Oscar v B17E

[FatR]

ORIGINAL: xj900uk

Just been looking up a few things last night. The IJAAF standard tactic for attacking bombers (whether two engined or four) was to fly in single file one behind the other up under the tail (6 o'clock low) and pump loads of mg rounds into its belly. This was the correct tactic in WWI against two-seaters, and the IJAAF had a lot of success with it in China in the 30's (mainly because the Chinese bombers were crap and had no defensive armament to cover their 6 o'clock low position) so never saw any need to change it or official training prior to '44.

This is so very untrue. The tactic of head-on passes concentrated on a 4E bomber at the edge of formation was developed in summer of 1942 and taught widely, as evidenced by IJAAF pilots employing it in just about every large engagement from then on. Some, like 64th Sentai, even practiced it in mock fights against an actual captured B-17.

[FatR]

ORIGINAL: SuluSea

So there were no unescorted bombing raids against Rebaul in 1942?

Of course there were... when it was a minor outpost that was also visited by Catalinas, Hudsons and whatever Allies had.

[mike scholl 1]

ORIGINAL: FatR

Yet they clearly had. You know when Allies sent unescorted Liberators against Rabaul at the first time? 9 March of 1944. As late as January of 1944 Allies lost 8 B-24s per 263 sorties over Rabaul area (note, that in RL 1 loss per 33 sorties is a rather high figure). As about the battles where Allies didn't have overwhelming material superiority, their air offensive against Rangoon from 11/25 to 12/6 of 1943 resulted in loss of 12 B-24s and 3 Wellingtons out of 222 bomber sorties.

Actually a loss rate of 03% would be considered quite sustainable in strategic bombing...., and compares very well to those achieved in Europe. And be aware that just because historically the Allied didn't "mass" their bombers in the Pacific as they did in Europe doesn't mean they couldn't. Japan didn't invade Australia or India historically, never send a second strike against PH, and certainly never mounted adequate CAP over it's CV's. Should Japanese players be prevented from choosing different courses of action?

[SuluSea]

I guess it depends on  the definition of a "major or active base".

I see goal posts starting to move here.

I'll move on knowing the Allies not only contiplated but carried out  successful unescorted bombing attacks against fighter opposition long before the B-29.

[Nikademus]

ORIGINAL: Misconduct

Does anyone have actual accounts of Japanese Pilots taking down huge numbers of B-17's and B-24s? I mean I never remember hearing any after action reports on american sides suggesting the japanese had any success at any part of the war in taking down 4 engine bombers. Some creditable claims I have read that further disprove every Japanese Fan boy here, are aces like Saburo Sakai who sat behind an F4F and put almost 1,000 rounds of 7.7mm into it and the plane wouldn't drop, were talking F4F here not a B-17.

The ki-43's in Burma, what level of success were they having? How many were being brought down 1-2? or typical japanese over-excelled combat reports with hundreds of "B24's shot down".

Ki-43's brought down 22 B-24's over the course of the Burma campaign in exchange for 18 of their own number. Typical actions tended to be squadron level bombing runs which was a norm outside of the massive strategic bombing campaigns of Europe and over Japan in 44/45. Interceptors similarily were small in #.

4E's were generally the toughest to bring down but it could still be done. Bergerud documented one notable occurance where A6M's downed 4 x B-17's in one mission and shot up the survivors. USAAF mission planners never discounted the danger of enemy fighter defenses and planned their missions to minimize their apperance and impact. The obtainment of long range escorts was a major priority of air commanders like Kenney. Loss of a bomber (and crew) was only one part of the equation (and the worst case scenario). Damage to plane, wounding and death of crewmembers and disruption or aborting entirely of a mission were all factors that could occur if enemy defenses were strong. Wargamers tend to get "tunnel vision" and focus on kills only. Granted, in games like WitP, this is understandable as often with the exponential effect of large-mass formations, only outright kills yield tangible results [in-game]. When players get pounded by air to ground and protest, the argument naturally orbits around kill result comparisons creating the disconnect.

