Shattered Vow

[Nemo121]

But a torpedo run should have never have happened.

Really, so in 1944 and 1945 you are clear that no IJNAF or IJAAF ever made a torpedo run on Allied shipping? OR an attack whose profile closely approximated that of a torpedo attack?

An alternate way of expressing this would be to point out that during their ingress to the initiation point ( that point at which the attack run begins ) torpedo bombers, dive-bombers, kamis etc all frequently made rather similar approaches. Only once they reached the initiation point did the dive-bombers dive begin moving into their dive positions, the kamis begin their glides and the torpedo bombers drop down to 200 feet or so. Since the journey to the initiation point is when most interceptions occured statistically speaking planes which made it to the initiation point tended to be able to make their attack runs - no matter what profile that was.

The last puncture in this particular balloon would be to point you to youtube and all of the video there showing kamikazes coming in straight and level at 100 to 200 feet from the sides of ships. Often these kamikazes were torpedo-carrying Kates or Jills. In fact I read some rather interesting articles on pieces of kamikazes recovered from ships hit in famous footage in which several of the kamikazes conducting these low-level attacks at 100 to 200 feet were Kates. So, apart from the fact that you don't like it could you explain to me precisely how this torpedo-carrying plane "shouldn't" have ever made an attack run when there is clear film evidence that kamikazes made almost identical attack runs during the 1944 and 1945 period?

If they could make side-on level flight approaches at 100 to 200 feet in 1944/45 I see no reason why a torpedo-carrying plane could not do so now.

Certainly you might not like to see these planes leak through but if it happened in the real war and resulted in kamikazes making low-level attacks ( as can be seen on many videos ) I see nothing objective which supports your opinion.


As proof I'll post a few links - I don't endorse any glorification of either side in these videos but post them merely for the video of low-level, level flight attacks by kamis which approximate torpedo-bomber attacks quite closely ( and were often the preferred method of attack of Kate and Jill kamis - the Zekes and Vals tended to be the high-approach, steep diving attack profile types )...
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kj-xkobaRuE
1:00 to 1:14 Clear shots of a level flight low-level kami - flight path approximates Kate attack pattern relatively closely.
1:32 to 1:35 Same again.
2:06 to 2:10 Clear shot of controlled low-level flight into a ship. Carried out by a torpedo-carrying plane later identified as a Kate based on a fragment of a wing someone examined several decades later.

If these guys could make it through CAP and make attack runs quite similar to torpedo attack runs I see no reason why pilots in the game couldn't.


Remember there IS a difference between a result you don't like and a result that shouldn't occur. A lot of people around here forget that difference.

[JohnDillworth]

Really, so in 1944 and 1945 you are clear that no IJNAF or IJAAF ever made a torpedo run on Allied shipping? OR an attack whose profile closely approximated that of a torpedo attack?

An alternate way of expressing this would be to point out that during their ingress to the initiation point ( that point at which the attack run begins ) torpedo bombers, dive-bombers, kamis etc all frequently made rather similar approaches. Only once they reached the initiation point did the dive-bombers dive begin moving into their dive positions, the kamis begin their glides and the torpedo bombers drop down to 200 feet or so. Since the journey to the initiation point is when most interceptions occured statistically speaking planes which made it to the initiation point tended to be able to make their attack runs - no matter what profile that was.

The last puncture in this particular balloon would be to point you to youtube and all of the video there showing kamikazes coming in straight and level at 100 to 200 feet from the sides of ships. Often these kamikazes were torpedo-carrying Kates or Jills. In fact I read some rather interesting articles on pieces of kamikazes recovered from ships hit in famous footage in which several of the kamikazes conducting these low-level attacks at 100 to 200 feet were Kates. So, apart from the fact that you don't like it could you explain to me precisely how this torpedo-carrying plane "shouldn't" have ever made an attack run when there is clear film evidence that kamikazes made almost identical attack runs during the 1944 and 1945 period?

