This new stand alone release based on the legendary War in the Pacific from 2 by 3 Games adds significant improvements and changes to enhance game play, improve realism, and increase historical accuracy. With dozens of new features, new art, and engine improvements, War in the Pacific: Admiral's Edition brings you the most realistic and immersive WWII Pacific Theater wargame ever!
Correct me if I'm wrong. Having skimmed through all this, to me the obvious failure is in the PB's not sinking under bombardment. If they had, then CD fire would have shifted from counter battery fire to the shelling of the transports. This would have massively increased the damage & casualties to the attacking Japanese force.
While there are a lot of points & counter points on the PH defenses, and player abilities, this seems to be the crux of the matter. Am I missing something? And if this is in fact the problem, how difficult would it be to improve the game model going forward?
So, if you're right, and I don't know if you are about targeting priority, all I have to do is mix in a few heavier, more robust warships and I can once again ensure that those untrained gun bunnies leave my AKs alone?
I think the unloading of men and material is far too fast. Perhaps a max unload limit (similar to a SPS-type rule) should be instituted to prevent a one-day landing of huge masses of troops and material. We have this for ports, why not beaches? This would allow the defender several attempts at inflicting damage and possibly counterattacking the landing if they had the forces. Realstically neither side could land such forces in one or two or even three days, especially before the advent of more specialized landing crafts.
I think the unloading of men and material is far too fast. Perhaps a max unload limit (similar to a SPS-type rule) should be instituted to prevent a one-day landing of huge masses of troops and material. We have this for ports, why not beaches? This would allow the defender several attempts at inflicting damage and possibly counterattacking the landing if they had the forces. Realstically neither side could land such forces in one or two or even three days, especially before the advent of more specialized landing crafts.
All other objections aside, how do you handle it on a map data basis when those specialized crafts appear? Look at the gear landed at Tarawa, and that used at Okinawa. Two different wars, way different unload speeds. What if I don't invade Tarawa until late 1945?
And the comparison betwen ports and beaches is invalid. Ports are constrained by pier space and longshoreman resources. In a beach invasion, essentially the entire crew base of the troops ships are longshoremen. They aren't the constraint. And there's no space constraint around the anchored troop ships.
Correct me if I'm wrong. Having skimmed through all this, to me the obvious failure is in the PB's not sinking under bombardment. If they had, then CD fire would have shifted from counter battery fire to the shelling of the transports. This would have massively increased the damage & casualties to the attacking Japanese force.
While there are a lot of points & counter points on the PH defenses, and player abilities, this seems to be the crux of the matter. Am I missing something? And if this is in fact the problem, how difficult would it be to improve the game model going forward?
So, if you're right, and I don't know if you are about targeting priority, all I have to do is mix in a few heavier, more robust warships and I can once again ensure that those untrained gun bunnies leave my AKs alone?
Computer code is stupid.
Well, maybe not stupid, but not functioning as intended.
Ok, you put heavier ships in the group. If, as mentioned earlier and as happened hitorically, these heavier ships come under bombardment then they to would be sunk. I'm using Wake as an example. While the defenders of Wake did in fact surprise the Japanese ship commanders, the fact remains that several warships were sunk by a small number of CD weapons. It appears, to my eye, that ships coming under bombardment fire from CD's do not sink. I have vever seen one. Damage yes, sink no. If the fault is in the code relating to damage recieved by CD's, then it may be relatively easy to review and/or correct.
This commentary is based on work I did 25 years ago when I was chief engineer for a major corps-level combined arms C3I system. I'm working from memory without any of my manuals or documentation, so please forgive me. I do have the Command at Sea manuals, but they don't discuss doctrine and what landing operations are really like.
An assault landing was meticulously planned and scheduled, much more carefully than a land set-piece attack. Neither is well-modelled by the game engine. Let's start with a land set-piece attack. Simplifying, it consisted of a detailed fire (and air support) plan, including a preliminary bombardment to cover the movement of troops into the front line, scheduled and on-call barrages of various sorts to keep the defenders suppressed, scheduled and on-call destruction fire to take out positions. Eventually the infantry-tank teams would either directly assault the defended positions or use fire and movement to do the same thing. If this was successful, positions in the front line would be captured. This was called the 'break-in'. Then there was period of attack and counterattack as the defence attempted to seal off or recapture those positions. This was termed the 'dog-fight'. Eventually in a successful attack, the back side of the defensive line would be reached, and mobile forces would be released. This was called the 'break-out'. Success reflected whether the attacking force could keep the defence continuously suppressed, as the defence usually had sufficient firepower to stop any attack dead if unsuppressed.
