Jap ASW forces

[Mike Scholl]

ORIGINAL: Dili

It was emplyed in naval search, besides it doesn't have a big range.

Yes..., and B-17's pioneered the art of "skip bombing"! Would you like to see 200 of them headed towards KB at 100 feet? [8|]

[Fishbed]

In 1943, gradually with groups going for skip bombing like Japanese groups are going Kamis in 1944, why not... Doesn't bother me.

[FatR]

ORIGINAL: Mike Scholl

Yes..., and B-17's pioneered the art of "skip bombing"! Would you like to see 200 of them headed towards KB at 100 feet? [8|]

If they are reduced to their historical durability, instead of being B-29s with smaller range and payload? Sure, why not.

[FatR]

ORIGINAL: Mike Scholl
So you are playing against an incompetent boob (or the AI, which is the same thing). That is hardly "historical" evidence. I stand by my original statement. Japanese ASW was poorly trained and equipped, and is way over-rated in the game.

I too stand by my original statement: Japanese ASW is undermodeled in the game past patch 3, when compared to the level of danger posed by subs. And, now, that you've resorted to name-calling and insulting my opponent, let's be perfectly clear about what I think: stop sucking at sub operations, and if you can't, stop thinking that it is not your problem.

[FatR]

ORIGINAL: Bradley7735

You can't always compare historical to your game. Historically, more than half the Allied subs were placed in defensive positions in 42 (or in positions that rarely saw enemy ships. Your opponent may be ignoring a sub ring around Pearl and focusing them near high traffic areas. I'm not saying the game has it correct, or incorrect. But, there's a large difference in results if you have 50+ more subs in convoy lanes than loitering around the Aleutians, PH, WC and OZ.

Yes, I know. It's people with whose opinion I argue demand making the historical results set in stone. War in AE, in general, is bloodier than in RL - more battles, more ships lost, more planes lost. In fact, my sub losses jumped since my previous posts in this thread, as attempts to operate from frontline bases caused some losses to port bombing. The trouble is, even accounting for much more intensive combat partrols, Allied subs seem to be way too good at both penetrating combat orders and hitting warships, for 1942. While out of four attack on carriers so far, three had missed on their own, the faulty torpedos is the only thing that keeps them for demolishing Japanese DDs and other escort ships, as these get attacked much more frequently.

[Shark7]

ORIGINAL: Mike Scholl

ORIGINAL: Dili

It was emplyed in naval search, besides it doesn't have a big range.

Yes..., and B-17's pioneered the art of "skip bombing"! Would you like to see 200 of them headed towards KB at 100 feet? [8|]

And individual Japanese pilots were known to fly their damaged planes into targets of opportunity starting with a pilot at PH, would you like Kamikazes from turn 1?

We can keep this up as long as you want to, but it doesn't solve the problem. This thread has lost any semblance of constructive discussion and devolved into a insult flinging contest of what each side should and shouldn't be able to do.

I remind everyone that this is a game, and if you don't like an aspect of it, house rules can fix any and all problems in a PBEM game. I doubt anyone cares that the AI can act a-historically, given the AI's ineptitude.

Besides this thread was originally about the effectiveness (or lack there of) of ASW and submarine forces. And from what I have seen, who ever is on the receiving end of a bad die roll is the one that thinks there is a problem. And that goes for both the AFBs and JFBs.

Just trying to keep things in perspective. [:)]

[Puhis]

Maybe it's just me, but last 4 or 5 sub-pages of this thread somehow reminds me argument of the famous argument clinic...
[;)]

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kQFKtI6gn9Y

[mdiehl]

but last 4 or 5 sub-pages of this thread somehow reminds me argument of the famous argument clinic

No, it doesn't.

[;)]

[mdiehl]

Scholl is correct. Indeed the basic problem with the whole "why force someone to achieve historical results" is this. Historically, Japan was mobilized (to the extent it could be) for a war for which it had well developed operational plans, numerical superiority, and prepositioned assets. The Japanese player is therefore in a position, using hindsight, to not only achieve more than the Japanese, but to use assets to which the Japanese, by doctrine and training, never had even the slightest access.

The counterargument that the Allies benfit from hindsight is false, because the Allies aren't given the assets with which to do anything different from that which they historically attempted. Indeed, the Allies, judging by AARs, don't seem even to have their historical capabilities at any point during the war.

