Which Caused the Axis Powers the Greatest Harm

[Nikademus]

ORIGINAL: John 3rd

How about if Hitler had taken Raeder's strategy to take Malta and Gibraltor to effectively seal off the Med and then grab Egypt?  Always seemed to me that this was a missed opportunity to FINISH off the Med.  The move might have freed up several valuable German units as well as most of Italy's troops and forces.  I KNOW how horrible Italy was but the Italians could have freed up additional German units in SE Europe for the USSR.

The Italian Chief of Staff, Pietro Badoglio made it very clear to Berlin that Italy wanted to eliminate Malta permanently as a threat but Hitler put them off due to German disinterest in the Med (unless they were in complete charge), the thought that air and submarines alone might be decisive, and distrust of Italian feats of arms. At the time (late 1940/early 41), there was a window of opportunity vs. Malta and while Italy was not yet prepared for a full scale amphibious assault in 1940, a fuller cooperation with Germany and the use of Paratroopers might have gotten the job done.

The heavy losses at Crete though coupled with Hitler's fear of the RN pretty much scrapped it despite continued noises.

[frank1970]

ORIGINAL: che200

P.hausser unfortunately i do not agree with your answer, Yes Soviet union inflicted most casualties to germany but the biggest contibuter to the defeat of the Axis was USA. If the Usa stayed neutral Great Britain would have collapsed and if Britain collapses Soviet Union would have been alone against Germany, Italy an Japan how long would they have lasted. Plus USA provided a lot of logistics to USSR and Britain. Something like 80% of trucks used by soviet union where Lend Lease. Lend Lease kept the war going. No USA to provide Money(credit for Russia and Britain so they could buy Items they did not produce) and equipment (I would reccomend to check what russia was producing and even england) would have resulted in Stalemate.

My 2 cents

Sorry, but the USA were at an undeclared war in 1941, supporting the Brits with about anything the Brits needed. Therefore Hitler only made this unofficial war official. The USA supported the Brits from the very first day of the conflict.

[chesmart]

Nick Malta would have been a tough nut to crack. German and Italian paratroopers would have very few areas were to land and beaches where heavily mined.

[bklooste]

ORIGINAL: Canoerebel

Don't "poo-poo" the lack of machine guns on German tanks.  That killed the Panzer divisions during the Battle of Kursk.

Thats wrong , there were 1 or 2 battalions of Tigers that were rejected in favour of a competing design ( Porshe Tigers) just these 60 or 70 tanks had no MG and it only really affected 1 battle these units were expendable and not really part of standard TOE. Kursk was lost because it was stupid. German successes relied on surprise and mobility here the location was obvious and the 6 months the Russians spent creating defences prevented any kind of mobility and fought the kind of war the Russians wanted.

[bklooste]

ORIGINAL: LoBaron

I did not say US help in ´40 or ´41.

All that would happen is a retreat of the RAF further north where it was nearly impossible for the LW to
harm anything because of single engine fighter range.
The British already increased pilot training during the BoB and outproduced Germany in total number of
AC.

As I said, not much impact.

How can the RAF do this they would have had to evacuate London since the germans could strike arifields within fighter range of it...Im sure the Luftwaffe would have loved sending 300 planes every day over London with Indecinaries i think whoever was in charge of teh RAF who did that would be out of a job .

[bklooste]

I dont think you can describe it as 19c rural . Japan had one of the biggest ship building industries in the world , one of the biggest merchant fleets , they also had a huge clothing manufacturing and export industry and a rapidly expanding industrial complex in Manchuria.

What Japan didnt have was a huge steel production but that was because they used little in construction and had a small auto industry which is closer to European countries. The US in 39 despite being also mostly rural also had a comparitevely large car industry which means they , needed more roads and bridges , throw in New York and you have a big steel industry. Expanding existing industry is much easier than building new plants .