Suppression meant that the attackers were winning the firepower duel--the defence would take higher percentage casualties than the attack over the operation until the breakout. This usually involved weapon system/weapon system engagements, and tactical details mattered. An infantry platoon was designed to defeat an infantry section, and so on, which is why there was combined arms down to the company and sometimes the platoon. Tanks worked with infantry in an assault, with the infantry providing target acquisition and flank protection, and the tanks providing suppressive firepower. The number of infantry needed per tank depended on the closeness of the terrain. Tanks were best off in flat, clear terrain, where they could get by with a fire team in support. They were in serious trouble in close three-dimensional terrain. Artillery did most of the killing, but most of their fire was suppressive. Artillery suppression usually involved guns of larger calibre (with heavier explosive charges and longer ranges) suppressing guns (and mortars) of smaller calibre rather than an advantage in numbers at a specific calibre.
Air strikes had an interesting role. Basically, troops take cover when under artillery fire, and scatter away from the bomb aim points when attacked by aircraft. It takes a lot longer for a unit to recover from an air strike than from artillery bombardment of the same intensity, and troops who have taken cover or scattered are not contributing their firepower to the defence during that period.
A corps set-piece attack on a dug-in but unfortified division was a slow (about a kilometre a day) but eventually successful process. If the division was fortified, a reinforced corps (3 divisions, tank brigade, artillery brigade, engineers) was needed. In terms of firepower, fortification doubled the defence, and reinforcement doubled the attack. A beach assault was a set-piece frontal attack against a fortified position, so it required a reinforced and specially-trained force. Naval gunfire was about 1/4 as effective as gunfire by surveyed-in artillery on land, so you needed a whole lot more tubes for the same effect. The attacking troops had nowhere to hide--they couldn't take cover and pull out at night--so even greater superiority was required.
The first stage in a beach assault was force recon. Then the amphib TF would close the shore, giving up its mobility and operating in restricted waters. If there were shore defences, naval gunfire had to suppress them, although, most shore defences remained under cover until the landing was taking place. Minecraft cleared the Amphibious Operating Area (AOA), which extended seaward 10-15 nm from the beach and was screened by surface forces. Shipping in the AOA was limited to 10-15 knots. The boat lanes extended out from the beach about 4-5 nm, while the transports remained 10-15 nm from the shore. In between was the approach lane. Fire support areas flanked this area. The goal of the landing was to break into the beach defences--in the same sense as above. If there were heavy coast defence artillery (155mm+), it forced the transports to stand off at about 15 nm, and slowed operations markedly. From transport to the beach was 2-3 hours, which was about all the troops could stand.
It didn't take much resistance to make a beach assault bloody. Very few landings were attempted in the vicinity of an operational coastal defence battery. The Japanese assault on Corregidor took 60% losses before it even reached the beach.
To model this, you need to determine which side has firepower superiority over the battlefield that day. If the attackers, they gain ground (about 8 square kilometres for a corps attack on a division frontage). If the defenders, the attack is stopped dead. Note that the defence has to counterattack to regain ground lost. Casualties can be estimated from the tempo of operations, historical data, accurate operational games (I like the OCS series), and the various planning manuals. Generally speaking, neither ground gained nor casualties were particularly sensitive to the degree of overmatch. To double defensive casualties from those in a corps attack (where the firepower superiority was just acceptable) you needed to attack a division with an army or more. That was a waste of assets--you were better off using an armoured corps, which advanced about twice as fast against a defending infantry division. Mobile ops were a whole different ball game, too.
Harry Erwin
"For a number to make sense in the game, someone has to calibrate it and program code. There are too many significant numbers that behave non-linearly to expect that. It's just a game. Enjoy it." herwin@btinternet.com
Well, maybe not stupid, but not functioning as intended.
Can't say that, unless the coders are bad on a technical basis, and ours aren't. Code does what it's told to do. People here are arguing about routines and algorithms (to the extent they're different things. Don't all you IT majors jump on me.)
