One of the things that are the complaints of many wargamers is the unrealistic benefits given to certain historic nations in order to increase gameplay. One of such is to allow for nations to win wars that were virtually unwinable.
Realistically, the Japanese had no chance in defeating the US. The best that it could come to is an unfavorable Armistice. Numbers is a result of that.
Should the IJN sink everything that floats, the US would still keep on fighting (relying on the fact that any landing on the West Coast would be easily repelled, let alone any landing on Oahu). The inevitable historical outcome would be Japan's defeat.
So why play?
One way in making a victory in defeat is to stress the concept of Victory Points and 'missions'. Instead of assigning VP's to kill ratio's (a very Vietnamish concept of victory), one might make VP's a little more flexible?
I am reminded of the game Europa Universalis II, where every 5 years your monarch assigns you a mission, and if you achieve it you gain, say, 30 VP's, but if you fail you lose 19 VP's. Missions were like gaining a marriage with another kingdom, vassalizing another kingdom, annexing a territory or defending a territory. Nations with high VP's were not necessarily those with the strongest militaries, or the biggest nations.
VP's should not be representative of absolute achievement, but relative achievement. If the Japanese player did better then historic (i.e., had fewer losses, held on to bases longer, etc..) but still lost, they should actually WIN the game (as the Allied player actually did worse then their historic counterparts, even though they still won).
Examples of VP missions could be...
No Japanese of X size (to stop commando raids) on the Australian Continent gives the Allies 'Y' VP's per turn.
Returning to the Philippines (and holding a base for more then 1 month) gives the Allies 'A' amount of VP's/turn in 1942, 'B' amount of VP's/turn in 1943, 'C' amount of VP's/turn in 1944, etc... (i.e., A=3, B=2, C=1)
No US troops of X size on Luzon gives the Japanese 'Y' VP's per turn after January 1944.
Every turn that Singapore is under British control the Allies get 'Y' VP's.
No B-29 raids on Japan from January 1944 gives the Japanese 'Y' VP's per turn until a raid occurs.
So, even slowing down the Allied advance could significantly increase the chance of the Japanese winning a VP war. Also, increasing allied advance will have them win a VP war. If everything generally follows history, then VP's should be about equal on both sides (i.e., Japan Unconditionally Surrenders in September 1945). However, even in 1946 the Allies might gain a chance at still winning, if they manage to gain VP's earlier in the game (i.e., holding on to Singapore longer but being slow on their counterattack).
Out of anything suggested, production, R&D, an early war, something like this can really enhance the replayability of the game and satisfy those who want a chance at winning without warping history too much to suit the Japanese.
The goal of the player is now not to hold Singapore forever, or abandon it, but to hold it until April 1942 instead of having it fall in February. The Japanese will try and secure the Philippines as quickly as possible instead of letting it linger until forces from other theatres are freed up. Possibly holding the US forces from taking the Marianas can guarantee the Japanese a breath of releif as this will not only give you VP's, but take away enemy VP's. These VP's are the driving force behind the player to take risks that can really pay off.
VP missions should 'guide' the player, as you do not always have to accept every mission (but you will face penalties). There should also be a few random ones. Maybe one game will have the IJN gain VP's if Port Moresby is secured, while another gives them VP's if New Caledonia is by a certain date. Possibly the US will get some VP's for Formosa, while other games give them VP's for landing on Luzon. Still, you could choose to land on Luzon if you were given a Formosa mission, but you will lose out on a few 'easy' VP's, that you 'might' make up through your attack on Luzon.
Japanese Victory?
Moderators: Joel Billings, wdolson, Don Bowen, mogami
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Jeremy Pritchard
- Posts: 575
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- Location: Ontario Canada
Jeremy,
I think your suggestion is really the only "true" way of balancing out a game for players when the real situation (on which the game was based) meant that only one side could realistically hope to gain final victory.
A few caveats (I'm not suggesting you wouldn't already have considered this, I'm just wondering what are your thoughts.)
1) You need to establish a timeline for the values of each possible event. This will rely heavily on judgement and interpretation.
2) You need to establish the value of an event in relation to another event occuring (does the capturing of one objective make the value of another redundant?). It will also involve a lot of judgement and interpretation.
3) You need to allow for all realistic alternative strategies being used and establish the value of events in light of those strategies. For example, if the Japanese never declare war on the US and go after the Far East and China, should the allies still get the value for Pacific posessions?
4) Should historical dates always be used as a benchmark as to doing better or worse? Re : Singapore - The allies made a shambles of their defence of Malaya. Unless that is assumed in the game, should you not set a realistic allied "hold" date for Singapore based on when the Japanese could "reasonably" be expected to capture it against a "reasonable" allied defence? Now we're really getting into interpretation. :p
Given the sheer scale of the game, I would think it may be a lot of work involved to come up with a satisfactory model (but then again, you might be able to able to put all the discussions held on this forum to good use in helping to thrash out the model - assuming anyone could agree with anyone else).
How complicated a process do you see it as?
I think your suggestion is really the only "true" way of balancing out a game for players when the real situation (on which the game was based) meant that only one side could realistically hope to gain final victory.
A few caveats (I'm not suggesting you wouldn't already have considered this, I'm just wondering what are your thoughts.)
1) You need to establish a timeline for the values of each possible event. This will rely heavily on judgement and interpretation.
2) You need to establish the value of an event in relation to another event occuring (does the capturing of one objective make the value of another redundant?). It will also involve a lot of judgement and interpretation.
3) You need to allow for all realistic alternative strategies being used and establish the value of events in light of those strategies. For example, if the Japanese never declare war on the US and go after the Far East and China, should the allies still get the value for Pacific posessions?
4) Should historical dates always be used as a benchmark as to doing better or worse? Re : Singapore - The allies made a shambles of their defence of Malaya. Unless that is assumed in the game, should you not set a realistic allied "hold" date for Singapore based on when the Japanese could "reasonably" be expected to capture it against a "reasonable" allied defence? Now we're really getting into interpretation. :p
Given the sheer scale of the game, I would think it may be a lot of work involved to come up with a satisfactory model (but then again, you might be able to able to put all the discussions held on this forum to good use in helping to thrash out the model - assuming anyone could agree with anyone else).
How complicated a process do you see it as?
Have no fear,
drink more beer.
drink more beer.
My definition of a wargame:
Given any battle, historically there was a victor.
Victory came through better tactics or better weapons or more weapons and or an element of luck.
Whatever the reason, one side was the victor.
A wargame should pretty much mimic what happened. I don’t want Tiger tanks 3 years before they were invented. So why play on the losing side?
The answer is for the victory conditions.
Stalemate: if the Japanese surrender near to the historical surrender date
Major victory: if the Japanese surrender well beyond the historical surrender date.
Major loss: if the Japanese surrender well before the historical surrender date.
This way victory goes to the player that performed best. It is not dependant upon having big Tiger Tanks where they never were.
My view is that 5 levels of victory rather than 3 is the better way to go.
Given any battle, historically there was a victor.
Victory came through better tactics or better weapons or more weapons and or an element of luck.
Whatever the reason, one side was the victor.
A wargame should pretty much mimic what happened. I don’t want Tiger tanks 3 years before they were invented. So why play on the losing side?
The answer is for the victory conditions.
Stalemate: if the Japanese surrender near to the historical surrender date
Major victory: if the Japanese surrender well beyond the historical surrender date.
Major loss: if the Japanese surrender well before the historical surrender date.
This way victory goes to the player that performed best. It is not dependant upon having big Tiger Tanks where they never were.
My view is that 5 levels of victory rather than 3 is the better way to go.
I agree with joe98 - close combat series had about 9 different victory "levels" all based on game dates vs historical dates.
But to throw the other side of the coin in, go look at Kid and Crockys great PBEM game/AAR. Certainly wasn't a historical result - and by your arguments, should not have been possible or probable - but it sure as hell was a fun read - and must have been more fun to play!
But to throw the other side of the coin in, go look at Kid and Crockys great PBEM game/AAR. Certainly wasn't a historical result - and by your arguments, should not have been possible or probable - but it sure as hell was a fun read - and must have been more fun to play!
With dancing Bananas and Storm Troopers who needs BBs?