The big issue with Japan was that it was much smaller than the US eg 1/3 of the population and 1/10 of the GDP ( but GDP is a silly measurement since it relies on exchange rates)
the even big issue was all the resources needed to be imported . The US estimated that the interdiction of shipping restricted the Japanese economy massively and even if there was no direct bombing product in 45 would have been at most 40% of what it reached in 44. Also if it wasnt for the very succesful US submarine campaign the Japanese economy in 44 would have bene significantly large as it was merchant shipping produced in 44 was 6 times 41 levels .

http://www.usaaf.net/surveys/pto/pbs16.htm

ORIGINAL: LoBaron

I think so too.

Japan was in fact a traditional 19th century rural society that was high-speed modernized
in some aspects to support the war effort.
The technical advances and the built up before the war were accomplished by a elite minority
which was never able to back up a sustained conflict.
Japan was not only lacking the capacity to build sufficient ammounts of war machinery but also
incapable of providing the needed numbers of basic machinery, technicians and mechanics.
So at the moment the war began the outcome was unavoidable.

[bklooste]

ORIGINAL: spence

The Germans investigated/studied the idea of taking Gibraltar to seal off the Med but Franco's assistance/acquiescence (for a large German presence in his country) was needed and the price he was asking was too big: that is, he wanted France's African Empire or significant parts of it. That would have put the peace with Vichy right in the toilet which would have made the situation in the West much less stable.

You sure about that ? IMHO this is not a high price... What was Vichy france going to do , they complain to much they get Anexed . Basically it would have forced Spain to take and guard those assets... Meaning something like Torch would have attacked Spain. Sounds greate to me a semi neutral covering your SW flank.

[Torplexed]

ORIGINAL: bklooste

ORIGINAL: spence

The Germans investigated/studied the idea of taking Gibraltar to seal off the Med but Franco's assistance/acquiescence (for a large German presence in his country) was needed and the price he was asking was too big: that is, he wanted France's African Empire or significant parts of it. That would have put the peace with Vichy right in the toilet which would have made the situation in the West much less stable.

You sure about that ? IMHO this is not a high price... What was Vichy france going to do , they complain to much they get Anexed . Basically it would have forced Spain to take and guard those assets... Meaning something like Torch would have attacked Spain. Sounds greate to me a semi neutral covering your SW flank.

Spain’s claim to a chunk of Vichy France’s African empire was too high a price for Hitler due to bad timing. The Hendaye meeting between Franco and Hitler came weeks after Vichy French forces at Dakar had repulsed a British and Gaullist attempt to seize the port. Hitler cherished hopes that this action presaged active Vichy military support for his armies. Dakar, which was at the time perceived in London as an unalloyed fiasco, thus yielded an uncomprehended blessing: Hitler refused to offer Franco French colonial possessions in return for joining the war. Hitler imagined that the meeting at Hendayne was a formality, at which Franco would merely announce the date of his entry into the war. Instead, to the Germans’ dismay, the Spanish leader produced a long shopping list of conditions for participation, new colonies in Africa prominent among them. Thinking his flank already covered and not willing to be upstaged by anyone, he turned Franco down.

Thus passed what subsequently proved a turning point. Though Franco continued to dicker with belligerence, and maintained his faith in Axis victory until at least the end of 1942, the moments at which the Spanish were willing to fight never coincided with those at which the Germans thought their price for doing so worth paying.

[mike scholl 1]

ORIGINAL: bklooste

How can the RAF do this they would have had to evacuate London since the Germans could strike airfields within fighter range of it...I'm sure the Luftwaffe would have loved sending 300 planes every day over London with indecinaries I think whoever was in charge of the RAF who did that would be out of a job .

What have you been smoking? At best, the Germans hoped to force the British to abandon the airfields along the SE Coast of England. London is farther NW, and at the very limit of Bf-109 range. In fact, many of the airfields in that area were beyond German fighter range. Trying to bomb London in daylight was what got the Luftwaffe soundly trounced in the Battle of Britain..., and closing down the Southeastern airfields would just put more fighters in the London area.

[bklooste]

thx Torplexed for that detailed explanation that makes a lot of sense when viewed at the time, funny how little battles like Dakar can have such huge consequences..if they didnt put up a fight than Hitler would have given them to Franco possibly bringing Spain into the war later.

