Early China, allies strat

[Barb]

At first - Japanese didnt want to have China under their complete control and occupation - too much troops required for that. What they prefered was to have China with some leader colaborating with them who will sign a peace treaty, assign all Japanese controled areas to them officially and to keep peace and order in the rest of China - co-prospering with Japan (well we all know this means giving up what they had for "protection").

Japanes know that drive to Chunking even if they tried to would not bring what they wanted, so they focused on isolating China - result was the Vietnam ports closed and later Burma Campaign. But they underestimated the situation.

On the other hand Chiang Kai Shek knows that if he had signed peace treaty with Japan he will be overthrown in no time. He also wanted to get rid of the Communists. Once the Second World War had begun, he wanted the americans to fight the war instead of him, so he could keep his units intact for fight with Communists. He requested 500 airplanes (later raised to 1000) because he was convinced that airpower alone can drive the Japs out of China. Stilwell wanted to have strong Chinese army (disbanding half of the divisions to have sufficient manpower to keep fewer units up to their TOE), train 30, later 60 and 90 Chinese divisions with american tactics, equip them with american weapons and have excellent core force, which could take up the Japs and later the Communists. Chiangs opinion prevailed and more effort was thrown into the "Hump" than Ramagh.

The crisis in China started when the Japanese begin their Ichi-go offensive. As Chiang didnt want to commit his own central reserve troops and various generals commanding War areas (Warlords) retreated before the Japanese.

Result: The Japanese had not enough forces to subdue whole China and China was forceless to do something with the situation.

[Mike Scholl]

ORIGINAL: Barb

Result: The Japanese had not enough forces to subdue whole China and China was forceless to do something with the situation.

Gee..., this sounds a lot like what I said way back on page one of this discussion...

"China should simply be a quagmire eating the efforts of both sides for minimal return. Anything else is wrong..., and game-warpingly so."

[findmeifyoucan]

It seems that just like SPI's WIP and this game WIPAE, the China land war is very hard to simulate and make realistic to the historical war. I remember when I played the Allies I took advantage of the rules with unlimited stacking for the Chinese and destroyed Japanese stack after Japanese stack one at a time with Japan having no chance to defend against it in the SPI WIP game. We ended up making a house rule of stacking limitations for the Chinese.
It seems from reading many comments in this game that the Chinese cannot defend against the Japanese artillery and that it is a cake walk for the Japanese through China.

I will find out myself as I am new to the WIPAE. Only time will tell.

[stuman]

ORIGINAL: Barb

At first - Japanese didnt want to have China under their complete control and occupation - too much troops required for that. What they prefered was to have China with some leader colaborating with them who will sign a peace treaty, assign all Japanese controled areas to them officially and to keep peace and order in the rest of China - co-prospering with Japan (well we all know this means giving up what they had for "protection").

Japanes know that drive to Chunking even if they tried to would not bring what they wanted, so they focused on isolating China - result was the Vietnam ports closed and later Burma Campaign. But they underestimated the situation.

On the other hand Chiang Kai Shek knows that if he had signed peace treaty with Japan he will be overthrown in no time. He also wanted to get rid of the Communists. Once the Second World War had begun, he wanted the americans to fight the war instead of him, so he could keep his units intact for fight with Communists. He requested 500 airplanes (later raised to 1000) because he was convinced that airpower alone can drive the Japs out of China. Stilwell wanted to have strong Chinese army (disbanding half of the divisions to have sufficient manpower to keep fewer units up to their TOE), train 30, later 60 and 90 Chinese divisions with american tactics, equip them with american weapons and have excellent core force, which could take up the Japs and later the Communists. Chiangs opinion prevailed and more effort was thrown into the "Hump" than Ramagh.

The crisis in China started when the Japanese begin their Ichi-go offensive. As Chiang didnt want to commit his own central reserve troops and various generals commanding War areas (Warlords) retreated before the Japanese.

