Why DB's should do floatation damage
Moderators: Joel Billings, Tankerace, siRkid
Re: yeah that is pretty retarded....
Personely I always order my SBD to drop their bombs next to the Battleships not on them. 
I have my SBD's....
duct tape very sharp railroad spikes to the front of my GP bombs. This is how they can penetrate the deck armor so easily.
I really think that most of the floatation damage caused by bombs should be replaced by fire damage.
I really think that most of the floatation damage caused by bombs should be replaced by fire damage.
I agree Doomonyou. But I think fire damage should mean something too...like chance of fuel or ammo explosion or causing other problems, maybe if fire damage gets bad enough the ship is abandoned, that would be interesting. As of right now, I pray for fire damage (actually I pray that any damage I get is fire damage and nothing else, I don't pray that I get fire damage 
great idea Doomonyou....the world's first sabot-bomb. Kind of like the "Silver Bullet" round used in Desert Storm (and just as effective!)

I agree that FLT damage due to bomb hits needs to be sharply curtailed in favor of SYS (when penetrating) and FIRE levels whether penetrating *or not*. Carriers in particular would be better simulated, especially in these early war times.
Shell damage too, except in terms of belt hits.....the addition of the Superstructure hit location would go a long way toward addressing ship stamina issues.
I agree that FLT damage due to bomb hits needs to be sharply curtailed in favor of SYS (when penetrating) and FIRE levels whether penetrating *or not*. Carriers in particular would be better simulated, especially in these early war times.
Shell damage too, except in terms of belt hits.....the addition of the Superstructure hit location would go a long way toward addressing ship stamina issues.
yeah...
I think the damage system needs to better reflect that while surely ships were sunk many times they were reduced to water-line stable wrecked hulks. Out of control fires that set off ammo, fuel, trap crew and kill them below decks, etc would be great.
Noone's asking for a more in-depth, down to the specific compartment type damage control system ala the fatally flawed GNB series. For a strategic/operational level wargame, UV has already a fantastic level of detail ala the ships, especially when one includes the representation of individual weapons mount, each one suspectible to damage.Originally posted by XPav
The damage control system could be better, however, the two variables that we've got (sys & float) work pretty well for most all of the situations.
While a GNB-esque damage control game might be fun, I think that what we've got now is a pretty good system.
We'd just like to see the present variables (SYS, FLT, and FIRE)integrate in a more realistic way with the types of ordinances coming in.
Penetrations should not always cause severe damage to a ship nor should incoming ordinances often to almost always cause damage increments to all three major DC counters at the same time (why else then have them? why not just go back to the old singular GGPW, "Damage" rating? We'd also like to see FIRE damage get a bit more respect in the same vein that progressive flooding does.
At the very least (for UV i should say, WiTP i'm hoping for more since that game is still in the development stage) we're hoping the UBER gets taken out of the current crop of GP bombs.
-
HARD_SARGE
- Posts: 168
- Joined: Mon May 27, 2002 9:58 am
- Location: Cleveland, Ohio
Nothing "Uber" about 1000 pounders causing heavy damage, flooding or even sinking BBs, even Yamatos. From the Senkan homepage TRAM for Yamato (on combinedfleet.com):
The same page notes that a recent underwater survey of IJN Yamato found her bent/broken in twain, with catastrophic damage in the vicinity of #3's magazine. The report concludes that the terminal death rattle of Yamato was the result of #3 magazine cooking off (I guess in turn set off by the explosion of the upper magazine), in turn attributed to the uncontrolled fire started by the second bomb mentioned above. Even had Yamato's damage control contained this fire (rather than being forced to abandon ship from the numerous torp hits and pending capsize), they would probably have to flood #3 magazine, causing both flotation loss and reduction of mission capability.The Attack Force changes course to 100 degrees. "Helldivers" from the BENNINGTON and the HORNET attack from port. At flank speed, the YAMATO commences a right turn but two 1000-lb AP bombs hit her. The first explodes in the crew's quarters abaft the Type 13 radar shack. The second penetrates the port side of the aft Command station and explodes between the 155-mm gun magazine and main gun turret No. 3's upper powder magazine. It starts a fire that cannot be extinguished and rips a 60-foot hole in the weather deck. One "Helldiver" is shot down, another is damaged badly.
Show me a fellow who rejects statistical analysis a priori and I'll show you a fellow who has no knowledge of statistics.
Didn't we have this conversation already?
Didn't we have this conversation already?
Re: I have my SBD's....
Originally posted by doomonyou
duct tape very sharp railroad spikes to the front of my GP bombs. This is how they can penetrate the deck armor so easily.
