Comprehensive Wishlist

[ColinWright]

ORIGINAL: madner

Well prior to the war there was quite a debate about the proper caliber for light divisional artillery, with the US army and Wehrmacht going for the 105mm, UK for 87mm and Red Army for 7.62mm guns (which were to be replaced by 107mm artillery, starting in 1941). And the Germans had the long range 105mm as well, so clearly they felt there was a niche for a longer range light artillery piece. Mainly useful for counter battery fire I suppose.  

I'm sure that since the Germans had lots of 88's anyway, it made sense to use them as divisional artillery. However, I doubt if it was an especially efficient use of the piece. All those optics, all that velocity, all that ability to rapidly deploy, the training of the crews as AA gunners and in a ground combat role -- all obviously wasted.

It's like when I had my moving company. Well, when the car was out of commission, we used the moving van to go to movies in. That doesn't mean it was the best tool for the job. It does show the Mack could serve in more than one role.

It made an outstanding camper, as well...in fact, I would have kept it for that purpose if the peculiarities of insurance and registration fees hadn't made such a course of action prohibitively expensive.

But I digress...

The 88 was an outstandingly versatile piece of equipment that played a decisive role in several important engagements -- most famously, as an extremely long-ranged AT gun. Sterile debates about who said what when and attempts to demonstrate the truth of logically improbable propositions don't contribute much of anything to anything.

[Panama]

*Panama checks the horses pulse*

Nope, no sense beating this horse any more, it's dead. [:D]

[Curtis Lemay]

ORIGINAL: madner

Now if that would be true, why would the above mentioned report complain about the usage versus ground forces? It only makes sense if they were deliberately used (like latter in Wacht am Rhein) to support ground forces.

A small fraction were used in emergencies. When they did so, their performance was abysmal. Most were kept in the rear for air defense of the frontline forces.

I don't see how anyone could read that article and not understand that the 88's had lost their effectiveness as AT by 1944. Or that they were now primarily used by ground forces for air defense because of that.

Not comparable as in the desert the flak units represented a significant percentage of German units capable of destroying tanks. If you posses one third of the anti tank assets you should at least destroy as many tanks.

Based on my CFNA scenarios, I have a grand total of about 2000 AFVs, 500 AT guns, and 138 88mm DP guns for the Axis in the Desert War. That's about 5% of the AT assets. I could be off by a little, but not that much. There weren't that many of them. Big contrast to Normandy.

The important point is that a retreating force is subject to tank losses for operational reasons (cut off, breakdown, out of fuel, etc.), and tactical losses will mostly be inflicted by mobile equipment.

The Red army artillery coordination was always poor, that said they 7.62 was by design meant to be both field and AT gun, and engage targets mostly by direct fire.

They did get better as the war progressed. And, didn't their tanks have HE?

And, I will repeat for one more time: The Germans were compelled, late in the war to create a dedicated 88mm AT gun, and abandoned the comparable Flak-41. That only has one rational explaination: The 88mm Flak was no longer effective in the AT role.

Regardless, the point remains that the 88's were only effective in the AT role against incompetent enemies. If the Soviets were still incompentent, they may still have been effective against them. But only for that reason.

But I digress, wasn't it you that claimed that the 8.8 was able to be dismounted fast enough to engage strafing aircraft without prior warning?

No. I've said that:

1. In many cases they would have prior warning because the planes start out at altitude where they can be spotted at great distance,
2. Even if they don't, they can deploy in time to engage them before they fly back out of range,
3. Multiple passes by strafing aircraft can be engaged,
4. At certain locations (see post #1111) they would already be automatically unlimbered.

Let's review the quote in that post one more time. Note that it contains the following three words:

heavy Flak is required

So, if the moving unit is ever going to cross a bridge, defile, or intersection, or ever halt, it requires heavy Flak. By policy.

Hard for me to understand how anyone could read that statement and still claim that heavy Flak was "useless" for air defense of moving units.

Certainly after destroying targets it would be possible to shift the firing positions?

The article clearly shows that repositioning is a major weakness of the Flak gun.

[Curtis Lemay]

ORIGINAL: ColinWright

88's, employed as AA guns, would tend to be in the rear with the gear, protecting fixed and vulnerable points, which yes, were plentiful, even in the desert. As such, they would usually not be in a position to support assaults and provide AT protection. When they were deployed in such roles, they were usually not in a position to fulfill the AA mission they were best at. The 88's can be protecting Tank Repair Workshop 8, or they can be smashing up Matildas. They can't be doing both. Not at once.

This has all been completely disproved by the article.

1. By 1944 88's were organically included in the TO&E of panzer divisions and even corps-sized allotments of them were being rushed to the front for even more support of the ground forces. The worse the Air War got, the more 88's were needed at the front.

