Japanese Victory?

[Jeremy Pritchard]

Originally posted by byron13
Jeremy:

The conversation on this thread may have run well past my comments on victory conditions, but I want to respond anyway.

Again, my version of the victory conditions assume the objectives of each side are to (i) force the enemy to surrender and (ii) at the least cost to one's own forces. The U.S. should force Japan to surrender - naturally. Who wins is based on (i) how long it takes America to win and (ii) the casualties suffered on each side. Forcing a surrender in August 45 with historical casualties on each side results in a draw. Winning in a shorter time provides more points for the U.S.; winning in a longer time provides points to the Japanese.

Balanced against time are casualties. The difference between my idea and the normal model is that, rather than earning points by destroying the enemy, you lose points by taking casualties. If the U.S. wins in August 45 but suffers 20,000 more casualties, it will lose unless the Japanese has suffered X casualties more than was historical.

For the U.S., this is a historical balance. If you can win and not take casualties, that's smart, and you might try, say, island hopping to take territory and reduce casualties. The Japanese didn't historically have the same kind of concern for casualties, so call reducing casualties a victory for the post war economy.

But who cares? Matrix is going to do its thing. I just don't want to lose victory points because the computer asked me to take Bora Bora when that doesn't fit my strategic plan to take Los Angeles.

This is actually the basic concept behind PacWar's victory system. It was ok, but really is not a driving force to do anything but to kill enemy troops. Although killing the enemy is an objective, it is an objective really pressed by the US in Vientam. Capturing and defending territory was a very powerful influence in the Pacific War, but is not represented in a game that deals with absolute values of territory and combat losses to determine who wins.

Realistically, the US was more sensitive to casualties then the Japanese, but this sensitivity is really overblown by history. The US military was very willing to invade the Japanese Home Islands, which would have made WWII the bloodiest war the US participated in (beating out the US Civil War). Had the Atomic Bomb not have been built, Operation Coronet would have taken place, without much complaint from the US population. It is not the casualties that the US public dislikes, it is casulaties for a war without a cause (Korea had about as many casualties as Vietnam, in a much shorter timeframe as well, but there was little opposition to Korea as it had a defined mission). Including this into the game will just be an incorrorect way in giving Japan a way to win.

Possibly this is a way in determining the victor in the game, but I feel that casualties will mainly increase timid fighting, particularly on the side of the United States. The US will attack, but will wait until they have overwhelming superiority, as most of them would do in PacWar. Also, once Japan loses their ability to really harm the USN, then what is the point about trying to win when casualty points is all that matters? Invariably, wherever the Allies attack (as they historically did), they will have overwhelming firepower, and casualties will always be in their favour.

Really, without something beyond territory and casulaty VP's the game will never be played out to its fullest, as who would want to play a game where you know you are going to lose anyway? It is very hard as the Japanese to inflict casualties on the Allies after 1944. Allied quality and quantity really knocks Japan to the floor. You will really just end up with a bunch of games that are won in 1942, and neither player finishes the game, as it is already a foregone conclusion once all of the Japanese Carriers are sunk.

This is the main problem that I have found in 8 years of playing Pacific War. Most games are called at around January 1943, when realistically Japan could hang on until 1945, but would still lose. With just casualty and territory points, the game is very simple in how you win, and if done correctly, will have the US doing it all the time.

Also, many people don't seem to understand the missions. YOU DON'T HAVE TO DO THEM, you would just get extra points beyond casualties and territory if you did do them. You can just go to LA if you want, and be thrown into the sea, ignoring Bora Bora. It is not to say that you must do these things, but doing them will help you win, while not doing them won't help you lose, it will just make it tougher.

Without these missions, you will always end up with people doing things that cannot be done historically. You could not withdraw US forces from the Philippines in 1942, nor stop reinforcint Singapore. But with a system of victory JUST on territory and casualties will in fact work toward this totally unrealistic way in fighting. You will never commit troops if there is a good chance they are defeated, but historically THEY WERE OUT OF NECESSITY. How do you represent this? Give the player a reason to be 'wreckless' with their troops. Casualties and territory VP will just not do it, especially in a theatre as large as the Pacific.

Basically, what I would like to see for WitP is a series of UV games combined into one game. In UV you are given victory objectives due on a specific time. This is what WitP should be like, where you are given theatre objectives, and gain VP's for achieving them. Without this, there is no reason for you to play the game to its conclusion, nor would you want to risk any of your men or ships in the first 6 months of the war.