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Jeremy Pritchard
- Posts: 575
- Joined: Thu Sep 27, 2001 8:00 am
- Location: Ontario Canada
Timelines for events are very easy for the first few months of the war. I am expecting that the scenarios will be well developed so the Japanese will have a relatively easy time in the first few months, and the Allies not have enough men and equipment. The chances that Singapore will fall in February or March are very good, primarily due to reasons of quality beating quantity. The Allied player will probably do better then their historic counterparts, but so too might the Japanese player.
Instead of activation dates where you get VP's in one big bunch, you should accumulate some VP's over time. For example, Singapore gives the British player 2 VP's per turn/week that build up. So if they hold it longer then February they will continue to gain VP's. The Japanese know this, so they will want to crack the defenses as quickly as possible.
Other missions should be a one shot deal. If the Japanese is given the mission to attack and secure Midway by July 1942, then if they land at or before this date, they get the points. If they land after or never, they lose VP's.
Events that eliminate other events are fairly easy. Giving the player a choice over 2-3 possible routes. For example...
"Nimitz, MacArthur and FDR meet to discuss the plan of advance in the Pacific"
choose an option
#1. Listen to MacArthur. (missions will generally give you VP's for moving through New Guinea and the Philippines on the way to Japan)
#2. Listen to Nimitz. (missions will generally give you VP's for moving through Central Pacific and Formosa on the way to Japan)
#3. Compromize. (missions will follow plans of both, giving you more VP missions, but a much riskier timeplan)
What if the Allied player wants to go through the East indies instead of SW and Central Pacific? Possibly some VP missions will be the result of trigger events. If you take Base X at times G-Y then mission Z will appear. Say the Allies retake Timor in 1943, then they will get a mission to clear the Moluccas in 1944 of Japanese troops, then possibly to Borneo, etc. while if they had not taken Timor, they would not have got these missions.
I do see this as a complicated system, but fixed VP's based on Combat Losses and Base Value will tend to follow historic results, and should almost always result in Japanese defeat if done to absolute values (i.e., Rabul is worth X points for both Japan and the US). Multipliers also muddy up the reality of the situation. PacWar gave the Japanese kill modifiers in 1944, in an attempt at giving them a chance at winning even late in the game. However, this is still based primarily off of kills and combat losses. It is almost impossible for the IJ to compete with the massive US Military Machine (that gets most of its kills VP's from sub attacks!).
This way gives the players absolutely no incentive to do anything historic.
Why hold Singapore when the troops can be better used to counterattack in 1943? You would get nothing for holding Singapore for months longer then historic, and it is almost impossible to keep it out of Japanese hands unless you send all resources from all theatres to help.
I want reasons for doing things. Reasons for me to not just always attack the Japanese homeland from the North. Reasons for the Japanese to attack in August 1942 when you know it is not wize. Reasons to take risks other then to get positive kill ratios. Even if you lose half of the forces involved, but still achieved your goal, I still want to be satisfied that I might have just won the game by succeeding in such a dangerous mission.
These missions are not necessarily historic as well. Possibly the Japanese will get missions to attack 'India', 'Australia' or 'the Hawaiian Islands'? They also do not have to follow these missions, but following them will give them some quick VP's (if they happen to be victorious at achieving goals).
Instead of activation dates where you get VP's in one big bunch, you should accumulate some VP's over time. For example, Singapore gives the British player 2 VP's per turn/week that build up. So if they hold it longer then February they will continue to gain VP's. The Japanese know this, so they will want to crack the defenses as quickly as possible.
Other missions should be a one shot deal. If the Japanese is given the mission to attack and secure Midway by July 1942, then if they land at or before this date, they get the points. If they land after or never, they lose VP's.
Events that eliminate other events are fairly easy. Giving the player a choice over 2-3 possible routes. For example...
"Nimitz, MacArthur and FDR meet to discuss the plan of advance in the Pacific"
choose an option
#1. Listen to MacArthur. (missions will generally give you VP's for moving through New Guinea and the Philippines on the way to Japan)
#2. Listen to Nimitz. (missions will generally give you VP's for moving through Central Pacific and Formosa on the way to Japan)
#3. Compromize. (missions will follow plans of both, giving you more VP missions, but a much riskier timeplan)
What if the Allied player wants to go through the East indies instead of SW and Central Pacific? Possibly some VP missions will be the result of trigger events. If you take Base X at times G-Y then mission Z will appear. Say the Allies retake Timor in 1943, then they will get a mission to clear the Moluccas in 1944 of Japanese troops, then possibly to Borneo, etc. while if they had not taken Timor, they would not have got these missions.
I do see this as a complicated system, but fixed VP's based on Combat Losses and Base Value will tend to follow historic results, and should almost always result in Japanese defeat if done to absolute values (i.e., Rabul is worth X points for both Japan and the US). Multipliers also muddy up the reality of the situation. PacWar gave the Japanese kill modifiers in 1944, in an attempt at giving them a chance at winning even late in the game. However, this is still based primarily off of kills and combat losses. It is almost impossible for the IJ to compete with the massive US Military Machine (that gets most of its kills VP's from sub attacks!).
This way gives the players absolutely no incentive to do anything historic.
Why hold Singapore when the troops can be better used to counterattack in 1943? You would get nothing for holding Singapore for months longer then historic, and it is almost impossible to keep it out of Japanese hands unless you send all resources from all theatres to help.
I want reasons for doing things. Reasons for me to not just always attack the Japanese homeland from the North. Reasons for the Japanese to attack in August 1942 when you know it is not wize. Reasons to take risks other then to get positive kill ratios. Even if you lose half of the forces involved, but still achieved your goal, I still want to be satisfied that I might have just won the game by succeeding in such a dangerous mission.
These missions are not necessarily historic as well. Possibly the Japanese will get missions to attack 'India', 'Australia' or 'the Hawaiian Islands'? They also do not have to follow these missions, but following them will give them some quick VP's (if they happen to be victorious at achieving goals).
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Jeremy Pritchard
- Posts: 575
- Joined: Thu Sep 27, 2001 8:00 am
- Location: Ontario Canada
(I was busy writing this while Jeremy posted his last couple of posts, but I think it is still relevant)
I think Drongo has found the problem with the missions or objectives type of scoring.
You are forcing the player to accept the biases of the programmer. It forces Japan to, say, take the Philippines early or forces the Commonwealth to defend Singapore. Each side may have a strategy that runs counter to history - at least with respect to a region - and they should not be penalized for doing so. I may decide to bypass the Philippines to try and capture Los Angeles.
The only way to overcome this drawback is to design in more and more alternatives and interconnected objectives. In other words, the Japanese don't lose points for not capturing the Philippines by X date if they accomplish Y or Z. I think this is still too scripted, and you would make the victory conditions so complicated that you could not possibly design a coherent strategy around them. The closer you get to offering the player true freedom of action, the closer you get to one man is worth 1 point, one plane is worth ten points, one city is worth 100 points.
Ultimately, Joe has pretty much boiled it down to its essence. We are competing against history. Each side's objective was to (i) defeat the other side and (ii) with the fewest losses to your own side. Destroying the other side's forces were only a means to an end and theoretically not necessary (though necessary practically). I believe the victory conditions should be based upon when you force the enemy to surrender modified by the losses you've suffered to achieve that surrender; enemy losses to not factor directly into the equation. The enemy will surrender based on a combination of factors such as losses, number of objectives owned, resources, and whatever else makes sense. Thus, destruction of the enemy's forces is factored in indirectly but is not necessary to win. If you can devise a brilliant strategy that enables you to capture territory and starve Japan of resources without destroying its military, you can still win.
If the U.S. shortens the war but suffers twice the losses, it may lose compared to history. If Japan surrenders later than was historical and suffers the same losses as was historical, it may win. If the U.S. forces Japan to surrender at the same time as was historical and suffers fewer losses, it may still lose the game if, comparatively speaking, Japan suffered even fewer losses. Both sides would have played better than their historical counterparts and fought a fine war, but Japan just did it better than the U.S.
There are still points awarded to kills, but they are kills on my own forces. In the end, this may result in the same kind of victory points assigned to kill ratios that Jeremy detests, but it would hopefully create a different incentive. Rather than trying to kill more of the enemy at a reduced cost to yourself, the incentive is to gain as many objectives that will force surrender with the fewest losses. This seems to me to be the incentive of every nation at war.