If they could make side-on level flight approaches at 100 to 200 feet in 1944/45 I see no reason why a torpedo-carrying plane could not do so now.

Certainly you might not like to see these planes leak through but if it happened in the real war and resulted in kamikazes making low-level attacks ( as can be seen on many videos ) I see nothing objective which supports your opinion.


As proof I'll post a few links - I don't endorse any glorification of either side in these videos but post them merely for the video of low-level, level flight attacks by kamis which approximate torpedo-bomber attacks quite closely ( and were often the preferred method of attack of Kate and Jill kamis - the Zekes and Vals tended to be the high-approach, steep diving attack profile types )...
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kj-xkobaRuE
1:00 to 1:14 Clear shots of a level flight low-level kami - flight path approximates Kate attack pattern relatively closely.
1:32 to 1:35 Same again.
2:06 to 2:10 Clear shot of controlled low-level flight into a ship. Carried out by a torpedo-carrying plane later identified as a Kate based on a fragment of a wing someone examined several decades later.

If these guys could make it through CAP and make attack runs quite similar to torpedo attack runs I see no reason why pilots in the game couldn't.


Remember there IS a difference between a result you don't like and a result that shouldn't occur. A lot of people around here forget that difference.

< Message edited by Nemo121 -- 5/10/2010 8:14:10 PM >

_____________________________

"History, it is just one bloody thing after another."

Looks like most of these came in at an angle way to high for a torpedo attack. The one guy at 1:01 seem a bit right but still to high. A properly conducted torpedo attack would require lining up the ship for a bit , staying strati, and releasing the torpedo at the correct height and angle. None of these guys seems to have done that. Not saying it can't be done, but does anyone know of a successfully executed torpedo attack against an allied capital ship after 1943?

[Nemo121]

Well John you must have looked at a different clip than I. How you can argue that the torpedo-bomber at 2:06 to 2:10 wasn't executing a torpedo-run-like attack is beyond me. In addition the point is not that it wasn't a successful attack. The point is that it was making an attack run after breaking through CAP, just like the planes in this example.

Still, none so blind as those who don't wish to see and all that.

[Chickenboy]

ORIGINAL: JohnDillworth

Not so sure about this. IIRC, the Judy was pretty darn fast in a shallow dive. The nature of the intercept-low level, high speed, difficulty in establishing an intercept vector with imperfect information, etc.-would make real life interception of a TB flying at high speeds problematic.

Of course, the problem with the Judy was that they tended to fly too fast for their torpedoes and / or the pilot would misjudge the closing rate to target or the height above the water. Many of them went 'splat' for this reason, rather than an effective CAP intercept.

_____________________________

Did a Judy EVER make a successfully torpedo attack? Certainly not against a carrier and proably not against a capital ship. Don't know that it was ever done.

If by 'successful', you mean evading CAP and being in a position to make a torpedo attack, I think the answer is yes. If by 'successful' you mean evading CAP, lining up properly, evading flak, dropping from appropriate altitude, dropping from appropriate speed, non-breakup of the torpedo, proper torpedo guidance, impact on target and explosion, that's a different story.

What we're measuring here isn't the net result (exploding torpedo against an allied capital ship), but the issue of CAP liquidating all attackers before they got close. The former simply contains too many variables for this discussion of the efficacy of CAP in the air-to-air model.

Anyways, the leaky CAP model feels in AE feels about right to me. CAP should only rarely completely destroy 100.0% of an incoming strike, no matter how superfluous the number of fighters (or ready on deck) may be.

[Chickenboy]

ORIGINAL: JohnDillworth

Really, so in 1944 and 1945 you are clear that no IJNAF or IJAAF ever made a torpedo run on Allied shipping? OR an attack whose profile closely approximated that of a torpedo attack?