[byron13]

Originally posted by Jeremy Pritchard
You could have missions for the allies like...

No Russia in Manchuria
No Russia in Korea
No Russia in the South of Karafuto
And so on...

Just curious, how do the Allies keep the Russians out? I'm sure you don't intend for this to be a war objective that would force me, as the Allies, to capture Korea. It is some kind of political objective with a trigger. Not sure how you handle it, though the ticking clock may be the answer. In July 45, the Soviets do X. In September 45, the Soviets do Y. There's a penalty to the Allies if these happen so that the Allies have every incentive to move things along. For the Japanese, if he does X, the Soviets are activated, which will only cause more casualties and shorten the war, so he has every incentive to keep from doing X as well.

But, you're right. These arguments are moot and just a bunch of us spouting our brilliance. Wish the game would come out, because we've looked at every stupid aspect of the game from every conceivable angle.

Wait! We haven't talked about whether the game should have video clips and music! I strongly feel that there should be no video clips, and that only Glen Miller music should be played. I won't buy the game unless it does.

[Jeremy Pritchard]

A lot of people are getting confued over the two different victories in the game.

#1. Winning the war

#2. Winning the game

Winning the war is a foregone conclusion. 99 out of 100 it should be the Allies. 99 out of 100 Japan will not take India and/or Australia, in fact, this is impossible. Australian and British Forces in India outnumbered Japan's total committment of forces in the Pacific. They did not have the men or material to take these bases, let alone hold them and fend off the US in the rest of the Pacific. It could be done in PacWar, but it won't be possible in WitP.

Winning the war will be limited to the historical limitations that the Allies will overwhelm the Japanese, there is no way that Japan will come out of this war better then before it. They will lose, and it will be total.

Winning the game is based around the Player's ability to either beat the Japanese by holding out longer (in Singapore, Bataan, East Indies, Burma, etc...) and having a quicker comeback (back to the Philippines in 1943 instead of 1944). Invariably the US will be at Japan's door, either in 1943 or 1945. The Japanese can win due to a combination of things, as defeating the Allies better in 1942 along with holding them off longer, or as long (if they managed to do better in 1942) then historically.

There must be a difference between the two, as they are two separate things. Many people heavily overestimate the ability of Japan to invade India, Australia or the West Coast. One of these might have been possible had Japan not been heavily invested in China, but if they were not in China, there would not have been a Pacific War. Japan cannot win the war, but they can win the game (if a specific form of VP's are instituted).

[Jeremy Pritchard]

Originally posted by byron13


Just curious, how do the Allies keep the Russians out? I'm sure you don't intend for this to be a war objective that would force me, as the Allies, to capture Korea. It is some kind of political objective with a trigger. Not sure how you handle it, though the ticking clock may be the answer. In July 45, the Soviets do X. In September 45, the Soviets do Y. There's a penalty to the Allies if these happen so that the Allies have every incentive to move things along. For the Japanese, if he does X, the Soviets are activated, which will only cause more casualties and shorten the war, so he has every incentive to keep from doing X as well.

But, you're right. These arguments are moot and just a bunch of us spouting our brilliance. Wish the game would come out, because we've looked at every stupid aspect of the game from every conceivable angle.

Wait! We haven't talked about whether the game should have video clips and music! I strongly feel that there should be no video clips, and that only Glen Miller music should be played. I won't buy the game unless it does.

You keep them out by defeating Japan before they invade Korea. If you let the game go into late 1945, then you let Russia get all of Korea.

[wpurdom]

Jeremy's approaches may work for a scenario where one commands a small part of the front, but most of these ideas seem too artifical. The British committed the forces they did to Malaya, not because there was a political benefit in delaying the Japanese at the cost of those formations but because they thought they could win. A sensible strategy does not commit British and Aussie divisions there. Holding Singapore another month or two does not represent any sort of victory for the British.

[Jeremy Pritchard]

That is what is wrong with the game.

The British defended Singapore knowing that it was almost ready to fall. Just like the US decided to send troops to the Philippines instead of pulling them out in 1941, fully knowing that they were not to be relieved. It was political, Churchill was determined that Singapore not fall as it would, and did, SEVERELY damage British reputation in the region. Not going back to the Philippines would have resulted in major relation problems between the Filipino's and Americans, resulting in possibly the loss of a post war Philippines being a major US military base.

Should we IGNORE the FACT that not reinforcing Singapore was IMPOSSIBLE? That not going back to the Philippines was also impossible? Why play a Pacific War game where you must rely on house rules to fight a game that remotely follows the progress of the war?