This relativistic method of winning is what I think you are requesting, Jeremy. I guess the difference in our approaches is that I think victory is determined at the end based on the absolute achievement of forcing surrender; there are no milestones or intermediate objectives. When the war is over, you count the points. If I won quicker and with fewer losses than my historical counterpart, I should win regardless of how I did it. If I understand Jeremy's method, I can force surrender quicker and with fewer losses but still lose because I did not achieve my victory in the way the programmer envisioned or incentivized. Or have I missed something?
As far as needing a reason to do something, the reason for doing anything would be to force surrender at the lowest cost. If it means surrendering Singapore on December 8th to preserve forces, fine. On the other hand, I might try and hold it as a magnet for Japanese forces in an effort to kill as many as possible, thus hastening their surrender. I don't think we need artificial incentives. We should have the same incentives to do anything that our counterparts had, which is (pardon the repetitiveness) to force surrender as soon as possible (or delay surrender as long as possible) with the fewest losses.
I think Drongo has found the problem with the missions or objectives type of scoring.
You are forcing the player to accept the biases of the programmer. It forces Japan to, say, take the Philippines early or forces the Commonwealth to defend Singapore. Each side may have a strategy that runs counter to history - at least with respect to a region - and they should not be penalized for doing so. I may decide to bypass the Philippines to try and capture Los Angeles.
The only way to overcome this drawback is to design in more and more alternatives and interconnected objectives. In other words, the Japanese don't lose points for not capturing the Philippines by X date if they accomplish Y or Z. I think this is still too scripted, and you would make the victory conditions so complicated that you could not possibly design a coherent strategy around them. The closer you get to offering the player true freedom of action, the closer you get to one man is worth 1 point, one plane is worth ten points, one city is worth 100 points.
Ultimately, Joe has pretty much boiled it down to its essence. We are competing against history. Each side's objective was to (i) defeat the other side and (ii) with the fewest losses to your own side. Destroying the other side's forces were only a means to an end and theoretically not necessary (though necessary practically). I believe the victory conditions should be based upon when you force the enemy to surrender modified by the losses you've suffered to achieve that surrender; enemy losses to not factor directly into the equation. The enemy will surrender based on a combination of factors such as losses, number of objectives owned, resources, and whatever else makes sense. Thus, destruction of the enemy's forces is factored in indirectly but is not necessary to win. If you can devise a brilliant strategy that enables you to capture territory and starve Japan of resources without destroying its military, you can still win.
If the U.S. shortens the war but suffers twice the losses, it may lose compared to history. If Japan surrenders later than was historical and suffers the same losses as was historical, it may win. If the U.S. forces Japan to surrender at the same time as was historical and suffers fewer losses, it may still lose the game if, comparatively speaking, Japan suffered even fewer losses. Both sides would have played better than their historical counterparts and fought a fine war, but Japan just did it better than the U.S.
There are still points awarded to kills, but they are kills on my own forces. In the end, this may result in the same kind of victory points assigned to kill ratios that Jeremy detests, but it would hopefully create a different incentive. Rather than trying to kill more of the enemy at a reduced cost to yourself, the incentive is to gain as many objectives that will force surrender with the fewest losses. This seems to me to be the incentive of every nation at war.
This relativistic method of winning is what I think you are requesting, Jeremy. I guess the difference in our approaches is that I think victory is determined at the end based on the absolute achievement of forcing surrender; there are no milestones or intermediate objectives. When the war is over, you count the points. If I won quicker and with fewer losses than my historical counterpart, I should win regardless of how I did it. If I understand Jeremy's method, I can force surrender quicker and with fewer losses but still lose because I did not achieve my victory in the way the programmer envisioned or incentivized. Or have I missed something?
As far as needing a reason to do something, the reason for doing anything would be to force surrender at the lowest cost. If it means surrendering Singapore on December 8th to preserve forces, fine. On the other hand, I might try and hold it as a magnet for Japanese forces in an effort to kill as many as possible, thus hastening their surrender. I don't think we need artificial incentives. We should have the same incentives to do anything that our counterparts had, which is (pardon the repetitiveness) to force surrender as soon as possible (or delay surrender as long as possible) with the fewest losses.
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Jeremy Pritchard
- Posts: 575
- Joined: Thu Sep 27, 2001 8:00 am
- Location: Ontario Canada
You are just going to end up with a game that never reaches its completion.
Has anyone ever completed a PacWar PBEM game to 1945 when it was a forgone conclusion that the US would win by 1943?
I know that victory is victory, but there is absolutely no way for Japan to win a victory. Bypassing the Philippines to attack the West Coast is not really realistic, as US West Coast defenses were greater then all Japanese forces avalible for invasion.
Also, by no means did I say that the system I developed forced you to follow certain missions. You can easily ignore your missions and try to win the war through kill ratios and territory grabbing. However, without a VP system similar to the one I have above, the only way for the Japanese player to win is to do some majoryly unrealistic invasion of the United States. This will either spell victory or defeat by 1943.
So why play longer then that?
Why have the game run until 1945 if there is no way in winning past 1943 for the Japanese?
Victory is victory, that is true, but really looking at the United States and Japan in this war, there was no way the US would ever accept anything other then total victory. The US outproduced total Japanese aircraft production in ONE YEAR. Of course the US will win just about every game.
The only way we can measure victory and defeat is when it is measured against history. Wargames put you in the position of military commanders in order to change the outcome of the war. However, no matter how good you are as the Japanese, unless you manage to be victorious in every single battle you fight, the US will overwhelm you in quantity and quality. It is your role as a military commander to do better then your historic counterparts. However, total victory should not sway against you. You might have a Japanese player who brilliantly fought a delyaing action, and kept the US bombers from the Japanese homeland until 1945. They will still lose the game (as once those bombers get there they will wreak havoc), but they should actually win, as they did much better then their historic counterparts while the US player, well, 'sucked'.
Otherwize it is an all or nothing gambit, that is usually decided after the first major battle.
Without reasons to attack or hold bases, there will be just a series of gamey ways in winning the war, primarily for Japan. Invading the West Coast 'may' be possible, but it was not realistic. There would be no way that the US would surrender, even if kill ratio VP levels were very high against their favour, in fact, it would probably spurn a longer war to rid their nations from the invaders. Especially after Pearl Harbour, the US would fight even if 1 000 000 of their soldiers would die.
Without these missions, all you will see is the Japanese trying to win the war in 1942, and if they either do or do not, then the game is over.
Has anyone ever completed a PacWar PBEM game to 1945 when it was a forgone conclusion that the US would win by 1943?
I know that victory is victory, but there is absolutely no way for Japan to win a victory. Bypassing the Philippines to attack the West Coast is not really realistic, as US West Coast defenses were greater then all Japanese forces avalible for invasion.
Also, by no means did I say that the system I developed forced you to follow certain missions. You can easily ignore your missions and try to win the war through kill ratios and territory grabbing. However, without a VP system similar to the one I have above, the only way for the Japanese player to win is to do some majoryly unrealistic invasion of the United States. This will either spell victory or defeat by 1943.
So why play longer then that?
Why have the game run until 1945 if there is no way in winning past 1943 for the Japanese?
Victory is victory, that is true, but really looking at the United States and Japan in this war, there was no way the US would ever accept anything other then total victory. The US outproduced total Japanese aircraft production in ONE YEAR. Of course the US will win just about every game.
The only way we can measure victory and defeat is when it is measured against history. Wargames put you in the position of military commanders in order to change the outcome of the war. However, no matter how good you are as the Japanese, unless you manage to be victorious in every single battle you fight, the US will overwhelm you in quantity and quality. It is your role as a military commander to do better then your historic counterparts. However, total victory should not sway against you. You might have a Japanese player who brilliantly fought a delyaing action, and kept the US bombers from the Japanese homeland until 1945. They will still lose the game (as once those bombers get there they will wreak havoc), but they should actually win, as they did much better then their historic counterparts while the US player, well, 'sucked'.
Otherwize it is an all or nothing gambit, that is usually decided after the first major battle.
Without reasons to attack or hold bases, there will be just a series of gamey ways in winning the war, primarily for Japan. Invading the West Coast 'may' be possible, but it was not realistic. There would be no way that the US would surrender, even if kill ratio VP levels were very high against their favour, in fact, it would probably spurn a longer war to rid their nations from the invaders. Especially after Pearl Harbour, the US would fight even if 1 000 000 of their soldiers would die.