2. Their primary purpose was air defense of those forces. They were too close to the front to be defending Tank Repair Workshops, airfields, ports, etc. They were close enough to provide artillery support, which was close enough to protect the frontlines.

3. AT wasn't even their secondary role by that time. And when used in that role, they were abysmal at it.

4. Nevertheless, they did do both at the same time - operationally. Exactly the way it's represented in TOAW.

Let's just post the link to the article again:

http://home.swipnet.se/normandy/gerob/othghq/3flak.html

It's such a fantastic read. No fair reading of that article (that omits certain people on this thread) can escape the total agreement it provides to my position:

1. The 88mm Flak was only effective in the AT role due to enemy incompetence.
2. The British in the Desert War were one of those incompetents.
2. It was always effective in the Air Defense of ground forces role, and remained especially so to the end.
3. Later in the war, enemy competence improved, and the gun was no longer effective in the AT role.

That's what I've been saying all along, and the article totally vindicates that.

[golden delicious]

ORIGINAL: Curtis Lemay

1. By 1944 88's were organically included in the TO&E of panzer divisions and even corps-sized allotments of them were being rushed to the front for even more support of the ground forces. The worse the Air War got, the more 88's were needed at the front.

2. Their primary purpose was air defense of those forces. They were too close to the front to be defending Tank Repair Workshops, airfields, ports, etc.

Really? You mean Panzer divisions don't have rear area assets? Bridges along their supply routes?

One feature of Normandy was the Allied habit of preceeding major offensives by plastering the combat zone with heavy bombers. That's why the Heer started deploying it's own 88s in the divisions rather than relying on the corps guns provided by the Luftwaffe.

4. Nevertheless, they did do both at the same time - operationally. Exactly the way it's represented in TOAW.

Either the gun is on the line waiting for armour to show up, or it's back at the bridge pointed at the sky. It can't be both.

In fact your source proves this point. III Flak was designed by the Luftwaffe to protect rear areas- and so it did that. Only occasionally did it even encounter Allied tanks. The exception would be the small sub-units specifically organised for anti-tank roles, but the article points out that these had received little training and in any case had only a few guns.

Note that at most TOAW scales, an 88 can be guarding lines of communication from air attack and still be in the first two hex rows.

[ColinWright]

ORIGINAL: Panama

*Panama checks the horses pulse*

Nope, no sense beating this horse any more, it's dead. [:D]

It would seem you were mistaken.




For one thing, that ain't a horse.

[Panama]

I certainly hope those are not your britches on the horn. [:D]

[ColinWright]

ORIGINAL: Panama

I certainly hope those are not your britches on the horn. [:D]

I imagine opinions would differ about that.

[Curtis Lemay]

ORIGINAL: golden delicious

Really? You mean Panzer divisions don't have rear area assets? Bridges along their supply routes?

Yes. And troops in the front lines.

One feature of Normandy was the Allied habit of preceeding major offensives by plastering the combat zone with heavy bombers.

Specifically targeting the combat units themselves. Regardless, it was only done a few times, and only effectively a couple of times. That's hardly the reason that 88's were added to the TO&E of panzer divisions and etc. They were already in the TO&E before those few strategic bomber diversions.

Either the gun is on the line waiting for armour to show up, or it's back at the bridge pointed at the sky. It can't be both.

This really stumps me. What is it that prevents a Flak gun in an AT position from firing at a plane that flys over? And what is it that prevents a Flak gun in an air defense position from firing at a tank that penetrates the lines?

Nevermind that, operationally, the unit was clearly doing both at the same time. 462 planes shot down. 92 Tanks destroyed. (And doing artillery support at the same time as well - a "TP" gun). That isn't some theory. It's an observed fact.

In fact your source proves this point. III Flak was designed by the Luftwaffe to protect rear areas- and so it did that. Only occasionally did it even encounter Allied tanks. The exception would be the small sub-units specifically organised for anti-tank roles, but the article points out that these had received little training and in any case had only a few guns.

It litterally states that the guns were at least close enough to provide artillery support. That's close enough to provide air defense as well. Note the horizontal range of the 88's that I listed earlier. They can easily fire at planes 10km away from their location. There's no question that they could provide air defense to the front lines if they were only a couple of kms behind it.

Regardless, the principle fact is that the gun was provided to the frontline units for the purpose of air defense. That's all that I require for my claims. It was a true DP weapon. Claims that it was only useful to frontline units for AT purposes have been proven false.