An alternate way of expressing this would be to point out that during their ingress to the initiation point ( that point at which the attack run begins ) torpedo bombers, dive-bombers, kamis etc all frequently made rather similar approaches. Only once they reached the initiation point did the dive-bombers dive begin moving into their dive positions, the kamis begin their glides and the torpedo bombers drop down to 200 feet or so. Since the journey to the initiation point is when most interceptions occured statistically speaking planes which made it to the initiation point tended to be able to make their attack runs - no matter what profile that was.

The last puncture in this particular balloon would be to point you to youtube and all of the video there showing kamikazes coming in straight and level at 100 to 200 feet from the sides of ships. Often these kamikazes were torpedo-carrying Kates or Jills. In fact I read some rather interesting articles on pieces of kamikazes recovered from ships hit in famous footage in which several of the kamikazes conducting these low-level attacks at 100 to 200 feet were Kates. So, apart from the fact that you don't like it could you explain to me precisely how this torpedo-carrying plane "shouldn't" have ever made an attack run when there is clear film evidence that kamikazes made almost identical attack runs during the 1944 and 1945 period?

If they could make side-on level flight approaches at 100 to 200 feet in 1944/45 I see no reason why a torpedo-carrying plane could not do so now.

Certainly you might not like to see these planes leak through but if it happened in the real war and resulted in kamikazes making low-level attacks ( as can be seen on many videos ) I see nothing objective which supports your opinion.


As proof I'll post a few links - I don't endorse any glorification of either side in these videos but post them merely for the video of low-level, level flight attacks by kamis which approximate torpedo-bomber attacks quite closely ( and were often the preferred method of attack of Kate and Jill kamis - the Zekes and Vals tended to be the high-approach, steep diving attack profile types )...
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kj-xkobaRuE
1:00 to 1:14 Clear shots of a level flight low-level kami - flight path approximates Kate attack pattern relatively closely.
1:32 to 1:35 Same again.
2:06 to 2:10 Clear shot of controlled low-level flight into a ship. Carried out by a torpedo-carrying plane later identified as a Kate based on a fragment of a wing someone examined several decades later.

If these guys could make it through CAP and make attack runs quite similar to torpedo attack runs I see no reason why pilots in the game couldn't.


Remember there IS a difference between a result you don't like and a result that shouldn't occur. A lot of people around here forget that difference.

< Message edited by Nemo121 -- 5/10/2010 8:14:10 PM >

_____________________________

"History, it is just one bloody thing after another."

Looks like most of these came in at an angle way to high for a torpedo attack. The one guy at 1:01 seem a bit right but still to high. A properly conducted torpedo attack would require lining up the ship for a bit , staying strati, and releasing the torpedo at the correct height and angle. None of these guys seems to have done that. Not saying it can't be done, but does anyone know of a successfully executed torpedo attack against an allied capital ship after 1943?

Some months ago, someone posted the engagement envelope for mid-late war IJN aerial torpedoes. On paper at least, many were 'designed' to be dropped at >250 knots and >500 feet altitude. It boggles the mind, but that's what the design parameters were. I imagine that a good many of these torpedoes failed upon impact with the water or had their guidance fins knocked akimbo. But this otherwise jaw-dropping engagement envelope *was* standard fare for IJN tactical engagement.

In other words, if you see a plane at between 0-500 feet elevation and <250 knots or so, it's probably within the tactical engagement profile of mid-late war IJN aerial torpedoes.

[packerpete]

Late war, after the US Mk14 aerial version was fixed and improved, this torp was allegedly able to be dropped from 14Kft and 400 Knts. The speed maybe a little high but the 14 Kft stands out in my memory.

I will try to find the article. I believe it was linked of the "torpedo debacle" article?

Not trying to hijack the thread just posting some info. that I found interesting.

My numbers above are off but check this, improved Mk-13 numbers. DOH!!!!!!

http://www.history.navy.mil/museums/key ... /part1.htm

IMPROVED TORPEDO MK 13

Parallel with the development of the Mk 25, the Mk 13 was undergoing continuous improvement. Most significant was the development of flight-in-air accessories: stabilizers, drag rings, and shroud rings which permitted launching at altitudes of 2400 feet (vice 50 feet) and air speeds of 410 knots (vice 110 knots). With these improvements, the Mk 13 was successfully employed in the latter stages of World War II; the most noteworthy success being its part in the sinking of the 45,000-ton Japanese battleship YAMATO in April 1945 off Kyushu.

