ORIGINAL: morleron1
I agree, the Soviet OOB does seem inflated both in numbers and in capability. IIRC, the Soviets were in the process of disbanding their Mechanized Corps and reorganizing the men and equipment into true "all arms" formations, based loosely on the German panzer divisions, when the Germans embarked on their little vacation trip. From what Guderian wrote in his memoirs the Soviet Mech Corps were unwieldy and the command structure did not lend itself to rapid reaction - both factors which prompted the Soviets to pull them out and reorganize them as quickly as they could. The Soviets also suffered from having far too many different kinds of tanks - all with different capabilities and not really trained to work together - problems which they corrected (at least organizationally) by 1942 after the Germans relieved them of most of their useless T-28s, etc. in the 1941 encirclement battles. Somewhere I have a picture of the main highway between Moscow and Smolensk which looked a lot like the highway north of Kuwait City when the Iraqis tried to evacuate during Desert Storm - miles of abandoned and destroyed vehicles.
Is it possible to still get McBride's DNO scenario. He's withdrawn it from the "Rugged Defense" site and I've been unable to find it elsewhere. How big a job would it be to graft his initial OOB onto FiTE? Also, is there a definitive source for Red Army OOB information over the course of the war?
The Soviets had already started to disband their Mech Corps in late 1939/early 1940. 'Lessons' learned in Spain, Poland and Finland made the Soviets reconsider their usefulness. They started splitting up the tank units to support infantry and cavalry. Then came the German successes in France and the Soviets did an about face. Not only did they reinstitute the Mech Corps, they were going to expand them so they would have 29! They didn't even have the equipment for the 9 they had!
Also, the Axis didn't have to relieve the Soviets of tanks. Old and obsolete, the majority of them broke down, were abandoned by paniced crews or ran out of gas/ammo. There werre too few modern tanks. In the SW one unit received about a dozen KVII but there was no ammo for the 152mm guns they mounted.
The reasons for the abysmal performance of many of the mech corps were legion. Untrained officers/ncos. No time to train as a unit at any level. Many of the tank and mech divisions had only formed three or fewer months earlier. Hardly enough time to get men and equipment together let alone train. There was a severe shortage of modern tanks and tankers who knew how to simply drive them properly. If you use the two words, "Not Enough" and put anything after them pertaining to the Soviet Mech corps you would be correct. There were a few brights spots, generally south of the Pripets where some units had actually trained together. The tank battles in the Ukraine were the result. Barely mentioned in any histories, these battles bought some badly needed days for the Soviets and bloodied some German units. Some of the future Tank Army commanders came from these battles.
The solution for the unweildy Mech Corps was to disband all of them, I believe around the end of July 1941. Then the Soviets disbanded the tank divisions and formed brigades in August and September 1941. There were still over 2 thousand tanks in the West and another few thousand in the Far East. These brigades became the foundation for the Tank Corps and Mech Corps to come. They still had to suffer through 1942 but with the time bought by distance and blood they learned and won.
You should read about the history of the Soviet tank corps. It's an amazing story.