Result: The Japanese had not enough forces to subdue whole China and China was forceless to do something with the situation.

So then a question from one ignorant of the details of the China front : if Ichi-go was successful late war, why not an version of Ichi-go two years earlier ?

[Mike Scholl]

ORIGINAL: stuman

So then a question from one ignorant of the details of the China front : if Ichi-go was successful late war, why not an version of Ichi-go two years earlier ?

It will make more sense if you think of "Ichi-Go" as a good weather raid. The Japanese pulled a lot of units out of garrisons to drive on the B-29 airfields, but had to return them to their original positions soon after or lose control of areas they already held. China simply proved too big and too populated for them to hold down.

[Jim D Burns]

ORIGINAL: Mike Scholl

ORIGINAL: stuman

So then a question from one ignorant of the details of the China front : if Ichi-go was successful late war, why not an version of Ichi-go two years earlier ?

It will make more sense if you think of "Ichi-Go" as a good weather raid. The Japanese pulled a lot of units out of garrisons to drive on the B-29 airfields, but had to return them to their original positions soon after or lose control of areas they already held. China simply proved too big and too populated for them to hold down.

Not to mention the fact Japan had brought in a LOT more force into China in the preceding two years that weren't available two years before. Also they didn't have the supplies on hand two years prior to launch an Ichi-Go style offensive. Japan's supply situation in China was a nightmare in 1941.

Every time Japan would launch an operation to clear their rear areas, the Chinese formations would simply melt away into the local populace. Once Japan had moved through an area, the units would fully reconstitute again in their rear in very short order and wreak havoc.

Given the kind of war they faced in China, Japan had no choice but to station large strong permanent garrisons along all their supply routes to prevent these guerilla type forces from starving their inland troops. In fact Japan was having major troubles in Dec. 41 keeping their logistic network functioning, as they lacked sufficient troops to hold open supply routes to everything they had.

Jim

[Mike Scholl]

ORIGINAL: Jim D Burns

Given the kind of war they faced in China, Japan had no choice but to station large strong permanent garrisons along all their supply routes to prevent these guerilla type forces from starving their inland troops. In fact Japan was having major troubles in Dec. 41 keeping their logistic network functioning, as they lacked sufficient troops to hold open supply routes to everything they had.

Jim

Truth be told, Japan NEVER controlled the Chinese countryside..., which is how the Doolittle survivors were spirited right across the length of the country to freedom under their noses. At harvest time, the Japanese would organize raids from the major pop centers they did occupy into the countryside to steal as much food as they could lay their hands on, then run back to the cities. That was the only way most of the interior garrisons kept off starvation.

[Barb]

1. Why not Ichi-go two years earlier?
Because they were thinking that by grabing Burma they will cut-off China and without help the China will fall to their hands all by himself. For the Ichi-go they needed many supplies that has to be used in SRA and Solomon-New Guinea Campaigns.

2. Japanese had brought in a lot more force into China ...
You are not really right. In fact many seasoned divisions of China Expeditionary army were send to New Guinea, Philipines, Marianas and Ryukyus. To fill the vacuum, some of the garrisoning independent infantry brigades were reinforced and reconstructed as Type B divisions. So you ended with the same number of division, but less combat efficient then the previous ones were. (You can easily see this in witp-AE - there are some brigades that will become divisons when their other parts arrive in 1944). I think only 1-2 divisions were actually borrowed from Manchuria with two Army HQs.