In view of the shortcomings of the torpedo which dictated the tactics employed, and in some cases, the early aircraft (TBD), the overall statistical performance of the Torpedo Mk 13 as shown in table 3 is suprising.

Development of Torpedo Mk 25 was completed before the end of the second World War, but the torpedo was never produced for service use. The large inventory of Mk 13's (resulting from wartime production), improvement of Mk 13 performance, and the changing role of Naval aircraft from strike warfare platforms to ASW platforms, undoubtedly influenced this decision.

[Canoerebel]

Orders issued for next turn:

1) Carriers to move a few hexes east but remain in position to offer protection to the transports at Sampit.
2) Most of the "high value" (APA, etc.) transports depart Sampit tonight.
3) I'm going to wait two mroe days before the first attack at Sampit.
4) Three divisions should arrive at Makassar in a few days.
5) Airfield at Donggala just went to level one and will continue to build. This will help provide cover for the invasion of Balikpan, which I think will get underway within ten days.
6) Japanese lead just dropped below 8,000 points for the first time.

[Chickenboy]

Canoerebel,

You've commented several times on the tactical value of APAs in your island hopping campaign, but have they affected your strategic goals at all? In other words, because you have rapid unloading capabilities, are you looking at different targets and rationale than you otherwise would if you had standard xAPs or xAKs?

[Canoerebel]

Allied players are going to LOVE APAs.  They are pure gold.  Whereas an xAP may need five or six days at a beach, and an AP at least three or four days, an APA is done in two days (or, since we're playing two-day turns, it might even be one day).

When time at a forward beach equates to danger - from enemy carriers or combat ships having time to react and strike or giving the enemy time to reconfigure his LBA to maximum effect - leaving a beach after two days is a vast difference from leaving in five or six days.

The value of the APA rises along with the need for the Allies to get in and get out.  So, if the Allies are at a disadvantage in carrier numbers, or are so far foward that giving the enemy time to organize a strike is risking calamity, then APAs reduce your risk.

Also, if you're playing two-day turns, it is possible to organize invasions so quick that your opponent won't even have a chance to counterattack before your APA are gone.  This usually appllies to smaller invasions (say, a beach or base garrisoned by a regiment or naval guard unit) than major invasions where you end up having to use more of the slow-unloading ships.

In my game under my circumstances (I've lost alot of transports, have been at a decided disadvantage in carriers for most of the game, and I am now advancing into areas that have lots of enemy airfields), APA broaden the invasion target options.  I think my opponent also recognizes their utilities and has a healthy respect, perhaps even some fear, of the APA fleets (judging by his comments when he's damaged but failed to sink APAs).

[FatR]

ORIGINAL: Nemo121

Hmm, you know, I seem to remember quite a few reports from the Pacific War in which small raids or small fragments of raids DID make it through to make attack runs... Just because something is deleterious to one's cause doesn't make it unfair or unrealistic.

Even at Marianas, two USN carriers received bomb near-misses that caused casualties on board, Enterpise has a torp exploding in her wake, and two more CVs were attacked but missed. The raid mentioned above was bigger in numbers that all but one Japanese strike waves at Marianas and, considering superior aircraft that composed it, more powerful than any of them.