That, of course, was also proven by the simple fact that no dedicated 88mm AT gun was produced till very late in the war. That could only be justified by the gun's dual purpose. And, the fact that such an AT gun was finally required, proves that it's AT purpose was no longer effective late in the war. And, we've clearly seen that the reason it was effective earlier was enemy incompetence. And enemy competence was the reason its effectiveness waned late in the war.

[madner]

This is becoming frustrating. Your logic is fallacious, where you are reading far to much into what Zetterling wrote to support a thesis that is devoid of any support in facts.

I don't think it even deserves a detailed answer, but a quick point.

1. The Flak units attached to divisions on the Eastern front were attached to the units preparing for the offensive in the summer of 1942, at a time when the Luftwaffe was still capable of establishing air superiority. They main purpose was to deal with the heavy tanks of the Red Army. It wasn't done to combat air power, not 1942!

2. How do you arrive at the conclusion of abysmal performance? Clearly the numbers are quite favorable.

3. The Flak-Sturm units were specifically built to provide mobile support.

[golden delicious]

ORIGINAL: Curtis Lemay


Nevermind that, operationally, the unit was clearly doing both at the same time. 462 planes shot down. 92 Tanks destroyed.

In two months. They must've been really frantically running back and forth.

It litterally states that the guns were at least close enough to provide artillery support. That's close enough to provide air defense as well.

Not close enough for AT fire though.

Regardless, the principle fact is that the gun was provided to the frontline units for the purpose of air defense. That's all that I require for my claims.

This is hardly controversial in itself- it is an AA gun. Once the divisions started to be at risk of attack from high altitude bombers, it became necessary to provide them with high altitude AA guns.

[Curtis Lemay]

ORIGINAL: madner

This is becoming frustrating. Your logic is fallacious, where you are reading far to much into what Zetterling wrote to support a thesis that is devoid of any support in facts.

I'm not frustrated at all, since my position is iron-clad.

1. The Flak units attached to divisions on the Eastern front were attached to the units preparing for the offensive in the summer of 1942, at a time when the Luftwaffe was still capable of establishing air superiority. They main purpose was to deal with the heavy tanks of the Red Army. It wasn't done to combat air power, not 1942!

Then why didn't they create a dedicated 88mm AT gun for them by then? And you're actually claiming that German units in Russia in 1942 didn't need Flak protection? What about all those Sturmoviks? Were German units in Russia provided with Flak or not?

2. How do you arrive at the conclusion of abysmal performance? Clearly the numbers are quite favorable.

"The Flakkampfgruppen were not very successful in combat. The results were not in proportion to the casualties.11 They lost about 35 8,8 cm guns and 70 light Flak guns, while the number of tanks they knocked out were assessed to be twenty.12"

Losing 35 heavy and 70 light guns in exchange for 20 tanks is abysmal.

"The fact that the 8,8 cm Flak was not suitable for anti-tank misisons was also clearly recognized by the commanders and men serving in the III. Flak-Korps. Both in the post-war manuscript produced by the corps commander, Wolfgang Pickert5, and in a report, dated 20 September 1944, discussing the experiences from the actions of the corps during the battles in Normandy6, this is clear."

Not just my opinion, but the opinion of the commanders and men of the III Flak Corps. They ought to be in a position to know.

3. The Flak-Sturm units were specifically built to provide mobile support.

Not even a hint of that in the article. But, it's not really necessary to my position. The Flak units were provided to front line units for air defense purposes. It was a dual purpose weapon. That's all I need.

[Curtis Lemay]

ORIGINAL: golden delicious

ORIGINAL: Curtis Lemay


Nevermind that, operationally, the unit was clearly doing both at the same time. 462 planes shot down. 92 Tanks destroyed.

In two months. They must've been really frantically running back and forth.

The key term was "operationally". As has been said before, this isn't a first-person-shooter.

It litterally states that the guns were at least close enough to provide artillery support. That's close enough to provide air defense as well.

Not close enough for AT fire though.

Only if they broke through. But, if the gun had still been effective in the AT role, they could have rushed them to the front in emergency situations. That fits with half-week turns just fine.

Regardless, the point was that they were there for air defense of the frontlines. They would actually be well positioned a couple of kms away from the targets. If the planes are flying parallel to the gun it reduces the transom adjustments and shrapnel timing adjustments needed. Kind of like firing at level bombers.

Regardless, the principle fact is that the gun was provided to the frontline units for the purpose of air defense. That's all that I require for my claims.

This is hardly controversial in itself- it is an AA gun.

Seems to be to Colin.

[ColinWright]

ORIGINAL: Curtis Lemay

ORIGINAL: golden delicious

ORIGINAL: Curtis Lemay


Nevermind that, operationally, the unit was clearly doing both at the same time. 462 planes shot down. 92 Tanks destroyed.