Ok, you put heavier ships in the group. If, as mentioned earlier and as happened hitorically, these heavier ships come under bombardment then they to would be sunk. I'm using Wake as an example. While the defenders of Wake did in fact surprise the Japanese ship commanders, the fact remains that several warships were sunk by a small number of CD weapons. It appears, to my eye, that ships coming under bombardment fire from CD's do not sink. I have vever seen one. Damage yes, sink no. If the fault is in the code relating to damage recieved by CD's, then it may be relatively easy to review and/or correct.
I had two previously non-damaged DDs sunk by CD in the Wotje invasion I described many screens ago.
The point is, people here are beefing about the transports not being attacked, and all those thousands of troops getting ashore because the CD routines focus on escorts. If you put in heavy warships, they shoud, under this theory, be hit too, but take more damage, thus still giving the transports a window to unload, thus causing people here to continue to beef.
I've been watching this thread with some interest. I have not yet had time to do any new testing on this - I did test the guns at PH and Manilla several times in early 2009 and bombardment fleets were 100% in all cases - these included multiple BBs, Cruisers, DDs.
On the one hand the example in the thread is complex because it exposes a number of very different issues: targeting of CD guns against large numbers of invading ships, damage caused by CD guns to ships in amphibious TFs, over saturation of shots against ships in amphibous TFs, overly rapid unloading of troops from amphbious TFs. Most of these issues have been with us since day-1 of WITP and are not new to AE.
But one fundamental point to make which is fairly simple, is that as with many if not most of the sub-systems within the game engine (both WITP and AE) if you scale things up far enough, you will be likely to break the sub-system. In WITP this was perhaps most glaringly true for the Air vs Air subsystem (the issue got called "Uber CAP"). We specifically targeted this issue for fixing in AE, and so far, it looks like this fix is holding. But many other sub-systems were not targeted for fixing, so there will still be scalability issues.
So, as to which, if any of these issues, we will ultimately address, we cannot say yet, this will require some testing to sort things out. In the mean time, just be aware that if you launch a very large Amphibous invasion as was done here, you will get outside the window were things work correctly.
And I might also add, that it still seems like to me that the defending base did not have any air force turned on and I haven't heard much about that - but I wonder what would be happening if PH had a large air force turned on during the landings - I would think that would have made a difference in the outcome - though I'm not actually sure what the out come is - I've missed some of the posts I'm sure.
But it is an interesting exercise in scaling things up beyond the engine's ability to handle, no doubt there.
WITP Admiral's Edition - Project Lead
War In Spain - Project Lead
On the IRL side of the commentary, it seems to me that the effect of 16 inch guns is being overestimated. Forgive me for relying on memory rather than quotes, but I think I remember from the recent biography of Captain Evans of the USS Johnston, that at Leyte none of the (3?) battleship AP rounds that hit her did fatal damage - for an unamored ship the AP shells passed through the ship without detonation so it was a matter of chance whether fatal damage was done by the pass of the shell through the ship - and the ship could take multiple shells without immediately sinking. IIRC, it was the 6" light crusier shells that did her in. My fainter memory is something similar happened at the first Naval Battle of Guadalcanal with the 14" AP shells of the two Jap BB's - it was the secondaries that were brutal on the US ships below the CA level. So it may not be unreasonable for the ships to absorb multiple hits from the big guns.
In game terms, I'm not entirely convinced that this landing result would be inappropriate for a 1 in 100 outcome. Combat accuracy of troops in their first combat is often a pale fraction of wartime experience with target pratice when panic, excitment, etc. enter into play. (As a consistent outcome it does seem way off base). I can even come up with a story to explain it - the 16" guns fire a the wrong targets with the wrong ammo, the mobile guns misdeploy, and the co has a mental breakdown.
In the land model, I refought an AI turn once because I accidentally ended the term, and then decided to replay it 6 more times with reloads because of the disparate result. AI Jap attacked Chinese corps in jungle. I had 1 1-2 result, 3 1-1 results, 1 3-1 result (no allied retreat) 1 6-1 result and 2 hundreds to 1. The causalty results varied from higher Jap casualties to surrender of the Chinese force. That range of results seemed appropriate to me.
In our game against Joe and Nik I noticed some of this. It is in the AAR if you are interested
Defenders were 25-30 CD guns (155mm CD guns) and 24 x 155 art (not sure if or when they fired).
Noticed the multiple hit per ship thing (like the PB's) this appears to be an issue as noted in they should sink, then the guns should move on. Some PB's were taking 7-9 155mm hits. I think this is an issue.
