Japanese Victory?

[TIMJOT]

Sorry Jeremy, I didnt see your last post. It seems we are in agreement.

[byron13]

Originally posted by Jeremy Pritchard


That's the problem. When it comes down to casualty points determining the victor of the game, it will undoubtedly result in players being more cautious in their attacks, waiting, as the US, until they have overwhelming numbers and quality to smash the Japanese. The Japanese will also have no reason in risking their ships in order to sink an equal or more of their opponent, as once their ships are gone, the replacements have no way in catching up.

I'm just kicking a dead horse - as are we all - but I'm going to respond more time and bail from this thread.

I trust you're not lumping me in with those you accuse of not understanding the difference between winning the war and winning the game. The U.S. will certainly win the war but, as you and I have both suggested, to win the game they must surpass the job done historically. I believe this is quantified by a balance of losses on one's on side and time.

I believe these are historical incentives. Why would the U.S. not "be more cautious in [its] attacks, waiting . . . until they have overwhelming numbers and quality to smash the Japanese?" If they wait too long, they will not win the war until well after August 1945. The benefit of fewer casualties may be setoff by winning the war in a longer time - thus possibly losing the game.

Why would the Japanese risk their ships against a superior opponent? Historically, I don't believe they did after the Solomon campaign. They husbanded their surface fleet and few carriers until the Battle of the Phillipine Sea (I believe that's the right battle). Was that the right choice? Dunno. Would it be the right choice in a game? Dunno. If you don't fight, the Allies win the war sooner, which is a sure way to win the game. As in the real war, you have to pick your spots as the Japanese: sacrifice some ships here to extend the war for another month, a division there for three weeks.

I understand what you are trying to do Jeremy. I don't disagree with what you're doing. I only disagree with what I perceive to be the pervasiveness of your "missions." Even without the missions, I would still defend Singapore and the Philippines out of a sense of history, and I personally don't game the game and do wildly ahistorical things as an allowable cheat within the game's programming. You wish to force - or strongly encourage - a player to pursue political objectives that are not reflected in a pure losses and time victory determination. So long as they are limited, e.g., Singapore, Philippines, maybe Ceylon/India/Australia, and some few objectives for the Japanese, I would not object. But most of the important objectives have their own tangible value, and a player will likely fight retain them because it is cheaper and more time efficient to hold them than to retake them later. Or, in slowing the Japanese now and at this place, the tide turns sooner with the Japanese owning less real estate and allowing the Allies to win the war (and the game) that much sooner. Or, in losing India or Australia, the Allies lose a valuable source of combat capability that would speed the end of the war (and win the game). There are natural incentives to taking losses and disputing territory without assigning victory points to that territory. Again, I just don't want to be forced to fight for Midway or New Guinea if that doesn't fit into my plan.

With that, I bail and bid you all adieu.

[TIMJOT]

I think I have to come down on the side of Byron on this one. How big a problem is this anyway? I mean is any allied player worth his salt really going to just pull out his forces and wait 100 7day turns or 700 1day turn:eek: before he makes his move? Yeah its a sure fire way to win the game, but IMO I dont think most of us play these games simply to win. We play them to win well. I for one would not consider defeating a Japanese player by Aug 45 a win. Not to mention how boreing that would be.

Regarding specifics. There is, as was historically plenty of reasons for an allied player to try to hold on to Singapore. If you hold the Malaya barrier, Japan runs out of oil and you win the war in by 43 instead of 45.

If the game is modeled correctly. It should be hard but not impossible to hold the Malaya barrier in 42. Historically if the allies had been able to hold the Japanese even just to their own original time tables, there was enough reinforcements in the pipeline to possiblely make a difference.

[mdiehl]

Had McClelland been elected as Democrat leader in the north, he might have offered an armistice should Grant not have been as successful. However, this is a big might, but WAY more possible then the US offering peace in WW2 without total victory.

Mmm. Except that McClellan's election platform was pro-war, greatly annoying the (Copperhead-like) radical elements of the Democratic Party. Still, who can say what Little Mac would have done once in office. He lost his nerve on the battlefield constantly.