I really think that most of the floatation damage caused by bombs should be replaced by fire damage.
No No No the spikes only cause the bombs to stick in the deck.
Name one battleship, at sea, sunk by common general purpose bombs.Originally posted by mdiehl
Nothing "Uber" about 1000 pounders causing heavy damage, flooding or even sinking BBs, even Yamatos. From the Senkan homepage TRAM for Yamato (on combinedfleet.com):
The same page notes that a recent underwater survey of IJN Yamato found her bent/broken in twain, with catastrophic damage in the vicinity of #3's magazine. The report concludes that the terminal death rattle of Yamato was the result of #3 magazine cooking off (I guess in turn set off by the explosion of the upper magazine), in turn attributed to the uncontrolled fire started by the second bomb mentioned above. Even had Yamato's damage control contained this fire (rather than being forced to abandon ship from the numerous torp hits and pending capsize), they would probably have to flood #3 magazine, causing both flotation loss and reduction of mission capability.
As for the report, three things.
the bombs specified were "AP" i.e. Armor Piercing. If that is the case they are a different animal from the weapons in UV.
Second, the description of the damage to Yamato's deck in the area of the explosion. Its above the primary armor deck. A 1000ILB bomb was incapable of penetrating Yamato's 7.5 - 9.1 inch armor deck. In fact the primary culprit of the fire was most likely caused by a 1000 or even 2000ILB bomb hit directly on the aft most secondary 6.1 turret, an very lightly protected structure which was completely destroyed by the impact/blast. The resulting fire was allowed to burn uncontrolled in the face of other massive damages being absorbed and crew casualties caused by other hits.
Subsidiary fire damage resulting from bomb hits i have no problem with. This is something i have been advocating all along. FIRE damage should be completely independant of armor penetration as much of a ship's lighter structures are contained above the armored citidal of a ship, including battleships. the FLT damage caused by flooding one magazine space would be negligable compared to the damages seen, + compartments purposely flooded but undamaged by hits are the most likely to be drained.
After some extensive researching I've come up with the names of four types of USN WW2 AP and Semi-Armor-Piercing 1000 lb bombs available to CAGs. They are as follows:
Armor-piercing 1000# bombs -- Mark 33, Mark 52A1
Semi-armor-piercing 1000# bombs -- Mark 13, Mark 59
I will post links to articles about the same after I find a few.
Armor-piercing 1000# bombs -- Mark 33, Mark 52A1
Semi-armor-piercing 1000# bombs -- Mark 13, Mark 59
I will post links to articles about the same after I find a few.
These hits were among the first. The massive damage to which you allude was *started* by the bomb hit in question. Subsequent torpedo hits followed after a considerable interval, allowing for plenty of time for damage control to respond to this individual hit, assuming that the necessary damage control equipment (water mains, for example) was not itself taken out by the blast.in the face of other massive damages being absorbed and crew casualties caused by other hits
Show me a fellow who rejects statistical analysis a priori and I'll show you a fellow who has no knowledge of statistics.
Didn't we have this conversation already?
Didn't we have this conversation already?
High-explosive: High-explosive (HE) bombs are also known as "general purpose (GP)" bombs, and destroy targets through direct explosive blast. They are about 50% explosive by weight, and are effective against most targets that have not been "hardened" against attack.
Penetration and armor-piercing: Penetration bombs are similar to GP bombs, but use hardened casings to allow them to punch through earth and reinforced concrete (or armor). Most of the mass of a penetrating bomb is in the casing. They contain only about 25% to 30% explosive by weight
This is a similar setup with HE shells vs AP shells fired by the guns of surface warships.
The period covered in UV had earlier types of GP bombs used vs the improved types that were used by the time of Yamato's death.
Designations i have turned up:
M-33 500ILB GP bomb (and a heavy case Mk31 semi AP)
M-34 1000ILB GP bomb
Mk1 1600ILB *AP* bomb (quoted at 7.4 inches from 10,000 feet)
(these were the converted battleship AP shells carried by Enterprise pre-war *but were never used* due to the limited range they imposed on the SBD Dauntless. UV gives a 500ILB GP bomb 5inches pen, and a 1000ILB GP bomb 10 inches pen, independant of height dropped from)
Depending on the time setting of the fuse, and whether it was placed in the nose or the tail of the bomb, it could have a 'semi-AP' status but for the most part it was a GP or HE type bomb and having 50% of it's mass devoted to explosive, encased in a thin metal shell, had little true AP capability, as wittnessed by numerous bomb hits on wooden decked carriers
Since you do not own or play UV i will re-emphasis the point that i have made (yet again) on the principle objections to the bombs as currently modeled in the game and how they specifically interact with warships that are struck by them.