The PB's were sunk first, the xAKL next, the xAK then finally the xAP. It was as if the guns worked from the closest to the shore (escorts, then smaller ships then bigger ships) ourwards.
In the end a LOT of ships were sunk over 4-8 days of unloading. Maybe Joe and Nik note those in their thread.
But like here the troops got ashore, and appear to be in bad shape, and will not take the island without reinforcement.
The air and Naval attacks closed the airfields, caused light damnage and light to moderate dsiduption to the defenders.
The outcome was below my expectation (I thought we would cream the invasion more), but still very costly.
Correct me if I'm wrong. Having skimmed through all this, to me the obvious failure is in the PB's not sinking under bombardment. If they had, then CD fire would have shifted from counter battery fire to the shelling of the transports. This would have massively increased the damage & casualties to the attacking Japanese force.
While there are a lot of points & counter points on the PH defenses, and player abilities, this seems to be the crux of the matter. Am I missing something? And if this is in fact the problem, how difficult would it be to improve the game model going forward?
I've been watching this thread with some interest. I have not yet had time to do any new testing on this - I did test the guns at PH and Manilla several times in early 2009 and bombardment fleets were 100% in all cases - these included multiple BBs, Cruisers, DDs.
On the one hand the example in the thread is complex because it exposes a number of very different issues: targeting of CD guns against large numbers of invading ships, damage caused by CD guns to ships in amphibious TFs, over saturation of shots against ships in amphibous TFs, overly rapid unloading of troops from amphbious TFs. Most of these issues have been with us since day-1 of WITP and are not new to AE.
But one fundamental point to make which is fairly simple, is that as with many if not most of the sub-systems within the game engine (both WITP and AE) if you scale things up far enough, you will be likely to break the sub-system. In WITP this was perhaps most glaringly true for the Air vs Air subsystem (the issue got called "Uber CAP"). We specifically targeted this issue for fixing in AE, and so far, it looks like this fix is holding. But many other sub-systems were not targeted for fixing, so there will still be scalability issues.
So, as to which, if any of these issues, we will ultimately address, we cannot say yet, this will require some testing to sort things out. In the mean time, just be aware that if you launch a very large Amphibous invasion as was done here, you will get outside the window were things work correctly.
And I might also add, that it still seems like to me that the defending base did not have any air force turned on and I haven't heard much about that - but I wonder what would be happening if PH had a large air force turned on during the landings - I would think that would have made a difference in the outcome - though I'm not actually sure what the out come is - I've missed some of the posts I'm sure.
But it is an interesting exercise in scaling things up beyond the engine's ability to handle, no doubt there.
Interesting points, Joe. But I think one of the major problems revealed here is the "targeting routine". Against a bombardment TF, shooting at warships makes excellent sense..., but against an "Amphibious TF", the danger is from troops being landed; and AK's and AP's should be the #1 priority targets.
The PB's guns are no threat to Oahu, but the transports troops are. The AI's targeting priority is completely backward. The other thing that stands out is the ability of weak ships to absorb massive numbers of hits. U-Boats used to sink substantial-sized Allied Freighters with a half dozen well-placed hits from their 88mm's..., but in WITP 3,000 ton Japanese merchant rustbuckets absorb 5, 6, and even 8" shells like the Yamato. Those PB's should have blown up and sunk with 1-10 hits..., not been "99% damaged" from 50!
There seem to be a number of problems which converged in this example..., and I suppose we owe WITPPL a vote of thanks for trying something screwy enough to expose them all.
In our game against Joe and Nik I noticed some of this. It is in the AAR if you are interested
Defenders were 25-30 CD guns (155mm CD guns) and 24 x 155 art (not sure if or when they fired).
Noticed the multiple hit per ship thing (like the PB's) this appears to be an issue as noted in they should sink, then the guns should move on. Some PB's were taking 7-9 155mm hits. I think this is an issue.
The PB's were sunk first, the xAKL next, the xAK then finally the xAP. It was as if the guns worked from the closest to the shore (escorts, then smaller ships then bigger ships) ourwards.
In the end a LOT of ships were sunk over 4-8 days of unloading. Maybe Joe and Nik note those in their thread.
But like here the troops got ashore, and appear to be in bad shape, and will not take the island without reinforcement.
The air and Naval attacks closed the airfields, caused light damnage and light to moderate dsiduption to the defenders.