In two months. They must've been really frantically running back and forth.

The key term was "operationally". As has been said before, this isn't a first-person-shooter.

Indeed. Suppose, though, purely hypothetically, the attacker assaults a position and bombs its communications at the same time.

It's entirely possible the attacker might bomb that bridge -- and not wait for the defender to drag those 88's back up to the front. It's even possible they won't furnish the information the defender needs to schedule the successive deployment of the guns. Unsporting, you say? But such things have been known to happen.

[Curtis Lemay]

ORIGINAL: ColinWright

Indeed. Suppose, though, purely hypothetically, the attacker assaults a position and bombs its communications at the same time.

A key term here is "purely hypothetically". Not only is such synchronization very difficult to achieve, it's actually willfully avoided - the attacker's don't want to get killed by their own planes.

Regardless, it only takes seconds to re-aim the gun from the sky to the horizon. Air attacks last a few minutes at 200mph, ground attacks, at about 3mph take a lot longer. And this applies to all equipment, not just Flak. Almost everything in TOAW has AT, AA, and AP ratings.

It's entirely possible the attacker might bomb that bridge -- and not wait for the defender to drag those 88's back up to the front. It's even possible they won't furnish the information the defender needs to schedule the successive deployment of the guns. Unsporting, you say? But such things have been known to happen.

If they are in the attacked hex, then the attack may come to them. Attacks do penetrate the front, you know.

Regardless, the more common situation is for the attack to take long enough for reserves to be deployed against it. After all, that's what reserve movement represents in TOAW - a unit not even in the hex joins the fray.

[Curtis Lemay]

A couple of points to consider from this long-winded discussion:

1. Heavy Flak guns should be more vulnerable to directed artillery fire than normal if deployed forward. (Perhaps force dependent, depending upon the circumstances). I'm not sure about the mechanics, though - how to indicate that they are deployed forward.

2. Maybe AT guns should be less vulnerable to directed artillery fire than normal.

3. It should be possible to add artillery ranges to Flak guns without screwing up their assigned AT levels. (I don't know just how that works right now).

[Curtis Lemay]

...

[ColinWright]

ORIGINAL: Curtis Lemay

ORIGINAL: ColinWright

Indeed. Suppose, though, purely hypothetically, the attacker assaults a position and bombs its communications at the same time.

A key term here is "purely hypothetically". Not only is such synchronization very difficult to achieve, it's actually willfully avoided - the attacker's don't want to get killed by their own planes.

Regardless, it only takes seconds to re-aim the gun from the sky to the horizon. Air attacks last a few minutes at 200mph, ground attacks, at about 3mph take a lot longer. And this applies to all equipment, not just Flak. Almost everything in TOAW has AT, AA, and AP ratings.

It's entirely possible the attacker might bomb that bridge -- and not wait for the defender to drag those 88's back up to the front. It's even possible they won't furnish the information the defender needs to schedule the successive deployment of the guns. Unsporting, you say? But such things have been known to happen.

If they are in the attacked hex, then the attack may come to them. Attacks do penetrate the front, you know.

Regardless, the more common situation is for the attack to take long enough for reserves to be deployed against it. After all, that's what reserve movement represents in TOAW - a unit not even in the hex joins the fray.

You're incorrigible.

[ColinWright]

ORIGINAL: Curtis Lemay

A couple of points to consider from this long-winded discussion:

1. Heavy Flak guns should be more vulnerable to directed artillery fire than normal if deployed forward. (Perhaps force dependent, depending upon the circumstances). I'm not sure about the mechanics, though - how to indicate that they are deployed forward.

2. Maybe AT guns should be less vulnerable to directed artillery fire than normal.

3. It should be possible to add artillery ranges to Flak guns without screwing up their assigned AT levels. (I don't know just how that works right now).

Any way of deposing you? Having you locked away? One can accept the idea that there won't be any further development of TOAW -- but that there would be someone actively working to make the system worse is a bit hard to take.

[Panama]

ORIGINAL: Curtis Lemay

3. It should be possible to add artillery ranges to Flak guns without screwing up their assigned AT levels. (I don't know just how that works right now).

Well, lets do this. We can make AAA a multi purpose swiss knife weapon. We can give it an artillery value so it can support ground combat at range. We can give it an AT value so it can help out in that respect. And we can give it an anit air value so it can help out with suppressing air units. And while we're at it let's give it anti ship values too since there's nothing stopping AAA from shooting at a ship. Did I leave anything out? Maybe something about elves and dwarves?

Personally I'd rather they work on giving scenario designers more tools. Make things like movement bias, communications and replacements dynamic so we can change values during a scenario. Things that would be really useful.