1) they are given penetration values far in excess of their actual capability. For the 1000ILB GP bomb in particular, a 10 inch penetration ability is ridiculous. If you can find a reference that states it can do this and that a 500ILB GP bomb can penetrate 5 inches of armor grade steel , fine. As such, bombs as a group can currently penetrate everything modeled in the game thus making them "UBER" If such was historical it would not have been necessary to use 12,000+ILB "TALLBOY" bombs against the battleship Tirpitz in 1944. Bombs specifically designed to peirce heavy reinforced and hardened targets. They could have just dropped 500ILB GP bombs
2) The way the damage is calcuated in UV, when "penetrating" the armor, which almost always causes signifigant damage, and in particular, FLT damage. I have acomplished, multiple times over, the destruction of even the most heavily protected battleships and other armored warships by 500 and/or 1000ILB GP bomb alone without the aid of torpedoes. This includes heavyweights such as the North Carolina class as well as (most recently) the Yamato class (the latter not sunk but heavily flooded and damaged....had i been able to followup the initial attacks, or had only one been present, i have little doubt it would have been acomplished, particularily with the UV progressive flooding rules factoring in on a per-turn basis)
While one can accept the occasional FLT damage caused by bombs, especially if they land very close to the hull creating a mine effect, this would be the exception, not the rule
You have avoided my question. The answer is "zero" battleships were sunk by GP bombs. As for the hits on Yamato, had *only* bombs struck her, as at Letye, it is perfectly conceivable that damage control teams would have been able to contain the blaze or at least flooded the 155mm magazines, preventing a catastrophe. (though a 2nd bomb that wiped out the after damage control party contributed to the chaos during the battle. This facet added to the incoming torpedo hits amidst a morass of straffing and diving planes all made their contribution but regardless, it was the *torpedoes* that doomed the ship. But all this is irrelevent to the point being made; these *improved* bombs did not cause FLT damage, and they did not pentrate the armored citidal, their *direct* effect did not threaten the stability or reserve bouyancy of the ship. Damage control and damage control failures are seperate issues. Damage to fire fighting equipment (such as water mains etc etc) can be and should be represented by FIRE level damage that proves hard to extinquish as in the case of the Midway victims. None suffered signifigant if any FLT damage after punishing 1000ILB GP hits....they were turned into blazing infernos by subsidiary explosion of fuel and ammo sources and proved beyond the control of DC teams to contain or extinquish. This is not currently modeled in UV. FIRE damage always gets extinquished and never causes explosions (it can cause add'l SYS damage in the turns between established level and it's reduction to ZERO)
In the end, the issue posed is one of penetration , (these bombs could not penetrate Yamato's deck, nor could they punch through half of what they are rated for against armor grade steel) and the type of damage they cause when they penetrate in the game. Damage control issues, like fire issues are subsidieary effects of bombs, and one i would like to see better simulated, in the form of FIRE damage as specific DC measures are not represented in UV. This routine should be independant of actual penetration . Penetration would determine moderate to major SYS damage and while FLT damage should be possible it should be curtailed sharply as a good number if not most (depending on ship type) will suffer their damage and blast effects above the waterline, or in the case of beamier ships, below WL damage that does not cause flooding in of itself. Sufficient chance of FIRE even in the event of a non penetration, coupled with the potential for catastrophic explosion, fire spreading etc, would be more than adequate to simulate the types of damages suffered by heavily armored warships in the face of GP or semi-AP bomb attack.
As they are modeled now, in the game, bombs are essentially steep angled torpedoes.
Penetration and armor-piercing: Penetration bombs are similar to GP bombs, but use hardened casings to allow them to punch through earth and reinforced concrete (or armor). Most of the mass of a penetrating bomb is in the casing. They contain only about 25% to 30% explosive by weight
This is a similar setup with HE shells vs AP shells fired by the guns of surface warships.
The period covered in UV had earlier types of GP bombs used vs the improved types that were used by the time of Yamato's death.
Designations i have turned up:
M-33 500ILB GP bomb (and a heavy case Mk31 semi AP)
M-34 1000ILB GP bomb
Mk1 1600ILB *AP* bomb (quoted at 7.4 inches from 10,000 feet)
(these were the converted battleship AP shells carried by Enterprise pre-war *but were never used* due to the limited range they imposed on the SBD Dauntless. UV gives a 500ILB GP bomb 5inches pen, and a 1000ILB GP bomb 10 inches pen, independant of height dropped from)
Depending on the time setting of the fuse, and whether it was placed in the nose or the tail of the bomb, it could have a 'semi-AP' status but for the most part it was a GP or HE type bomb and having 50% of it's mass devoted to explosive, encased in a thin metal shell, had little true AP capability, as wittnessed by numerous bomb hits on wooden decked carriers
Since you do not own or play UV i will re-emphasis the point that i have made (yet again) on the principle objections to the bombs as currently modeled in the game and how they specifically interact with warships that are struck by them.
