Manila or Pearl-new paradigm?

[xj900uk]

Agree he listened, Genda was a nobody .. The reason for the abort of the 3 rd wave was Nagumo was satisfied of teh damage done ( ie the BBs) and to a lesser extent fear for his carriers and 2 BB from a US CV strike while his planes were over PH.

Genda was a very intelligent and clever chap, the only trouble is he was a bit of an oddball, a real hermit who would retreat into his cabin for literally days on end, not washing shaving or eating whilst he went over a problem. Total focus and concentraction.
Regarding Nagumo's decision to abort, he was naturally cautious in fact probably to much so, I always wonder what would have happened if Yamamoto had followed his gut instinct and replaced him with someone more agressive (like his no 2, Yamagushi I think his name was, he was on the Hiryu). True Nagumo did cite his reasons for withdrawing (in this order, although not necessarily in order of priority) to his staff officers :
(1). The IJN had already won a 'crushing victory' with the destruction of at least six battleships, numerous smaller craft and many land-based planes
(2). They did not know where the US carriers were. 'Even now, they could be out searching for us, planning a counter-strike'.
(3). (Perhaps the most telling quote of all, showing his true state of mind) 'This carrier strike force will be vital to us in the conflict that lies ahead. It is my duty to return it intact to His Majesty.

[BrucePowers]

That last item was very true.

[FatR]

ORIGINAL: AcePylut

In my current PBEM, I'm getting about 2-3 enemy ships hit (with detonations) per day from those manila subs.  In mid Feb '42, I've sunk the CA Kako, put torps into the Hiryu and a couple of BB's, sunk numerous AK's. 

I'd say you simply got very lucky. In my Japanese PBEM against Yubari he sank 5 ships over 55 days with USN subs. Damaged about two or three more, don't remember by now. I destroyed at least one of these subs in return too. And as now Allied fleet is kicked out of DEI, the rate of sub attacks had dropped already.

In my Allied PBEM, I got 12 ships with USN subs by the end of March 1942 (at least 2 of them by subs operating from Hawaii), but then, as Japanese ASW effort took form, the results rapidly decreased, and by now USN subs hardly ever sink anything except near-worthless PBs and SCs. Not at a very good rate too. And most of victims are claimed by Pacific subs.

[AcePylut]

Interesting... I wonder how he was deploying them.

I didn't send any subs to the Jap HI.  For the most part, during the inital expansion, I kept them within 2-4 days sail of a port they could replenish (this helped increase the number of attacks), and flooded the 4-5 obvious chokepoints.  I didn't bother driving any of the fleet subs to the Home Islands for convoy interdiction.  After the second week of the war, it was obvious that my opponent was making for Oz proper (Feb 7th now, and he's got all of northern Oz and parts of the east coast.  Nothing i can do, no ships, planes, or troops to stop it).  It made it fairly easy to flood the approaches - this increased attack % greatly. 

[bklooste]

FatR expereinces are iMHO more normal esp with dud torps, i dont understand how you can get so many hits in the DEI as these shoudl be well escorted troop convoys ( and he should have some naval search up unless he is suicidal) though you can get lucky with some war ships.  Supply and resources convoys dont really move through there till later.
 
If you go by the 1 ship in 11 days  you get 100 or so ships in the war .  As this is reduced by the fact these subs will be attritioned  and not all subs are from Manilla i think 100 or so ships is right.
 
So the equation is closer to
 
Manilla
KB is in a better location
25 or so subs 100 or so AKs
2 AS
Subs provide good training for your ASW ( your own skills as well as experience)  so when 43 hits and you get the ASW bonus your units will be quite effective
 
 
PH
2-4 old BBs   + 2-4 more in the dock for a few years
100 Air craft =10-15 Ak  ( From the PYBs) , Seriously hamper his Air search , start attritioning his air
1-2 CA/CL  
1-2 subs = 10 AKs or so.
Low accuracy Manilla Subs provide good training for your ASW ( your own skills as well as experience)  so when 43 hits and you get the ASW bonus your units will be quite effective
 
IMHO the biggest threat for Japan is the allied Air , and attritioning it to reduce training is my number one priority ( provided he does the normal keep his carriers out of harms way).  You can keep allied subs under control provided you have good air cover when you loose this in late 43 thats when the allied sub kills go through the roof.
Hence im a PH fan.  
 