Without these missions, all you will see is the Japanese trying to win the war in 1942, and if they either do or do not, then the game is over.
"Flexible" victory points are a great idea. I totally agree with the conclusion the US could not lose. So it would be interesting to see how quick they can win without too much impact on the "Germany first" strategy:
- the ressource area should have lesser VP , but a US "player" could decide to attack it in favour to cut the supplies for Japan on a strategic level
- location for basis for strategic bombing (like Marianas) could gain more VP for the Japanese over time
- the Singapore idea is great because the Allied would really consider to hold it and not fall back and stockpile ressources/forces
- Phillipinas "yes" or "no" could be a real hard question. In PacWar I attack everytime. After that I regularly have enough VPs for a major victory. Historically the war wasn´t over.
- the idea to reward commando ops in this manner is great because it sounds realistic to me.
- ok. ok. ... I already mentioned the Jap sub-doctrine: a more aggressive warfare against merchant ships would definitly not "sink the whole world" but force the Allied to spend more planes/forces/ships in ASW which would not be available for attack purposes
- on the other side the Japanes should be able to spend more in ASW with the same disadvantage. So a japanese "player" is asked whether he wants ressouces or VPs.
- giving the major bases (i.e. Truk and Rabaul) more and more VPs would force the Allied to consider to seizure them
- I think it would also give the Japanese a motivation to be more agressive and flexible in the defence because a tactical victory based on a "Midway-on the-other-side" would significantly increase the chance of good result at the beginning of 1945
Finally I adore the idea that the VPs are redistributed after you start a new campaign. That gives the game almost infinite replayability...
- the ressource area should have lesser VP , but a US "player" could decide to attack it in favour to cut the supplies for Japan on a strategic level
- location for basis for strategic bombing (like Marianas) could gain more VP for the Japanese over time
- the Singapore idea is great because the Allied would really consider to hold it and not fall back and stockpile ressources/forces
- Phillipinas "yes" or "no" could be a real hard question. In PacWar I attack everytime. After that I regularly have enough VPs for a major victory. Historically the war wasn´t over.
- the idea to reward commando ops in this manner is great because it sounds realistic to me.
- ok. ok. ... I already mentioned the Jap sub-doctrine: a more aggressive warfare against merchant ships would definitly not "sink the whole world" but force the Allied to spend more planes/forces/ships in ASW which would not be available for attack purposes
- on the other side the Japanes should be able to spend more in ASW with the same disadvantage. So a japanese "player" is asked whether he wants ressouces or VPs.
- giving the major bases (i.e. Truk and Rabaul) more and more VPs would force the Allied to consider to seizure them
- I think it would also give the Japanese a motivation to be more agressive and flexible in the defence because a tactical victory based on a "Midway-on the-other-side" would significantly increase the chance of good result at the beginning of 1945
Finally I adore the idea that the VPs are redistributed after you start a new campaign. That gives the game almost infinite replayability...
Now this might go a bit off topic, but since we are debating about the nature of a military victory I might add my 20c as well.
I take the old saying that: “war is an extension of politics” as a truth.
A war doesn’t start before one side decides that they have something to gain through an act of aggression and one decides to defend itself against the aggressor. Obviously both sides can think they have something to gain, and both can be equally eager to start the war in hope of some gain, but I simplify here intentionally.
I my mind there are two balancing factors that define a victory or a defeat: gain vs. loss.
Gains are anything that benefits the nation. If a nation conquers a land that has sentimental value or gains new resources, it has the potential to be better off after the war then before it. Also the gain can be political gain of demonstration of superior power and deterrence rather than anything else. Also the gain can be a political gain, such as demonstration of superior power, which acts as deterrence.
Losses are anything that hinders the nation after the peace, such as death of people at their best age, destruction of infrastructure, loss of natural resources (oilfields, goldmines) and loss of land that has cultural, strategic, religious or otherwise sentimental value for the people of the warring nation.
Victory and Defeat could be derived from this: Japan wins the war if, when a peace treaty is signed, it is a certain amount better off than before the war. The same goes for allied. The game is a draw if both sides are better or worse than before the war.
Loss and gain is divided to two categories: Political and resource. Conquered land counts towards the both, depending on its political and resource importance. All the warships and -airplanes count toward political victory points. All merchant ships and -airplanes count towards the resource, same for factories, railroads and so forth.
Death and injury of people (civilians and soldiers) are counted equally towards the both categories, as the mounting death toll reduces the political eagerness of war and also the recovery of a nation from the war.
All the caused losses would be counted as something away from the opponent, rather than something for you. In real life, your people don’t really benefit anything from a destruction of a tank factory in another country, but people in that country are greatly hindered. The only way to get more points is through getting something more for your people. Although I must admit that abstract political influence should grow after a won battle as your own people celebrate and other people re-consider their power in relation to your, but this is a matter of tweaking.
In this system victory and defeat can come in many forms. If a side conquers a lot of land, but loses too many soldiers, airplanes and warships in the process the sum of political influence can eventually be less than before the war. This is to reflect a future where a nation has a lot of land, but no real means to keep it. However, the gained resource points would still remain, which might be enough to count the war successful.
Same goes the other way around. In spite of tremendous military gains, if country’s merchant fleet is neatly wiped out and the factories and cities are in ruins it becomes economical cripple –hence losing the war.
The point system then is independent for the both nations. In essence you would fight the war against your set goals, not the opponents. The opponent is just an obstacle on your warpath.
In relation to this game, the goals could look like this (these figures came just from top of my head, but I’m sure that they could be figured out realistically thought research):
Japan wins if it manages to increase its resources by 400% and political influence by 300%
Allied wins if it increases its political influence by 800%
Obviously both sides can’t meet their decisive goals at the same time, hence the contest that would be called War in the Pacific.
In this system, if Allied player loses too much material in relation to gained ground, it pulls out of the pacific war. Also the time should be a concern and it could be easily counted in loss of points to the Allied player if the war gets prolonged.
A Nuke would obviously devastate Japanese resource and political points very quickly, thus urging the Japanese to sign the treaty.
Whoops. It seems that I wrote a novel. Oh well, procrastination from university assignments makes one to do many weird and wonderful things.
I take the old saying that: “war is an extension of politics” as a truth.
A war doesn’t start before one side decides that they have something to gain through an act of aggression and one decides to defend itself against the aggressor. Obviously both sides can think they have something to gain, and both can be equally eager to start the war in hope of some gain, but I simplify here intentionally.
I my mind there are two balancing factors that define a victory or a defeat: gain vs. loss.
Gains are anything that benefits the nation. If a nation conquers a land that has sentimental value or gains new resources, it has the potential to be better off after the war then before it. Also the gain can be political gain of demonstration of superior power and deterrence rather than anything else. Also the gain can be a political gain, such as demonstration of superior power, which acts as deterrence.
Losses are anything that hinders the nation after the peace, such as death of people at their best age, destruction of infrastructure, loss of natural resources (oilfields, goldmines) and loss of land that has cultural, strategic, religious or otherwise sentimental value for the people of the warring nation.
Victory and Defeat could be derived from this: Japan wins the war if, when a peace treaty is signed, it is a certain amount better off than before the war. The same goes for allied. The game is a draw if both sides are better or worse than before the war.
Loss and gain is divided to two categories: Political and resource. Conquered land counts towards the both, depending on its political and resource importance. All the warships and -airplanes count toward political victory points. All merchant ships and -airplanes count towards the resource, same for factories, railroads and so forth.
Death and injury of people (civilians and soldiers) are counted equally towards the both categories, as the mounting death toll reduces the political eagerness of war and also the recovery of a nation from the war.
All the caused losses would be counted as something away from the opponent, rather than something for you. In real life, your people don’t really benefit anything from a destruction of a tank factory in another country, but people in that country are greatly hindered. The only way to get more points is through getting something more for your people. Although I must admit that abstract political influence should grow after a won battle as your own people celebrate and other people re-consider their power in relation to your, but this is a matter of tweaking.
In this system victory and defeat can come in many forms. If a side conquers a lot of land, but loses too many soldiers, airplanes and warships in the process the sum of political influence can eventually be less than before the war. This is to reflect a future where a nation has a lot of land, but no real means to keep it. However, the gained resource points would still remain, which might be enough to count the war successful.