1) they are given penetration values far in excess of their actual capability. For the 1000ILB GP bomb in particular, a 10 inch penetration ability is ridiculous. If you can find a reference that states it can do this and that a 500ILB GP bomb can penetrate 5 inches of armor grade steel , fine. As such, bombs as a group can currently penetrate everything modeled in the game thus making them "UBER" If such was historical it would not have been necessary to use 12,000+ILB "TALLBOY" bombs against the battleship Tirpitz in 1944. Bombs specifically designed to peirce heavy reinforced and hardened targets. They could have just dropped 500ILB GP bombs
2) The way the damage is calcuated in UV, when "penetrating" the armor, which almost always causes signifigant damage, and in particular, FLT damage. I have acomplished, multiple times over, the destruction of even the most heavily protected battleships and other armored warships by 500 and/or 1000ILB GP bomb alone without the aid of torpedoes. This includes heavyweights such as the North Carolina class as well as (most recently) the Yamato class (the latter not sunk but heavily flooded and damaged....had i been able to followup the initial attacks, or had only one been present, i have little doubt it would have been acomplished, particularily with the UV progressive flooding rules factoring in on a per-turn basis)
While one can accept the occasional FLT damage caused by bombs, especially if they land very close to the hull creating a mine effect, this would be the exception, not the rule
You have avoided my question. The answer is "zero" battleships were sunk by GP bombs. As for the hits on Yamato, had *only* bombs struck her, as at Letye, it is perfectly conceivable that damage control teams would have been able to contain the blaze or at least flooded the 155mm magazines, preventing a catastrophe. (though a 2nd bomb that wiped out the after damage control party contributed to the chaos during the battle. This facet added to the incoming torpedo hits amidst a morass of straffing and diving planes all made their contribution but regardless, it was the *torpedoes* that doomed the ship. But all this is irrelevent to the point being made; these *improved* bombs did not cause FLT damage, and they did not pentrate the armored citidal, their *direct* effect did not threaten the stability or reserve bouyancy of the ship. Damage control and damage control failures are seperate issues. Damage to fire fighting equipment (such as water mains etc etc) can be and should be represented by FIRE level damage that proves hard to extinquish as in the case of the Midway victims. None suffered signifigant if any FLT damage after punishing 1000ILB GP hits....they were turned into blazing infernos by subsidiary explosion of fuel and ammo sources and proved beyond the control of DC teams to contain or extinquish. This is not currently modeled in UV. FIRE damage always gets extinquished and never causes explosions (it can cause add'l SYS damage in the turns between established level and it's reduction to ZERO)
In the end, the issue posed is one of penetration , (these bombs could not penetrate Yamato's deck, nor could they punch through half of what they are rated for against armor grade steel) and the type of damage they cause when they penetrate in the game. Damage control issues, like fire issues are subsidieary effects of bombs, and one i would like to see better simulated, in the form of FIRE damage as specific DC measures are not represented in UV. This routine should be independant of actual penetration . Penetration would determine moderate to major SYS damage and while FLT damage should be possible it should be curtailed sharply as a good number if not most (depending on ship type) will suffer their damage and blast effects above the waterline, or in the case of beamier ships, below WL damage that does not cause flooding in of itself. Sufficient chance of FIRE even in the event of a non penetration, coupled with the potential for catastrophic explosion, fire spreading etc, would be more than adequate to simulate the types of damages suffered by heavily armored warships in the face of GP or semi-AP bomb attack.
As they are modeled now, in the game, bombs are essentially steep angled torpedoes.
- CapAndGown
- Posts: 3078
- Joined: Tue Mar 06, 2001 10:00 am
- Location: Virginia, USA
I don't wish to dispute anything that has been said about penetration ability. But I would like to ask the question: would the proposed solution (reducing FLT damage by bombs) apply to skip bombing? And should it? It would seem to me that skip bombs are much more likely to cause floatation damage since they are likely to hit at or close to the water line. Whatever may be done about bombs dropped by dive bombers, this should probably be differentiated from skip bombs.
I have hope in Matrix/2By3...
Hi all,
UV bomb model.