Probably the root cause of the problem goes back to the entire concept of EXP, carried over from the original Gary Grigsby's War in the Pacific. It's an index that DOMINATES combat results, but it's not tied to anything real. It is simply presupposed that Japanese skippers and crews, aircrews, and ground units, were much better at warfare by training and doctrine than their allied opponents. That is a manifest error. The correct position is that the Allies were in fact by training, doctrine, and firepower, on the whole much more effective (and should have HIGHER not lower EXPs across the board) than the Japanese, but were hindered by being caught unmobilized, and with few prepositioned assets and a developed logistical base to effectively resist the Japanese. Early war Japanese successes were primarily a consequence of bringing superior numbers or, in the case of Malaya, well prepared and suddenly implemented battle plans, to the engagements against isolated enemy positions. Every time they ran into resistence that they could not overrun or isolate, they got hurt bad.

[HHI]

Submarines and ASW

What I have found (Allies vs. japanese A/I) is that Japanese ASW capability has noticeably increased around April 1944, to the point that I withdrew all submarines from the waters near Japan, after loosing three boats in one day, all to e patrol boats. I do not really have a problem with this. However, I do have a problem with a number of areas.

As suggested by Spence, the I-class submarine has a lot of problems, none of which are represented in the uber boats modeled in A/E. The most obvious is the limited diving depth of only 200 feet. This does not permit the submarine to get under the "thermal layer" in the warm water of the Pacific. For those of you who do not know of this effect, it is a boundary layer of high density water (because it is cold) through which sonar cannot effectively penetrate. US submarines had a diving depth of 350 feet, later, 400 feet, which allowed them to get under the thermals. In addition to the limited diving depth, the I-class boats were very large, making them a first-rate target for sonar. In addition, the Long Lance torpedo, though a marvelous weapon, was not a wakeless torpedo, leading escorts to the launch point. It also had a long dive time and limited maneuverability. In short, the I-class was not a very good submarine and a particularly poor commerce raider. The I-class should be ASW fodder.

The RO's are a little different. From RO-33 on, they have a diving depth of 250 feet. Getting under the thermals at 250 feet is a bit iffy, but might be possible anywhere but the South Pacific. Since the Japanese submarine effort is won or lost in the Coral Sea, they probably aren't any better off than the I-class.

Most of these game problems are related to the overwhelming emphasis placed on experience, of which the Japanese are modeled as very experienced (particularly at night) and the US ships are modeled as being manned by seaman seconds fresh out of Great Lakes. We are told (by the JFB's, obviously) that the Japanese had a prewar emphasis on night surface battle. This is particularly noticeable with the performance of the pre-war battleships, which are helpless against anything the Japanese send out, four battleships are easily defeated by a heavy cruiser and a couple of destroyers. Now, I don't know specifically how much night training the ships of the Battleforce received, but I doubt that it was none. The US Navy was a haven during the Great Depression and the best of these people went to the Battleforce. Crewmen were not sent to another ship every three years. They stayed on the same ship. Gunnery was highly emphasized, with annual competitions which were taken very seriously. These ships had a lot of problems, but crew experience was not one of them and neither was gunnery. This experience is simply a means of achieving play balance in the game and has very little to do with reality. In my opinion, the "historical' selection should get a historical representation.

A good example of this experience imbalance is seen when Yamato becomes available. At roughly the same time, Washington becomes available. Now, the captain of the Washington was a dedicated proponent of radar fire control. Obviously, the radar fire control team doesn't care whether it is night or day. But, Yamato comes in with night experience about 30 points higher than Washington. Where did they get all that experience. IRL, Kirishima was to learn how good Washington was at night.

US ships gain combat experience only through action, Japanese ships are launched with it.

[Mike Scholl]

ORIGINAL: mdiehl

Scholl is correct. Indeed the basic problem with the whole "why force someone to achieve historical results" is this. Historically, Japan was mobilized (to the extent it could be) for a war for which it had well developed operational plans, numerical superiority, and prepositioned assets. The Japanese player is therefore in a position, using hindsight, to not only achieve more than the Japanese, but to use assets to which the Japanese, by doctrine and training, never had even the slightest access.

The counterargument that the Allies benfit from hindsight is false, because the Allies aren't given the assets with which to do anything different from that which they historically attempted. Indeed, the Allies, judging by AARs, don't seem even to have their historical capabilities at any point during the war.