The parallel invites further discussion IMO. If one were to posit a sea change in public sentiment in the 1944 election, were there in fact any potential candidates in the wings that one might reasonably construe to have advocated peace, despite PH, because of the losses all around?

I think that the difference between the USCW and WW2 is primarily because of the reasons for war. The reasons for WW2 are actually stronger then the USCW. Why fight to force another group of people to remain as a part of your nation? Or, why fight to gain the freedom for people in this nation that separated? Realistically, the USCW was a war over idealism and morality, where WW2 was a war more out of vengeance (against the Pearl Harbour attack), while the war against Hitler was more out of idealism and morality.

Oh, I think there was a huge chunk of Idealism and Morality in WW2, and a huge chunk of Vengeance in the ACW. Fort Sumter was treated as a fundamental betrayal of the most egregious sort. Perhaps not as blood-boiling as PH but only because the Rebels weren't Japanese. Certainly Sherman's boys took extra pleasure in ravaging South Carolina *because* it was the head of the snake, so to speak.

Realistically too, nations tend not to fight harder due to ill treatment of their soldiers in enemy POW's. One could argue that the North and South's treatment of their POW's in the USCW was as harsh as the Japanese treatment of POW's. However, the driving force behind winning these wars was not to avenge POW suffering, but to win political goals.

Mm. Sure the driving force was political and ideological. But in both WW2 and the Rebellion, treatment of prisoners became a strong contributing secondary issue well before the last shots were fired. Andersonville certainly motivated Sherman's folks after some Andersonville escapees made it to his lines during the march through Gerogia. Similarly, Japanese conduct towards prisoners on the combat lines (and their duplicity in false surrenders) motivated US troops in WW2. Then there was one famous PI raid early in the invasion of Luzon dedicated to the liberation of an Allied POW camp (Er, the phrasing is awkward, Allied prisoners of the Japanese) because the ill-treatment of prisoners was known from several sources. The fear was that the PI POWs would be executed, and that fear it had a deterministic local effect on strategy and tactics.

Korea and Vietnam come to mind as examples of unpopular wars that ended up in armistices. Mainly because large portions of the population simply did not understand why the wars were being fought or believed were not neccessary in defending America.

Mmm. But, the Korean armistice was not signed because of US public pressure or even Allied losses. It was signed because the US and China did not really want to get into an escalated war. Viet Nam you can have as an unchallenged example.

In fact the only other two *major* wars that I can think of, that the US got involved in without being directly attacked; the War of 1812 and Persian Gulf ended in armistices. I discount WW1 because the sinking of US ships was considered by most as acts of war and even that ended in an armistice (albeit not a favorable one).

Add to those the Mexican War. Actually a very unpopular war because the Federal income tax was instituted (IRIC) to pay for it, and because no one thought it worth fighting over a chunk of the lower Rio Grande, and because many of the well-informed pundits and political leaders in Washington and in Europe expected the US to get its arse kicked. Ended of course in a huge US victory and territorial expansion. Mmm. One could argue that the Plains Wars were publicly unpopular wars that the Feds "won." (Here's hoping the current N.A. lawsuit over Interior Dept oversight of trust land swiped by the Feds under the auspices of the Dawes Act proves ultimately to be a win for the Native Americans.)

Let's see: Grenada. Not much of a war as they come, but an "unprovoked" one. Not too popular at the time on campus but I thought it a good idea. Successful conclusion from the US POV.

Operation "Get Noriega." FWIW Not much of a war, though. Another successful outcome.

The protracted PI campaign post the Spanish-American War. Ended in a US victory but more or less off the public's radar.

The post revolution invasion of the USSR you can count both as an unprovoked war and a failure. The American C/O having the sense not to commit his troops as allies of the White Russians and to get the US out without fighting. Again, pretty much off the public radar.

[TIMJOT]

I forgot about the Mexican war. Although technically that was started because of a supposedly unprovoked skirmish on the rio grande. So far as the public knew we were attacked. It was pretty popular war though. All that manifest destiny stuff and there was no shortage of volunteers. It was only after the war people started to have a bad taste in there mouths.