[Wirraway_Ace]

ORIGINAL: FatR

ORIGINAL: xj900uk

Just been looking up a few things last night. The IJAAF standard tactic for attacking bombers (whether two engined or four) was to fly in single file one behind the other up under the tail (6 o'clock low) and pump loads of mg rounds into its belly. This was the correct tactic in WWI against two-seaters, and the IJAAF had a lot of success with it in China in the 30's (mainly because the Chinese bombers were crap and had no defensive armament to cover their 6 o'clock low position) so never saw any need to change it or official training prior to '44.

This is so very untrue. The tactic of head-on passes concentrated on a 4E bomber at the edge of formation was developed in summer of 1942 and taught widely, as evidenced by IJAAF pilots employing it in just about every large engagement from then on. Some, like 64th Sentai, even practiced it in mock fights against an actual captured B-17.

FatR, can you refer me to your sources? I find this very interesting. Sakai says his Sentai developed this tactic in 42, but his memories (as translated) come off as if to prove they thought of it before the Germans and have not been given appropriate credit. Taught widely? By who to whom? It seems very unlikely the IJN pilots taught the IJAAF pilots or vice versa. By early 43, how many pilots did Japan have that could execute this type of attack at approximately 600 knots closure and hit the small target area of a bomber's nose with enough rounds to have a chance for a multiple crew kill?

[Nikademus]

IIRC, the IJAAF pilots developed head on attacks in the same way that the Germans did, and that Sakai and other naval pilots did......learning by experience...Adjusting tactics etc. Not every attack became a head on though. It depended on opportunity and other tactical considerations. Same for bombers. Learn by experience. Tail proving vulnerable? add a gun. Start experiencing head on attacks....add a gun (and/or turret). Parry and thrust. Attacks still continued from different angles and successes and failures continued depending on the specific situations.

[FatR]

ORIGINAL: Wirraway_Ace
FatR, can you refer me to your sources? I find this very interesting.

The information about IJAAF tactics and the battles over Burma is from "Ki-43 'Oscar' Aces of WW II" by Hiroshi Ichimura ("Oscars in CBI Theatre" would have been a more correct name for the book, but whatever). Information about Allied operations in SWPac I took from "13th Fighter Command in World War II - Air Combat over Guadalcanal and the Solomons" by William Wolf (this book rarely bothers to verify American claims, but information about Allied own losses should be reasonably accurate, I presume).

[FatR]

ORIGINAL: SuluSea

I guess it depends on  the definition of a "major or active base".

I see goal posts starting to move here.

I'll move on knowing the Allies not only contiplated but carried out  successful unescorted bombing attacks against fighter opposition long before the B-29.

Well, then you surely can provide, you know, actual examples? And, as you're concerned about goalposts, these attacks should actually be a)against fighter opposition, i.e., engaged by fighters; and b)successful, i.e. with noticeable damage to the enemy.

[Dili]

The obtainment of long range escorts was a major priority of air commanders like Kenney. Loss of a bomber (and crew) was only one part of the equation (and the worst case scenario). Damage to plane, wounding and death of crewmembers and disruption or aborting entirely of a mission were all factors that could occur if enemy defenses were strong.

Crew morale also important.

[Brady]

I was rereading the book, B-29 hunters, and it sorta confirms what my understanding was in the Air War over Europe, and what the Book the IJAF Aces and their Fighter Units said, While Kills were had on both sides, it was far more common for a plane to be damaged, it was very dificult for the bombers gunners to make meaningfull hits aganst enemy fighters, this can be evidanced in part by the raming atacks Japanes planes made late in the war, heck even over Burma Oscars were not wacked out of the sky like flys from B-24's.
 I have a couple charts comming...
 Aparently they had ample warning:

 

 

 

 

 
From Avation Eliet Units, B-29 Hunters of the IJAAF:

 

 


 

 
 
 

[SuluSea]

ORIGINAL: FatR

ORIGINAL: SuluSea

I guess it depends on  the definition of a "major or active base".

I see goal posts starting to move here.

I'll move on knowing the Allies not only contiplated but carried out  successful unescorted bombing attacks against fighter opposition long before the B-29.