[FatR]

ORIGINAL: AcePylut

Interesting... I wonder how he was deploying them.

First in and around the hexes where Japanese landings occured, then around Kendari, where most of the Combined Fleed concentrated for a time. Dedicated air ASW efforts and DD TF were able to supress the sub blockade there eventually. Approaches to major ports and oil centers are patrolled too. Dutch subs produced most of the successful attacks so far.

[bklooste]

ORIGINAL: FatR

ORIGINAL: AcePylut

Interesting... I wonder how he was deploying them.

First in and around the hexes where Japanese landings occured, then around Kendari, where most of the Combined Fleed concentrated for a time. Dedicated air ASW efforts and DD TF were able to supress the sub blockade there eventually. Approaches to major ports and oil centers are patrolled too. Dutch subs produced most of the successful attacks so far.

I suspect a lot of player just treat a sub as a sub and see sub losses if it is broken down we will see the Manilla ones are a small percentage once 43 hits. The dutch ones are far more effective and you still have them in a Pearl strike.

[Ken Estes]

I do not recall that later studies of the activities of ONI ever upheld Kemp Tolley's tales. Sinking gunboat Panay, a commissioned USN warship, did not provide a causus belli a few years earlier. Early warning may have been a likely motive. The IJN made similar recce of SWPac with fishing boats, etc. in 40-41.

Asiatic Fleet did not wish to be bottled up in Manila, but 'joining' Force Z had hardly been worked out and ABDAFlot had yet to be established, so I consider Hart's movements and dispositions to be the usual prewar plans to clear out and cooperate as feasible with others.

[JWE]

Looking at this Manila v PH thing, it is in my mind that Japan would employ a bit of the flexibility represented in thier operational designations. The KB was not as monolithic as many would assume. Given a Southern orientation, I might bifurcate the KB. Manila/Clark would be an opportunity strike; it would not be in support of immediate ground ops, and would not require the full KB. If Manila, then definitely Malaya; opportunity strikes on Singapore and support of immediate ground ops.

So .. I might send CarRon 5, augmented by Zuiho or Ryujo, to carry out an opportunity strike against the Manila/Clark area. Further, I might send CarRons 1 and 2, augmented by Ryujo or Zuiho, to carry out an opportunity strike against Singapore and support the Malaya landings. If I had really big ones, I might even run an augmented CarRon 1 against Singapore and use CarRon 2 in support of a Mersing gambit.

[mike scholl 1]

ORIGINAL: JWE

Looking at this Manila v PH thing, it is in my mind that Japan would employ a bit of the flexibility represented in thier operational designations. The KB was not as monolithic as many would assume. Given a Southern orientation, I might bifurcate the KB. Manila/Clark would be an opportunity strike; it would not be in support of immediate ground ops, and would not require the full KB. If Manila, then definitely Malaya; opportunity strikes on Singapore and support of immediate ground ops.

So .. I might send CarRon 5, augmented by Zuiho or Ryujo, to carry out an opportunity strike against the Manila/Clark area. Further, I might send CarRons 1 and 2, augmented by Ryujo or Zuiho, to carry out an opportunity strike against Singapore and support the Malaya landings. If I had really big ones, I might even run an augmented CarRon 1 against Singapore and use CarRon 2 in support of a Mersing gambit.

Problem here John. While the Japanese had operated their CV's off the China coast since 1937, they had never ventured further South. Having even part of KB show up off Indo-China in December of 1941 would be a major sign that war was immanent and should allow an Allied response. So while the Philippines aren't a problem, Malaya is.