Your wrong about the Korean war, once the war became a stalemate and the calsualties started to pile up, the discontent at home had a lot to due with the decision to negotiate. Eisenhower made solving the Korean *problem* election campaign issue.

The Indian wars on a whole were all very popular and almost always framed as retaliation of supposedly Indian aggression.

The Philipine insurection was just that an insurection. Where the philipinoes rose up and attacked there new white masters. It didnt so much end as it just pettered out and as you said it was really bellow the radar screens of most 19 century Americans.

I did say *major wars*. Niether Grenada or Panama can really be considered war. One was more or less a giant narco bust and the other was an exercised veiled as a rescue mission. Even so if either had bogged down with escalating casualties than you better believe the out cry to get out would have been loud and clear. Just look at Somalia.

[mdiehl]

Yeah, you're right about the Mex War. The general populace followed the media, so I guess you'd call it a popular war. It did generate a very vocal and rather impressive anti-war opposition movement, though.

I can't agree on the general statement about the various campaigns against the tribes. Generally the earlier ones were more popular than the later ones, but the public sentiment gauge on these varies in time, place and by cause. Not very on-topic. The only reason why I brought them in is that many viewed them as naked territorial ambition *at the time.* Yet they were concluded to the political satisfaction of the US.

I'll agree to diasagree on Korea. True US public sentiment began to run against, but the level of opposition was not sufficient, IMO, to say that it was more important than avoiding the risk of an escalating war with China. Sans that risk, the war would have ended with a unified Korea, public sentiment about casualties or no.

The others were minor actions I agree. I know you said major. I was just rounding out the list by looking at the ones that the pub commonly know about.

[wpurdom]

“I forgot about the Mexican war. Although technically that was started because of a supposedly unprovoked skirmish on the rio grande. So far as the public knew we were attacked. It was pretty popular war though. All that manifest destiny stuff and there was no shortage of volunteers. It was only after the war people started to have a bad taste in there mouths.”

Shock! For once I find myself agreeing with mdiehl, except for his response being a little too accommodating. The Mexican War was at least as unpopular as Vietnam before Tet or the War of 1812 before 1814. Most Northern Whigs and Van Buren Democrats viewed the war as part of a slave-holding conspiracy. A majority of the populace in the previous election had voted for candidates opposing expansion. Although volunteers were plentiful they were primarily from the South with a moderate Western addition. Abraham Lincoln first enters national politics as an extremely bitter opponent of this war, decrying its immorality in the strongest terms. The commanding general, Scott, although approving of defending rights up to the Rio Grande and chastising the Mexicans for their resort to arms over the disputed area, thought war aims involving the conquest of California as immoral - he was at least as disapproving of his government as Howe in the Revolution. As with Dems in Vietnam or the Gulf War, there was some support for the war among Whigs and the Whigs wanted to be cautious about appearing disloyal or betraying the troops. The Whig national party leadership was confidently awaiting bad news from the front when they were overtaken by events - unbounded success brought about principally by the brilliance of General Scott’s campaign.
As for the Philippine “insurrection”, viewing the war in that fashion is accepting ideological terminology. The Filipinos had a de facto army and government in place upon the Spanish surrender, prior to U.S. forces expanding beyond the immediate vicinity Manila. Like the Dutch in Indonesia, and the French in Indochina after WWII, the U.S. was faced with the necessity of conquering the native government to establish its own. I don’t have the casualty figures for the campaign at my fingertips, but I believe you will find they are up there in U.S. major wars, ahead of the Spanish-American War. Nor was the fight on the periphery of the American consciousness but in fact was one of the principle issues of Bryan’s 1900 Presidential campaign.

[TIMJOT]

Originally posted by wpurdom
“I forgot about the Mexican war. Although technically that was started because of a supposedly unprovoked skirmish on the rio grande. So far as the public knew we were attacked. It was pretty popular war though. All that manifest destiny stuff and there was no shortage of volunteers. It was only after the war people started to have a bad taste in there mouths.”

