The Mersing Gambit

[herwin]

My opponent is trying a long-delayed Mersing Gambit (23/24 December rather than 7/8 December). I'll start with a historical discussion and then ask some questions about the game.

I suspect Japan did not invade at Mersing on 7/8 December or later for two reasons:
1. Too close to Singapore to provide adequate surprise and operational security.
2. Too small a port/over-the-beach capacity to support a corps-level operation against Singapore.

The standard Mersing Gambit involves a corps-level landing on 7/8 December, followed by an advance across the peninsula to cut off the III Indian Corps to the north. It's definitely gamey as it takes advantage of the big bang at the beginning of the game to do something that was not operationally feasible. The delayed Mersing Gambit (by a couple of days) is vulnerable to the movement of forces to their wartime positions and counter-action by Allied surface action groups. As a small supplement to the standard landings at Singora and Kota Bharu, it's out of mutual support range and unlikely to do much against the local garrison--much like the issues with the Anzio landing in 1944.

Are these issues in game play?

[henri51]

ORIGINAL: herwin

My opponent is trying a long-delayed Mersing Gambit (23/24 December rather than 7/8 December). I'll start with a historical discussion and then ask some questions about the game.

I suspect Japan did not invade at Mersing on 7/8 December or later for two reasons:
1. Too close to Singapore to provide adequate surprise and operational security.
2. Too small a port/over-the-beach capacity to support a corps-level operation against Singapore.

The Japanese didn't invade Mersing because on Dec. 8 they invaded Malaya at 7 points to the North along the 600-mile coast between Merqui and Kota Bharu, presumably to ensure their supply line. Landing a Corps at Mersing would have meant removing it from somewhere else, and leaving it out of supplies between Singapore and Percival's force. Assuming they could have supplied the Corps, could it have done anything other than trying to cut off Percival's supplies? The Prince of Wales and the Repulse were in the area, and if not sunk could have caused major damage to the invasion force.

Henri

[Nikademus]

Its only "gamey" in that player 1 is aware at the start of the amphibious bonus which allows large scale landings without the usual necessary preperation. The bonus is necessary to make the early campaign playable but of course can be exploited like any other rule.

On the con side, the Mersing gambit 'does' entail greater risk for player one. I've successfully conducted this strategy in stock WitP on two occasion, the 2nd time though i paid for it with a damaged battleship (torpedoed by a vildebeast and KO'd for several months.) and had to suffer a major surface attack by Force Z which while repulsed....resulted in further large scale damage to signifigant IJN assets. Proximity to Singapore airfields also led to concentrated air attacks on transports and ground troops (at least until enough JAAF could be transferred in)

Players who want to ensure maximum availability of their surface assets are advised to go with the original plan which allows the JNAF/JAAF it's best chances to cover the op and thwart Force Z in particular.

[mike scholl 1]

ORIGINAL: herwin

My opponent is trying a long-delayed Mersing Gambit (23/24 December rather than 7/8 December). I'll start with a historical discussion and then ask some questions about the game.

I suspect Japan did not invade at Mersing on 7/8 December or later for two reasons:
1. Too close to Singapore to provide adequate surprise and operational security.
2. Too small a port/over-the-beach capacity to support a corps-level operation against Singapore.

The standard Mersing Gambit involves a corps-level landing on 7/8 December, followed by an advance across the peninsula to cut off the III Indian Corps to the north. It's definitely gamey as it takes advantage of the big bang at the beginning of the game to do something that was not operationally feasible. The delayed Mersing Gambit (by a couple of days) is vulnerable to the movement of forces to their wartime positions and counter-action by Allied surface action groups. As a small supplement to the standard landings at Singora and Kota Bharu, it's out of mutual support range and unlikely to do much against the local garrison--much like the issues with the Anzio landing in 1944.

Are these issues in game play?

The "standard" Mersing Gambit is TOTALLY gamey. It relies on the game's "mechanics" to make possible the impossible and is a complete exploit.

The "delayed" gambit at least allows the opposing player a chance to react and defend. It still exploits hindsight and the mechanics somewhat, but it's not the completely "smarmy" nonsense of the "standard" model.

I wouldn't call a landing there at the 2-week plus mark "gamey" at all.