ORIGINAL: Torplexed



Spain’s claim to a chunk of Vichy France’s African empire was too high a price for Hitler due to bad timing. The Hendaye meeting between Franco and Hitler came weeks after Vichy French forces at Dakar had repulsed a British and Gaullist attempt to seize the port. Hitler cherished hopes that this action presaged active Vichy military support for his armies. Dakar, which was at the time perceived in London as an unalloyed fiasco, thus yielded an uncomprehended blessing: Hitler refused to offer Franco French colonial possessions in return for joining the war. Hitler imagined that the meeting at Hendayne was a formality, at which Franco would merely announce the date of his entry into the war. Instead, to the Germans’ dismay, the Spanish leader produced a long shopping list of conditions for participation, new colonies in Africa prominent among them. Thinking his flank already covered and not willing to be upstaged by anyone, he turned Franco down.

Thus passed what subsequently proved a turning point. Though Franco continued to dicker with belligerence, and maintained his faith in Axis victory until at least the end of 1942, the moments at which the Spanish were willing to fight never coincided with those at which the Germans thought their price for doing so worth paying.

[bklooste]

Historically they did not abandond all the SE airfields that were around and N of London ( you dont get more SE than London) which led to the results... Note the premise of my coments was a reply to a suggestion to abandon SE airfields so the germans can continue their atatcks vs the airfields, so your saying you can abandon the SE and have airfields > 250 km N of London ( ie N of York which is still at about 40% range from a plane comming from Calais) and still cap /protect London with reasonable loiter time, now thats smoking. London to Calais is only 149km ( 82 nautical miles)
Range of the Me109 was certainly enough to escort any raids of airfields within range of London. Note the comments about London being at the extreme range of the Me109 are garbage , at that range from further bases than Calais they had only 10 minuntes dog fight time but at combat speeds its only 20 minutes to london and dogfighting uses a lot of fuel.

ORIGINAL: mike scholl 1

ORIGINAL: bklooste

How can the RAF do this they would have had to evacuate London since the Germans could strike airfields within fighter range of it...I'm sure the Luftwaffe would have loved sending 300 planes every day over London with indecinaries I think whoever was in charge of the RAF who did that would be out of a job .

What have you been smoking? At best, the Germans hoped to force the British to abandon the airfields along the SE Coast of England. London is farther NW, and at the very limit of Bf-109 range. In fact, many of the airfields in that area were beyond German fighter range. Trying to bomb London in daylight was what got the Luftwaffe soundly trounced in the Battle of Britain..., and closing down the Southeastern airfields would just put more fighters in the London area.

[LoBaron]

ORIGINAL: bklooste

Historically they did not abandond all the SE airfields that were around and N of London ( you dont get more SE than London) which led to the results... Note the premise of my coments was a reply to a suggestion to abandon SE airfields so the germans can continue their atatcks vs the airfields, so your saying you can abandon the SE and have airfields > 250 km N of London ( ie N of York which is still at about 40% range from a plane comming from Calais) and still cap /protect London with reasonable loiter time, now thats smoking. London to Calais is only 149km ( 82 nautical miles)
Range of the Me109 was certainly enough to escort any raids of airfields within range of London. Note the comments about London being at the extreme range of the Me109 are garbage , at that range from further bases than Calais they had only 10 minuntes dog fight time but at combat speeds its only 20 minutes to london and dogfighting uses a lot of fuel.

ORIGINAL: mike scholl 1

ORIGINAL: bklooste

How can the RAF do this they would have had to evacuate London since the Germans could strike airfields within fighter range of it...I'm sure the Luftwaffe would have loved sending 300 planes every day over London with indecinaries I think whoever was in charge of the RAF who did that would be out of a job .

What have you been smoking? At best, the Germans hoped to force the British to abandon the airfields along the SE Coast of England. London is farther NW, and at the very limit of Bf-109 range. In fact, many of the airfields in that area were beyond German fighter range. Trying to bomb London in daylight was what got the Luftwaffe soundly trounced in the Battle of Britain..., and closing down the Southeastern airfields would just put more fighters in the London area.

The basic problem of this is that alone the knowledge of having only fuel for 10mins on combat power, over enemy territory and with a channel to cross
does weird things to a pilot.
Nearly all daylight raids the Germans sent over London resulted in unbearable losses for the LW.