Same goes the other way around. In spite of tremendous military gains, if country’s merchant fleet is neatly wiped out and the factories and cities are in ruins it becomes economical cripple –hence losing the war.
The point system then is independent for the both nations. In essence you would fight the war against your set goals, not the opponents. The opponent is just an obstacle on your warpath.
In relation to this game, the goals could look like this (these figures came just from top of my head, but I’m sure that they could be figured out realistically thought research):
Japan wins if it manages to increase its resources by 400% and political influence by 300%
Allied wins if it increases its political influence by 800%
Obviously both sides can’t meet their decisive goals at the same time, hence the contest that would be called War in the Pacific.
In this system, if Allied player loses too much material in relation to gained ground, it pulls out of the pacific war. Also the time should be a concern and it could be easily counted in loss of points to the Allied player if the war gets prolonged.
A Nuke would obviously devastate Japanese resource and political points very quickly, thus urging the Japanese to sign the treaty.
Whoops. It seems that I wrote a novel. Oh well, procrastination from university assignments makes one to do many weird and wonderful things.
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Adnan Meshuggi
- Posts: 532
- Joined: Thu Aug 02, 2001 8:00 am
Well,
some very interesting aspects here...
but the main problem is allways the "the defeat/victory is clear" problem... different to the European theatre, esp. in the east, there is no hope that the japanese could win against the allies... in pac war, if you sunk enough allied carriers and ships, it is impossible for the allies to win (because they can´t defeat the japanese navy (well, for this you need much luck and a stupid enemy)), but in real live, the americans had produced 100 carriers more (without the bomb) and had defeated the japanese in 1946 or 47.... or with jets etc...
this is allways one point why i want a flexible production system, because you can give production orders to react to losses...
but your idea of flexible vp´s (with jobs to achieve or you get troubles...) is interesting, because if the allied side just want to sit und wait untill they have everything four times they need, it is boring... if the allied player try to do this, he loose quickly the game with your method, or the japanese player, knowing historic things must be more carefull, because if he succseed at port moresby he got maybe the order to invade northern australia....
also, if the allied player perform great, their is allways the chance that ships will be withdrawn to the atlantic ("germany first"), because i the allies had large succsess in 1942 and could hold for example the phillipines and start to bomb jaban, taiwan etc., many troops/ships aren´t neccessary for this campaign, but it is needed in the eto... etc, we have many intersting options with this (and we don´t fight for the r&d-problematics...
)
So this could be a great idea, i hope they develop something from your idea...
some very interesting aspects here...
but the main problem is allways the "the defeat/victory is clear" problem... different to the European theatre, esp. in the east, there is no hope that the japanese could win against the allies... in pac war, if you sunk enough allied carriers and ships, it is impossible for the allies to win (because they can´t defeat the japanese navy (well, for this you need much luck and a stupid enemy)), but in real live, the americans had produced 100 carriers more (without the bomb) and had defeated the japanese in 1946 or 47.... or with jets etc...
this is allways one point why i want a flexible production system, because you can give production orders to react to losses...
but your idea of flexible vp´s (with jobs to achieve or you get troubles...) is interesting, because if the allied side just want to sit und wait untill they have everything four times they need, it is boring... if the allied player try to do this, he loose quickly the game with your method, or the japanese player, knowing historic things must be more carefull, because if he succseed at port moresby he got maybe the order to invade northern australia....
also, if the allied player perform great, their is allways the chance that ships will be withdrawn to the atlantic ("germany first"), because i the allies had large succsess in 1942 and could hold for example the phillipines and start to bomb jaban, taiwan etc., many troops/ships aren´t neccessary for this campaign, but it is needed in the eto... etc, we have many intersting options with this (and we don´t fight for the r&d-problematics...
)So this could be a great idea, i hope they develop something from your idea...
Don't tickle yourself with some moralist crap thinking we have some sort of obligation to help these people. We're there for our self-interest, and anything we do to be 'nice' should be considered a courtesy dweebespit
How could you possibly "react to losses" when it takes years to build warships ? The great majority of the ships that fought the war in the Pacific were ordered before the war ever began.Originally posted by Adnan Meshuggi
this is allways one point why i want a flexible production system, because you can give production orders to react to losses...
Even changing aircraft production lines to an entirely different type took months, with a big loss in output while it was underway. It also had to be planned well in advance so that engines and so on were available for the airframes.
As has been said before, the last thing WitP needs is a "flexible production system".
Cheers,
Angus
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Jeremy Pritchard
- Posts: 575
- Joined: Thu Sep 27, 2001 8:00 am
- Location: Ontario Canada
Even if the IJN manages to sink all of the USN carriers, the US should be producing enough LBA that they will still have a seady advance (albiet not as fast). With the US continually producing carriers, they will invariably regain their carrier superiority even though the Japanese might have wiped them out repeatedly. Attrition will inevitably favour the US. I have looked at a lot of 'what if' sites, and they state that even had the IJN won at Midway, by 1944 they would still be outnumbered qualitatively and quantitatively.
Realistically, by 1944 (usually) the US has the choice to attack wherever they want. The Japanese can only really delay the American advance.
No matter the US casualties, I cannot forsee the US accepting anything other then Unconditional Surrender. Basically any piece of territory will be taken by the US eventually, it is basically a matter of time.
This is what I feel to be important in the game.
Time.
The timing of when things happen is very important to be modeled. Back to the ever popular Singapore situation...
If Territorial and casualty VP's are only counted at the point of occupation (i.e., you only get points if you occupy a base) then this is what will happen.
1941
- British evacuate as many units as possible from Malaya/Singapore (Save on losing casualty VP's)
(Base VP's to UK)
1942
- Japanese easily secure Singapore/Malaya
(Base VP's to IJA)
1944
- Britain returns to Malaya/Singapore primarily because of the use of the 18th British and 8th Australian Divisions.
(Base VP's to UK)
1945
- Game ends
(Base VP's to UK)
The way that this game goes it ends almost as if the Japanese never took the base (as VP's are only calculated at the end of the game). The withdrawl of UK forces was smart because having them stay and fight Japan will give them nothing, but retreating to retake the base when VP's count (near the end) is the most intelligent thing to do. Casualty VP's will count only against you, so why risk units when losing them will give you nothing, even if you manage to delay your enemy significantly.
With a flexible VP system it will be like this...
Historically, from December 1941 to February 1942 the UK get, say, about 200 VP's for holding Singapore.
1941
- Every turn the British get 20 VP's for holding Singapore (once Sintapore is taken, even if it is retaken they lose this VP bonus)
- The Japanese will gain 200 VP's (a one time bonus) for taking Singapore by February 15, 1942. (Every turn after that they lose 0-50 VP's until they get Zero, or something like that)
So, it is beneficial for the UK to delay the Japanese, as they not only gain VP's, but make Japan lose them. It is beneficial for the Japanese to take the base sooner, as to gain the 200 VP bonus, and limit the number of VP's the UK gets.
As you can see, if the base is captured on the historical date, both sides will recieve 200 VP's. So, if everything is done historic (still resulting in Japan's defeat), neither side would 'win', and it would be a stalemate.
The Avalon Hill game Operation Crusader gave points per turn for bases, as for every turn you held on to Tobruk you gained 100 VP's.
VP calculation like this help to remove the ever present threat of hindsight taking control. Of course the British know that holding Singapore is virtually impossible, and without any reason to do it they will not. However, with significant VP's to be lost or gained by holding it for just a few months might be enough to get them to want to throw away the 18th and 8th Divisions. Different VP values for both sides is also important. The Japanese will not get as much for Singapore/Malaya as the British, nor should the UK get as much if they liberate it.
The Japanese know that by 1944 there will be 5+:1 odds against them, and so does the US. All the US has to do is sit back until 1944, when they charge in will all of their pre-war carriers and Essex's equipped with F6F's and TBM's.
Absolutely, casualties and territory control is important, but it should not be the only determination of victory. Using this method, the only way that Japan can win is if unrealistic situations are introduced (i.e., US surrender if casualties get too high, they control enough territory, you run out of time etc..). These reasons really would not have resulted in a Japanese victory in the real world. Pacific War was done in a time before complicated victory systems could be included into games, due to code limitations.