[findmeifyoucan]

Which I did myself but in week 3 as it took me that long to clear out the American Surface fleet threat! I used several Jap battle and cruiser fleets plus a small KB to take care of those nasty Vilderbeasts and Swordfish coming from Singapore with lots of P40 and other flavours for escort . then it was for my Amphibious Assualt Transports. Battlefleet with Carrier support meant light Jap fleet cassualties and heavy cAsualties for the Americans!

I do agree that it is gamey to attack Mersing on turn 2 as you have the advantage of hindsight and know the American fleet can't get to you that quickly,

[bilbow]

I used KB to hit Manila, the moved to cover a landing at Mersing on the 12th. Early enough to be effective at cutting off some of the British, but without the risk of air attack by the Sinapore air forces. Well they attacked and got slaughtered. The idea of slamming in there on the 7-8th without air over repells me. Gamey or not I wouldn't do it. Jap assets are just to precious to waste that way.

[PaxMondo]

ORIGINAL: Nikademus

On the con side, the Mersing gambit 'does' entail greater risk for player one. I've successfully conducted this strategy in stock WitP on two occasion, the 2nd time though i paid for it with a damaged battleship (torpedoed by a vildebeast and KO'd for several months.) and had to suffer a major surface attack by Force Z which while repulsed....resulted in further large scale damage to signifigant IJN assets. Proximity to Singapore airfields also led to concentrated air attacks on transports and ground troops (at least until enough JAAF could be transferred in)

This is pretty much why I don't see even the Dec 7 landing gamey. Sure, IJ will get Sings 1 - 2 months early. But, she will pay for it with repair time (or worse) on capital assets that she can't afford to lose during her time of likely expansion.

Watching the AAR's, it isn't clear at all if it is worth it. (Unless you can get lucky and not lose anything more than a few xAK's). However, it seems the median level of damage is more like Nik.

Still, watching the AAR's on this is interesting and may change my opinion if it becomes too easy to do this with no losses.

[Bliztk]

It has been a "gambit" and not much prepared. I had a resupply convoy with troops (4th Div) to reinforce Khota Baru attack, and I had KB heading to Hong Kong to rearm.

Then three days ago I spotted Mersing with only 1 unit and recalled KB and BBForce (old BBs) and went for it.

As I said to Herwin my goal is not to conquer Singapore, but to cut off the Northern Force so I can defeat them in detail and then advance to Singapore with the door closed. In fact maybe I will not advance to Johore.

I have lost 10 Vals on an unescorted attack and 1 transport sunk, KB CAP covering the hex was very succesful killing Buffalo escorted strikes. I will try to take Mersing in the next turn, then I will have local based fighters to cover the beach and I can move KB to the "hunter-killer" with POW and Repulse as main target

[bklooste]

I dont consider the Mersing landing as gamey as they could have landed in the morning with associated risks HOWEVER how come they can unload 1-2 weeks supplies for 2 Divs in combat ( or even a Corps) in a few days....
 
The special landing bonus should be removed...If the IJN cant do what they did histroically then there is a problem that needs fixing not covering up as its silly that you can do a landing in Dec 41 which you cant in Dec 42 even though they have a lot more experience.
 
The landing bonus should be removed vs opposed troops and should provide little benefit in landing supplies. There probably can be a smaller bonus through the whole war to signify Japans abbility to land on open beaches with much worse equipment helped by their night landings.

[herwin]

ORIGINAL: Bliztk

It has been a "gambit" and not much prepared. I had a resupply convoy with troops (4th Div) to reinforce Khota Baru attack, and I had KB heading to Hong Kong to rearm.

Then three days ago I spotted Mersing with only 1 unit and recalled KB and BBForce (old BBs) and went for it.

As I said to Herwin my goal is not to conquer Singapore, but to cut off the Northern Force so I can defeat them in detail and then advance to Singapore with the door closed. In fact maybe I will not advance to Johore.

I have lost 10 Vals on an unescorted attack and 1 transport sunk, KB CAP covering the hex was very succesful killing Buffalo escorted strikes. I will try to take Mersing in the next turn, then I will have local based fighters to cover the beach and I can move KB to the "hunter-killer" with POW and Repulse as main target

There was a reason only one unit was left at Mersing... [;)]

[mike scholl 1]

ORIGINAL: bklooste

The special landing bonus should be removed...If the IJN cant do what they did histroically then there is a problem that needs fixing not covering up as its silly that you can do a landing in Dec 41 which you cant in Dec 42 even though they have a lot more experience.