[Canoerebel]

6/18/44 and 6/19/44
&nbsp;
Livin' la vita loca:&nbsp; DD Swanson just&nbsp;completed a mad dash around Borneo.&nbsp; I had sent her west and then north to see if the KB might close on my Sampit invasion fleet from the South China Sea.&nbsp; Swanson didn't encounter eny bogies and is nearing the friendly port of Manado...so I'm going to send her back just to see if she can do it again.&nbsp;
&nbsp;
Sampit:&nbsp; All troops are ashore and in good shape.&nbsp; The Allies have 400 AV and the Japanese 150.&nbsp; First deliberate attack will take place tomorrow.
&nbsp;
Allied carriers:&nbsp; Will temporarily retire to the Banda Sea to give pilots some rest.&nbsp; CV Constellation has 20 FLT damage, so I'll probably send her to the Capetown yards.
&nbsp;
Balikpan:&nbsp; The invasion fleet is assembling south of Kendari at about the same point as the carriers are about to reach.&nbsp; I think D-Day for Balikpan is five or six days away.
&nbsp;
KB:&nbsp; No sign of it - my patrol aircraft can cover the northern approaches, but my biggest concern is a surprise raid from the Kuching area.&nbsp; Hence the second voyage of DD Swanson.&nbsp; Once Sampit falls, patrol aircraft will be able to cover raids from that sector.
&nbsp;
Thailand:&nbsp; More Allied troops on the way to Nikon Richtisima, which is now isolated by Allied units in and around the base.&nbsp; First probing attack should take place in about a week, by which time the Allies should have 1000 AV present; of that number, 600 AV will be 50 to 100% prepped for Nikon, the rest are mostly prepped for Bangkok.
&nbsp;
Strategic Situation:&nbsp; With bases on Celebes and more to come soon, the Allies have shut down traffic to Balikpan and Banjermasin, and are about to shut down traffic to Soerabaja.&nbsp; IJ traffic to Tarakan is risky, now, and will get riskier once the Allies take Balikpan.&nbsp; So the squeeze on IJ fuel sources is beginning.

[Canoerebel]

6/20/44 and 6/23/44
 
Sampit:  Two Allied attacks have come off at less than 1:1 odds and haven't touched three forts, but the Japanese are suffering about 2x casualties.  So it appears likely that the force at hand will take this base within a reasonable time frame.

Makassar:  The advanced Allied troops (a tank destroyer unit and a big cavalry division) got repulsed by the Japanese garrison.  But two more Allied divisions are about to arrive with other units in tow, so the siege of Makassar will begin in earnest.

Balikpan:  The Allied tansports have taken station west of Makassar with the carriers just to the south (CV Constellation is making for Darwin, but two CVEs arrived to partially make up for the loss of her fighter).  Recon shows more than 400 IJ planes at Balikpan, and based upon Miller's reaction when he thought I was targeting Balikpan, I think he'll throw everything at me.  I've sent DD Swanson on yet another circumnavigation of Borneo to check for carriers, so I don't see any sign of the KB.  D-Day is probably two days away.

Thailand:  Lots of units on both sides boiling around Nikon Richtisima.  Not sure yet if the Allies have enough to break through.

[Canoerebel]

Orders have been issued for the invasion of Balikpan.&nbsp; D-Day will occur on the day two of this two-day turn.&nbsp; Some notes:
&nbsp;
1.&nbsp; Balikpan is strongly garrisoned by 50k Japanese troops.&nbsp;The Allied invasion force consists of three Army divisions, a Marine regiment, and two Chindit units.&nbsp; Additional Allied troops will reinforce later.&nbsp; This will be a long, tough siege, but I am proceeding because I want the oil and refinery (eventually).
&nbsp;
2.&nbsp; Transports head straight to the beach with the carriers taking station two hexes east, close to Donggala which will lend two fighter squadrons to the CAP.&nbsp; Smaller combat TFs will take station in the narrowest part of the Makassar Strait in case enemy ships try to transit that strait.
&nbsp;
3.&nbsp; DD Swanson is no on its third circumnavagation of Borneo searching for signs of the KB.&nbsp; I also have the waters to the north well patroled.&nbsp; No signs of enemy carriers and I doubt they could show up on day one.
&nbsp;
4.&nbsp; B-24 from Kendari, Gorotolo, Ternate, and Manado will try to suppress the airfield at Balikpan, but I recon reports 400+ aircraft there.

