What would the result of Midway attack be if kept secret?

[fbs]

Area for discussion: if the Japanese had been as careful in Midway as they were in Pearl Harbor, what would have happened?

(a) Similar thing? USN would have learned of it by other means, laid down a trap and have the tactical advantage?

(b) Yamamoto's plan worked? USN answered later as predicted into a trap laid down by IJN, and Nagumo have the tactical advantage? Not that it would change the results of the war, but perhaps extended it for several months.

(c) Nothing at all. The USN wouldn't risk her assets by sailing into unknown situation far away from friendly waters? The non-reinforced Midway would be occupied by the IJN, then frequently hammered and neutralized by USN, and the war extended for a few months?

What do you think?

Thanks,
fbs

[Fishbed]

Technically, Shattered Sword gives a good account of the consequences of a possible invasion attempt - and it shows that it had most probably only low chances to succeed. The forces committed to the attack were woefully inadequate considering the USMC garrison and the defenses at Midway.

[Iridium]

Does this also suppose that since there is no impetus(no foreknowledge of an attack) to accelerate repairs on Yorktown at Pearl Harbor and instead ship it to Puget Sound like originally thought by planners?

If so you might just have Japan with a few more bases in their hands to get stuck behind naval blockade in '44. This is assuming no naval forces are sent to support the defense of any US holdings and Japan somehow does manage to muster enough strength to take on their objectives. Not a huge issue, the US would eventually out gun Japan and a "Midway-ish" type battle would occur somewhere.

[jeffs]

Hard to see (a).....The US knew what was coming and prepared.

I doubt (b)....
The Yorktown was in bad shape after Coral Sea and was rushed back into service not really in total fighting shape...As the US knew what was coming they felt it worth the risk.
Very good chance they would not have gone right into the trap.

It should be mentioned that more ground troops had been put into Midway as a result of the intelligence. That would not have happened as well, making Midway harder to defend.

Also...Let`s face it...Midway is not that much of a threat....If they took pago pago or suva, that is more of a strategic threat.....

[fbs]

ORIGINAL: Fishbed

Technically, Shattered Sword gives a good account of the consequences of a possible invasion attempt - and it shows that it had most probably only low chances to succeed. The forces committed to the attack were woefully inadequate considering the USMC garrison and the defenses at Midway.

Yeah, but Midway was reinforced with the knowledge of the attack, and probably wouldn't have as many aircrafts. Nevertheless, even if the landing failed, Yamamomomoto's plan would still succeed if the USN sailed into a trap. The US carriers were the main target, I reckon, so if the USN didn't sail, then it wouldn't really matter if Midway was occupied or not, and the whole exercise would be a gigantic waste of fuel.

Thanks,
fbs

[Iridium]

ORIGINAL: fbs

ORIGINAL: Fishbed

Technically, Shattered Sword gives a good account of the consequences of a possible invasion attempt - and it shows that it had most probably only low chances to succeed. The forces committed to the attack were woefully inadequate considering the USMC garrison and the defenses at Midway.

Yeah, but Midway was reinforced with the knowledge of the attack, and probably wouldn't have as many aircrafts. Nevertheless, even if the landing failed, Yamamomomoto's plan would still succeed if the USN sailed into a trap. The US carriers were the main target, I reckon.

Thanks,
fbs

I only see Midway occurring because the US had intelligence regarding Japan's moves and wanted to set a trap. The US would not risk their CVs if they did not think they had a chance of victory.

Japan desperately needed Admiral Akbar's advice on Midway.

[John 3rd]

ORIGINAL: Iridium

ORIGINAL: fbs

ORIGINAL: Fishbed

Technically, Shattered Sword gives a good account of the consequences of a possible invasion attempt - and it shows that it had most probably only low chances to succeed. The forces committed to the attack were woefully inadequate considering the USMC garrison and the defenses at Midway.

Yeah, but Midway was reinforced with the knowledge of the attack, and probably wouldn't have as many aircrafts. Nevertheless, even if the landing failed, Yamamomomoto's plan would still succeed if the USN sailed into a trap. The US carriers were the main target, I reckon.

Thanks,
fbs

I only see Midway occurring because the US had intelligence regarding Japan's moves and wanted to set a trap. The US would not risk their CVs if they did not think they had a chance of victory.

Japan desperately needed Admiral Akbar's advice on Midway.

Didn't Akbar realize that the Empire had set the trap AFTER he walked into it??!!

[bklooste]

ORIGINAL: fbs

ORIGINAL: Fishbed

Technically, Shattered Sword gives a good account of the consequences of a possible invasion attempt - and it shows that it had most probably only low chances to succeed. The forces committed to the attack were woefully inadequate considering the USMC garrison and the defenses at Midway.