The landing bonus should be removed vs opposed troops and should provide little benefit in landing supplies. There probably can be a smaller bonus through the whole war to signify Japans abbility to land on open beaches with much worse equipment helped by their night landings.

For once we agree on something. Perhaps the "bonus" should be replaced with a "preparedness factor"? Make landings that are 100% prepared for their target more effecient. That would cover most of the early Japanese successes, and penalize last minute changes in operations.

[herwin]

ORIGINAL: mike scholl 1

ORIGINAL: bklooste

The special landing bonus should be removed...If the IJN cant do what they did histroically then there is a problem that needs fixing not covering up as its silly that you can do a landing in Dec 41 which you cant in Dec 42 even though they have a lot more experience.

The landing bonus should be removed vs opposed troops and should provide little benefit in landing supplies. There probably can be a smaller bonus through the whole war to signify Japans abbility to land on open beaches with much worse equipment helped by their night landings.

For once we agree on something. Perhaps the "bonus" should be replaced with a "preparedness factor"? Make landings that are 100% prepared for their target more effecient. That would cover most of the early Japanese successes, and penalize last minute changes in operations.

I think I agree as well. The Japanese advantage in 1941-early 1942 was their careful planning before the war.

[Tone]

A early landing at Mersing and Kuantan was discounted by of Japanese Imperial Army planners because the invasion convoys would be too far advanced across the Gulf of Siam the day before to land in early morning - This would have given British early warning of invasion and allowed their Battle Squadron based at Singapore to easy intercept these convoys - As history proves as Prince of Whales and Repulse visited Kuantan early in the morning of the day they were sunk.

[Bliztk]

Lost 7% of 4th Division at the Landing. Mersing occupied. No signs of counterattack by surface ABDA forces. Buffalo escorted strikes continue to be repulsed by KB air support, but I got lucky and several unescorted Vildeeblest strikes went unescorted and were slaughered by Zeroes

[bklooste]

ORIGINAL: mike scholl 1

ORIGINAL: bklooste

The special landing bonus should be removed...If the IJN cant do what they did histroically then there is a problem that needs fixing not covering up as its silly that you can do a landing in Dec 41 which you cant in Dec 42 even though they have a lot more experience.

The landing bonus should be removed vs opposed troops and should provide little benefit in landing supplies. There probably can be a smaller bonus through the whole war to signify Japans abbility to land on open beaches with much worse equipment helped by their night landings.

For once we agree on something. Perhaps the "bonus" should be replaced with a "preparedness factor"? Make landings that are 100% prepared for their target more effecient. That would cover most of the early Japanese successes, and penalize last minute changes in operations.

I dont like use prepare as i think its overally powerfull already .. and the Japanese did successfull invasions at short notice. Basically there were doctrinal differences , the Japanese doctrine used Night landings and were better at small landings with little preperation they also had a lot more experience with landings when the war started having done opposed multi divsional landings in 37 at Shanghai. You could give the Japanese a small doctrinal bonus that only worked if there was 5 days preperation . The US should get a larger doctirnal bonus from 44 for larger landings with more preperation.

Maybe the prep which tunrs on the doctrine should be based on the size of landing ...

Anyway i think the combat oriented aspects of the discussion are outweighed by the supply / unloading bonus which are NOT appropriate.

[bklooste]

ORIGINAL: herwin

ORIGINAL: mike scholl 1

ORIGINAL: bklooste

The special landing bonus should be removed...If the IJN cant do what they did histroically then there is a problem that needs fixing not covering up as its silly that you can do a landing in Dec 41 which you cant in Dec 42 even though they have a lot more experience.

The landing bonus should be removed vs opposed troops and should provide little benefit in landing supplies. There probably can be a smaller bonus through the whole war to signify Japans abbility to land on open beaches with much worse equipment helped by their night landings.

For once we agree on something. Perhaps the "bonus" should be replaced with a "preparedness factor"? Make landings that are 100% prepared for their target more effecient. That would cover most of the early Japanese successes, and penalize last minute changes in operations.