Well, then you surely can provide, you know, actual examples? And, as you're concerned about goalposts, these attacks should actually be a)against fighter opposition, i.e., engaged by fighters; and b)successful, i.e. with noticeable damage to the enemy.

Shall I tell you whether they wore boxers or briefs as well?
[8|]

In addition to the other examples I posted.

The next offensive mission came on 25 January 1943, when six B-24's of the 371st Bombardment Squadron staged through Midway for daylight reconnaissance and incidental bombing of Wake. The bombers flushed six to eight interceptors, but their reaction was tardy and the damage to the heavies slight.17 Again, on 15 May, seven out of eighteen planes dispatched by the 371st and 372d Squadrons struck Wake during daylight. The enemy intercepted with nineteen Zekes and three Hamps, trading four of the interceptors for a B-24, the first B-24 lost to enemy action by the Seventh Air Force.18 Finally, on 24 and 26 July the reconstituted 11th Group, now flying B-24's, sent two missions of squadron strength against the former American outpost. Diversionary in nature, these attacks had been ordered by the Navy in the hope of confusing the enemy as to our intentions in the Pacific. Japanese defenses seemed to have been greatly improved, but the returning crews claimed a total of twenty interceptors destroyed. One B-24 had crashed into the ocean after a mid-air collision with an enemy fighter falling out of control.19 Wake would not be hit again by the Seventh Air Force until March 1944. These early raids, though small and scattered, had been generally well executed and effective.20

By staging down through Funafuti in the Ellice Islands, for a total distance of well over 2,000 miles via Canton, Palmyra, or Christmas Islands, it had also been possible to strike twice against enemy positions in the Gilberts during April 1943. After the Japanese had seized the Gilberts early in 1942, they had constructed a two-strip airfield and elaborate fortifications on Tarawa. In addition, they had occupied Apamama and Makin and the outlying atoll of Nauru, to the west. These atolls carried a potential threat to the Allied line of communications joining the South and Central Pacific, and as with the coming of 1943 the Joint Chiefs of Staff gave some thought to the possibility of a Central Pacific offensive,* the islands acquired a new importance. After sending two reconnaissance missions in small force over the Gilberts in January and one in February,21 General Hale got the green light from Admiral Nimitz for a quick one-two jab at Tarawa and Nauru. Nimitz designated for the mission the 371st and 372d Bombardment Squadrons, joining them together as Task Force 12 under the personal command of General Hale. Reconnaissance of all the Gilberts, for the purpose of determining the airfield potentials for either Japan or the Allies, was to be combined with the bomber strikes. The task force would return from its temporary base at Funafuti upon completion of its mission.22
Having dispatched a small boat two weeks in advance with necessary supplies and equipment, General Hale reached Funafuti with the B-24's on 18 April. Two days later at high noon twenty-two of the B-24's droned over Nauru. Since an early morning take-off, they had carried their bomb loads more than a thousand miles, which crowded the tactical radius of the B-24D to the limit. The weather over the target was excellent for the bombing with 28 x 1,000-pound and 45 x 500-pound GP bombs plus 45 frag clusters. Despite heavy interception and antiaircraft fire, direct hits on the runway, dispersal area, and a near-by phosphate plant were achieved. An oil dump at the north end of the runway went up in flames.23 General Hale, who had gone on the mission, returned to Funafuti in high spirits over the performance of his inexperienced crews. The heavy damage sustained by five of the B-24's forced postponement of the Tarawa strike, originally scheduled for the 21st. As it happened, this delay proved fortunate, for the enemy promptly struck back in a predawn raid on the strip at Funafuti that would have caught the American bombers just as they assembled for the take-off. Even so, the B-24's parked along the narrow runway suffered serious damage when a hit on a bomb-loaded plane resulted in its destruction and in damage to five other planes.24

The transition to B-24's for all Pacific heavy bombardment units, a transition begun late in 1942, greatly enhanced the importance of modification as a depot function. The B-24D was sadly lacking in firepower, particularly in the nose of the plane. Japanese pilots soon discovered this defensive weakness, with the result that General Landon reported that approximately half of all early enemy fighter attacks on B-24's were made front ally.37 After Lt. Col. Marion D. Unruh, of the VII Bomber Command, had designed a nose turret to correct the weakness,* it was installed by the Hawaiian Air Depot in more than 200 B-24's during 1943.