The goal of the game is to get the players to do better then history without adding unrealistic victory levels. Should the Japanese have a bad few turns, the game could be over if casualty and territory VP's are all that matters. With mission VP's, they might be able to still pull off a victory, or a stalemate, even with a disaster or two. Without a flexible VP systme the US does not really have to play smart either. All they have to do is sit back and wait for the men and material arrive before starting their attacks. However, we all know that the Allies counterattacked in 1942 in all theatres (SW and Central Pacific as well as SEAC), and faced a lot of problems and casualties in achieveing (and sometimes not achieving) all of their goals within their timeplans.
Sure, sometimes you might refuse a mission because of knowing that your next mission might be too risky (like taking PM might lead you to the mission of taking Australia). However, the mission VP's might be a little more flexible. Instead of continuing to advance, maybe your next mission is to hold and defend your conquest, gaining VP's for holding it each turn, or gain a bunch of VP's if you hold it until a certain date, allowing you to withdraw witn no VP penalty after this time. These can be major VP bonanzas, worthy of risking your best troops and ships over.
Should the US stop at the Marianas to bomb out the Home Islands, possibly the Japanese will gain enough VP's through holding Luzon, Formosa and Okinawa in the face of economic VP loss due to bombing? It forces players to be not only more aggressive, but more defensive. It would be like a series of small UV's in the game, where you will gain VP's for taking and/or holding bases, possibly even getting VP's for destroying enemy equipmend (i.e., the USN gets a one time bonus of 1000 VP's if they do a Doolittle raid, and possibly the IJN gets 500 VP's for every enemy CV sunk by a certain date for the IJN after the Doolittle raid, encouraging a Midway like invasion to draw out the USN).
Realistically, by 1944 (usually) the US has the choice to attack wherever they want. The Japanese can only really delay the American advance.
No matter the US casualties, I cannot forsee the US accepting anything other then Unconditional Surrender. Basically any piece of territory will be taken by the US eventually, it is basically a matter of time.
This is what I feel to be important in the game.
Time.
The timing of when things happen is very important to be modeled. Back to the ever popular Singapore situation...
If Territorial and casualty VP's are only counted at the point of occupation (i.e., you only get points if you occupy a base) then this is what will happen.
1941
- British evacuate as many units as possible from Malaya/Singapore (Save on losing casualty VP's)
(Base VP's to UK)
1942
- Japanese easily secure Singapore/Malaya
(Base VP's to IJA)
1944
- Britain returns to Malaya/Singapore primarily because of the use of the 18th British and 8th Australian Divisions.
(Base VP's to UK)
1945
- Game ends
(Base VP's to UK)
The way that this game goes it ends almost as if the Japanese never took the base (as VP's are only calculated at the end of the game). The withdrawl of UK forces was smart because having them stay and fight Japan will give them nothing, but retreating to retake the base when VP's count (near the end) is the most intelligent thing to do. Casualty VP's will count only against you, so why risk units when losing them will give you nothing, even if you manage to delay your enemy significantly.
With a flexible VP system it will be like this...
Historically, from December 1941 to February 1942 the UK get, say, about 200 VP's for holding Singapore.
1941
- Every turn the British get 20 VP's for holding Singapore (once Sintapore is taken, even if it is retaken they lose this VP bonus)
- The Japanese will gain 200 VP's (a one time bonus) for taking Singapore by February 15, 1942. (Every turn after that they lose 0-50 VP's until they get Zero, or something like that)
So, it is beneficial for the UK to delay the Japanese, as they not only gain VP's, but make Japan lose them. It is beneficial for the Japanese to take the base sooner, as to gain the 200 VP bonus, and limit the number of VP's the UK gets.
As you can see, if the base is captured on the historical date, both sides will recieve 200 VP's. So, if everything is done historic (still resulting in Japan's defeat), neither side would 'win', and it would be a stalemate.
The Avalon Hill game Operation Crusader gave points per turn for bases, as for every turn you held on to Tobruk you gained 100 VP's.
VP calculation like this help to remove the ever present threat of hindsight taking control. Of course the British know that holding Singapore is virtually impossible, and without any reason to do it they will not. However, with significant VP's to be lost or gained by holding it for just a few months might be enough to get them to want to throw away the 18th and 8th Divisions. Different VP values for both sides is also important. The Japanese will not get as much for Singapore/Malaya as the British, nor should the UK get as much if they liberate it.
The Japanese know that by 1944 there will be 5+:1 odds against them, and so does the US. All the US has to do is sit back until 1944, when they charge in will all of their pre-war carriers and Essex's equipped with F6F's and TBM's.
Absolutely, casualties and territory control is important, but it should not be the only determination of victory. Using this method, the only way that Japan can win is if unrealistic situations are introduced (i.e., US surrender if casualties get too high, they control enough territory, you run out of time etc..). These reasons really would not have resulted in a Japanese victory in the real world. Pacific War was done in a time before complicated victory systems could be included into games, due to code limitations.
The goal of the game is to get the players to do better then history without adding unrealistic victory levels. Should the Japanese have a bad few turns, the game could be over if casualty and territory VP's are all that matters. With mission VP's, they might be able to still pull off a victory, or a stalemate, even with a disaster or two. Without a flexible VP systme the US does not really have to play smart either. All they have to do is sit back and wait for the men and material arrive before starting their attacks. However, we all know that the Allies counterattacked in 1942 in all theatres (SW and Central Pacific as well as SEAC), and faced a lot of problems and casualties in achieveing (and sometimes not achieving) all of their goals within their timeplans.
Sure, sometimes you might refuse a mission because of knowing that your next mission might be too risky (like taking PM might lead you to the mission of taking Australia). However, the mission VP's might be a little more flexible. Instead of continuing to advance, maybe your next mission is to hold and defend your conquest, gaining VP's for holding it each turn, or gain a bunch of VP's if you hold it until a certain date, allowing you to withdraw witn no VP penalty after this time. These can be major VP bonanzas, worthy of risking your best troops and ships over.
Should the US stop at the Marianas to bomb out the Home Islands, possibly the Japanese will gain enough VP's through holding Luzon, Formosa and Okinawa in the face of economic VP loss due to bombing? It forces players to be not only more aggressive, but more defensive. It would be like a series of small UV's in the game, where you will gain VP's for taking and/or holding bases, possibly even getting VP's for destroying enemy equipmend (i.e., the USN gets a one time bonus of 1000 VP's if they do a Doolittle raid, and possibly the IJN gets 500 VP's for every enemy CV sunk by a certain date for the IJN after the Doolittle raid, encouraging a Midway like invasion to draw out the USN).
Given the surprise attack on Pearl Harbor, the US was not going to roll over and play dead. In all likelihood, in the absence of massive casualties, even with a near total loss of the pre-war Pacific Fleet and IJE control of the Pacific Ocean, the US was going to avenge the attack on Pearl.
With that premise, it is impossible for the IJE to win a military victory.
An IJE player in a 1941-194? campaign should not be playing for a military victory. He should be playing for a political victory based on the game's victory conditions.
The Allies not only must win the war... they must win the peace as well. Too long of a delay in defeating the Empire will result in a greatly increased Soviet intervention. Not only will Machuria, the Kurile Islands and parts of Korea be occupied, but Soviet armor columns will penetrate into the heart of China. The increased committment of Soviet forces will increase the political cost of denying the Soviets an occupation zone in Japan. The political partition of Japan into a Communist and Western Zone would have had significant impacts on the post-War political climate.
In addition, the Western Allies faced the problem of their colonies. The Western Powers not only wanted to boot the IJE out of their colonies, they wanted to regain political control of said colonies. Some of the operations planned for later in the war were done entirely for political considerations to restore "face" in these colonies.
The US, while owning no colonies, faced the problem of the Phillippine Commonwealth. Delay a/o failure to liberate this ally prior to the defeat of Japan would have done much to damage goodwill in this important ally and would have reduced its ability to withstand the subsequent communist insurgency.
The Allies, particularly, the US, also had to contend with the expected casualties that an invasion of Japan would bring. While I believe the US population was willing to accept these casualties in the present war, there would have been a backlash against future military involvements along the lines of what happened in France and UK post WWI. Our willingness to commit to the many post wWWII obligations would have suffered. Would we have been willing to engage in Korea if the US had suffered 1 million casualties invading the Home Islands? Remember, despite our losses, the price we paid for victory was cheap compared to Europe. The ballon payment on the mortgage would have come due with the invasion of Japan and only their surrender prior to the invasion spared us those losses.