I have hope in Matrix/2By3 (they promissed to look into this)...
Leo "Apollo11"
This is great line that explains exactly what is wrong with currentOriginally posted by Nikademus
<snip>
As they are modeled now, in the game, bombs are essentially steep angled torpedoes.
UV bomb model.
I have hope in Matrix/2By3 (they promissed to look into this)...
Leo "Apollo11"

Prior Preparation & Planning Prevents Pathetically Poor Performance!
A & B: WitW, WitE, WbtS, GGWaW, GGWaW2-AWD, HttR, CotA, BftB, CF
P: UV, WitP, WitP-AE
Yep. With reason too. The Yamato sinking describes the hit as an AP type. I was not sure (and am still not sure) that the USN deployed an AP type or "semi AP" type until asking about it elsewhere and being given the Marks posted a few msgs ago. I found one web site that discussed a naval catastrophe in which a cargo loading several kinds (including some incindiaries, and "1000 pound Mark 33 AP bombs") detonated in a California port. I've not been able to run down the other types.You have avoided my question.
Unless, of course, the one that started the fire in Yamato's upper 6" magazine was a GP type. In that event *one* GP type bomb may have sunk Yamato had not other hits (primarily torpedoes) caused her to sink before the fire spread to her #3 main's mag.The answer is "zero" battleships were sunk by GP bombs.
Agreed. But then, they did have some time before those other hits intervened. I wonder if the hit near the 155mm also destroyed the capacity to flood that magazine. Otherwise, why would the fire be uncontrollable. I can't accept that no one was available to open a valve. Surely the threat would have been recognized and dealt with *if possible.*As for the hits on Yamato, had *only* bombs struck her, as at Letye, it is perfectly conceivable that damage control teams would have been able to contain the blaze or at least flooded the 155mm magazines, preventing a catastrophe.
Undoubtedly the torpedoes sank the ship before the 155mm mag fire could sink the ship. Yamato may have been doomed one way or the other with that uncontrollable 155 mm mag fire. Of course, if GP bomb hits and MG bullets prevented damage control from working on that fire, perhaps there is a case to be made for a BB sunk by a couple of GP bombs, some 6" rockets and some .50 cal.This facet added to the incoming torpedo hits amidst a morass of straffing and diving planes all made their contribution but regardless, it was the *torpedoes* that doomed the ship.
It all depends on the measures necessary to control a fire. Clearly, flooding one or more magazines, or any other compartment for that matter, reduces a ships buoyancy. To be sure, BBs have lots of space to flood, so the proportional effect of flooding from a 500 or 1000 lb bomb (or flooding to control fires from same) varies by ship displacement. *Lots* of such bombs however might require lots of flooding, and counterflooding to maintain stability.But all this is irrelevent to the point being made; these *improved* bombs did not cause FLT damage, and they did not pentrate the armored citidal, their *direct* effect did not threaten the stability or reserve bouyancy of the ship.
None suffered signifigant if any FLT damage after punishing 1000ILB GP hits....they were turned into blazing infernos by subsidiary explosion of fuel and ammo sources and proved beyond the control of DC teams to contain or extinquish.
At what point does a sustained uncontrollable fire cause a ship to sink? You've got to ultimately infer flooding damage from fires, with or without deliberate flooding to extinguish fires. According to Barrier and Javelin (Willmott) the heat from the fires probably melted some of the the decks and internal compartmentation. Similar horrors were probably experienced by the guys trapped in Yamato and Bismarck.
1) they are given penetration values far in excess of their actual capability. For the 1000ILB GP bomb in particular, a 10 inch penetration ability is ridiculous. If you can find a reference that states it can do this and that a 500ILB GP bomb can penetrate 5 inches of armor grade steel, fine. As such, bombs as a group can currently penetrate everything modeled in the game thus making them "UBER" If such was historical it would not have been necessary to use 12,000+ILB "TALLBOY" bombs against the battleship Tirpitz in 1944. Bombs specifically designed to peirce heavy reinforced and hardened targets. They could have just dropped 500ILB GP bombs
Actually, I'd like to find a web site that gives penetration values for any of the aerial bombs that did not start their lives as gun ordnance. FWIW, the accounts of the Mikuma/Mogami attacks (again, BAJ by Willmott) attribute the massive superstructure sans internal damage at Midway to *improperly fuzed* GP bombs. There appears to be in Willmott's opine the possibility that proper delay settings would have prevented either of these bruisers from escaping.
