Scenario/campaign suggestions

[TIMJOT]

Originally posted by John Carney
Using Jeremy's four start points, how do you change US build up and commitment levels?
Maybe 100% for 1 and 2, 85% for 3, and 70% for 4. Allowing training levels to increase US air units, with no restrictions on their deployment.
Is WITP starting date 7 December 1942?

I would think that the US build up and commitment would be 100% war footing in all 4 scenerios.

[Don Bowen]

Originally posted by mdiehl




Both seem like interesting scenarios. Re: 2. There were no formal treaties binding the US to the UK in defense of the Pacific possessions. However, I think you can take the US policy in the ETO as emblemic: multiple lend-leases (possibly transferring critical resources to American control, such as Balikpapan, forcing Japan to attack the US anyhow), in return for modest infusions of vessels and aircraft. At the same time, a huge buliding and reinforcement program would occur in the Phillippines and US Pacific Island bases at Wake, Guam, Midway, &c. All this assumes IMO that the UK is *not* war with Germany. If it is, IMO, the US makes every effort to get the war that is needed to relieve the UK and force the Japanese to operate on a much broader front.

The Japanese actually analyzed and considered the option and did not, after preliminary analysis, spend much further effort studying a move on the NEI and Malaya without first neutralizing the US Pacific Fleet and the PI. The basic problem was the extreme risk entailed in leaving a large and growing garrison and air force sitting on your flank, astride your lines of communication, supply, and movement, and within bombing range of S. Japan. Ironically, much of the fear had to do with the potential effect of B17s on shipping; apparently the USAAF's position on this matter was pretty much adopted by Japanese operational planners. No one knew at the time that it would be so bad at hitting moving targets. (I just finished Wllmott's "Barrier and the Javelin," which deals with this in the introductory chapters. It makes me want to read the prequel.)

Don't forget the "three little ships" (USS Isabel, USS Lanakai, USS Molly Moore) that Roosevelt was intentionally putting in harm's (and Japan's) way in the China Sea. A "Panay" type incident involing one of these was hoped for and probably would have pushed the U.S. sentiment all the way to war. There was also the pre-war Churchill/Roosevelt agreement for sending Asiatic Fleet destroyers to Singapore. Taken together, these virtually guaranteed a U.S. involvement even if U.S. interests were not directly attacked.

[Drongo]

I'm always amazed at how the efforts of just two determined men (admittedly national leaders) ensured that the U.S. was always going to be caught up in a world war (despite U.S. anti war sentiment). I find it very surprising that some of Roosevelt's dealings and plans with Churchill didn't bring about his political downfall (you would have thought his political opponents would have picked up on it from somewhere).

[Don Bowen]

Originally posted by Drongo
I'm always amazed at how the efforts of just two determined men (admittedly national leaders) ensured that the U.S. was always going to be caught up in a world war (despite U.S. anti war sentiment). I find it very surprising that some of Roosevelt's dealings and plans with Churchill didn't bring about his political downfall (you would have thought his political opponents would have picked up on it from somewhere).

My area is military history, not political. but I really have to side with Churchill and Roosevelt on this one. Churchill believed that Great Britain could well be defeated without U.S. help and Roosevelt believed that defeat for Great Britain would lead to certain defeat for the U.S. - divided and conquered. If the U.S. isolationist sentiment had kept the country on the sidelines too long it could well have found itself alone and terribly outnumbered.

The maneuvering was secret, political, and rather underhanded. Especially the apparent plot to have US and Filipino servicemen killed in order to inflame the two populations. But, other than that, the military preparations were sound. And, of course, the allies were reading the Japanese (and German) codes and knew things they could not let on that they knew.

Incidentally, the USS Lanikai (an auxillary schooner) ended up as an RAN vessel (Pendant Number Z253). She successfully escaped south from Manila, through the Netherlands East Indies and eventually to Broome. There, after a little patrol work up the coast, she was decomissioned as a U.S. vessel and turned over to Australia - officially as a boom defense vessel but really for use in commando operations. USS Isabel also escaped but Molly Moore was still in drydock when the war began and was never commissioned.