Probably the root cause of the problem goes back to the entire concept of EXP, carried over from the original Gary Grigsby's War in the Pacific. It's an index that DOMINATES combat results, but it's not tied to anything real. It is simply presupposed that Japanese skippers and crews, aircrews, and ground units, were much better at warfare by training and doctrine than their allied opponents. That is a manifest error. The correct position is that the Allies were in fact by training, doctrine, and firepower, on the whole much more effective (and should have HIGHER not lower EXPs across the board) than the Japanese, but were hindered by being caught unmobilized, and with few prepositioned assets and a developed logistical base to effectively resist the Japanese. Early war Japanese successes were primarily a consequence of bringing superior numbers or, in the case of Malaya, well prepared and suddenly implemented battle plans, to the engagements against isolated enemy positions. Every time they ran into resistence that they could not overrun or isolate, they got hurt bad.

Here I would beg to disagree with you. Japanese surface naval units had drilled and practiced under much more realistic conditions than Allied Navies did before the war. What they did, they did well..., especially night actions with torpedoes. They do deserve an "edge" over the Dutch and the US (not the Brits, they've had 2 years of "real war" to work up.) at war's start.

What they didn't do, and don't deserve any "edge" at all for, is practice ASW warfare or submarine ops. What training they did in these areas was based on faulty doctrines and wishful thinking. Here their "skill level/experience" ratings should be no better than anyone else's (and far less than the Brits).
Of course, giving the Yamato and other ships arriving during the war any better ratings than anyone else is pure nonsense. New crews have to "work up" no matter what navy they belong to.

[WLockard]

I think the IJN does start with a .67 multiplier for ASW. Maybe it should be a smaller multiplier. I think in 1943 it goes to a .80 multiplier, indicating that the IJN des indeed get better at ASW later in the war.

[mdiehl]

Japanese surface naval units had drilled and practiced under much more realistic conditions than Allied Navies did before the war.

Except they did not. The British and American navies trained extensively for night combat. What the USN didn't do was train for torpedo attacks. That said, even USN skippers knew what to do with torpedoes, when they weren't tied to a gunline and subordinate to a gun admiral. In January 1942 the USN delivered a significant asswhooping to the IJN, in which engagement (much like the Allies at Savo Island later in the year), the Japanese never fully realized the nature of the threat and failed to successfully react to it.

When you ONLY look at Savo Island and Tassafaronga, the Japanese look great. When you consider Balikpapan, or either of the two "Naval Battles of Guadalcanal" or the Battle of Cape Esperence, they look like idiots with respect to command and control, target identification, and accuracy.

[SuluSea]

ORIGINAL: HHI

Submarines and ASW

What I have found (Allies vs. japanese A/I) is that Japanese ASW capability has noticeably increased around April 1944, to the point that I withdrew all submarines from the waters near Japan, after loosing three boats in one day, all to e patrol boats. I do not really have a problem with this. However, I do have a problem with a number of areas.

As suggested by Spence, the I-class submarine has a lot of problems, none of which are represented in the uber boats modeled in A/E. The most obvious is the limited diving depth of only 200 feet. This does not permit the submarine to get under the "thermal layer" in the warm water of the Pacific. For those of you who do not know of this effect, it is a boundary layer of high density water (because it is cold) through which sonar cannot effectively penetrate. US submarines had a diving depth of 350 feet, later, 400 feet, which allowed them to get under the thermals. In addition to the limited diving depth, the I-class boats were very large, making them a first-rate target for sonar. In addition, the Long Lance torpedo, though a marvelous weapon, was not a wakeless torpedo, leading escorts to the launch point. It also had a long dive time and limited maneuverability. In short, the I-class was not a very good submarine and a particularly poor commerce raider. The I-class should be ASW fodder.

The RO's are a little different. From RO-33 on, they have a diving depth of 250 feet. Getting under the thermals at 250 feet is a bit iffy, but might be possible anywhere but the South Pacific. Since the Japanese submarine effort is won or lost in the Coral Sea, they probably aren't any better off than the I-class.