[xj900uk]

Still think after all the above (fascinating) debate that the subs in Manila are more dangerous to IJ than 7-8 old, slow battleships in PH, despite the poor nature of the US torpedos... Also something nobody seems keen to bring up is that the US lacked supporting/screening vessels for the battleships (particularly destroyers) and escorts for the tankers that would need to keep the battlehsips resupplied so the battlefleet would probably have had to return to the West Coast at the outbreak of hostilities in any case!
IMO whilst still hitting PH (or, better still, have the variant where the KB does catch the US carriers in or near port which is what the more far-thinking IJ naval planners had hoped for) make sure that Manila port is bombed flat in order to catch as many subs as you can in there + their support ships. Also mine Bataan heavily to catch any subs trying to sneak out after the initial aerial bombardment.
Of course the really most important prize for the IJ player though, whilst debating subs or battlehsips, is if he can catch a US carrier & despatch it straight to the bottom. In Dec '41 the Buffallo was still the main air superiority plane (although being fast replaced by the early Wildcat) whilst the less said about the destructive power of the TBD the better... The IJN would never ever have a better chance assuming it could actually find one of the US carrier groups...

[Nikademus]

ORIGINAL: JWE

Looking at this Manila v PH thing, it is in my mind that Japan would employ a bit of the flexibility represented in thier operational designations. The KB was not as monolithic as many would assume. Given a Southern orientation, I might bifurcate the KB. Manila/Clark would be an opportunity strike; it would not be in support of immediate ground ops, and would not require the full KB. If Manila, then definitely Malaya; opportunity strikes on Singapore and support of immediate ground ops.

So .. I might send CarRon 5, augmented by Zuiho or Ryujo, to carry out an opportunity strike against the Manila/Clark area. Further, I might send CarRons 1 and 2, augmented by Ryujo or Zuiho, to carry out an opportunity strike against Singapore and support the Malaya landings. If I had really big ones, I might even run an augmented CarRon 1 against Singapore and use CarRon 2 in support of a Mersing gambit.

Sounds reasonable. the PH raid was a gamble after all, a factor that tends to be dilluted by the passage of time. A more conservative use would have been easier to contemplate. In WitP terms, having KB near the focus of the 1st Operational phase would be a useful addition vs. the typical aggressive posture I have come up against in my PBEM's as Japan. The con is that a KB firmly located in the SRA will encourage Allied player mischief in the Mandates early on. (the typical early 1942 counter-invasions) I've yet to 'not' do PH yet. My last outing, managed to surpise a single USN CV TF in transit to Oz in the Coral Sea. That was sweet. [:D]

[JWE]

ORIGINAL: Nikademus
Sounds reasonable. the PH raid was a gamble after all, a factor that tends to be dilluted by the passage of time. A more conservative use would have been easier to contemplate. In WitP terms, having KB near the focus of the 1st Operational phase would be a useful addition vs. the typical aggressive posture I have come up against in my PBEM's as Japan. The con is that a KB firmly located in the SRA will encourage Allied player mischief in the Mandates early on. (the typical early 1942 counter-invasions) I've yet to 'not' do PH yet. My last outing, managed to surpise a single USN CV TF in transit to Oz in the Coral Sea. That was sweet. [:D]

We do play in a CPX mode, and the Japanese team boss has a choice of several different opening day operations. Once one is selected, the umpire gives an intelligence briefing to the Allied side (spearately to US and Brit/CW players). This is generally highly vague, and often misdirective, but will contain a kernal of truth. In response the US and Brit team bosses prepare opening day o-plans, independent of one another, and are expected to follow them on their 1st turn. That keeps things nicely uncoordinated.

Haven't seen much mischief in the Mandates. Typically, after a Manila strike, CarRon 5 redeployes to Palau and then Truk. It's followed up immediately by CarRon 1 or 2. The other (2 or 1) might follow in a week or so, or might hang around smiling and dialing on Dutch brookie in the DEI. All things considered, this provides a pause period during which the IJ fleet is relatively concentrated in a central location (assuming Palau). From there, it's dealers choice as to hunting the US CVs, or striking Ceylon, or the DEI, or running ops in New Guinea/OZ/Solomons, etc .. kinda sorta as it was, yeah?

We limit the counter-invasion crap by playing DaBabes and using house rules of professional reason. Allies may not amphib assault with any ship that is not a navalized vessel: i.e., not an AP/AK. An Allied ship with an x in front may never, ever, ever, participate in an assault landing before June '43. May show up 2 days later with a cargo, but never, ever, ever, in an assault TF. Understand that most non-professional wargamers will cheat the heck out of this, but played correctly, it works well. Besides, we don't play with people who just want to cheat themselves into an advantage.