As for Tirpitz and Tallboys. I'm not sure why the RAF used such gargantuans. Maybe because at precision bombing the RAF was even less capable than the USAAF. In that event, assuming that a host of Lancasters comparable to Xerxes army can't get a direct hit on a parked Behemoth, one might as well use 12,000 pounders. At least a "near miss" will, shall we say, "challenge Tirpitz' watertight integrity." If you wanted to mission kill Tirpitz, 500 lb GP would do the job quite well. You'd eliminate range finding, most fire control apparati, probably thoroughly louse up her ventilation, and render her incommunicado. A couple near misses close astern would likely improve her famous rudder design, and near misses close abeam would cause her to leak fuel oil.
Show me a fellow who rejects statistical analysis a priori and I'll show you a fellow who has no knowledge of statistics.
Didn't we have this conversation already?
Didn't we have this conversation already?
My preposed solution for the general bomb issue is primarily three fold:Originally posted by cap_and_gown
I don't wish to dispute anything that has been said about penetration ability. But I would like to ask the question: would the proposed solution (reducing FLT damage by bombs) apply to skip bombing? And should it? It would seem to me that skip bombs are much more likely to cause floatation damage since they are likely to hit at or close to the water line. Whatever may be done about bombs dropped by dive bombers, this should probably be differentiated from skip bombs.
1) reduce GP penetration ability to more realistic levels. 500ILB GP should have little AP capability here, 1.5 inch max i'd say. 1000ILB; not = or > than 3 inch (2 inch would be good but admitedly might be too low as much depends on fusing and altitude dropped from. Much depends on the resolution of penetration when armor pen is equal to the armor thickness being attacked. From my observations it appears that when equal, the ordinance 'wins' and penetrates. If so, 2 inch may be too low as most cruisers have 2inch decks and despite the impression given, i do not advocate making CL's and CA's immune to the effects of 1000ILB bombs....that would be an extreme in the opposite direction. If there was a 50/50 chance of penetration when pen vs armor thickness are equal, then it would work. 3 inch i could live with, in acknowledgement that one cannot ever completely calculate the pen ability of weapons, the 3 inch based on estimates from mult nations that it would resist if not downright defeat a standard issue 1000ILB GP bomb
2) FIRE damage....the primary threat from GP bombs, needs to be rewritten so that it is independant of whether or not the ordinance penetrates the warship's armor. This way, even against harder targets, bombs, especially bigger bombs such as the 1000ILB with it's roughly 500ILB filler can have a good chance of causing FIRE levels which in turn could lead to SYS and weapons system damages....and in a more dynamic system, cause the chance of explosion or increased FIRE levels depending on how high the current FIRE level is. (A similar system 'has' been done in Grigsby games of the past)
3) Non penetrations should cause little to no SYS damage if they dont penetrate since armor in UV represents citidel armor protecting vital systems. Penetrations may cause serious SYS damage but FLT damage should be curtailed. The chance should remain, but as i said, curtailed sharply. Right now bombs and weapons hits in general cause way too much FLT damage with the exception of torpedoes of course which are designed to damage ships below the WL at the point of contact between the ocean and the hull thus allowing entry once detonation occurs
On the more general issue of ship durability and lack of stamina in the face of penetrations in general;
I have preposed the addition of two new Hit Locations to the current engine , for WitP if not UV.
1) Superstructure: This would be essentially a non-armored HL, immune to FLT and SYS damage but *highly* suseptable to FIRE damage. This HL would solve a two fold problem
a) UBER bomb effect as already discussed ad-nasueum
b) act as a shell absorber which would IMO cure the old GGPW phenomenum of low ratio of medium to heavy shell hits to crippling/sinking ships in preportion to ship size and armor factor.
For example right now it is common for large ships, say CA's, whose armor cannot withstand BB caliber shells to suffer crippling damage or even be sunk after a mere couple of hits. (a recent surface engagement confirmed this once again.....a New Orleans class CA, hit by two 16.1 inch shells and nothing else....crippled to 67% SYS and 50+% FLT. Like the bomb issue, while such large ordinance "can" cause massive damage with a few or singular hit, this should be the exception, not the rule i.e. the "lucky hit" which denotes that a shell hit in a sensitive area. Warships are *large structures* and battle analysis has shown that outside of catastrophic effect (such as magazine or machinery/fuel explosions etc etc), that even lighter protected ships can often withstand numerous heavy hits without being crippled or sunk.