Yeah, but Midway was reinforced with the knowledge of the attack, and probably wouldn't have as many aircrafts. Nevertheless, even if the landing failed, Yamamomomoto's plan would still succeed if the USN sailed into a trap. The US carriers were the main target, I reckon, so if the USN didn't sail, then it wouldn't really matter if Midway was occupied or not, and the whole exercise would be a gigantic waste of fuel.

Thanks,
fbs

b)

Yamato didnt care about the island but expected the US carriers to come to its rescue , IMHO he was probably correct. Wake and the PI left a bad taste in their mouthes.

With regards to the defences expect something like Tarawa but much worse when the BBs bombard , sand and concrete bunklers are not good vs 18" shells and you could expect at LEAST 50% of teh garrison killed from bombardment add that to the daily air attacks and less aircraft and preparedness and it doesnt look good.

[wild_Willie2]

If you read shattered sword, you can see that there was NO plan to bombard Midway with battleships. The fire support plan was for about 2 DD's and maybe a CA (with no real close support fire support doctrine in place). Only after the invasion force would have been wiped out by the defenders (they would have to wade over the reef under fire for about 700 yards to even reach the island), the Japanese could have used their BB's to retaliate on the Midway defenders, but doing so would leave them low on ammo and far from home, not something I see the Japanese doing...

[Sardaukar]

ORIGINAL: bklooste

b)

Yamato didnt care about the island but expected the US carriers to come to its rescue , IMHO he was probably correct. Wake and the PI left a bad taste in their mouthes.

With regards to the defences expect something like Tarawa but much worse when the BBs bombard , sand and concrete bunklers are not good vs 18" shells and you could expect at LEAST 50% of teh garrison killed from bombardment add that to the daily air attacks and less aircraft and preparedness and it doesnt look good.

Actually coral atolls were very resistant to BB bombardment and even USN could not achieve "50% killed" in way more massive bombardments than anything IJN could do. IJN bombardment doctrine to support invasions was non-existent and troops dedicated to task were not prepared for the task any way.

Shattered Sword has very good analyses about invasion chances against Midway defenses.

[vettim89]

Yamato didnt care about the island but expected the US carriers to come to its rescue , IMHO he was probably correct. Wake and the PI left a bad taste in their mouthes.

With regards to the defences expect something like Tarawa but much worse when the BBs bombard , sand and concrete bunklers are not good vs 18" shells and you could expect at LEAST 50% of teh garrison killed from bombardment add that to the daily air attacks and less aircraft and preparedness and it doesnt look good.

First the Yamato was not part of the bombardment group. The bombardment would have been at least initially the four heavy cruisers assigned to the invasion force (Kumano, Suzuya, Mikuma, and Mogami). Adm. Nonutake could have detached three more CA's (Atago, Myoka, and Haguro) and two BC (Hiei and Kongo). Keep in mind that the Japanese had really only attempted one opposed landing up to this point in the war (Wake) and that did not go so well for them. They had no specialized landing craft and no doctrine. Considering the USMC difficulty at Betio with specialized landing craft and a much greater superiority in numers over the defenders, saying the US garrioson would be easily swept aside is not necesarily a given.

Now consider if the US had delayed in sending the CV's. The first IJN strike on Midway cost the Japanese somewhere between 6 and 36 a/c destroyed depending on which account you would use. The six probably represents those a/c that actually were shot down while the 36 include those planes written off because damage was too severe to merit repair. That measn 1/3 of the initaly strike was destroyed. Assuming most of the damage was accomplished by the AAA, it is safe that the second strike would have suffered a similar fate (maybe a little less). It is likely that the bulk of those losses were strike a/c. Let's just say 30 of the 36 were Kates and Vals. That means 40% of the strike force was wiped out in the first raid. Even assuming the second strike fared a little better, it is safe to say that nearly a third of Nagumo's strike a/c would have been gone by nightfall on 4 June. Assume similar results on the 5th. By that point Nagumo would probably have 50% or less of his force left.

Now lets say the USN shows up on the 6th. Not only would the US have superior numbers in both fighters and strike a/c but Nagumo would have the duel tasks of trying to hit the US CV's and protecting the now approaching Invasion force. The USN may have actually found itself in a better position on the 6th than they did on they 4th. Nagumo's force would be depleted, fatigued, and in a poorer position to meet the threat.

Now that is pure speculation but it is just a logical extension of the historical facts. Looking at the historical record of the CV vs CV battles of 1942, neither side hade the ability to stay in the battle area for more than a day and a half before attrition just ground the CV groups down to the point of ineffectiveness. The IJN plan for Midway was for the USN to not show up for two to three days. If that had happened, Nugumo may have been riding herd on largely toothless tigers.

[castor troy]

ORIGINAL: vettim89

Yamato didnt care about the island but expected the US carriers to come to its rescue , IMHO he was probably correct. Wake and the PI left a bad taste in their mouthes.