Along those lines, political victory points could be scored by the IJE for various things...
1. Each turn, control of UK, French, Dutch colonies and the Phillipine Territory yields political points to the IJE. These points do not go away when the territory is liberated. I.e. the points represent the destruction of the cloak of western invicibility. This has several effects... First, it encourages the IJE to sieze these territories quickly as the earlier they are captured, the earlier the PPs start to accumulate. Second, it encourages the UN forces to hold these areas as long as possible in an attempt to deny these points to the IJE. E.g. The UK/Holland can evacuate Malay and the DEIs, but the IJE will walk through the place. Are the troops worth the loss of these places months before their actual fall? Third, it encourages the UN to liberate these places - just as they did in the real war. The Allies will need to balance the cost of capturing these places with the PPs that accumulate. Are Summatra and Java held in strength, then will the 100,000 casualties be worth it or should the islands be isolated and the main attack directed at Japan?
2. Each turn after the end of the European War, survival of the IJE grants large PPs in an increasing manner. Delay in conquering or defeating Japan and you've opened the door to communism. In a sense, this is the inverse of the strategy pursued by the Germans where they fought tooth and nail against the Soviets becayse liberation by the Western Allies was better than "liberation" by the Soviets. The occupation zones, of course, made this strategy worthless.
3. Casualties inflicted on the UN reap PPs. Heavy losses suffered by the Allies will have an effect on their ability to confront the Soviets after the war.
Victory would be measured by a scale TBD based on the PP score when/if Japan surrenders. Too many PPs and the Allies won the war, but the post war conflict has been lost.
This still allows for freedom of action on both sides. It forces the Allies to trade speed for casualties.
Any thoughts?
With that premise, it is impossible for the IJE to win a military victory.
An IJE player in a 1941-194? campaign should not be playing for a military victory. He should be playing for a political victory based on the game's victory conditions.
The Allies not only must win the war... they must win the peace as well. Too long of a delay in defeating the Empire will result in a greatly increased Soviet intervention. Not only will Machuria, the Kurile Islands and parts of Korea be occupied, but Soviet armor columns will penetrate into the heart of China. The increased committment of Soviet forces will increase the political cost of denying the Soviets an occupation zone in Japan. The political partition of Japan into a Communist and Western Zone would have had significant impacts on the post-War political climate.
In addition, the Western Allies faced the problem of their colonies. The Western Powers not only wanted to boot the IJE out of their colonies, they wanted to regain political control of said colonies. Some of the operations planned for later in the war were done entirely for political considerations to restore "face" in these colonies.
The US, while owning no colonies, faced the problem of the Phillippine Commonwealth. Delay a/o failure to liberate this ally prior to the defeat of Japan would have done much to damage goodwill in this important ally and would have reduced its ability to withstand the subsequent communist insurgency.
The Allies, particularly, the US, also had to contend with the expected casualties that an invasion of Japan would bring. While I believe the US population was willing to accept these casualties in the present war, there would have been a backlash against future military involvements along the lines of what happened in France and UK post WWI. Our willingness to commit to the many post wWWII obligations would have suffered. Would we have been willing to engage in Korea if the US had suffered 1 million casualties invading the Home Islands? Remember, despite our losses, the price we paid for victory was cheap compared to Europe. The ballon payment on the mortgage would have come due with the invasion of Japan and only their surrender prior to the invasion spared us those losses.
Along those lines, political victory points could be scored by the IJE for various things...
1. Each turn, control of UK, French, Dutch colonies and the Phillipine Territory yields political points to the IJE. These points do not go away when the territory is liberated. I.e. the points represent the destruction of the cloak of western invicibility. This has several effects... First, it encourages the IJE to sieze these territories quickly as the earlier they are captured, the earlier the PPs start to accumulate. Second, it encourages the UN forces to hold these areas as long as possible in an attempt to deny these points to the IJE. E.g. The UK/Holland can evacuate Malay and the DEIs, but the IJE will walk through the place. Are the troops worth the loss of these places months before their actual fall? Third, it encourages the UN to liberate these places - just as they did in the real war. The Allies will need to balance the cost of capturing these places with the PPs that accumulate. Are Summatra and Java held in strength, then will the 100,000 casualties be worth it or should the islands be isolated and the main attack directed at Japan?
2. Each turn after the end of the European War, survival of the IJE grants large PPs in an increasing manner. Delay in conquering or defeating Japan and you've opened the door to communism. In a sense, this is the inverse of the strategy pursued by the Germans where they fought tooth and nail against the Soviets becayse liberation by the Western Allies was better than "liberation" by the Soviets. The occupation zones, of course, made this strategy worthless.
3. Casualties inflicted on the UN reap PPs. Heavy losses suffered by the Allies will have an effect on their ability to confront the Soviets after the war.
Victory would be measured by a scale TBD based on the PP score when/if Japan surrenders. Too many PPs and the Allies won the war, but the post war conflict has been lost.
This still allows for freedom of action on both sides. It forces the Allies to trade speed for casualties.
Any thoughts?
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Capt. Harlock
- Posts: 5379
- Joined: Sat Sep 15, 2001 8:00 am
- Location: Los Angeles
- Contact:
My humble opinion is that there WAS a way for Japan to win a military victory. That was, not to raid Pearl Harbor or the Philippines. Instead, arrange for Germany to grant the Japanese the oil fields in Dutch Indonesia (since the Netherlands was under Nazi control at the time). The Free Dutch government would have resisted, and Roosevelt would probably have intervened. However, the war would not have been anywhere near as popular; in fact, some left-wing pundits would have been sure to denounce the US as the agressor, upholding colonialism. The mobilization of industry would have taken far longer, and not been as complete. (Try banning automobile manufacturing for four years today!) And above all, the vast majority of the American public would not have demanded unconditional surrender, but would have accepted an armistice, that might well have left Japan with a number of captured colonies.
I imagine it's too late to allow for political manuevering before Pearl Harbor, but it might work to set up a "cut-off" date for the US , beyond which the public would no longer support the war effort. The Japanese would get VP's for all territory stil in their possession.
I imagine it's too late to allow for political manuevering before Pearl Harbor, but it might work to set up a "cut-off" date for the US , beyond which the public would no longer support the war effort. The Japanese would get VP's for all territory stil in their possession.
Civil war? What does that mean? Is there any foreign war? Isn't every war fought between men, between brothers?
--Victor Hugo
--Victor Hugo
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Jeremy Pritchard
- Posts: 575
- Joined: Thu Sep 27, 2001 8:00 am
- Location: Ontario Canada
This above scenario would probably be the only way to win the Pacific War. If it is included, you really are not fighting the Pacific War, but an alternate history.
Actually, it was not 'left wing pundits' who were the main opposers to the US getting involved in WWII, but primarily a wide range of people, and a lot from the Right Wing (Charles Lindburgh was opposed to war against Germany). In fact, the 'left wing pundits' were probably the largest individual group in the US who were supporting joining the war, especially after the invasion of the USSR.
The post-war coldwar factor could be added for the Allied player, but this will not fix much of the history hindsight bugs, just ensure that the US have to end the war by September 1945. It depends on how the Soviets are included, wether or not they would be controlled by the Allies, or seen as a foe competing for victory is another. Although you would not fight them, possibly the USSR can 'steal away' VP's from the Western Allies as well as from the Japanese?
However, I still would like to see some individual missions that would help guid the player to do realistic missions (not just sitting in the North or Marianas and bomb Japan to submission which can be done by PacWar), and give the Japanese a better way in winning other then outright victory and outright defeat, which would be done within the first year of the war, ignoring the realistic 3-4 years that it would take for the US to actually end it.
Actually, it was not 'left wing pundits' who were the main opposers to the US getting involved in WWII, but primarily a wide range of people, and a lot from the Right Wing (Charles Lindburgh was opposed to war against Germany). In fact, the 'left wing pundits' were probably the largest individual group in the US who were supporting joining the war, especially after the invasion of the USSR.
The post-war coldwar factor could be added for the Allied player, but this will not fix much of the history hindsight bugs, just ensure that the US have to end the war by September 1945. It depends on how the Soviets are included, wether or not they would be controlled by the Allies, or seen as a foe competing for victory is another. Although you would not fight them, possibly the USSR can 'steal away' VP's from the Western Allies as well as from the Japanese?