1 February 1944. CATCHPOLE, as operations for the occupation of Eniwetok Atoll had been coded, would take place three months later.100 The ease with which Kwajalein and Majuro were occupied, however, prompted a speed-up in timing which resulted in a decision to mount CATCHPOLE immediately, and by 19 February, Eniwetok, northwesternmost of the Marshalls, also had been captured against light enemy resistance.
So far as air operations were concerned, the campaigns in the Gilberts and Marshalls were continuous. On 21 November 1943 (D plus 1 on Tarawa), B-24's of the 38th Bombardment Squadron escorted Navy PB4Y photo planes over Nauru, while Liberators of the 431st and 42d Bombardment Squadrons conducted daylight bombing raids on the same target.101 During the remainder of November and most of December, Seventh Air Force Liberators, staging through Baker and Nanomea from their bases at Canton and in the Ellices, continued to pound Nauru, Mille, Jaluit, and Maloelap, in tactical support of the base-development phase of GALVANIC and in preparation for CATCHPOLE. Beginning on 16 December, Wotje, site of a strongly fortified and well-defended airfield and extensive seaplane facilities, came under the sights of the B-24's.102

It's kind of humorous reading complaints against the allied side knowing how many ahistorical bonuses Japan gets.
I believe the developers got this aspect correct. Just like players of the Japanese side train their pilots up allied players are training as well.

[Wirraway_Ace]

ORIGINAL: FatR

ORIGINAL: Wirraway_Ace
FatR, can you refer me to your sources? I find this very interesting.

The information about IJAAF tactics and the battles over Burma is from "Ki-43 'Oscar' Aces of WW II" by Hiroshi Ichimura ("Oscars in CBI Theatre" would have been a more correct name for the book, but whatever). Information about Allied operations in SWPac I took from "13th Fighter Command in World War II - Air Combat over Guadalcanal and the Solomons" by William Wolf (this book rarely bothers to verify American claims, but information about Allied own losses should be reasonably accurate, I presume).

Thanks. How is Ichimura's book? I did not enjoy Sakai's as much as I had hoped, though it was better than Galland's "First and Last"--that went straight back to the used book store.

[FatR]

ORIGINAL: SuluSea

Shall I tell you whether they wore boxers or briefs as well?
[8|]

No, just your source of quotes. As it takes A2A claims at face value (it is obvious that these are claims, and checking entries for appropriate days on www.pacificwrecks.com confirms this), it is rather suspicious, but I want confirmation. Also, only one of provided examples can possibly qualify. For the Wake raid there aren't even concrete claims of hitting anything on the ground and bombing secondary targets at Gilberts past the beginning of "Galvanic" hardly could meet air opposition.

[FatR]

ORIGINAL: Wirraway_Ace

Thanks. How is Ichimura's book? I did not enjoy Sakai's as much as I had hoped, though it was better than Galland's "First and Last"--that went straight back to the used book store.

Of course a relatively recent research has little in common with semi-memoirs ("semi" because Caidin allegedly edited them rather heavily). As I said, the title is rather misleading. The battle history of 64th and 50th Sentais, and, by extension, Oscars in CBI Theatre, takes most of the book. Units that fought in New Guinea and Philippines are covered very sketchily. Ichimura generally tries to verify claims using sources from both sides (although not very dilligent at it, but at least he provides overall summaries of true losses for periods of battle activity), and obviously took a lot of interviews with veterans. The research seems solid.

[SuluSea]

As it takes A2A claims at face value

but japanese claims seem the gospel
revise to your hearts content

http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/AAF/IV/AAF-IV-9.html

[FatR]

ORIGINAL: SuluSea
but japanese claims seem the gospel

A strawman, and an inept one.