These points will guide the players away from just having games based on casualties and capturing random bases. In fact, these missions will WORK PERFECTLY with a large scale game such as War in the Pacific. They have worked in other larger scale games (Europa Universalis II for example), and without them there would be no 'drive' to do anything even remotely historic. These missions worked brilliantly. You didn't have to follow them, and you could take a completely different route, but following them would be another way in getting you to win, other then just going 180 degrees from history ALL OF THE TIME.

These VP's have NOTHING TO DO WITH VICTORY IN THE PACIFIC. It is a foregone conclusion that Japan will lose, and will lose totally. There must be a way to get players playing the game from 1941-1945 when you know that Japan will lose in 1941. Otherwize, as I have said countless times, PBEM games will perpetually be done by late 1942, as why would the Japanese player waste their time?

Ask most players of Pacific War, who have played the game since the early 1990's, and they will say that some of the major problems in the game is that with only calculating Casualties and Territory control there is no reason to do anything remotely historic.

NOT ONE SINGLE PBEM GAME HAS EVER GONE BEYOND 1943 IN PAC WAR IN ANY AAR IN THE PAST 8+ YEARS.

Tell me some other better solution that will keep the games lasting beyond the first major battle?

ALL THAT I WANT IS A REASON TO DO THINGS! Not force you to do the same thing every time, just to make following a similar course of history to pay off, while as it stands, completely going against history is the only way that it pays off.

This is a War game on an epic scale. You are a top military commander, but EVERY top commander knows that they do not dictate everything. There are reasons why things happen, and do not happen, and without these reasons, this is not a wargame representing the Pacific War from 1941-1945.

[mogami]

Greetings, While I did not always post AAR's for all my Pac War PBEM games I did have many go well beyond 1943. As Japan I always fought till the game ended. In my last PBEM game as Japan I was playing Frank (from Germany) This game was past the 200th turn when UV was released and I still answered every turn while mainly playing UV. The situation was pretty hopeless for Japan but I was still trying to achieve minor victories.
How to decide who is winning a game of WITP is an interesting question. We all know the allies if they stay the course will be able to defeat Japan. Japan on the other hand has no hope of forcing Allied surrender. Therefore the victory conditions have to be Japanese improved performance. Japan will have to be the measuring stick. If the Japanese can increase the time period where they possess a valid offensive threat they should score points. If Japan can hold the outer defensive perimeter past a certain date they should score points. If the Japanese can keep their economy producing they score points. IMO Japanese performance should be the starting point. If they do better they score VP likewise the Allies preventing this scores points for them.
20/20 hindsight almost assures the Japanese player will do better. The Allies in their turn know certain things that should be avoided.
In many games ships/tanks/aircraft are assigned victory points for their destruction. The Japanese naval units should be assigned higher ratings then similar allied units simply because they cannot be replaced.
The Japanese should be penalized for losing these irreplaceable assets and at the same time pay cheaper costs for those units that they did possess in numbers. (Japanese infantry should not be as costly in VP as US infantry-while the US certainly had no shortage of manpower they were not as able after the opening period to throw it away)
Perhaps dividing the period covered by the war into periods or phases and assigning VP for locations and units within each period and ending the game if one side or the other achieves a certain ratio. (Singapore is more valuable from Dec 41 to May 42 then afterwards.) Japanese CV are more valuable before mid 43 (when Allied numbers means almost certain defeat. The Allied player who can sink them sooner scores more points for doing so
There is plenty of time to debate this subject and it is certainly one worthy of open and honest discussion.

[Drongo]

Posted by Mogami

In many games ships/tanks/aircraft are assigned victory points for their destruction. The Japanese naval units should be assigned higher ratings then similar allied units simply because they cannot be replaced.

Isn't that a bit harsh? I understand your rationale but since the Japanese player can't normally replace his losses in naval units anyway, each ship sunk penalises him more than an equivalent ship loss for the allies (certainly the US) without the need for losing extra VP's.

The Japanese player will know that he has to survive pretty much with what he starts with. If you upped the VP cost for a ship sunk, you might force the Japanese player to have to play more cautiously than historical.

Unrelated question,
have Matrix given any indication as to how victory in WitP will be established? Will it be along the same lines as UV?

[Jeremy Pritchard]

Originally posted by Drongo
Posted by Mogami


Isn't that a bit harsh? I understand your rationale but since the Japanese player can't normally replace his losses in naval units anyway, each ship sunk penalises him more than an equivalent ship loss for the allies (certainly the US) without the need for losing extra VP's.