It is particularily apparant when dealing with Destroyers, due to their small displacement, lack of armor and low durability. In general, as with GGPW, one can cripple and/or sink most DD's with less than half a dozen hits depending on shell size (and bomb size) This is because when ordinances "penetrate" UV assumes that critical damage is being acrued. (the level of which can be variable but it is often not insignifigant)
With the HL "Superstructure" in place, ship stamina can be better simulated and perhaps save the coders a bit of a headache by allowing BELT and DECK armor hits to continue with their more serious damage effects (though DECK armor FLT damage should be curtailed); TOWER ARMOR hits would continue to represent SYS damage to key command control and electrics and SUPERSTRUCTURE would represent non-vital hits but hits that have a good chance of causing FIRE levels; which if heavy and long enough, can cause SYS, WEAPONS and eventually FLT damage unless attended too, controlled and extinquished.
The 2nd HL, is already partially in place but needs clarification. Bombs can and do occasionally strike "Belt armor" in the game but as even the mighty UBER 1000ILB GP cannot penetrate battleship belt armor this causes no damage. a HL called "NEAR MISS", which randomizes to a degree whether or not slight to moderate FLT damage occurs would address this. This too has been a feature of Grigsby games of the past , so this is not a new idea, but a suggestion to return to the past in this respect.
Skip bombing, would/could use both the BELT ARMOR and the NEAR MISS location to simulate ship vulnerability in this area as most transports, DD's and escorts have no armor in this region and BELT ARMOR and NEAR MISS hits would also have the highest probabilty of causing FLT damage.
i thought it was because you knew the answer already :pOriginally posted by mdiehl
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Yep. With reason too. The Yamato sinking describes the hit as an AP type. I was not sure (and am still not sure) that the USN deployed an AP type or "semi AP" type until asking about it elsewhere and being given the Marks posted a few msgs ago. I found one web site that discussed a naval catastrophe in which a cargo loading several kinds (including some incindiaries, and "1000 pound Mark 33 AP bombs") detonated in a California port. I've not been able to run down the other types.
***
even were they AP a 1000ILB would not have pierced Yamato's primary armor deck, which was designed to resist heavier ordinances. It would take a much heavier or more advanced bomb. the 'estimate' on a 1,600 AP mark I was around the 7 inch mark. The converted 16.1 inch bombs used by B5N's at Pearl are attributed to have just had enough to penetrate Arizona's 4+ inch armor deck from 10,000 feet. (disputed by some who favor the black powder theory) A 10 inch rating for UV GP bombs is far too high
But as stated previously, the issue of what hit Yamato in 45 is irrelevent as the bombs in UV are the earlier, non-improved, non-AP types used in the first half of the war. A AP bomb powerful enough might do the trick, but certainly not a thin walled HE bomb and certainly not against the most heavily armored battleship in UV.
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The one GP bomb did *not* sink the Yamato. Yamato exploded *after* she had capsized from flooding caused by torpedoes. The nature of her explosion has not been proven to have been the result of the fire raging amidst the ruin of the aft secondary 6.1 turret. Even where it to be conclusively proven, the fact remains that the explosion did not happen until after the ship had been mortally wounded by torpedoes and then capsized.
Unless, of course, the one that started the fire in Yamato's upper 6" magazine was a GP type. In that event *one* GP type bomb may have sunk Yamato had not other hits (primarily torpedoes) caused her to sink before the fire spread to her #3 main's mag.
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The primary culprit here was the complete anhilation of the after damage control party by another 2000ILB GP bomb. Added to the chaos of the ensuing battle vs 300+ aircraft and the continual impact and cumulative effect of torpedo impacts, the progressive flooding and the surviving DC teams efforts to counterflood and stem the flooding put the fire raging in the after secondary turret in a lower priority bracket. Given that the ship did capsize before she blew, i'd say they were correct to worry about the torpedo damage.Agreed. But then, they did have some time before those other hits intervened. I wonder if the hit near the 155mm also destroyed the capacity to flood that magazine. Otherwise, why would the fire be uncontrollable. I can't accept that no one was available to open a valve. Surely the threat would have been recognized and dealt with *if possible.*
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Very amusing. You are making a case for arguing just for the sake of arguing.Undoubtedly the torpedoes sank the ship before the 155mm mag fire could sink the ship. Yamato may have been doomed one way or the other with that uncontrollable 155 mm mag fire. Of course, if GP bomb hits and MG bullets prevented damage control from working on that fire, perhaps there is a case to be made for a BB sunk by a couple of GP bombs, some 6" rockets and some .50 cal.
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IJN damage control was not stellar, but i see no evidence to support that, bereft of the other damages coming in below the belt, that they would not have either tended to the fire or at the least flooded the magazine. Additionally, Yamato was on a suicide mission, hence the decision to flood magazines was more difficult as it would defeat her purpose to be used as a beached, floating battery in the defence of Okinawa. At no other time did IJN BB's suffer catastrophic explosions after being struck by GP bombs without accompanying and terminal underwater damage.