3. One of the reasons of the "Japanese run wild in AE"
Did the Japanese player buy out Artillery, Engineers, Armor and Air forces from Manchukuo? Well for few PPs and no decrease of AV in Manchuria he has twice the firepower Japan could have in the area. Japanese feared the Russian attack so they should in no way pull all their corps artillery, mobile reserves and air force out of Manchuria - exactly the thing any Japanese player will do ASAP. [:-]

[Mike Scholl]

ORIGINAL: Barb
3. One of the reasons of the "Japanese run wild in AE"
Did the Japanese player buy out Artillery, Engineers, Armor and Air forces from Manchukuo? Well for few PPs and no decrease of AV in Manchuria he has twice the firepower Japan could have in the area. Japanese feared the Russian attack so they should in no way pull all their corps artillery, mobile reserves and air force out of Manchuria - exactly the thing any Japanese player will do ASAP. [:-]

Totally agree. Real problem is poor basic design of the PP rules by 2by3. If the Manchurian Garrison Rules valued Artillery, Engineers, Armor, and Air Power the same way the Land Combat Rules do, pulling them out would cost "an arm and a leg"...., and trigger Soviet intervention to boot.

[maybee]

IMHO...

The underlining issue is that there is only one allies player, whereas there should be multiple allies players of conflicting interests. An acceptable fix in game term is by adding one more leader attribute called "subordination". Units under leader of low subordination will have higher probability of insubordination (not responsive to player commands). That's they have their own (AI) minds.

In extreme dice rolls, an insubordinate unit would become partisan and functions as an enemy unit to both allies and japan players. It'd require the allies player to "re-conquer" an insubordinate unit by some kind of game mechanism.

For most Chinese leaders, their inspiration/leadership and other useful attributes should be inversely proportional to subordination. So that the Chinese command is effectively paralyzed.

If one increases the garrison requirement on the Japanese side at the same time, wouldn't it be a more realistic simulation?

 

[Jim D Burns]

ORIGINAL: maybee
there should be multiple allies players of conflicting interests.

CHS actually did China pretty well by fixing large numbers of Chinese units in place to simulate the uncooperative warlords Chiang had to deal with. This basically meant that China was unable to launch any kind of significant offensive because about half its army was fixed in place.

Japan’s garrison requirements were still far too low in CHS, but Chinese units preformed well enough in combats that they could at least stand up to the Japanese. AE has nerfed the Chinese unit’s combat abilities to such an extent and made artillery so completely overpowered that it has ruined the game and turned China into a complete blowout again.

Japan needs to be nerfed in kind by vastly increasing the garrison needs so huge armies can’t be formed to crush the pitifully weak Chinese. Artillery also need to be nerfed and supply costs for using artillery need to be increased dramatically so that players can’t sit back day after day and launch massive bombardments with no real detriment to their supply stocks.

Jim

[vonTirpitz]

I totally disagree. I have one PBEM opponent who has managed to gather at least 2 stacks of +200k and 2-3 more stacks of +80k Chinese and run rampant over the map by late December 41. One stack easily routed 3 full strength defending IJA divisions. So unless one of you is going to inform me that his tactics aren't sustainable then I have to disagree entirely with your assessments about the so-called Japanese advantages...

T

[herwin]

ORIGINAL: vonTirpitz

I totally disagree. I have one PBEM opponent who has managed to gather at least 2 stacks of +200k and 2-3 more stacks of +80k Chinese and run rampant over the map by late December 41. One stack easily routed 3 full strength defending IJA divisions. So unless one of you is going to inform me that his tactics aren't sustainable then I have to disagree entirely with your assessments about the so-called Japanese advantages...

T

Playing the latest patch here. My Japanese opponent neglected the Chinese theatre, and so far (mid-Dec 1941) the Chinese have captured Ichang and are pursuing the retreating Japanese.

[Marcus_Antonius]

I am in late January of 1941 in my first AE game, and the Japanese are far from running all over the Chinese. The Chinese have in fact taken the initiative and forced me to pay more attention to China than I had initially planned to early in the game.

I suspect this Chinese effort will not be sustainable, but its a headache all the same. After all what is the point of pouring effort into China in 1942 when so many other richer prizes are up for grabs?

While I can see the point of denying the Americans strategic air bases in China later in the game (if it is really possible for the Allied side to supply them), China seems like a bit of a sideshow to me. The Japanese can't win the war by simply conquering China, can they? I'd rather keep it as quiet as possible for as long as possible.