The Japanese player will know that he has to survive pretty much with what he starts with. If you upped the VP cost for a ship sunk, you might force the Japanese player to have to play more cautiously than historical.

Unrelated question,
have Matrix given any indication as to how victory in WitP will be established? Will it be along the same lines as UV?

That's the problem. When it comes down to casualty points determining the victor of the game, it will undoubtedly result in players being more cautious in their attacks, waiting, as the US, until they have overwhelming numbers and quality to smash the Japanese. The Japanese will also have no reason in risking their ships in order to sink an equal or more of their opponent, as once their ships are gone, the replacements have no way in catching up.

[Toro]

jjjanos had a concept.

I've played some game in the past (can't recall the title, though) in which a player was given VPs EACH TURN for holding positions. And, once these VPs were earned, they were never "lost" by losing control of that position. This would extend well, I think, to this situation.

I believe everyone is in consensus that Japan could not win this war. The US production might was just too large. However, Japan's hopes were that they could achieve an armistice through damage and intrinsic victory.

If every major position, whether city/port or resource center, were given a VP value, and each "turn" (month?) this value was awarded to the owner, and once awarded, those points were not lost, this would provide for the following strategies:

1. Japan to expand as quickly as possible.
2. The Allies to counter as quickly as possible.
3. Japan to hold their expansion as long as possible.

The effects are similar to what several posters have noted as "victory conditions." First, an extended delaying tactic for Japan would award them more points, extend the war, whatever. Second, the Allies would be driven to protect critical areas, or recapture them as quickly as possible.

Of course, additional points should be awarded to damaged/destroyed units.

Thoughts?

[jjjanos]

The war that the IJE started was due to a gross miscalculation of the US industrial might and our willingness to see the war to an end given the attack on Pearl Harbor. Given the attack on Pearl, the US was not goint to accept anything other than total victory or total victory while allowing the Emperor to remain on the Throne.

That statement defines the victory conditions for the game. The IJE player is NOT going to win the war. He might win the game. When starting the Grand Campaign, IJE players must recognize that, unless they have inflicted huge casualties without proportional losses, they will be on the defensive starting in 1943. If they cannot accept that, then do not play the IJE in a Grand Campaign.

As for victory in a game, designers can schedule their victory conditions on the likely impact on the post war situation. Thus, a IJE player is not trying to win the war... he is trying to win the game by causing the western allies to lose the peace.

The minor contributions of the Soviets gave them the rest of Sakhalin and the Kurile Islands. The Soviets landed troops in Japan after the armistice in an attempt to claim an occupation zone. MacArthur booted them out, I believe without asking for permission. A more substantial contribution by the Soviets - as in armor spearheads in Southern China, etc. not only would have resulted in a quicker Communist victory in the Chinese Civil War, but would have built great international pressure to grant an occupation zone in Japan. Such pressure would have impacted the post-war situation.

A land invasion of Japan would have had significant impacts on the willingness of the US to get involved in cold war hot spots. Approx. 55K killed in Vietnam constrained our willingness to get involved in conflict for decades. One million plus casualties invading Japan would have had the same impact.

In addition, the European Powers did undertake campaigns for political, i.e. colonial, reasons. The liberation of Burma contributed nothing to the defeat of Japan. By Feb. 1945, the start of the liberation, Leyte and Samar were "clean." Mindoro had been invaded. A breakout had occured on Luzon. Iwo Jima would be invaded in mid-February. The recapture of Burma did nothing to further the subsequent campaigns. The IJA troops in Burma were not going to get back to Japan to fight in the last campaigns.

Commonwealth troops were planning landing in Malay - I do not recall if these were done before the end of the war. These campaigns would have added nada to the defeat of Japan.

These campaigns, however, would have restored some of the prestige that was lost as a result of the defeat of the Europeans by Asians. By both showing that the Europeans were willing to take casualties to "free" their subjects and to restore the appearance of European power.

The only way that I can see to balance the need to conquer Japan before the Soviets muck up the post-war situation, limit heavy casualties and encourage an Allied player to consider the political constraints he should face is to award VPS is the method I discussed earlier.

To win the game, you need to win the peace.

[Nikademus]

Originally posted by Jeremy Pritchard


That's the problem. When it comes down to casualty points determining the victor of the game, it will undoubtedly result in players being more cautious in their attacks, waiting, as the US, until they have overwhelming numbers and quality to smash the Japanese. The Japanese will also have no reason in risking their ships in order to sink an equal or more of their opponent, as once their ships are gone, the replacements have no way in catching up.