The outcome was below my expectation (I thought we would cream the invasion more), but still very costly.
Cheers
Rob
I dont have a problem with this for 75mm guns but 155's and larger should target the bigest ship they can find and leave the small screening escorts for a smaller guns or ignore them alltogether. You should not be able to just throw enough small expendable escorts into an invasion TF to act as shell spounges. CD guns should activly try to target AKs and APs as long as they aren't being suppressed by escorts with equivelent guns.
It was always my understanding that in order for an invasion escort to be able to suppress a defender's coastal artillery in AE, the escorts had to "match" the size of the guns. If the defender had 5" guns, then destroyers could "match" them. If there were 6"-8" guns, then cruisers would be needed, and if defensive guns were larger (such as at Singapore, Corregidor, Pearl and mainland Japan/WC/Australia) then battleships would be needed. If they couldn't "match" the defensive guns, they couldn't be suppressed and the CD guns would fire at whatever they wanted to.
If transports were anchoring off of Oahu at 12,000 yd range then they should have been dead meat to nearly every gun larger than 5" defending the site. The 12" mortars practiced hitting targets at 15,000 yds, the 12" and 14" guns did the same thing, as did the 8" railroad guns and the 16" barbette guns. They would have all used HE against identified transports, wreaking havoc on their unarmored hulls and causing extensive fires, saving AP shells for warships larger than DD's. The USN DD's at Samar had AP shells fired at them because Kurita's ships believed they were fighting cruisers, not DD's. A 16" shell hit on a destroyer would inflict near catastrophic damage anywhere it hit on such a small ship.
I've never said that the Japanese could not have attempted an invasion of Oahu, or that it would have been repulsed by the coast defenses alone. However, by January 42 all the beaches were mined as were the offshore approaches, barbed wire everywhere, concrete pillboxes for beachfront defense were in place, and artillery was all prepositioned and boresighted. The Japanese did very poorly whenever they faced undisrupted coast defenses that they couldn't bypass or avoid; Wake Island is the only "success" they had against a defense like that and it took them two tries to succeed.
My issue with the results from this AAR is that the coastal guns fired only at the small escorts, even though they outnumbered and vastly outgunned the ships trying to suppress them. Hundreds of transports lying 12,000 yds offshore with only patrol boats providing covering fire, no aerial or ship bombardment, should have resulted in dozens of hits on transports and thousands of casualties among the inbound troops. Certainly some would have made it ashore (unless the invasion commander lost his nerve), but in a highly disrupted state and facing a dug in defense, probably at least level 6 if not even higher (concrete pillboxes, mines, barbed wire, etc).
I think this business of matching guns is wrong. If a bunch of guys in a rowboat could get close enough, they could knock out a CD gun by killing the crew with hand-grenades. The point being that it's weapons vs targets, not weapons vs weapons.
With PB's and CD's, it's the CD guns vs the PB armor (or lack thereof), and vice versa. Of course, if the PB is too far away, it can't hit the CD at all. But the point is there shouldn't be any measuring of guns (that's for the local pub![:D]). If PB's get close enough, and take CD's under fire, then the CD's very well might shoot at the PB's to stop the attack. Gun crews can certainly be killed by rounds from PB guns that hit home, no matter how big the breech they're loading.
BTW, this is certainly in line with what jrlans posted about the shore defenses attempting to allocate guns to targets based on size (that sounds like it would/could be doctrine). But when escorts (of any size) do manage to start putting fire onto CD guns, there shouldn't be any "sorry, that shell is smaller than the one your target shoots - so it doesn't count."
... In game terms, I'm not entirely convinced that this landing result would be inappropriate for a 1 in 100 outcome. Combat accuracy of troops in their first combat is often a pale fraction of wartime experience with target pratice when panic, excitment, etc. enter into play....
My feelings as well. War isn't always about logic and the biggest and best frequently does not always triumph. Plenty of examples of this, my favorite is Mao's escape across the Lu Ding Bridge. One of the most important combat outcomes of the 20th century and less than a 1% probable event outcome. (My opinion is about 1 in a million.) Nonetheless, it is history and no game engine would ever be able to replicate and account for it. Just too improbable.
Also, it wasn't just the landing, but the fact the allies had suffered so many other losses prior. No navy and little Air Force left. A string of terrible defeats .... momentum in War is a big thing.