On the other side of the world Saburo Sakai, when praising his beloved Zero, highlighted its range as one of the major advantages over
the Allies. He pointed out that the ability to fight without thinking about fuel consumtion made this task much easier and emphasised that
low fuel had a huge negative effect on a pilots combat performance. He also expressed
a high respect for the Allied pilots that dared to cross big areas of ocean with their short legged single engine fighter.

[Mark Weston]

ORIGINAL: bklooste

Historically they did not abandond all the SE airfields that were around and N of London ( you dont get more SE than London) which led to the results... Note the premise of my coments was a reply to a suggestion to abandon SE airfields so the germans can continue their atatcks vs the airfields, so your saying you can abandon the SE and have airfields > 250 km N of London ( ie N of York which is still at about 40% range from a plane comming from Calais) and still cap /protect London with reasonable loiter time, now thats smoking. London to Calais is only 149km ( 82 nautical miles)
Range of the Me109 was certainly enough to escort any raids of airfields within range of London. Note the comments about London being at the extreme range of the Me109 are garbage , at that range from further bases than Calais they had only 10 minuntes dog fight time but at combat speeds its only 20 minutes to london and dogfighting uses a lot of fuel.

1. "You don't get more SE than London". Look at a map before making definite (and definitively silly) posts. South East of London is what we call Kent, where in fact a number of 11 Group's squadrons were based. Most of 11 Group was based south of London.

2. Surprisingly it wasn't possible to base the several thousand aircraft of two Luftflotte in Calais. Their bases were spread all across northern France, Belgium and Holland. So measuring distances from Calais will give you absurdly optimistic estimates of range and endurance.

3. Forming up 100+ bomber raids from multiple airfields took a lot of time. Calculating combat radius as max range / 2 minus 10 minute allowance for combat will again lead to horribly optimistic estimates when pilots might spend up to an hour circling their airfield before the mission got under way.

4. "Withdrawing north" in the context of this discussion means withdrawing north of the Thames. The idea of pulling the RAF back to York would be a bizarre one which no-one apart from you has mentioned.

5. "Range of the Me109 was certainly enough to escort any raids of airfields within range of London." We know for a fact that the Luftwaffe didn't believe this so I'm not sure why you do.

[mike scholl 1]

ORIGINAL: Mark Weston
5. "Range of the Me109 was certainly enough to escort any raids of airfields within range of London." We know for a fact that the Luftwaffe didn't believe this so I'm not sure why you do.

Might I suggest that he is looking at the direct transfer range, without the factors of climbing to altitude, forming up, or having to travel at less-than-optimal speed to maintain station on the bombers being escorted? He's probably also assuming that the game's "sweep" routine has some relevance here.

With only the Brits having radar and the forward observer corps, the RAF's Spits and Hurricanes simply avoided the Luftwaffe's "Free Chase" missions and waited for the real targets (the bombers) to show up. All sweeps got the Germans was ops losses..., thus Goering's insistance that his fighters fly "close escort" (severely limiting their range).

[LoBaron]

ORIGINAL: mike scholl 1

ORIGINAL: Mark Weston
5. "Range of the Me109 was certainly enough to escort any raids of airfields within range of London." We know for a fact that the Luftwaffe didn't believe this so I'm not sure why you do.

Might I suggest that he is looking at the direct transfer range, without the factors of climbing to altitude, forming up, or having to travel at less-than-optimal speed to maintain station on the bombers being escorted? He's probably also assuming that the game's "sweep" routine has some relevance here.

With only the Brits having radar and the forward observer corps, the RAF's Spits and Hurricanes simply avoided the Luftwaffe's "Free Chase" missions and waited for the real targets (the bombers) to show up. All sweeps got the Germans was ops losses..., thus Goering's insistance that his fighters fly "close escort" (severely limiting their range).

[:D]

You hit the mark.

This and every British pilot knowing that he can jump over homecountry and probably be seen by a number people out watching and saving, compared to be frightened to look at the fuel gauge
and having the same people watching-if-you-jump-and-funs-over might also have been a bit of a downer...