[Canoerebel]

6/24/44 and 6/25/44
&nbsp;
Balikpan:&nbsp; No appearance by the KB and the invasion force has landed in good shape.&nbsp; The Japanese AV is 950 and the Allied AV ashore thus far is about 1200 AV.&nbsp; So we settle in now for what should be a protracted seige.&nbsp; My ships will have to stick around a few days, so I'm keeping a wary eye out for the KB.
&nbsp;
Sampit:&nbsp; Miller is sending in a mixed brigade by air transport.&nbsp; A good move by him.&nbsp; I will have to reinforce my army.
&nbsp;
Next on the List:&nbsp; Once the transports are finished at Balikpan - and probably after the carriers retire to Darwin to replace lost aircraft - the Allies have lots of troops prepped for Banjermasin and Ketapang.&nbsp; Undoubtedly, Miller will station the KB to interfere with any such move on my part.
&nbsp;
Sub Wars:&nbsp; ASW badly damaged I-1 off Perth.&nbsp; I mention this only because damaged CV Constellation will stop there briefly on her way to Capetown.&nbsp; Milller continues to lose lots of subs, but the Allies aren't far behind.
&nbsp;
Nikon Richtisima:&nbsp; Miller withdrew a unit from Nikon Richtisims to (successfully) attack an Allied unit in an adjacent hex that was blocking the road.&nbsp; Seeing an opportunity, the Allied army at Nikon launched a shock attack that easily took the base.&nbsp; This is very bad news for the Japanese because it opens several routes to attack southeast, east, or northeast into Cambodia and Vietnam.
&nbsp;
&nbsp;

[Chickenboy]

Canoerebel,

Can you comment about any discernible changes in ASW efficacy for you in the last few months? This was the first time I recall you mentioning an effective ASW action, although you have mentioned sinking several IJN subs with surface combat TFs. Do you still notice a better ASW effect from your 'surface combat' ships or is ASW per se more the way to go at this point in the war?

Thanks.

[Canoerebel]

Some comments about subs and ASW by mid '44:
&nbsp;
1.&nbsp; Miller has lost so many subs (more than 100 now) that there are fewer encounters these days.
2.&nbsp; He tends to wait until a major action (such as the concentration of Allied ships for an invasion) and then "floods the zone" with what he has available - usually three or four subs now.
3.&nbsp; Combat TFs remain by far the most potent Allied ASW weapon.
4.&nbsp; ASW TFs are still anemic, though the PF class does pretty well in ASW TFs.
5.&nbsp; Japanese ASW is far, far, far more potent than it was early in the game.&nbsp; I have lost scores of subs now - probably more than 80.&nbsp; Most of these are in deep water hexes.&nbsp; I move my subs around some, but I could do better.

[Canoerebel]

While I await a turn later this afternoon, some comments about the current situation:
&nbsp;
1.&nbsp; The Allies have three attacks underway in the DEI - Makassar, Balikpan and Sampit.&nbsp; That's a little much at one time, but I had expected Sampit to fall fairly easily.&nbsp; My opponent's reinforcement of Sampit by air will require the Allies to reinforce the landing.
&nbsp;
2.&nbsp; I don't have to be a prophet to foresee this developing into a major engagement.&nbsp; The Japanese bases on South Borneo are not strongly protected, but they are vital.&nbsp; I think Miller will throw everything into this battle assuming he has everything available.
&nbsp;
3.&nbsp; I think he may have sent his carriers to the Home Islands to upgrade.&nbsp; Just a guess on my part.&nbsp;
&nbsp;
4.&nbsp; The Allied carriers will retire from Balikpan to Darwin to replace lost aircraft.&nbsp; As soon as that is done, they'll return to Kendari where transports will pick up the Sampit reinforcements (a US Army division an a Brit brigade).
&nbsp;
5.&nbsp; The Allies are ashore in good shape at Balikpan, but definately need reinforcements.&nbsp; These are located at several bases, so the Allies will need to pick those up.&nbsp; The Allies also have a decent force prepped for adjacent Samarinda and may land there too (let's up the ante of the number of ongoing operations!).
&nbsp;
6.&nbsp; It appears that the key island of Billiton (between Borneo and Java) is unoccupied.&nbsp; The Allies&nbsp;may land a decent-sized force there at the same time&nbsp;they land the reinforcements at Sampit&nbsp;- if&nbsp;I can confirm that the KB isn't in the area.&nbsp; Sounds like DD Swanson will have to make more circumnavigations of Borneo.
&nbsp;