I think I agree as well. The Japanese advantage in 1941-early 1942 was their careful planning before the war.

Hardly that would last about a week , preparation needs to be based on enemy locations and these vary according to recon... Looks Wake lots of preperation come back with a larger unprepared unit and some air support and its successfull. Palembang , etc ?

Then again the landing at Milne bay was successfull against a much large allied force once they landed and found out the enemy strength the did the Harold.

[bklooste]

ORIGINAL: Tone

A early landing at Mersing and Kuantan was discounted by of Japanese Imperial Army planners because the invasion convoys would be too far advanced across the Gulf of Siam the day before to land in early morning - This would have given British early warning of invasion and allowed their Battle Squadron based at Singapore to easy intercept these convoys - As history proves as Prince of Whales and Repulse visited Kuantan early in the morning of the day they were sunk.

For the slow ships this is true but they could have done a few hour dash with the 19 knot ships and landed at dawn with the follow ups durring the day. The Shinshu Maru and the other large fast one could have landed 4000 troops and supplies, the question then is can the Surface assetts deal with POW /Repulse.. Then again if Japan landed at Mersing they may have used an extra BB or 2 and or a CVE/CVL.

The real issue is not the landing but the supply . It would be hard to keep sending supplies to Mersing and unloading them in time esp if the british do not commit there capital ships as it woulkd require the Capital ships to be present near Mersing and risk air attack , if they are damaged then teh Brittish reinforced by DEI forces could attack. However this option is available to players except for the fact so many supplies can be unloaded in a day or 2.

[mike scholl 1]

ORIGINAL: bklooste

I dont like use prepare as i think its overly powerful already .. and the Japanese did successful invasions at short notice.

No..., they made some successful unopposed landings at short notice. Invasions have opposition, and the Japanese record in this regard is poor.

[herwin]

ORIGINAL: mike scholl 1

ORIGINAL: bklooste

I dont like use prepare as i think its overly powerful already .. and the Japanese did successful invasions at short notice.

No..., they made some successful unopposed landings at short notice. Invasions have opposition, and the Japanese record in this regard is poor.

Writing as someone who was once the chief systems engineer of a USMC system that did planning and control of assault landings, the short-term advantage is the careful organisation of the initial landing. The long-term advantage is efficient over-the-beach logistics. What we saw in 1941-early 1942 were careful prewar plans for entire operations--all that was needed was the Stichwort. I'm not sure how to model that in the game since it wasn't just 100% preparation of the land units--the air and naval assets were also on carefully defined schedules. In game terms, most of the hand work players have to put in to structure an operation was preplanned and automatic. It would be nice if WiTP 2 had a planning mode where players could define operations, perhaps down to the classes/types/numbers of ships/aircraft/LCUs to be used and have the game automatically gather them together and set things up. Once the assets were available and prepared, the player issues the Stichwort, and the operation begins to play out.

We tried to do something like that for the training mode of our system.

The post-war USMC opinion of Japanese landing operations in the documents I've read was that they were very good at unopposed landings and lacked the assets and training to pull off assault landings.

[Nikademus]

ORIGINAL: bklooste


Hardly that would last about a week , preparation needs to be based on enemy locations and these vary according to recon... Looks Wake lots of preperation come back with a larger unprepared unit and some air support and its successfull. Palembang , etc ?

Then again the landing at Milne bay was successfull against a much large allied force once they landed and found out the enemy strength the did the Harold.

The Japanese started the war with the most experience in Amphibious operations, which would include landing while under fire. Amphibious Assault was not deemed practical due to the British experience in WWI (of which the IJN was closely modeled after) but should not be confused as "they could only land on empty beach" which was not the case. Amphibious assault implies landing against a fully fortified and prepared beach. The USMC was the only force that actively studied the concept prewar *and* embraced it part of their doctrine but at war's start had had no practical experience at attempting such. WATCHTOWER ended up being plagued by SNAFU's as a result and was thankfully unopposed, providing many object lessons incorprated in future endevors. With the exception of Atoll situations, it was always preferable to land on an undefended or underdefended beach and both Allies and Japanese sought to do so where possible.