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No, the flooding of one or two compartments does not equate with the continual and constant FLT damage being observed in the game. Further, such 'measures' are not implemented in the game. Interestingly enough, there is a msg "Listing---counterflooding" msg after torpedo hits that occasionally displays but i do not know whether or not that is scenery or a real consideration factored into the torpedo code.It all depends on the measures necessary to control a fire. Clearly, flooding one or more magazines, or any other compartment for that matter, reduces a ships buoyancy. To be sure, BBs have lots of space to flood, so the proportional effect of flooding from a 500 or 1000 lb bomb (or flooding to control fires from same) varies by ship displacement. *Lots* of such bombs however might require lots of flooding, and counterflooding to maintain stability.
No battleship was ever so badly damaged or set on fire that a superlative # of compartments had to be flooded as a result. For one, it would imply that all the fires are being caused below the WL where counterflooding devices are available. This is hardly the case and again, is not a factor in UV that i am aware of.
Damages caused by FIRE levels themselves i have no problem with and would like to see greatly enhanced. I've said this repeatdly. Do you truely read other people's posts?
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Irrelevent. The issue being discussed is direct damage caused by bombs, not the effects of FIRE levels/damage, of which i've already addressed.
At what point does a sustained uncontrollable fire cause a ship to sink? You've got to ultimately infer flooding damage from fires, with or without deliberate flooding to extinguish fires. According to Barrier and Javelin (Willmott) the heat from the fires probably melted some of the the decks and internal compartmentation. Similar horrors were probably experienced by the guys trapped in Yamato and Bismarck.
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Not disputing the capabiltiies of semi-AP GP bombs that are properly set. Mogami and Mikuma had light deck protection and lighter gun houses.....dont have a major problem with this. Again, and if you played the game, you would see, the issue is 100% deep penetration, causing heavy SYS damage and 9 out of 10 cases of FLT and serious SYS damage together. FIRE levels are present but are somewhat negligable and dont convay any of the dangers of fire at sea.Actually, I'd like to find a web site that gives penetration values for any of the aerial bombs that did not start their lives as gun ordnance. FWIW, the accounts of the Mikuma/Mogami attacks (again, BAJ by Willmott) attribute the massive superstructure sans internal damage at Midway to *improperly fuzed* GP bombs. There appears to be in Willmott's opine the possibility that proper delay settings would have prevented either of these bruisers from escaping.
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The reason was simple. Coventional GP bombs, used on Tirpitz previously failed to knock her out of the war, because they were incapable of penetrating her armor decks. Use of TALLBOYS was a bit of a desperation ploy as the British were almost obsessively fixated on the Tirpitz, even after it was learned that X-craft had badly damaged her and reduced her role to that of 'floating battery', the British had invested so much energy into her destruction that nothing less than total victory would satiate them. The British had the bomb, and the means (Lancasters) by which to deliver them and it was known that Tirpitz was a more or less stationary target unless alerted far ahead of time.As for Tirpitz and Tallboys. I'm not sure why the RAF used such gargantuans. Maybe because at precision bombing the RAF was even less capable than the USAAF.
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TALLBOYS were overkill no question, but the fact that they had to be used at all shows how resistant heavily armored targets are to non or semi AP bombs. UV does not have TALLBOYS though, but the bombs act like them.
But as stated previously, the issue of what hit Yamato in 45 is irrelevent as the bombs in UV are the earlier, non-improved, non-AP types used in the first half of the war. A AP bomb powerful enough might do the trick, but certainly not a thin walled HE bomb and certainly not against the most heavily armored battleship in UV
Interesting. Do you have a web site or source regarding when different kinds of AP/SAP bombs were distributed/deployed?
We're chasing tails on Yamato. Sunk by torps works for me, but the underwater assessment team (that included some alleged experts, one hopes; and considering the cost and typical make-up of such underwtaer historical explorations there's no reason to think they did not have some experts look at the pix) concluded that the #3 magazine blew. The best proximal explanation was the fire. The fire was "uncontrollable" according to the crew who survived the sinking. The explanation notably did not say "they'd have controlled the fire but the DC team were dead" or "they'd have controlled the fire but for all the torpedoes going off." It just said "uncontrollable." That could include the reasons you mentioned or it could mean that the magazine was unapproachable because of the heat, or that there was no source of water, or.. or..
Show me a fellow who rejects statistical analysis a priori and I'll show you a fellow who has no knowledge of statistics.
Didn't we have this conversation already?
Didn't we have this conversation already?