But is that caution necessarily a bad thing? This turn in the discussion reminds me of a minor complaint arising out of UV of late in which both side's are able to conduct, in some cases, very accelerated and sustained offensive drives due to the everlasting supply situation.

Obviously this wont be an issue in WitP but the tendancy for players to use their forces much more agressively than historical remains for the simple reason that to them(us), there is no negative consequence to the potential losses other than (possibly) losing the game. No public outcry or higher placed authority can yank you from your position as CiC if you gamble and things go badly.

So......maybe the idea of increased VP for ship losses is a good idea after all? Mogami has a point about penalizing the Japanese more for this since their forces are so finite.....a disaster on the scale of say, "Midway" could be reflected well by a gaggle of VP going to the Allied player.

The Allied player on the same token can afford to absorb more losses as many replacements on the way, but to prevent on their end this same disregard for caution due to lack of consequence, one might have Event triggers in place that would award Japan VP's if losses either become too high or remain high over a certain length of time.

[Jeremy Pritchard]

I really disagree on the US pulling out if casualties were excessive.

WWI: 100 000 casualties over 1 year.
WWII: 250 000 casualties over 3 years.
Korean War: 50 000 casualties over 3 years.
Vietnam War: 50 000 casualties over 9 years.

The concept that the US will pull out of the war because of heavy casualties is not based in fact. The only war in the 20th Century that they have fought that resulted in a defeat because of war weariness was the Vietnam war. This was NOT because of the casualty rates (as it had the absolute lowest casualty rate of any American war to that date), but rather due to the media influencing the public to what war actually is (not hidden away by John Wayne propaganda), along with the fact that there was no real reason for the US to be in Vietnam, along with the duration of a 9 year war.

Saying that the US would fold in WWII due to high military casualty rates is just like saying it would fold to terrorism had the US experienced very high casualty rates in Afghanistan. We all know that the driving force behind the US in these circumstances basically destroys any validity in the public eye of opposition to the war. After Pearl Harbour virtually all of the isolationists either disappeared or converted to war hawks.

Realistically, it is impossible for Japan to gain a positive kill ratio primarily due to the following factors.

#1. They are outnumbered as of late 1942.

#2. Virtually every piece of equipment used by the US surpasses the quality of the Japanese by early 1943.

#3. The Japanese had prepared for a short war, hoping for a US collapse (just like Hitler hoped for one in Russia).

The US submarine program alone caused more IJN shipping losses (military and civilian) then all other Allied forces combined. Japan lost 2000 merchant vessels in WW2, the Allies lost about 1:10th of that in the Pacific. The Japanese premise was that the US would get tired of fighting the war if it must fight to the death for every island. This actually did not require that US casualties be higher then Japanese casualties, just that the US casualties be high enough to cause them to pull out due to pressure. However, that pressure NEVER EXISTED in the United States. There was reason enough to fight and win this war at ANY cost, and the propagandists made the population very pro-war and pro-government.

There is no historical basis for the US to experience problems faced in a different war, in a different time, under completely different situations to fit in the WW2 Pacific theatre.

[Jeremy Pritchard]

Ok, let me say this one more time as you guys are really confused to the difference of winning the war and winning a game.

To win the war, Japan must be defeated, or they must somehow gain an armistice. I really do not know how the Japanese can gain an armistice. Tell me a situation where the US would sue for peace. Please.

Winning in the game should not necessarily be total defeat or total victory, like winning the war must be. There must be marjins on how the game tells which side is the winner.

Will casualties do this?

No.

It won't do this because it is much easier for one side to inflict casualties on the other.


Will territory value do this?

No.

The most valuable territory is continually in the posession of one side.


The Japanese believed that the US would fold, but this was a false belief, so we should not use a false belief in a game meant to represent history. It would be like giving one side weapons what the other thought it was equipped with.


Each nation had a timeplan for scheduled invasions as well as requirements for troop replacement and reolcation after a campaign had ended.

EVERY war had these pressures of time nagging its commanders. I don't think there is a single military history book that does not say that the driving force behind military blunders and briliant actions is that commanders are pressed for time. In order to make up this time, they must do daring and dangerous things. Sometimes they succeede (MacArthur at Inchon), and sometimes they fail (Montgomery at Arnhem). Without any sort of VP mission, with some sort of time penalty or driving force, you will just end up with a calculated form of gameplay, with your only driving force being to kill your enemy. Killing your enemy is part of war, but is not the only thing in war. Achieving concrete goals is the driving force behind wars before Vietnam (where this current thought of kill ratios means you win the war began).