ORIGINAL: SuluSea
revise to your hearts content

OK:

Operating thus at extreme range and through the use of an intervening staging point, Seventh Air Force bombers over the long period between the Battle of Midway and the actions preliminary to invasion of the Gilberts had been able to get in an occasional blow at Wake, Tarawa, or Nauru. Such missions served to break the tedium of routine reconnaissance, but they could have little cumulative effect on the enemy's strength and served chiefly to provide for the crews valuable experience and for headquarters no less valuable intelligence.

Postwar investigation of enemy sources has revealed that the Japanese were in no position to make a serious effort to hold either the Gilberts or Marshalls. A serious shortage of air strength, a shortage imposed by the heavy losses sustained in the Solomons and New Guinea operations, together with the continuing demand of operations in those two areas, limited the Japanese effort to making the U.S. advance as costly as possible. Reinforcements sent into the Gilberts and Marshalls in advance of GALVANIC were chiefly ground forces. At the beginning of the operation, the Japanese apparently disposed only about 100 aircraft in the entire Marshalls-Gilberts area. Reinforcements up to 135 planes were sent in during November and December,134 but the continuing attrition suffered over Rabaul and in the Solomons made it impossible to send significant reinforcements thereafter. Against this meager strength, the occupation of the Gilberts was supported by ap proximately 900 carrier-based aircraft, the Marshalls by approximately 700. By D-day on Kwajalein, there was not an operational Japanese aircraft east of Eniwetok.135 Throughout the operation the US. Navy dominated the air over the Gilberts and Marshalls. The planes of the Seventh Air Force, flying long overwater missions, maintained the neutralization of bases initially knocked out by planes from the fast carriers. Continued bombardment from the air reduced the by-passed atolls to impotence; their garrisons, cut off even from communication with other positions, were occupied in a struggle merely to keep alive.

As you see, even your own source (veiledly) admits that uber-claims it provides are false. And, much more directly, than earlier missions were basically ineffective. And says directly that later systematic bomb raids basically were just mopping up after carriers. Now, seriously, where is the validation for "4Es have potential for knocking out airbases on their own" reality of AE in that?

[SuluSea]

Game wise-
If Japanese have the supply and engineers the base won't be closed for long just like historical , It's the  same with the Japanese side attacking Allied.

ORIGINAL: FatR

Even the most cursory examination of actual combat episodes reveals that unescorted 4E raids against major and active Japanese bases weren't even contemplated until the advent of B-29s.

This has been refuted numerous times already, my work here is done.

[PaxMondo]

ORIGINAL: castor troy

ORIGINAL: witpqs

ORIGINAL: Who Cares

You can get a pilot from 20 experience to 70 in 2-3 months as is in the game.

I haven't seen that with even a single pilot. You can train them up in a skill to about 70 in a few months, but not experience. Or is the skill what you mean?

like I´ve said earlier, he´s mixing up skill and experience. He means skill and is correct that you can train from (below) 20 to 70 in 2-3 months. You can´t get their experience from 20 to 70 with training in 2 months though.

Castor, this is also my interpretation. And, I also beleive this is correct.

Training improves skills primarily. Combat improves experience primarily. In both cases not exclusively.

Using someone elses reference, this is why the USN has Top Gun. Even combat experienced aviators can significantly improve their skills with training. Experience when matched with skill is a very deadly combination. The reason why is twofold. In training you can practice and experiment with tactics that you may not wish to risk in actual combat. In combat you tend to use tactics that have proven to work, "it kept me alive last time", but these may not be optimal tactics. Most people are not that creative when bullets (and larger objects) are coming at them, they tend to be reactive at that point.

The second advantage of training is repetition; you do it until you do so automatically when the situation appears. Ex: Your wingman says "break right", you don't think, you break right first and then look to see what it was.

[FatR]

ORIGINAL: SuluSea
[/i]

ORIGINAL: FatR

Even the most cursory examination of actual combat episodes reveals that unescorted 4E raids against major and active Japanese bases weren't even contemplated until the advent of B-29s.

This has been refuted numerous times already, my work here is done.

You know very episodic bombing of absolute backwaters like Nauru and Wake does not really refure this even one time. Edge cases can always be found, but your own source only confirms, that unescorted Allied LBA should not be able to suppress Japanese bases before B-29s, and historically it wasn't even tried.