I guess it must have been a similar feeling for an 8th Airforce pilot in 43. But the ressources behind that were different and thats why this is a strategy game and not a flight simulator. [;)]

[Nikademus]

Fighting over one's own territory does convey advantages, but from what i've read this didn't do much to soothe British/Commonwealth/Allied nerves when the order to scramble came in.

[LoBaron]

Still I don´t think that difference between sudden excitement/fear (like the scambling squads) and nagging/long-time fear (like
crossing the channel/worry about fuel consumption, keeping a large formation in sight, may having to bail over enemy territory)
cancel each other out.
From a "like to have" scenario perspective.

There were only a few heroes and the majority just wanted to complete the ordered mission and get the **** out...

[Big B]

This is historic - because I'm going to publicly admit "I don't know"[:D]

ORIGINAL: Canoerebel

Which do you think cost the Axis Powers the greatest strategic harm in World War II?

1) Japanese failure to equip fighters with self-sealing gas tanks and armor

2) German failure to equip heavy tanks with machine guns

3) German failure to have fighters with sufficient legs to escort bombers deeply into Britain

But I would guess my three greatest reasons for Axis harm would have been:
1) Point 3 above - not equipping German fighters with workable drop tanks - to allow prolonged air combat over British skies in the BoB. (I understand they made them, but discovered they leaked and were unusable?)

2) BoB shifting prime Luftwaffe target from RAF airfields to cities.

3) Definitely failing to undertake the invasion of Malta. High price - Yes, but doable.

Hard to say overall, many mistakes were made. As someone pointed out - the USA was effectively a co-belligerent with Britain from the beginning.
But, in a moment of fantasy, what if Hitler declared war on Japan instead of the US after PH?
Silly in the extreme, but maybe it would have made active US intervention in Europe a difficult sell for FDR in Dec 1941? It sure wouldn't have hindered Japan's Pacific War since Germany couldn't make the declaration good....

Oh well - Cheers

[DaveP]

Allow me to throw a handgrenade into this discussion.

All of this talk of the Battle of Britain and the lack of German strategic bombing capability is interesting, but irrelevant. WWII in Europe was fought and won in Russia; the participation of the Western Allies was peripheral and of minor importance. The German forces left in the west before 1943 were litttle more than garrisons -- the British posed no real threat (only slightly more than if Britian had been driven to its knees in 40-41). By the time there was a true two front war, the turning point had been reached in Russia and the outcome was already decided. As much as it offends American pride, the participation of the US in Europe only helped speed up a Russian victory (though it was decisivie in keeping Western Europe free of Russian domination in the post-war period).

Most people argue that the turning point was either Stalingrad or Kursk. My old military history professor positied that the turning point was during the winter of 41-42 when the Germans lost 10% of their armored forces -- loses that their production capacity (as has been well described by other posters) was unable to make good. Pick whichever you like, but they are all before the Germans faced a real threat in the West.

Ducking for cover,
DaveP

[Torplexed]

ORIGINAL: DaveP

As much as it offends American pride, the participation of the US in Europe only helped speed up a Russian victory (though it was decisivie in keeping Western Europe free of Russian domination in the post-war period).

Doesn't offend me. With a vicious enemy on her throat, Russia had the far more brutal, but straightforward and simple war. Essentially, a vast land struggle with the Red Air Force acting as flying artillery. The US had a complex war in many dimensions. On land, at sea, under the sea, in the air, and had to conduct a strategic bombing campaign against two very different antagonists. In addition, the US had to play some delicate diplomatic balancing acts with Britain and China, and a host of minor allies while plying them with arms and oil, while also supplying Russia with a substantial amount of aid and equipment (Stalin, on the other hand could afford to ignore most diplomatic niceties). The US managed to work in a very expensive atomic bomb program too. All this from a stubbornly isolationist nation with an army smaller than Portugal's was in 1939.

And, in the end Russia's staggering causality list probably saved a lot of American lives. D-Day, as conducted wouldn't have been possible if the majority of German divisions had been stationed in France.

Plus, we got the part of Europe with the better-looking women. [;)]