Cruise of the Lanikai (ISBN 0-87021-132-3) tells the complete story and is an excellent read.

[Drongo]

All's fair in love and war (and politics).

Re : Lanikai
Yes, I had heard of the Lanikai before. You could make a movie about her career (I think she was actually in one).

[TIMJOT]

Originally posted by Don Bowen

Don't forget the "three little ships" (USS Isabel, USS Lanakai, USS Molly Moore) that Roosevelt was intentionally putting in harm's (and Japan's) way in the China Sea. A "Panay" type incident involing one of these was hoped for and probably would have pushed the U.S. sentiment all the way to war. There was also the pre-war Churchill/Roosevelt agreement for sending Asiatic Fleet destroyers to Singapore. Taken together, these virtually guaranteed a U.S. involvement even if U.S. interests were not directly attacked.

Fully believe t hat Roosevelt was hopeing for a Panay type incident. Both he and Churchill were very much afraid that Japan would limit their attack to Malaya and NEI. There was no formal agreement to go to war in behalf of the Brits or the Dutch and Roosevelt no full well he just didnt have the support to go to war under those circumstances. However its not a certainty that a sinking of one small auxillary ship would have done the trick. If the sinkings of US DDs in the Atlantic are any measure.

The agreement on the destroyers was "IF" the US was also at war.

[Don Bowen]

Originally posted by TIMJOT

The agreement on the destroyers was "IF" the US was also at war.

I've heard both ways on this - only if US attacked or just send them to support Force Z.

From FDR:Pacific Warlord
----------
FDR still wasn't satisfied. He had been at Warm Springs and when he returned he instructed Stark to send Admiral Hart a message ordering him to improvise and send off a few small picket boats to the invasion coasts. Filipinos were to be in the crew. These pickets, a "Defensive Information Patrol," would be in the path of Japanese fleets heading for Siam and Malaya. Pretty obviously, in Admiral Hart's view, the president was hoping to provoke an incident which would foil any cunning Japanese plan to bypass the Philippines. In the event, the Japanese identified and ignored the only boat to reach station, Admiral Hart's yacht Isabel. Nothing happened, except that years later a retired admiral wrote a good-humored account of how the chief executive had apparently schemed to get Japan to commit the first overt act on his picket ship and his extremely junior person. Tommy Hart, thinking back, believed that Washington, i.e., Roosevelt, was obviously thinking about provoking an incident by allowing Asiatic Fleet destroyers to head toward Singapore to help the British and an inevitable clash with the Japanese.
---------

This only infers that the DDs were to be war bait. Do you have another source?

Don

[TIMJOT]

Originally posted by Don Bowen


I've heard both ways on this - only if US attacked or just send them to support Force Z.

From FDR:Pacific Warlord
----------
FDR still wasn't satisfied. He had been at Warm Springs and when he returned he instructed Stark to send Admiral Hart a message ordering him to improvise and send off a few small picket boats to the invasion coasts. Filipinos were to be in the crew. These pickets, a "Defensive Information Patrol," would be in the path of Japanese fleets heading for Siam and Malaya. Pretty obviously, in Admiral Hart's view, the president was hoping to provoke an incident which would foil any cunning Japanese plan to bypass the Philippines. In the event, the Japanese identified and ignored the only boat to reach station, Admiral Hart's yacht Isabel. Nothing happened, except that years later a retired admiral wrote a good-humored account of how the chief executive had apparently schemed to get Japan to commit the first overt act on his picket ship and his extremely junior person. Tommy Hart, thinking back, believed that Washington, i.e., Roosevelt, was obviously thinking about provoking an incident by allowing Asiatic Fleet destroyers to head toward Singapore to help the British and an inevitable clash with the Japanese.
---------

This only infers that the DDs were to be war bait. Do you have another source?