Why retake the Philippines? To cut off supply from the East Indies to Japan.

Will the US do this anyway? Yes.

So what is the point of playing when it comes down to the basic point that kill points and basic territory points will just lead to US victories in the game?

[wpurdom]

"The British defended Singapore knowing that it was almost ready to fall. Just like the US decided to send troops to the Philippines instead of pulling them out in 1941, fully knowing that they were not to be relieved. It was political, Churchill was determined that Singapore not fall as it would, and did, SEVERELY damage British reputation in the region. Not going back to the Philippines would have resulted in major relation problems between the Filipino's and Americans, resulting in possibly the loss of a post war Philippines being a major US military base."

I disagree entirely with this assessment about Singapore and partly about the Phillipines. With respect to Singapore, Churchill initially expected to win. He felt that the Japanese air power was a very limited, wasting asset and the presence of just a few modern aircraft would be decisive. Similarly he felt that the presence of a BB, BC and CV would have a major strategic impact in slowing down the Japanese advance and making amphibious landings questionable. On the ground, he had no reason to think he wouldn't have superiority to what Japanese logistics would allow to go up against him (numbers weren't the problem on the ground in Malaya). He was remembering the success of the British in the Mediterranean with a bold front against the Italians at long odds. Had Churchill understood the situation, he would have cut his losses in Singapore with perhaps a greater effort in Burma - the fall of Singapore was a great deal more politically disasterous due to the commitment made. Churchill didn't send the Prince of Wales and the Repulse to Singapore as a symbolic effort. In contrast, he was quite put out that the symbolic garrison in Hong Kong was not reduced per his wishes.
With respect to the Phillipines, the judgment must be more mixed. Originally the Phillipines was understood to be a write-off. Some protions of the U.S. military, particularly the Navy continued that judgment. But then the dazzlement of the assurances of MacArthur as to the readiness of the Phillipine army, a gross over-assessment of the value of the B-17, particularly in the anti-ship role, and MacArthur's own prestige led to an evaluation that the Phillipines could be held, particularly if was started after April 1942. The decision was quickly reversed after the war began and Eisenhower was placed in charge of assessing what could be done for the Phillipines. But consider, The Phiilipine Army greatly outnumbered the invading Japs; if the Phillipine Army formations had really been comparable to the Phillipine Scout formations as MacArthur's fantasy explanations were suggesting, the 12 or so light divisions available would have precluded a successful Japanese invasion until the collapse of the overall defense of the Allies around them would have allowed the Japs to finish them off.
Of course, once troops had already been deployed, political as well as military constraints probably prevented evacuation. I wonder what scale of evacuation from Singapore or the Phillipines would have really been feasible once the hopelessness of each situation actually penetrated. I suspect not much, and a partial evacuation would surely have lead to a rapid collapse of the bulk of forces left behind. Further, the theater commander could not make an assessment different from the Central government, but then who the hell are we, the players, in WitP anyway? (see below)