[Nikademus]

We limit the counter-invasion crap by playing DaBabes and using house rules of professional reason. Allies may not amphib assault with any ship that is not a navalized vessel: i.e., not an AP/AK. An Allied ship with an x in front may never, ever, ever, participate in an assault landing before June '43

Very interesting rule!

I'd been focused on the over-availability of unrestricted major LCU units allowing such early "counter-offensives". Umpire driven games i find facinating but have never had the pleasure. The FoW element is much more dynamic.

[xj900uk]

Another thing about the attack on PH is outside of purely military terms/results, was the sheer scale of shock/panic it generated. PH was supposed to be the most protected/fortified naval base in the world, an attack on it was outside the minds and imaginations of most of the Orange-staff (although the possibility of it being attacked had actually been discussed as long ago as 1903, although then the Spanish were seen as the likely agressors). The amount of damage done was quite spectacular, and it added to the mindset 'invincibility' of the Japanese war machine.
Also it gave momentum to the wave of IJ strikes, offensives, invasions and results coupled against Allied confusion, indecision, the short unhappy life of ABDACOM, low morale, loss of PI, loss of DEI and Singapore etc that lasted right up until Midway.
Of course all this had been quite accurately predicted by Yamamoto, who had been asked back in the summer of '41 if war was to be declared before Christmas, how exactly would the IJ forces fare. His reply was I guarantee that we can raise merry hell with them for six months. After that I guarantee nothing.

[John 3rd]

ORIGINAL: xj900uk

Agree he listened, Genda was a nobody .. The reason for the abort of the 3 rd wave was Nagumo was satisfied of teh damage done ( ie the BBs) and to a lesser extent fear for his carriers and 2 BB from a US CV strike while his planes were over PH.

Genda was a very intelligent and clever chap, the only trouble is he was a bit of an oddball, a real hermit who would retreat into his cabin for literally days on end, not washing shaving or eating whilst he went over a problem. Total focus and concentraction.
Regarding Nagumo's decision to abort, he was naturally cautious in fact probably to much so, I always wonder what would have happened if Yamamoto had followed his gut instinct and replaced him with someone more agressive (like his no 2, Yamagushi I think his name was, he was on the Hiryu). True Nagumo did cite his reasons for withdrawing (in this order, although not necessarily in order of priority) to his staff officers :
(1). The IJN had already won a 'crushing victory' with the destruction of at least six battleships, numerous smaller craft and many land-based planes
(2). They did not know where the US carriers were. 'Even now, they could be out searching for us, planning a counter-strike'.
(3). (Perhaps the most telling quote of all, showing his true state of mind) 'This carrier strike force will be vital to us in the conflict that lies ahead. It is my duty to return it intact to His Majesty.

I don't think the person you are describing was Genda. This sounds much more like the member on Yamamoto's that they nick-named "Gandhi." I cannot think of his name but he did serve with Yamamoto.

Most of everything I've read is that Genda was a bright, young leader who was a true visionary. Does anyone know where Genda ended up by war's end?

[John 3rd]

ORIGINAL: Nikademus

We limit the counter-invasion crap by playing DaBabes and using house rules of professional reason. Allies may not amphib assault with any ship that is not a navalized vessel: i.e., not an AP/AK. An Allied ship with an x in front may never, ever, ever, participate in an assault landing before June '43

Very interesting rule!

I'd been focused on the over-availability of unrestricted major LCU units allowing such early "counter-offensives". Umpire driven games i find facinating but have never had the pleasure. The FoW element is much more dynamic.

Concur. This is a fascinating rule to examine.

[ckammp]

ORIGINAL: John 3rd

ORIGINAL: xj900uk

Agree he listened, Genda was a nobody .. The reason for the abort of the 3 rd wave was Nagumo was satisfied of teh damage done ( ie the BBs) and to a lesser extent fear for his carriers and 2 BB from a US CV strike while his planes were over PH.