With regards to the defences expect something like Tarawa but much worse when the BBs bombard , sand and concrete bunklers are not good vs 18" shells and you could expect at LEAST 50% of teh garrison killed from bombardment add that to the daily air attacks and less aircraft and preparedness and it doesnt look good.

First the Yamato was not part of the bombardment group. The bombardment would have been at least initially the four heavy cruisers assigned to the invasion force (Kumano, Suzuya, Mikuma, and Mogami). Adm. Nonutake could have detached three more CA's (Atago, Myoka, and Haguro) and two BC (Hiei and Kongo). Keep in mind that the Japanese had really only attempted one opposed landing up to this point in the war (Wake) and that did not go so well for them. They had no specialized landing craft and no doctrine. Considering the USMC difficulty at Betio with specialized landing craft and a much greater superiority in numers over the defenders, saying the US garrioson would be easily swept aside is not necesarily a given.

He meant Yamamoto, not the BB Yamato because the battleship couldn´t think anyway.[;)]

[bklooste]

Actually coral atolls were very resistant to BB bombardment and even USN could not achieve "50% killed" in way more massive bombardments than anything IJN could do. IJN bombardment doctrine to support invasions was non-existent and troops dedicated to task were not prepared for the task any way.

Shattered Sword has very good analyses about invasion chances against Midway defenses.

Tarawa lost half its garrison i think from the bombardment but the bombardment only destroyed 1/4 to 1/2 of the 5 and 8" CD guns , the Japanese forces in Tarwa had bunkers than the US at Midway and the US heavy shps fired at long range. The US bombardments later were not against Atols but against mountaist which are much more resistant than being dug into sand as shown by Tarawa..

Regarding Japan not making opposed landings i think most were , Wake *2 , Shanghai , Singora, Khota Bharu , PI , Milne bay ( where they had a good shot at it despite being outnumbered) , SIngapore and all the other landings in the DEI. In many of these cases landing ships came under fire and were lost so they were no picknick. If you apply the same rules you can only say the US made 4 (Tarawa , Iowa Jima , Okinawa and Dday) most of which were in 44-45.

[bklooste]

ORIGINAL: vettim89

Yamato didnt care about the island but expected the US carriers to come to its rescue , IMHO he was probably correct. Wake and the PI left a bad taste in their mouthes.

With regards to the defences expect something like Tarawa but much worse when the BBs bombard , sand and concrete bunklers are not good vs 18" shells and you could expect at LEAST 50% of teh garrison killed from bombardment add that to the daily air attacks and less aircraft and preparedness and it doesnt look good.

First the Yamato was not part of the bombardment group. The bombardment would have been at least initially the four heavy cruisers assigned to the invasion force (Kumano, Suzuya, Mikuma, and Mogami). Adm. Nonutake could have detached three more CA's (Atago, Myoka, and Haguro) and two BC (Hiei and Kongo). Keep in mind that the Japanese had really only attempted one opposed landing up to this point in the war (Wake) and that did not go so well for them. They had no specialized landing craft and no doctrine. Considering the USMC difficulty at Betio with specialized landing craft and a much greater superiority in numers over the defenders, saying the US garrioson would be easily swept aside is not necesarily a given.

Now consider if the US had delayed in sending the CV's. The first IJN strike on Midway cost the Japanese somewhere between 6 and 36 a/c destroyed depending on which account you would use. The six probably represents those a/c that actually were shot down while the 36 include those planes written off because damage was too severe to merit repair. That measn 1/3 of the initaly strike was destroyed. Assuming most of the damage was accomplished by the AAA, it is safe that the second strike would have suffered a similar fate (maybe a little less). It is likely that the bulk of those losses were strike a/c. Let's just say 30 of the 36 were Kates and Vals. That means 40% of the strike force was wiped out in the first raid. Even assuming the second strike fared a little better, it is safe to say that nearly a third of Nagumo's strike a/c would have been gone by nightfall on 4 June. Assume similar results on the 5th. By that point Nagumo would probably have 50% or less of his force left.

Now lets say the USN shows up on the 6th. Not only would the US have superior numbers in both fighters and strike a/c but Nagumo would have the duel tasks of trying to hit the US CV's and protecting the now approaching Invasion force. The USN may have actually found itself in a better position on the 6th than they did on they 4th. Nagumo's force would be depleted, fatigued, and in a poorer position to meet the threat.

Now that is pure speculation but it is just a logical extension of the historical facts. Looking at the historical record of the CV vs CV battles of 1942, neither side hade the ability to stay in the battle area for more than a day and a half before attrition just ground the CV groups down to the point of ineffectiveness. The IJN plan for Midway was for the USN to not show up for two to three days. If that had happened, Nugumo may have been riding herd on largely toothless tigers.