In some ways, the analysis of fantasy vs. reality is amusing. WitP will be a fantasy game, no matter how you look at it:
1. Who is the Allied player supposed to be, anyhow? You have a scope and freedom of maneuver not found short of the Combined Chiefs of Staff. I don't know if it will be possible to put theatres on AI like in PW, but who did that for more than an ocassional experiment, anyway? The Japanese side is almost as bad, totally wiping out the lack of cooperation or even sharing of basic intelligence between the Army and the Navy. These structural rigidities were every bit as fundamental as many of the constraints we debate as to whether eliminating them makes the game ahistorical.
2. One day turns will exasperate the unreality of command power. Of course those who say 7 day turns with daily combat result cycles make the tactical maneuvers not have the "feel" of WWII maneuvers may be quite right, but in any event, it is quite clear that Nimitz, for instance, could not make the decision as to how long the CV's could stay off Guadalcanal and how long the unloading should be supported. With 1-day turns we will be commanding right down to the fleet level, with "perfect harmony." I'm not saying that this is bad for the game, just unrealistic.
3. Players have way too much information. Even the fleet CO doesn't know just what the morale and fatigue of all his pilots are, hell the pilots don't even have that information. Ditto for the land commander who doesn't have that immediate precise understanding of how much his troops have been hurt and Ghormley back in Noumea, not to mention Nimitz in Pearl and the Combined Chiefs in DC have a much foggier notion. The FOW as to the other side is nice, but the information about your own side is phenomenal and even without the other's sides information gives you a very good feel for precisely what is working and not in very great detail. Sometimes the people on the spot had no idea what was happening - was it a sub or a Long Lance or your own jettisoned torpedo that just hit (the DD helping the Hornet is an example). We may cover up the precise impact on the opponents, but we sure don't bring in the noise of a real situation.
We could go on and on along this vein and bring up many matters in the game mechanics we all anticipate that are just as "unrealistic" as alternate starts, an unconstrained strategy, production variations or the like. Which constraints you feel are essential to the game and which interfere with one's enjoyment of it are matters on which no one will agree. And as a group, we would generally prefer omnipotence and detail and abhor the frustrations of real war where friction interferes with all plans and all plans go out the window when friction and the enemy conspire unfairly.
All that being said, one point Jeremy said I definitely agree to. The design team needs to be true to their own vision of this much awaited fantasy game and not mingle fantasies that don't fit in with their visions. As the best trial lawyer in Georgia stated - "you have to have your on vision of the story you will be telling and do nothing that doesn't fit into that story. If you see an opportunity to go off your story, no matter how tempting it is, no matter how smart it makes you look, or how bad it makes the other side look, if it doesn't fit with your story, don't do it." To some extent they can accomodate matters through a decent (supported) editor, to some extent they can let other people have their dreams through scenarios or options, but if it detracts from their story, or just consumes too much of their energy on peripheral matters, the game will be the less for it.

[wpurdom]

If we are going to be fancy about victory assessments, I would suggest some permanent VP's depending upon the situation in October 1942 (mid-term elections and the competing interest of North Africa), January 1944 (competition with the European front - last chance to divert forces between theaters) and October 1944 (presidential election) as well as overall success. Oil locations could have their own time schedule to reflect Japanese constraints unless they are otherwise built into the game logistics. This would give the Allies more incentive to fight early rather than just wait until they build strength, if you are worried about that. (I mainly fought against the AI and there you are aggressive early because its cheaper that way).
I use October rather than November for elections because of the need for lead time for political reaction to success or failure.

[Piiska]

I can see a condition where Japanese player would be able to get a peace treaty in such terms that it would be better off after the war than before it (my definition of Japanese victory): If American troops are not CLEARLY winning by the time the war in Europe starts to turn to race against communism -rather than Germany. (Sorry Aussies, Kiwis Poms & co for excluding your contribution to the war and focusing solely on U.S)

Historically U.S didn’t have to pull out from the Pacific because they were clearly starting to win after Guadalcanal. Losses were moderate, even small, and by 1944 it was obvious that Japan would fall sooner rather than later. In this historical reality, U.S had no concern that war effort in Pacific would severely hinder the winning of the peace. In such a situation there was no pressure to pull out, as the victory was behind the corner and U.S had clear visibility to there.

However, IF U.S had lost, for example, in Guadalcanal (as it can happen in the game), or botched the invasion of Truk, and suffered more significant losses in the progress; the political situation might have been different by 1944.

If by 1944 the Japanese player has managed to hold more ground than historically (can happen), still has operative forces left that could be considered a significant threat (can happen) or significant delay, and has caused more losses to U.S (also can happen) the political climate could be VERY different to what it was historically.

I know that even in this scenario U.S would eventually gain the unconditional surrender. No question about it. But historically speaking, miscalculations about the enemy’s capability to continue the war have happened before.

For example, Soviet Union during the WW II made a peace treaty twice with Finland (1940 and 1944), due to heavy losses they suffered in relation what they had achieved; and both times our troops very at the very verge of collapse.

Both times our troops would not have been able to carry on the war for more than few months maximum – according to some estimates not even two weeks. However, Russians didn’t know how bleak our military’s state was.

They only knew that they were running out of time (politically) and had taken severe losses, thus signing a peace treaty that granted them the formal victory, but not the victory they wanted.

In this case Finns won. In spite of losing significant land areas, we achieved our main goal that was to maintain our independency (-victory, possibly only a marginal). While Soviet won some land and political influence, its ultimate goal remained unfulfilled as it was not able to carry out the total conquest of Finland (marginal defeat, possibly defeat).