[Canoerebel]

6/26/44 and 6/27/44
&nbsp;
Balikpan:&nbsp; Most of the "first wave" Allied transports plus the covering carriers and combat ships withdrew from Balikpan (the carriers making for Darwin to replenish and replace lost aircraft).&nbsp; A Japanese CL/DD force came in an tangled with an Allied CA/DD force.&nbsp; The Allies won this battle:
&nbsp;
Day Time Surface Combat, near Balikpapan at 66,98, Range 24,000 Yards
&nbsp;
Japanese Ships
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; CL Kiso, Shell hits 45,&nbsp; heavy fires,&nbsp; heavy damage
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; DD Fuyuzuki, Shell hits 16, Torpedo hits 1, and is sunk
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; DD Asashimo, Shell hits 1
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; DD Hayashimo, Shell hits 5,&nbsp; on fire,&nbsp; heavy damage
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; DD Hatsukaze, Shell hits 16,&nbsp; heavy fires,&nbsp; heavy damage
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; DD Maikaze, Shell hits 4
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; DD Isokaze, Shell hits 3,&nbsp; on fire
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; DD Hatsushima, Shell hits 5,&nbsp; on fire,&nbsp; heavy damage
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; DD Yugure, Shell hits 11,&nbsp; heavy fires,&nbsp; heavy damage
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; DD Akebono, Shell hits 20, and is sunk
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; DD Katsutade, Shell hits 2
&nbsp;
Allied Ships
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; CA Northampton, Shell hits 2
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; CLAA Atlanta
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; CL Concord, Shell hits 2
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; CL Honolulu, Shell hits 1
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; DD Bennett, Shell hits 4,&nbsp; on fire
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; DD Boyd, Shell hits 2
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; DD Braine, Shell hits 3
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; DD Brownson
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; DD Bullard, Shell hits 2
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; DMS Howard
&nbsp;
A clash like this is more significant than you might expect, because the Japanese have suffered such heavy cruiser and destroyer losses in the game.
&nbsp;
Japanese air did manage to sink a number of transports that were protected only by LRCAP from Donggala.&nbsp; Also, new transports arrived bringing to Chindit units from Manado.&nbsp; The Allies have 1400+ AV.&nbsp; The Japanese have about 950 AV, including 4th Division, which was previously roughed up at Lautem and another location (perhaps it was Boela or Ambon).&nbsp; Heavy Allied 4EB raids vs. the airfield were pretty effective, but I'm not sure I can keep up enough pressure at this point to close the base and keep it closed.&nbsp; We'll see.
&nbsp;
KB:&nbsp; No sign of it.
&nbsp;
Allied Carriers:&nbsp; Should make Darwin in two days and will almost immediately depart to cover the anticipated reinforcement invasion of Sampit and possibly an invasion of Billiton Island.
&nbsp;
&nbsp;

[Heeward]

What is the status of your carrier upgrades? And in general upgrades overall?

[Canoerebel]

I'm in good shape, though for an unpleasant reason. The great carrier Battle of Morotai in November '43 left most surviving Allied carriers and BBs damaged. Most of them retired to Pearl Harbor, San Francisco, and Alameda to repair and upgrade. Other carriers that have since joined the fleet are not due to upgrade yet. So my carriers and BBs are essentially all up to date.