However, I still would like to see some individual missions that would help guid the player to do realistic missions (not just sitting in the North or Marianas and bomb Japan to submission which can be done by PacWar), and give the Japanese a better way in winning other then outright victory and outright defeat, which would be done within the first year of the war, ignoring the realistic 3-4 years that it would take for the US to actually end it.
The post-war coldwar factor could be added for the Allied player, but this will not fix much of the history hindsight bugs, just ensure that the US have to end the war by September 1945. It depends on how the Soviets are included, wether or not they would be controlled by the Allies, or seen as a foe competing for victory is another. Although you would not fight them, possibly the USSR can 'steal away' VP's from the Western Allies as well as from the Japanese?
Two things.
The requirement should be by the end of 1945. In any case, the historical result (surrender in August 1945) strikes me as heavily a consequence of frequent and repeated blunders by the Japanese in multiple theaters. A good IJN player ought to be able to do better than the historical Japanese unless some really realistic and frustraing limitations are dropped in his lap.
I'm not sure why or how you'd give the USSR VPs at the expense of the Wallies. Historically the USSR could not have put together the ships and air cover to mount a amhibious invasion of much. Certainly not the main home islands. The conquests in east-central Asia were inaccessible to the Wallies, so it wouldn't seem right to penalize them for not seizing Manchuria or Mongolia.
Show me a fellow who rejects statistical analysis a priori and I'll show you a fellow who has no knowledge of statistics.
Didn't we have this conversation already?
Didn't we have this conversation already?
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Jeremy Pritchard
- Posts: 575
- Joined: Thu Sep 27, 2001 8:00 am
- Location: Ontario Canada
You could have missions for the allies like...
No Russia in Manchuria
No Russia in Korea
No Russia in the South of Karafuto
And so on...
Russia could be activated and run by the AI starting on certain dates, and if they should achieve their objectives then the Allies will loose VP's. I can see that this would not benefit the Japanese, but it would hinder the Allies. Indeed, there could not be a Soviet invasion of the Japanese homeland, but they can clean up in China and Korea, and make Japan the frontline of the Cold War, instead of Korea.
Russia would be a pain in the neck for both the Allies and Japanese. It could kill off a lot of Japanese men and equipment, plus force the Allies to rush their timetable so Communism will not be fully entrenched in Northeast Asia.
It would be just another reason to be against the Allies sitting and waiting until 1944 to start their attack on Japan when they have a ton of men and equipment to overwhelm them wherever.
Indeed, the Japanese player will probably play a lot better then their historical counterparts, primarily due to the lack of incompetence as well as the benefit of historical hindsight. If these mission VP's are done flexibly enough, not relying solely on activation dates, but activation events as well, you can have both sides clamoring for victory in the last few months of 1945.
However, this discussion is all pretty much trivial, as the game is probably too far along to incorporate its ideas. However, I do feel that this game will have better victory contitions then Pacific War did, and even these were not 'too bad'.
No Russia in Manchuria
No Russia in Korea
No Russia in the South of Karafuto
And so on...
Russia could be activated and run by the AI starting on certain dates, and if they should achieve their objectives then the Allies will loose VP's. I can see that this would not benefit the Japanese, but it would hinder the Allies. Indeed, there could not be a Soviet invasion of the Japanese homeland, but they can clean up in China and Korea, and make Japan the frontline of the Cold War, instead of Korea.
Russia would be a pain in the neck for both the Allies and Japanese. It could kill off a lot of Japanese men and equipment, plus force the Allies to rush their timetable so Communism will not be fully entrenched in Northeast Asia.
It would be just another reason to be against the Allies sitting and waiting until 1944 to start their attack on Japan when they have a ton of men and equipment to overwhelm them wherever.
Indeed, the Japanese player will probably play a lot better then their historical counterparts, primarily due to the lack of incompetence as well as the benefit of historical hindsight. If these mission VP's are done flexibly enough, not relying solely on activation dates, but activation events as well, you can have both sides clamoring for victory in the last few months of 1945.
However, this discussion is all pretty much trivial, as the game is probably too far along to incorporate its ideas. However, I do feel that this game will have better victory contitions then Pacific War did, and even these were not 'too bad'.
Jeremy:
The conversation on this thread may have run well past my comments on victory conditions, but I want to respond anyway.
Again, my version of the victory conditions assume the objectives of each side are to (i) force the enemy to surrender and (ii) at the least cost to one's own forces. The U.S. should force Japan to surrender - naturally. Who wins is based on (i) how long it takes America to win and (ii) the casualties suffered on each side. Forcing a surrender in August 45 with historical casualties on each side results in a draw. Winning in a shorter time provides more points for the U.S.; winning in a longer time provides points to the Japanese.
Balanced against time are casualties. The difference between my idea and the normal model is that, rather than earning points by destroying the enemy, you lose points by taking casualties. If the U.S. wins in August 45 but suffers 20,000 more casualties, it will lose unless the Japanese has suffered X casualties more than was historical.
For the U.S., this is a historical balance. If you can win and not take casualties, that's smart, and you might try, say, island hopping to take territory and reduce casualties. The Japanese didn't historically have the same kind of concern for casualties, so call reducing casualties a victory for the post war economy.
But who cares? Matrix is going to do its thing. I just don't want to lose victory points because the computer asked me to take Bora Bora when that doesn't fit my strategic plan to take Los Angeles.
The conversation on this thread may have run well past my comments on victory conditions, but I want to respond anyway.
Again, my version of the victory conditions assume the objectives of each side are to (i) force the enemy to surrender and (ii) at the least cost to one's own forces. The U.S. should force Japan to surrender - naturally. Who wins is based on (i) how long it takes America to win and (ii) the casualties suffered on each side. Forcing a surrender in August 45 with historical casualties on each side results in a draw. Winning in a shorter time provides more points for the U.S.; winning in a longer time provides points to the Japanese.
Balanced against time are casualties. The difference between my idea and the normal model is that, rather than earning points by destroying the enemy, you lose points by taking casualties. If the U.S. wins in August 45 but suffers 20,000 more casualties, it will lose unless the Japanese has suffered X casualties more than was historical.
For the U.S., this is a historical balance. If you can win and not take casualties, that's smart, and you might try, say, island hopping to take territory and reduce casualties. The Japanese didn't historically have the same kind of concern for casualties, so call reducing casualties a victory for the post war economy.
But who cares? Matrix is going to do its thing. I just don't want to lose victory points because the computer asked me to take Bora Bora when that doesn't fit my strategic plan to take Los Angeles.
Maybe you're referring to someone else, but I'm not advocating victory points for holding certain objectives. Other than maybe recapturing the Philippines, I can't think of any strategic objectives that the Allies had in Europe or the Pacific that was an objective solely for a propoganda victory. As far as I'm concerned the Allies' advance was a logical progression of steps to end the war as quickly as possible with the fewest casualties. Rome and Paris were certainly great propaganda cities worth a ton of victory points, but the Allies did not focus on them as an objective to be achieved in themselves. Instead, North Africa was consolidated, Sicily captured, and an organized (uninspired) advance up the Italian peninsula was the strategy. Likewise, the Allies (wisely) opted not to invade France in 1943 (passing up a year's worth of VPs in France) and consolidated its Normandy holdings and the channel ports before going for Paris.Originally posted by Jeremy Pritchard
If Territorial and casualty VP's are only counted at the point of occupation (i.e., you only get points if you occupy a base) then this is what will happen.
I'm not sure I believe there should be any victory points for taking any objective. Resources locations should be an objective only because, by possessing them, it deprives the enemy of resources and thus shortens the war or the enemy's ability to wage war. Cities like Singapore are valuable as ports. I do not believe the Allies should be rewarded for recapturing Singapore if it does nothing to help the war effort and extends the length of the war by two months. The reward for capturing Singapore is that you either shorten the war or reduce casualties in the long run. As a bona fide war objective, Singapore is a Chimera except to the extent that its port or airfields are of value in furthering the tangible war effort.
In summary, there are no intermediate objectives - just as you say. But there are no last day objectives either. When Japan surrenders, the sole factors determining victory are time and casualties. Theoretically, this could lead to odd results such as America winning in '44 with miraculously few casualties while Japan possesses Australia and India. Presumably, India and Australia are valuable enough as bases from which to start a war-winning advance and as a source of forces and resources to be worth defending.