Genda was a very intelligent and clever chap, the only trouble is he was a bit of an oddball, a real hermit who would retreat into his cabin for literally days on end, not washing shaving or eating whilst he went over a problem. Total focus and concentraction.
Regarding Nagumo's decision to abort, he was naturally cautious in fact probably to much so, I always wonder what would have happened if Yamamoto had followed his gut instinct and replaced him with someone more agressive (like his no 2, Yamagushi I think his name was, he was on the Hiryu). True Nagumo did cite his reasons for withdrawing (in this order, although not necessarily in order of priority) to his staff officers :
(1). The IJN had already won a 'crushing victory' with the destruction of at least six battleships, numerous smaller craft and many land-based planes
(2). They did not know where the US carriers were. 'Even now, they could be out searching for us, planning a counter-strike'.
(3). (Perhaps the most telling quote of all, showing his true state of mind) 'This carrier strike force will be vital to us in the conflict that lies ahead. It is my duty to return it intact to His Majesty.

I don't think the person you are describing was Genda. This sounds much more like the member on Yamamoto's that they nick-named "Gandhi." I cannot think of his name but he did serve with Yamamoto.

Most of everything I've read is that Genda was a bright, young leader who was a true visionary. Does anyone know where Genda ended up by war's end?

After the Battle of Midway, Cdr. Genda served in the following units:

Jul - Sep 42 Air Officer on Zuikaku.
Oct - Nov 42 staff officer assigned to 11th Air Fleet.
Dec 42 - Jan 45 attached to IGHQ.
Jan - Aug 45 commander of 343rd Air Group.

[Nikademus]

ORIGINAL: xj900uk

Another thing about the attack on PH is outside of purely military terms/results, was the sheer scale of shock/panic it generated. PH was supposed to be the most protected/fortified naval base in the world, an attack on it was outside the minds and imaginations of most of the Orange-staff (although the possibility of it being attacked had actually been discussed as long ago as 1903, although then the Spanish were seen as the likely agressors). The amount of damage done was quite spectacular, and it added to the mindset 'invincibility' of the Japanese war machine.
Also it gave momentum to the wave of IJ strikes, offensives, invasions and results coupled against Allied confusion, indecision, the short unhappy life of ABDACOM, low morale, loss of PI, loss of DEI and Singapore etc that lasted right up until Midway.
Of course all this had been quite accurately predicted by Yamamoto, who had been asked back in the summer of '41 if war was to be declared before Christmas, how exactly would the IJ forces fare. His reply was I guarantee that we can raise merry hell with them for six months. After that I guarantee nothing.

True. As a bloke who's done both sides in PBEM, i can tell you its usually the opposite in WitP due to hindsight and god-like control. Player 2 most often jumps right out of the gate in anything but shock and immediately starts moves to counter the Japanese onslaught. This often makes for a frustrating experience as Player 1 when trying to follow the historical path of invasion using traditional methods (as opposed to the leap foward and work back technique)

This is why KB's exact location is so crucial as it's one of the few brakes due to risk of ambush. Once it reveals itself, player 2 knows where he can quickly counterattack with better chance of success. Personally, when i'm doing Allies, i tend to follow a conservative approach in order to foster a sense of realism based on RL factors including the "shock and awe/confusion" period but there's also a practical side to it as well. There are, after all, some sneaky aggressive Player 1's out there and they are good enough to know how to exploit over-aggressiveness on the part of player 2. So in deference to both factors, i tend to garrison first....contemplate offensive later, just like in real life. Suppose it makes me a boring Player 2 but i can be sneaky too with pinprick raids....probably my one great talent in the game. My last trick was a sneak attack on Sydney from KB moving around SOUTHERN Oz from the direction of Perth. Found myself a harbor stuffed full of juicy merchants. yum!

[Mundy]

This same line of thought has influenced my budding game against the Japanese AI. 
 
I've learned to quit fretting about getting the entire west coast into a massive, instant convoy as well as mobilizing all the Commonwealth/Dutch forces.
 
Besides, no matter how fast I act, I can't save the guys on Rabaul...
 
I've learned to enjoy the game more, knowing one day won't lose the war.
 
M-