Most of these game problems are related to the overwhelming emphasis placed on experience, of which the Japanese are modeled as very experienced (particularly at night) and the US ships are modeled as being manned by seaman seconds fresh out of Great Lakes. We are told (by the JFB's, obviously) that the Japanese had a prewar emphasis on night surface battle. This is particularly noticeable with the performance of the pre-war battleships, which are helpless against anything the Japanese send out, four battleships are easily defeated by a heavy cruiser and a couple of destroyers. Now, I don't know specifically how much night training the ships of the Battleforce received, but I doubt that it was none. The US Navy was a haven during the Great Depression and the best of these people went to the Battleforce. Crewmen were not sent to another ship every three years. They stayed on the same ship. Gunnery was highly emphasized, with annual competitions which were taken very seriously. These ships had a lot of problems, but crew experience was not one of them and neither was gunnery. This experience is simply a means of achieving play balance in the game and has very little to do with reality. In my opinion, the "historical' selection should get a historical representation.

A good example of this experience imbalance is seen when Yamato becomes available. At roughly the same time, Washington becomes available. Now, the captain of the Washington was a dedicated proponent of radar fire control. Obviously, the radar fire control team doesn't care whether it is night or day. But, Yamato comes in with night experience about 30 points higher than Washington. Where did they get all that experience. IRL, Kirishima was to learn how good Washington was at night.

US ships gain combat experience only through action, Japanese ships are launched with it.

Excellent post,

"the "historical' selection should get a historical representation"

I could not agree more. I was pumped for this game because I thought we'd get a realistic representation of the Pacific War, it's still a great game but I can't say it's better than UV or WITP which are great games in their own way.

EDIT= Andy's work on the AI does make this better than the 2 but I bought this game to play PBEM and IMO too many house rules need to be agreed for it to be playable, if you like to play historical not to mention atleast 5 issues with Japan including Uber Subs/Glen naval search

[vonTirpitz]

nm

[jackyo123]

Here is a quote from Morison - the 'Marianas' volume of his official history of the USN, WW2 - re: Albacore's attack on Taiho during the Battle of the Phillipine Sea:

"...three Japanese destroyers began depth-charging us - and not very methodically. Their sub chasing and ASW was just plain bad"

These were first class destroyers - and they were inept. Now imagine the poor slobs who were manning the SC's and the PB's - these guys are just way way too good, *in balance against the US skippers*.

That's the main thrust of my initial post - subs are deadly in this game. If thats a deisgn decision, then fine - but the allied player gets the worst of it, since, AHISTORICALLY, the Jap player gets a 'boost' to his ASW forces (i.e - they perform BETTER than their historical counterparts) and the US player gets no boost, and possibly even a penalty, through artificially deflated captain scores.

I have noticed a slight increase in us asw performance in one of my games that is now in '43. I've finally got 65+ skippers in all my DE's, and they are prosecuting - and hitting - more subs. But the key # for ASW prosecution seems to be aggressiveness, and thats where the Jap skippers are  more effective than their us brethren.

[Shark7]

ORIGINAL: jackyo123

Here is a quote from Morison - the 'Marianas' volume of his official history of the USN, WW2 - re: Albacore's attack on Taiho during the Battle of the Phillipine Sea:

"...three Japanese destroyers began depth-charging us - and not very methodically. Their sub chasing and ASW was just plain bad"

These were first class destroyers - and they were inept. Now imagine the poor slobs who were manning the SC's and the PB's - these guys are just way way too good, *in balance against the US skippers*.

That's the main thrust of my initial post - subs are deadly in this game. If thats a deisgn decision, then fine - but the allied player gets the worst of it, since, AHISTORICALLY, the Jap player gets a 'boost' to his ASW forces (i.e - they perform BETTER than their historical counterparts) and the US player gets no boost, and possibly even a penalty, through artificially deflated captain scores.

I have noticed a slight increase in us asw performance in one of my games that is now in '43. I've finally got 65+ skippers in all my DE's, and they are prosecuting - and hitting - more subs. But the key # for ASW prosecution seems to be aggressiveness, and thats where the Jap skippers are  more effective than their us brethren.

The best solution would be to have both Captain and crew ratings similar to the pilots with different areas of expertise to act as modifiers.

For example a Japanese captain might be similar to this:

Skill 65
Inspiration 60
Naval 75
Torpedo 72
ASW 30
AAA 54
Air 44
Land 23
Evasion 62 (ability to evade combat)
Aggression 71

His ship might have the following stats:

Day/Night

Gunnery 67/58
ASW 29/26
AAA 43/32
Torpedo Attack 69/63

*The ASW rating for a ship with now ASW weapons would also affect its ability to dodge the torpedoes that are fired at it.

Start of the war Allied ships and captains would of course be similar, and trainable, but would probably have ASW ratings in the 50s.