I bet you a hay penny that Russians were/are way less sensitive about loss of material and life than Americans are, and if they pull out of a campaign against country size of Finland, think about U.S in a theatre size of pacific against much larger armed force than the meager (but brave ) forces Finland had against Soviet Union.

Similar situation could happen in Pacific. Japan surrenders eventually, but it can happen in such a manner that it keeps the areas that are not important for the Allies. At least the areas that are not so important, that allied would have a desire to risk losses and prolonged war to get them in the context of upcoming cold war.

I really want to stress, that as long as U.S has a perceived CLEAR victory in a short time frame it would never make a peace treaty. However, IF the Japanese player 1944 still poses a CREDIBLE threat to U.S war machine, the political sentiments might favor preparation to 3rd world war, rather than trying to fight over ‘less significant’ Pacific area.

In this case Japan might be able to lose the war and surrender, but conditionally, so that it maintains some of the land gains it sought when starting the war. This way Japan is better of after the war and this would grant it a victory.

[mdiehl]

I really disagree on the US pulling out if casualties were excessive.

I have to agree with you on that Jeremy. To your list you can add the War of the Rebellion. The putative CSA basically played the same hand that the IJE attempted to play -- "A series of defeats and casualty fatigue *ought* to force the enemy into an armistace." Japan *could* have known that U.S. battle fatigue was a hopelessly unattainable fantasy from the start.

However, IF the Japanese player 1944 still poses a CREDIBLE threat to U.S war machine, the political sentiments might favor preparation to 3rd world war, rather than trying to fight over ‘less significant’ Pacific area.

Maybe, but I really doubt it. Unless you posit that there are abslutely no circumstances that can be reasonably portrayed as an Allied victory of one kind or another, *and* if you can hide (as the Japanese player) the POW war crimes, then you might get an armistice. Again, the War of the Rebellion provides a good political model, IMO.

[Jeremy Pritchard]

Actually, in the United States Civil War is probably more likely that the CSA would get something other then Unconditional Surrender then the Japanese. Had McClelland been elected as Democrat leader in the north, he might have offered an armistice should Grant not have been as successful. However, this is a big might, but WAY more possible then the US offering peace in WW2 without total victory.

I think that the difference between the USCW and WW2 is primarily because of the reasons for war. The reasons for WW2 are actually stronger then the USCW. Why fight to force another group of people to remain as a part of your nation? Or, why fight to gain the freedom for people in this nation that separated? Realistically, the USCW was a war over idealism and morality, where WW2 was a war more out of vengeance (against the Pearl Harbour attack), while the war against Hitler was more out of idealism and morality.

Realistically too, nations tend not to fight harder due to ill treatment of their soldiers in enemy POW's. One could argue that the North and South's treatment of their POW's in the USCW was as harsh as the Japanese treatment of POW's. However, the driving force behind winning these wars was not to avenge POW suffering, but to win political goals.

Still, I do not believe that the US would necessarily sue for anything other then total unconditional surrender. HOWEVER, should the Pearl Harbour attack not take place, the existence of an isolationist movement would be a powerful force against a long and bloody US involvement in the Pacific, as there would be no single incident to unite the US population.

[TIMJOT]

I really do not know how the Japanese can gain an armistice. Tell me as situation where the US would sue for peace. Please.

I really can think of only one slightly possible situation where Japan might have been able to gain an armistice in a war with the USA. That is by not going to war with the US. What I mean by that,is for Japan not attack the US and instead just attack the colonial powers. The US would have two options. One; draw a line in the eastern pacific and give as much aid to the UK and Dutch as possible without actually going to war. Or two declare war on Japan even though the US hasnt been attacked. In the former its doubtful any amount of aid available in 41/42 could have stopped Japan from conquereing SE Asia.

In the latter, even if FDR could somehow finagle a DOW, it is very doubtful that it would have full public support given the sentiments of the time. Certainly no where near the indignation and national uproar in the aftermath of PH. In this situation where portions of the public might see this war as strictly a war of colonialism or merely a matter of one colonial power supplanting another colonial power. Then yes, its possible that major defeats accompanying ever growing casualties, might have brought the US to the negotiating table.

Korea and Vietnam come to mind as examples of unpopular wars that ended up in armistices. Mainly because large portions of the population simply did not understand why the wars were being fought or believed were not neccessary in defending America.

In fact the only other two *major* wars that I can think of, that the US got involved in without being directly attacked; the War of 1812 and Persian Gulf ended in armistices. I discount WW1 because the sinking of US ships was considered by most as acts of war and even that ended in an armistice (albeit not a favorable one).