With the bombardment ships they could have sent the Battleships though you would have to say that 70 200mm guns and 16 356mm should be more than enough on such a small target whick lacked fortirfications and deep bunkers like at Tarawa esp if they were manning the beaches..

Regarding the aircraft that were damaged beyond repair They had a large number of replacements probably equal to this number so next day they would be almost full compliment again so with 2 strikes only a small fraction of their power was losts . Also losses should be considerably less for the second strike due to 2/3 of losses being from US fighters and also AA mounts being hit this would be further reduced due to less aircraft being present. Regarding striking power most of the Japanese actuall losses were Zeros ( 4 vs 3) .

Regarding the code being cracked the reinforcements were sent before the code was cracked.

Agree in CV vs CV battles that neither can stay in the field long.

Not saying the Japanese have enough just saying its not so clear cut especially if you put in a Tarawa style 50% casualties and 25% of CDs lost.

One fact often lost is that Japan only needed to take one of the 2 islands and than the US position is basically untenable with artillary fire. Also they had rubber boats inside tehir landcraft to handle the shallow reef.

[spence]

The occupation of Midway was hardly a foregone conclusion. I agree with "Shattered Sword"s assessment that the landing force was pathetic in both size and equipment and the IJN was itself ill prepared to make up the difference. The bombing by the KB on the 4th of June did not damage or knock out a single coast defense gun yet Hiryu effectively lost half its torpedo squadron in that attack. Although the IJN could bring a lot of gun-power to bear on the island it had no doctrine for shore bombardment in support of ground troops nor any liason amongst the ground troops (the bombardment of Wake on Dec 11 comes to mind as to the likely ineffectiveness of much of that gun-power: there were some 7 inch CDs on Midway which could definitely put the hurt on any IJN CA if not quickly taken out).

Also the actual landin

[spence]

Rubber boats! Cool! Why didn't the USMC think of that?

[spence]

The Japanese didn't knock out a single coast defense gun or AAA emplacement with their June 4th air attack. An exact count of how many spare aircraft the KB carried to Midway is included in the appendices of "Shattered Sword" (2 or 3 a/c per CV).

Midway had some 7" CDs that could put a serious hurt on any of the IJN warships projected to engage in shore bombardment (as well as 5"). I notice there is no mention made of the IJN's first attempt to land on Wake after a few days of desulatory air bombardment and an hour or two of equally ineffective ship bombardment. The pre-landing effort/attempt on Midway looks a lot more like that previous attempt than the 2nd attempt on Wake.

The IJN and IJA battalions which were supposed to make the landing had no communications with each other and no plan of cooperation. They were not equipped with artillery other than a few mortars. Rubber boats are not such a good solution for landing a 37mm AT gun (I think they had a section in the Army detachment) so effectively the landing force didn't have any AT weapons so the defenders' platoon of tanks would have a free hand against whoever managed to survive the surf and MG fire and actually got to die on dry land.
The defenders also had considerably more infantry (not counting the fact that "every Marine is a rifleman") with which to counterattack the landing than at Wake.

Depending on the landing force to overcome the Midway garrison is like the resurrection of the Kaga during the pre-battle wargame to insure that Yamamoto's Plan worked.

[crsutton]

Did not really matter what the outcome. Japan might have or might have not taken it. Would not have affected the course of the war. Allies would have taken it back.

In mid 1943 Japan was going to hit the wall. No matter where they were on the map.

[topeverest]

If we assume a historical battle of Coral Sea and no intel on the intensions at all, three american carriers would have been present for as battle within 48 hours of spotting the fleet - presumably 1 day before the air assault and two days before the invasion. Considering Nimitz state of mind as recorded, my view is he would have ordered no naval direct support and fortification of the atolls between Pearl and Midway. Assuming the island wasn't taken outright, I can see a four american carrier and battleship battle fleet assigned and committed. That would change the dynamics of the battle considerably and would have been a 'pick-em' battle with Midway still in American hands.

Guadalcanal campaign would not have occured unless a good outcome of Midway occured. Otherwise, a maximum effort expulsion campaign would have occured for Midway, assuming any non disasterous American outcome of a naval engagement at Midway. In most outcomes, the war would have taken a very different concentration in 42, and I agree it probably lasts longer.

[mdiehl]

Nevertheless, even if the landing failed, Yamamomomoto's plan would still succeed if the USN sailed into a trap.

If the Japanese don't take Midway, there is no "trap" for the USN to sail into. Indeed, if the Japanese fail to take Midway, and the Japanese CVs loiter in the area waiting for a response, it would have been a death trap to wipe out the Japanese CVs. A few days of screwing around fending off Midway a.c. would simply leave KB devoid of significant assets to deal with American CVs.