Don

I will have to go back and check specific sources, but I believe that I have read in several sources that, at a joint strategy meeting at Singapore in November 41. The US repeatedly refused British request to station significant US naval forces at Singapore. Finally they gave tacit approval to send a squadron of DDs in advent the US and UK found themselves at war with Japan. I know of no agreement to send US naval units to Singappore prior to hostilities or if the UK was at war with Japan alone. If he had planned to send those DDs in harmsway in any advent, what was the need to send those picket boats?

Sources that Ive read on this subject include, but not limited to: "Empires in the Balance"(Wilmont), "The Pacific Campaign"(Vanderjag), "The Pacific War"(Costello) and "Infamy"(Toland). I will try to get some specific quotes.

[CynicAl]

I too have read that the US refused to station major Naval forces in Singapore in 1941. The impression I got, though, was that by "major forces" they meant "the main force of Pacific Fleet." A DesRon might not have been out of the question, though.

[TIMJOT]

Originally posted by CynicAl
I too have read that the US refused to station major Naval forces in Singapore in 1941. The impression I got, though, was that by "major forces" they meant "the main force of Pacific Fleet." A DesRon might not have been out of the question, though.

Well, Im not saying it isnt possible, just that I have never read anything about a pre-war commitment to send any vessels, if only Britain or NEI were attacked. Hypothetically though, I would think at least some sort of lend/lease arrangement would have been made under those circumstances.

[Luskan]

Just to fire off a few ideas while waiting for my UV turn:

1. Little scns are great, but the one we all want is the grand campaign that stretches the length of the war, as long as it must until victory conditions are met.

2. Someone (forget who) sugested a scn without any US involvement for the first few months - what a brilliant idea. A variant of the above grand campaign could be when the japs start attacking british and dutch possessions etc (battle of the java sea would be even more one sided) and the US units, bases and ships are still neutral until attacked somewhere! The US would no doubt be doing the "armed neutrality" thing, but if they don't see you coming, you could set up your own Pearl Harbour, or maybe some idiot sub captain sinks a US tanker because he mis-identified it etc! The balance would be between keeping the US out of the war as long as possible, but striking them before they get unstoppable resources!

3. Ability for allied player to play the above scenario, fighting with everything the brits and dutch and aussies have while trying to manouvre his US assets to be in position for the war he knows is coming. Either a variable Jap declaration of war date or a jap attack on us forces, whichever comes first. The suspense in PBEM would be great, trying to keep US forces shadowing but not engaging jap forces all across the map, trying to send units where japs might attack them and force their hand, but not being allowed to attack them and start the war yourself.

Drooling at WiTP already. Wish it came out in December so I would have holidays from uni to spend on it!

[TIMJOT]

I agree it would be a great scenerio. Some think it would be boring for the Allied player, I dont agree. I like you think it would be blast for all the reasons you mention.

[Blackhorse]

So far we've been discussing variants on the Japanese decision to strike the Southern Resources Area. IRL, the Japanese judged that it was necessary to "neutralize" American military forces so the IJN/IJA could secure the SRA. I agree that it would be fun to have a variant where the Japanese go after the SRA *without* first attacking the United States.

But what would really intrigue me is to have the alternative to invading the SRA that the Japanese military leaders actually considered -- attacking the Northern Resources Area (i.e. Siberian Russian).

If the Japanese attacked Siberia they would also trigger war with Britain and the Commonwealth (Russia's allies), so the game play would be widespread even without immediate U.S. intervention. Think of the new units and controversies! MiGs and Yaks vs. Zeros!

[TIMJOT]

What about the oil? I dont think the Japanese had enough oil to choose the Northern option.

[Jeremy Pritchard]

In order for this scenario to work, Indo-China must not have been occupied in 1940-41. The US started their embargo once Indo-China was occupied. Had Japan gone to war against Russia and NOT England (sort of like what Russia did, war with Germany, but Peace with Japan, even though Russia's allies were at war with Japan). This might keep the US out of the conflict as none of their interests were affected (the US wanted China as their sphere of economic dominance).