Shock! For once I find myself agreeing with mdiehl, except for his response being a little too accommodating. The Mexican War was at least as unpopular as Vietnam before Tet or the War of 1812 before 1814. Most Northern Whigs and Van Buren Democrats viewed the war as part of a slave-holding conspiracy. A majority of the populace in the previous election had voted for candidates opposing expansion. Although volunteers were plentiful they were primarily from the South with a moderate Western addition. Abraham Lincoln first enters national politics as an extremely bitter opponent of this war, decrying its immorality in the strongest terms. The commanding general, Scott, although approving of defending rights up to the Rio Grande and chastising the Mexicans for their resort to arms over the disputed area, thought war aims involving the conquest of California as immoral - he was at least as disapproving of his government as Howe in the Revolution. As with Dems in Vietnam or the Gulf War, there was some support for the war among Whigs and the Whigs wanted to be cautious about appearing disloyal or betraying the troops. The Whig national party leadership was confidently awaiting bad news from the front when they were overtaken by events - unbounded success brought about principally by the brilliance of General Scott’s campaign.
As for the Philippine “insurrection”, viewing the war in that fashion is accepting ideological terminology. The Filipinos had a de facto army and government in place upon the Spanish surrender, prior to U.S. forces expanding beyond the immediate vicinity Manila. Like the Dutch in Indonesia, and the French in Indochina after WWII, the U.S. was faced with the necessity of conquering the native government to establish its own. I don’t have the casualty figures for the campaign at my fingertips, but I believe you will find they are up there in U.S. major wars, ahead of the Spanish-American War. Nor was the fight on the periphery of the American consciousness but in fact was one of the principle issues of Bryan’s 1900 Presidential campaign.

Regarding the Mexican war, sure there was opposition particularly with the *minority* political opposition, northeastern educated elite's and abolitionist, but I dont think the rank and file americans were against getting there hands on California,New Mexico, Arizona ect.... There were no shortage of volunteers to fight and the hero worship of Gen Taylor (won him the presidency) and Scott (could have been president) is evident of that.

At any rate this demonstrates my point. The opposition saw through Polks charade of a supposed Mexican attack. They correctly saw the war as a war of aggression. Im am sure that had the war entailed defeat after defeat with high casualties then the opposition would have grown and probably forced Polk to end the war. My point exactly

Regarding the Philipine insurection. Im sure your correct that there were more calsualities than the Spanish/American war, but it was more like a small bleeding wound than a massive trauma. It was the source of much political fodder back in Washington, but how much an issue was it to the vast majority? Evidently not much since Bryan was soundly defeated. So how unpopular was it?. Manifest destiny was at its peek in the later part of the 19century and in any case it wasnt a declared war at all. In fact it seems that most americans were all too willing to convince themselves we were doing the Philipinos a favor (civilizing them) much like our own american indians. On the other hand if the insurrection hadnt petered out and casualties continued to mount coupled with major defeats then of course public opposition would have grown enough to force the US to give up on the *Philipine expirement* that was at most only half hearted in the first place.


So in summary where do we disagree? You said your self that that the Mex war was not fully supported and that the opposition was eagerly waiting for defeats that never happened. Had the defeats occured than Polk is probably forced to quit the war.

So what happens if America having not been attacked, declares war in defence of the Euro-colonies in Asia. Would there not have been some opposition? Would this opposition have grown if faced with defeat after defeat and mounting casualties? Could this have forced the US to the negotiating table. I say its a definite possibilty.

[jjjanos]

Originally posted by mdiehl


I have to agree with you on that Jeremy. To your list you can add the War of the Rebellion. The putative CSA basically played the same hand that the IJE attempted to play -- "A series of defeats and casualty fatigue *ought* to force the enemy into an armistace." Japan *could* have known that U.S. battle fatigue was a hopelessly unattainable fantasy from the start.

The election of 1864 is what nailed the coffin in the Confederacy. Lincoln's victory ensured that there would the war would be waged at least 2 more years -- till the mid-term elections -- and probably at least 4 more years.

That beng said, the victory by Lincoln was a near thing. During Spring or Summer 1864, Lincoln himself was certain that he would lose the election. Three "victories" threw support to Hawks -- Mobil Bay, Siege of Petersburg and Fall of Atlanta. The strategy almost worked.