caliber DP in four twin turrets, two each superfiring fore & aft, AAA = 16 x 25mm, four triple wing sets. 2.3" belt, 1.5" deck, 1" turret faces. 1 seaplane. Obsolescent.

1926
2 x Type E (Yubari). 3,400 tons, 35 knots. 1941 Guns = 8 x 5" 40 caliber DP in four twin turrets, two each superfiring fore & aft, AAA = 12 x 25mm, 8 x 24" torpedo tubes in two quadruple centerline mounts. 2.3" belt, 1" deck & turret faces. Obsolescent.

1936-39
5 x Type F (Agano). 7,000 tons, 35 knots. 6 x 6" in three twin turrets, two superfiring forward & 1 aft, 10 x 3.9" DP (1 single turret superfiring above main battery fore & aft + 2 twin turrets on each side, AAA = 24 x 25mm, 8 x 24" torpedo tubes in two quadruple wing sets. 2" belt & deck, 1" turret faces. 1 seaplane.

1940-42
8 x Type G (AA cruisers - Oyodo). 6,000 tons, 35 knots. 12 x 3.9" DP in six superfiring twin turrets, three each fore & aft, AAA = 48 x 25mm, 8 x 24" torpedo tubes in two wing sets. 2" belt & deck, 1" turret faces.

Destroyers

1921-23
15 x Type A (Akatsuki). Obsolescent though modernized. 1400 tons, 33 knots. 4 x 3.9" DP in unenclosed single mounts on the centerline, AAA = 8 x 25mm, 3 x 24" torpedo tubes in triple centerline mount.

1924-26
15 x Type B (Hatshuharu). Obsolescent though modernized. 1500 tons, 36 knots. 6 x 3.9" DP in one twin turret forward & two superfiring aft, AAA = 8 x 25mm, 3 x 24" torpedo tubes in triple centerline mount.

1927-29
18 x Type C (Shiratsuyu). 1600 tons, 36 knots. 4 x 5" 40 caliber DP in twin turrets fore & aft, AAA = 8 x 25mm, 8 x 24" torpedo tubes in two quadruple centerline mounts.

1930-32
18 x Type D (Asashio). 1800 tons, 36 knots. 5 x 5" 40 caliber DP in twin turrets fore & aft plus one superfiring aft, AAA = 8 x 25mm, 8 x 24" torpedo tubes in two quadruple centerline mounts.

1933-35
18 x Type E (Kagero). 2000 tons, 36 knots. 6 x 5” 40 caliber DP in one twin turret forward & two superfiring aft, AAA = 10 x 25mm, 8 x 24" torpedo tubes in two quadruple centerline mounts with reloads.

1936-38
24 x Type F (Yugumo). 2200 tons, 36 knots. 6 x 5” 40 caliber DP in one twin turret forward & two superfiring aft (higher elevation for AA use than Type C), AAA = 12 x 25mm, 8 x 24" torpedo tubes in two quadruple centerline mounts with reloads.

1939-42
30 x Type G (Akitsuki). 2700 tons, 34 knots. 8 x 3.9" DP in twin superfiring turrets fore & aft, AAA = 24 x 25mm, 4 x 24" torpedo tubes in one quadruple centerline set with reloads. 16 completed by December 1941.


Destroyer Escorts

1933-37
15 x Type A (originally large torpedo boats - Kamikaze). 900 tons, 28 knots. 2 x unenclosed 3.9" DP, 1 each forward & aft, AAA = 4 x 25mm, 3 x 21" torpedo tubes in one triple centerline set, lots of depth charges.

1940-42
30 x Type B. 1300 tons, 25 knots (Mutsuki). 4 x 3.9" DP in twin turrets fore & aft, AAA = 8 x 25mm, 4 x 24" torpedo tubes in one quadruple centerline set, lots of depth charges.

Sea-Going Corvettes

1938-42
62 x Type A (Matsu). 900 tons, 19.5 knots, diesel engines. 2 x unenclosed 3.9" DP, 1 forward & 1 aft, 6 x 25mm AAA, lots of depth charges.

Coastal Corvettes

1933-39
24 x Type A (Sub Chaser). 300 tons, 20 knots, diesel engines. 1 x 40mm & 3 x 25mm AAA, 36 depth charges.

1940-42
64 x Type B (Escort). 450 tons, 16 knots, reciprocating engines. 1 x 3", 3 x 25mm AAA, 36 depth charges.


JAPANESE NAVY IN DECEMBER 1941

BUILT

8 fleet carriers (2 obsolescent), 3 light carriers, 2 CVE (1 obsolete), 13 battleships (1 modern, 2 modernized, 10 obsolescent/obsolete). 22 heavy cruisers (18 modern, 4 obsolescent). 25 light cruisers (6 modern, 20 obsolescent/obsolete). 124 fleet destroyers (94 modern, 30 obsolescent). 19 destroyer escorts, 14 sea-going corvettes, 40 coastal corvettes.