This scenario will be primarily land bases, so WitP must have a very good ground combat model for it to be interesting.

[byron13]

Originally posted by Jeremy Pritchard
This scenario will be primarily land bases, so WitP must have a very good ground combat model for it to be interesting.

Well. That's it then. The Siberian scenario is in the game. I mean, surely you're not suggesting that WitP WON'T have a very good ground combat model, are you?

Didn't think so . . . .

[Jeremy Pritchard]

What I was really getting at, was wether or not the game will have the ability to recreate heavy actions in Siberia. Fighting in Siberia and Manchuria would require almost a completely different set of rules for combat then fighting in Jungle or on Atolls. Heavy tank units would rule in Sibera-Manchuria but stall in the Pacific and East Asia theatres. I just hope that all aspects of a land war in Siberia will be included.

[Oleg Mastruko]

I am glad to see flurry of interesting ideas in this thread, that started with few humble suggestions

I am sure we may think of more interesting ideas for scenarios, let's just hope Matrix gives us a PROPER editor this time, unlike the one that came with UV...

How about this (hypothetical to a degree, but not as much as some of the scenarios discussed in this thread).

Germans conquer Holland as they did, and manage to install Quisling/Vichy style puppet government there. This goverment takes over Dutch colonial possesions (as Vichy goverment did with most of the French colonies) and decides to cooperate with their Axis partners (ie. Japan). Germans did have more then a few sympathisers among the Dutch anyway...

Now we have interesting situation. Japs, thanks to their friends the Germans, get the NEI oil relatively easy and the drills and rigs intact (not destroyed as most of them were historically). But what shall come next?

Shall the Japanese go after British Malaya, US Phillipines, none, or both, to secure their flanks?

Would the Allies strike at NEI first, irritated by Dutch "treason" (as they were irritated by Vichy French treason and stroke first at the Vichyites at many occasions... Dakar, Madagascar etc.)?

O.

[Blackhorse]

Originally posted by Jeremy Pritchard
In order for this scenario to work, Indo-China must not have been occupied in 1940-41. The US started their embargo once Indo-China was occupied. Had Japan gone to war against Russia and NOT England (sort of like what Russia did, war with Germany, but Peace with Japan, even though Russia's allies were at war with Japan). This might keep the US out of the conflict as none of their interests were affected (the US wanted China as their sphere of economic dominance).

I agree with Jeremy that the scenario should assume no occupation of Indo-China. Even if Japan only declares war on Russia, it is enormously likely that Britain would declare war on Japan -- if only to encourage Stalin to continue the fight. With Churchill as Prime Minister it is hard to imagine the British leaving Russia in the lurch.

This scenario will be primarily land bases, so WitP must have a very good ground combat model for it to be interesting.

A good ground combat model is also necessary for an invasion of India (see related thread) or just the fighting in China. So count me in Byron13s camp -- WitP will have a very good ground combat model.

[Jo van der Pluym]

Originally posted by Oleg Mastruko

Scenarios/campaigns I'd like to see in WITP, from most serious to the least:
Comments?

O.

I have another suggestion for a hypothetical scenario.

What about that there is no War in Europe. Then does the dutch, French and British reinforce there colonies with addional ships, Air and land forces.

(The Dutch had mayby finnished there first Battlecruiser. And the Dutch NEI had the Fokker G.Ia and G.Ib FB)

And then with the option that Germany, Italy can send forces to help Japan. (Like FJ, San Marco marines, GD, Tirpitz, Graf Zeppelin etc). And then can with this also the following happen in Europe.

1. Full War. Dutch, French and British withdraw some forces from the pacific and decreased reinforcements of these countries.
2. Phony War. No withdaw but only decreased reinforcements from the European Countries.
3. No War.