ORIGINAL: Terminus
That gives us a tactical/operational Luftwaffe, but not a strategic one. I don't buy the "they didn't think strategic bombing had merit" line, and would like to know the reasoning behind that thought.
I should be more correct in saying that the Luftwaffe in the 30's rejected the Douhet interpretation of strategic bombing as not having merit. The Luftwaffe did have a doctrine regarding strategic air warfare, however In Luftwaffe Regulation 16 (The Conduct of the Aerial War), the Luftwaffe rejected the theory of Douhet which made
the primary goal of strategic bombing to bomb the enemy cities, inducing terror into the civilian population with expectation that they would arise in and force an early end to the conflict. Such acts were to be avoided on "principle".....however, and this helps address recent posts regarding Hitler, the regulation's authors reserved the right to retaliate if the enemy inititated strategic attacks directed against the German civilian population.
Hitler's overriding of Luftwaffe ops over Britian though, i'd attribute more to stupidiity vs. any doctrine. He blundered...plain and simple and delivered victory to Fighter Command.
Regarding Regulation 16, the rejection of Douhetian theory was based on the thought that the primary objective of terror bombing civilians was that it was likely to be counterproductive, actually increasing the enemy's will rather than breaking it.
Bombing the enemy seat of government was discussed in the Regulation, and it was thought that if conducted at the right moment, national morale might be impacted but there was caution in that an enemy capital would likely be heavily defended. (Moscow proved this to be the case, if not Warsaw)
The Luftwaffe view on strategic bombing was to target sources of enemy power; production, food production, import facilities (ports), power stations, railroads and railyards, military barracks and centers of gov. administration.