[Chickenboy]

ORIGINAL: Jim D Burns
AE has nerfed the Chinese unit’s combat abilities to such an extent and made artillery so completely overpowered that it has ruined the game and turned China into a complete blowout again.

Jim,

With all due respect, I believe that your comments are no longer applicable after Patch III. It effectively neutralized (read: nerfed) artillery in most any setting, particularly against troops in terrain or fortifications.

I can't say yet about the ability of Chinese LCUs to mount an effective defense. In those games that preclude strategic bombing of resource centers in China and now have nerfed artillery, the Chinese are in a much better position to survive, defend and even counterattack later. IIRC, Patch III new starts have additional Chinese garrison requirements for the IJA, thus bleeding off yet more of its attacking strength. It's turning into something akin to the quagmire that it was for the Japs IRL.

[Canoerebel]

From what I've seen pre- and post-patch, here's what I think of China:

1.  Artillery is essentially toothless now - at least against troops in any kind of fortifications (but I think it's better for artillery to be too weak than too strong if you have to have one extreme; but I bet developers continue to tweak until it's just right).

2.  I'm not sure about the effect of artillery against unintrenched troops.

3.  Chinese troops in well-fortified bases perform well on the defensive.

4.  Chinese troops on the attack perform very, very poorly.

Based upon these factors, my strategy in China would be:

1.  Early in the war:  Get the Chinese into an MLR and build fortifications; use small units to harrass Japanese LOC.
2.  Mid-war:  Same as early war.
3.  Late-war:  The Chinese can go on the offensive if the Japanaese have weakly-held positions.  IE, the Chinese "hordes" can overrun weak IJA positions.  But the Chinese against well-entrenched IJA positions are in deep do-do. 

[Q-Ball]

With all the changes, China looks like a quagmire now. The Chinese probably still need to pull back from Wenchow and those SE cities, and maybe the central plain around Loyang and Nanyang, since that open terran is pretty indefensible. That should be as far as the Japanese can go.

I can't see tons of progress either by the Allies, because by the time you can go to the offensive, the Japs should be pretty dug in. They also have more mobility to shift troops around to trouble spots.

[FatR]

ORIGINAL: Mike Scholl

His position is that Japan CAN conquer China while at the same time taking on the Western Powers. My position is that if Japan couldn't conquer China when she had nothing else "one her plate", she damned well shouldn't be able to do it after starting the "War in the Pacific".

Japan never really was in such situation, though. And in 1941, in particular, the best part of their forces was in Manchukuo, awaiting the fall of Russia. Assuming the player diverts a large pile of extra units to China, which seems to be a usual requirement for major offensives there, we have no reason to assume that Chinese army won't be crushed and swept before the Japanese assault, until IJA overextends itself by garrizoning new captured territories. Which is totall likely to happen.

[FatR]

ORIGINAL: USS America

I am eager to see several games progress into late '42 and '43 when Japan has spent an enormous amount of supplies on the offensive in China.  I have a suspicion that putting so much focus on China will slow down the Japanese advance elsewhere in the Pacific, and make her weaker when the Allies come calling.  

The biggest Japanese problem with China is that even if you somehow overrun in completely - which, to my knowledge, never was done by any player to date - you still need to leave a ton of garrizons everywhere, and, combined with inevitable losses, this makes the perspective of freeing IJA for other fronts rather dubious. The second biggest problems is that you must attack and destroy Chinese forces actively, while they are weak, or be eventually overrun. Unlike RL, Chinese can successfully lauch major offensives, if left alone long enough.

[FatR]

ORIGINAL: Mike Scholl
Just as one that allowed the US to leap the entire Pacific and land in Tokyo in 1944 would be wrong.

This is perfectly possible, even against a good player. In fact, at least 4 current AARs are highly likely to end like this, or in some comparably decisive Japanese defeat. Can you please stop projecting your own problems on the game mechanics?