Jwilk's comments about the game engine are enlightening, and I take them as gospel that the amphib size exceeded the boundaries of the game alogrithm's. In spite of that, the outcome is not insane. Kudos to the dev team. Solid engine.
Have to agree with John wholeheartedly, just in the common sense department.
If your'e armed with a .50 cal you aren't going to be gunning for the Tanks you can't crack ....your'e going to be hitting the softer targets you can.
If you were firing morters, you would go for the opened topped vehicles and other softies or troops that you could put some pain on, unless the Big Bad Tank was running right on top of you.
When your life is on the line, you want to put the most hurt where you can, when you can.
With Defensive depth, Force Dispersal, Bore sighting , Predictive fire and Interlocking supportive fire from the FDC, and for the troops Overwatch, Sangars, Pepperpotting, Trenches, Barbed wire, CAS, and Minefields, which would have been employed concepts in the defence of Pearl, The casualty rate for ships, and men getting onto the beaches, should be higher than achieved here.
"Alea iacta est." Caius Julius
"If you can't beat your computer at chess, try kickboxing." Emo Philips
"Caedite eos! Novit enim Dominus qui sunt eius." Abbot Arnaud Amalric
I'm merely speculating , Don would have to confirm, but presumably the "algorithm" presumes the transports are for the most part "standing offshore" well outside the range of most of the "guns" used to fire...the PB's are presumed to be inside this envelope, and hence soak up much of the fire from the CD guns.
One other point that is missed is the landing LCU's themselves are attacked at the end of the turn sequence via a bombardment attack from the defenders...which gives me a thought...
I also presume that the transports carried with them 2500 V-22 Ospreys to enable all the troops to land en masse?
I think the concern about the CDs being so ineffective is quite justified and needs to be thoroughly examined but for me the biggest problem is being able to unload so quickly. My ships can't unload that quickly when docked, so I'm curious how the transports "standing offshore" can perform such feats. Even if the US had evacuated Oahu there is still no way the Japanese could land so much so quickly.
APs, AKs, xAPs, and xAKs do not beach themselves to disembark. They use landing craft ...all the little landing craft are represented abstractly by the unload rate....
Earlier in the thread it was mentioned that the TFs had 70ish transports each.... the units got offloaded quickly because each individual transport was not carrying very many devices...so the inherent and abstracted landing craft took the devices to shore quickly.
On top of that the Japanese receive a bonus to their unload rate early in the war abstractly representing dedicated shipping engineers that were detailed for the early invasions.
ORIGINAL: Yank
I've posted three days of combat reports in my commentary/AAR thread. Hope this helps
Does show another problem with the CD programming. Three days of combat, and nothing bigger than a 155 is firing at the two BB's. Where are all the 9.2", 12", 14" and 16" CD batteries? At 12,000 yards, they should all be firing...
Interesting points, Joe. But I think one of the major problems revealed here is the "targeting routine". Against a bombardment TF, shooting at warships makes excellent sense..., but against an "Amphibious TF", the danger is from troops being landed; and AK's and AP's should be the #1 priority targets.
The PB's guns are no threat to Oahu, but the transports troops are. The AI's targeting priority is completely backward. The other thing that stands out is the ability of weak ships to absorb massive numbers of hits. U-Boats used to sink substantial-sized Allied Freighters with a half dozen well-placed hits from their 88mm's..., but in WITP 3,000 ton Japanese merchant rustbuckets absorb 5, 6, and even 8" shells like the Yamato. Those PB's should have blown up and sunk with 1-10 hits..., not been "99% damaged" from 50!
There seem to be a number of problems which converged in this example..., and I suppose we owe WITPPL a vote of thanks for trying something screwy enough to expose them all.
Picked up an interesting account of action on February 17, 1945 off of Iwo Jima entitled Iwo Jima Recon...the book details the activity of 4 UDTs in a final recon before the invasion...
12 LCI(G)s made a reconnaisance of Iwo Jima's defences supported by BB's Tennessee and Nevada, a cruiser and several destroyers. The LCI(G)s approached within 2000 yards of the shore...1 was sunk and 9 heavily damaged. 2 others moderately damaged.
LCI(G) 473 suffered as many as many as six 5 inch shell hits as it approached within 1500 yards of Suribachi...but did not sink.
This photo is of LCI(G) 450 which took a number of 8 inch shell hits...yet was still able to unleash its rockets....and did not sink.