BUILDING/CONVERTING

10 fleet carriers (5 in 1942, 4 in 1943, 1 in 1944). 4 light carriers (2 each in 1942 & 1943). 4 escort carriers (2 in 1942, 2 in 1943). 3 battleships (1 in 1942, 2 in 1943). 6 light cruisers (2 in 1942, 4 in 1943). 8 destroyers, 8 destroyer escorts, 16 sea-going corvettes, 16 coastal corvettes.


Alternate History British Dreadnoughts in 1939

1915-16
Nine x Type A. Historic Queen Elizabeth class. 29,000 tons, 24 knots. 8 x 15", 12 workable 6" in casemates, 2 x 3" AA, 4 x 21" torpedo tubes. 4" decks, 13" belt, 13" turrets, ? torpedo bulkhead.

Queen Elizabeth class in 1939. 32,000 tons, 23.5 knots. 8 x 15", 8 x 6" in casemates, 8 x 4" AA, AAA = 16 x 2 pounder + some 20mm Oerlikon. 5" decks, 13" belt, 13" turrets, 2 x 1" torpedo bulkheads + bulge each side. 2 seaplanes. Obsolete.

1917
Four x Type B (Ramilles). 35,000 tons, 27 knots. 8 x 15", 14 x 6" in casemates, 2 x 3" AA, 4 x 21" torpedo tubes (2 submerged each side). 5" decks, 13" belt, 13" turrets, 2 x 1" torpedo bulkheads.

Two x Type B in 1939. 38,000 tons, 25 knots. 8 x 15", 8 x 6" in casemates, 8 x 4" AA, AAA = 16 x 2 pounder + some 20mm Oerlikon. 6" decks, 13" belt, 14" turrets, 3 x 1" torpedo bulkheads + bulge each side. 2 seaplanes. Obsolescent.

One x Type B fully modernized in 1939 and another undergoing full modernization. 36,000 tons, 27 knots (boiler & engine rooms alternated, etc.). 8 x 15", 16 x 4.5" DP in four twin turrets each side, AAA = 32 x 2 pounder + some Oerlikon. 6" decks, 13" belt, 14" turrets, 3 x 1" torpedo bulkheads + bulge each side. 2 seaplanes.

1924
Two x Type C (Nelson). 43,000 tons, 29 knots (boiler & engine rooms alternated, etc.). 8 x 15", 12 x 6" in twin turrets, 4 x 3" AA, 6.5" decks, 14" belt, 16" turrets, 3 x 1" torpedo bulkheads. 4 seaplanes.

Both Type C fully modernized by 1939. 43,000 tons, 29 knots (boiler & engine rooms alternated, etc.). 8 x 15", 16 x 4.5" DP in twin turrets, AAA = 48 x 2 pounder + some 20mm Oerlikon. 7" decks, 14" belt, 16" turrets, 3 x 1" torpedo bulkheads. 4 seaplanes.

[RevRick]

Right now, I am working on somewhat of a similar type of scenario...just for fun, of course.

[akdreemer]

Sounds like a lot of fun, need any help?

[akdreemer]

ORIGINAL: Tom_Holsinger

15 years ago I played a fascinating PBEM game of Gary Grigsby’s Pacific War based on an alternate history background I wrote to maximize early game action, and present the latter here for use in WITP-AE. The major change is that I gave Japan extra oil production of about two million tons a year (40,000 barrels a day) from Nazi-style synthetic oil plants in Japan and Manchuria. Both sides also received significant early-game upgrades to ship-based anti-aircraft systems, and some increases to the numbers of fleet carriers. The Japanese also received far greater production of everything, plus they had much greater initial numbers of aircraft squadrons and, in particular, merchant vessels and tankers.

My friend Trent Telenko played the Japanese and I played the Americans for about 6-9 months of game time. We discovered in spades that logistics counted for everything – a stalemate quickly developed in the South Pacific with all-out fight for New Guinea which almost exactly mirrored the historic Solomons campaign. Basically both sides’ logistics petered out pretty close to where they did historically in terms of location even with the additional Japanese oil production & ensuing Preparation Points.

But we sure had fun. Here is the opening part of the alternate history background. I’d appreciate it if someone with more knowledge of WITP-AE would post some ideas on how to implement the additional Japanese oil production. My wild-assed guess is that Tokyo and Port Arthur should be made oil production and refinery bases with say, 30,000 barrels a day at Tokyo and 10,000 at Port Arthur. For comparison purposes, Goralski & Freeburg said in their Oil & War that Japan produced about a million tons of oil a year (20,000 barrels a day) from all oil sources combined on the island of Formosa.

Edit - I've been informed that I should upload the whole thing as one huge post, which follows.

Increased oil production might be possible if the Japanese controlled all of Sakhlin Island and the rich oil deposits in the northern half.

[Anonymous]

[Deleted by Admins]

[oldman45]

That was a fascinating read, you have your work cut out for yourself.