Also, the same as pilots these could be trainable by putting a ship on 'manuevres' for a set period of time. While in training, the ship would naturally be unavailable for missions, but still attackable (sort of like being in the port repair queue). Taking it out of training would be possible, but would take X number of days (same as repair queue).

Now would a system like this satisfy everyone reguarding skills?

[Local Yokel]

Posters on this thread have been whipping themselves into a lather of indignation about how frightfully unfair it is for the Japanese crews to have such an enormous advantage in ASW due to their high experience levels. I thought it might be a good idea to take a look at the game’s actual experience figures and see whether they bear out such a charge.

As at 7 December 1941, I gauged Japanese destroyer crews’ experience as averaging out at around 70 in daytime and 67 at night. I looked at US destroyer crews based at Pearl Harbor and conservatively assessed their average experience levels at 45 daytime and 35 night time. I really couldn’t be bothered to approach this methodically; I just scanned through the ships and formed an impression. You may come up with different figures, but I suspect they won’t be far adrift from mine.

Now, applying the multipliers laid out in section 6.4.4.1 of the manual, Japanese crews in 1942 have their experience ratings reduced for ASW purposes to 67% of the usual rating. Using my assessed figures, that translates to an average daytime experience level for ASW work of 46.9%, and 44.89% for night time work.

Conversely, Allied crews receive a pre-1944 multiplier of 114% of their daytime rating and 150% of their night time rating. Applied to the average figures I assessed for the US destroyer crews these multipliers produce a daytime experience rating for ASW work of 51.3% and 52.5% at night.

Well, fancy that! The US destroyer crews apparently enjoy an ASW experience level a few percentage points better than their IJN equivalents both day and night! I suggest that before people vent their spleen on the dreadfully ahistorical ASW experience advantage enjoyed by the Japanese in the game they should first check the data to see whether the figures back up their preconceptions.

What, incidentally, were these “faulty doctrines” on which Japanese ASW is said to have been based, and where can I see this documented?

Oh, and with regard to Cape Esperance, I’ve a notion the crew of USS Duncan may have had a few choice comments to make about quality of command and control, and target identification, (and perhaps accuracy too) so far as their own side was concerned. Especially target identification.

[UniformYankee]

ORIGINAL: mdiehl

but last 4 or 5 sub-pages of this thread somehow reminds me argument of the famous argument clinic

No, it doesn't.

[;)]

I wonder how one poster can know what another poster is reminded of?
[&:]

[Nomad]

ORIGINAL: Local Yokel

Posters on this thread have been whipping themselves into a lather of indignation about how frightfully unfair it is for the Japanese crews to have such an enormous advantage in ASW due to their high experience levels. I thought it might be a good idea to take a look at the game’s actual experience figures and see whether they bear out such a charge.

As at 7 December 1941, I gauged Japanese destroyer crews’ experience as averaging out at around 70 in daytime and 67 at night. I looked at US destroyer crews based at Pearl Harbor and conservatively assessed their average experience levels at 45 daytime and 35 night time. I really couldn’t be bothered to approach this methodically; I just scanned through the ships and formed an impression. You may come up with different figures, but I suspect they won’t be far adrift from mine.

Now, applying the multipliers laid out in section 6.4.4.1 of the manual, Japanese crews in 1942 have their experience ratings reduced for ASW purposes to 67% of the usual rating. Using my assessed figures, that translates to an average daytime experience level for ASW work of 46.9%, and 44.89% for night time work.

Conversely, Allied crews receive a pre-1944 multiplier of 114% of their daytime rating and 150% of their night time rating. Applied to the average figures I assessed for the US destroyer crews these multipliers produce a daytime experience rating for ASW work of 51.3% and 52.5% at night.

Well, fancy that! The US destroyer crews apparently enjoy an ASW experience level a few percentage points better than their IJN equivalents both day and night! I suggest that before people vent their spleen on the dreadfully ahistorical ASW experience advantage enjoyed by the Japanese in the game they should first check the data to see whether the figures back up their preconceptions.

What, incidentally, were these “faulty doctrines” on which Japanese ASW is said to have been based, and where can I see this documented?

Oh, and with regard to Cape Esperance, I’ve a notion the crew of USS Duncan may have had a few choice comments to make about quality of command and control, and target identification, (and perhaps accuracy too) so far as their own side was concerned. Especially target identification.

Do you really think logic and facts will win out against ranting and raving? [:D] Good post.