Alternate Strategies: Winning with Japan

[madflava13]

Listen, everyone's getting a little heated here...
MDiehl, its your business if you don't want to buy the game. I liked Pacwar, and I agree it was flawed (I still played it for almost 10 yrs). But IMHO UV is much more than Pacwar with chrome. Its lightyears more advanced. I truly believe that. But if you don't want to check it out, thats not my business. I only wish there was a demo you could try. I think you'd be pleasantly surprised.

However, I must disagree with your statement that EXP should be even at the start. Yes, a very few USN pilots (as mentioned, Thach, O'Hare) should have high levels. Other than that, what experience did the USN pilots have beyond training? A few unopposed raids on Wake and the Gilberts is all. That doesn't build much experience.

On the other hand, the Japanese air arm, beyond its years of gearing up for war, had years of combat experience. Remember the long war in China? That was a real-life training ground. Also, Pearl Harbor, the campaigns in SE Asia and Indian ocean, etc... Thats real experience. There's no way the average Japanese pilot had the same experience levels the average USN pilot had. The Japanese had years of training and combat experience the USN wouldn't get until after Midway...

I think even if you don't like the idea of buying UV, you shouldn't discount WITP. UV is basically a warm-up for 2by3 and Matrix before WITP. All the lessons learned will be applied, so as much as I like UV, I think WITP will be even better...

Just my .02.

[Snigbert]

In response to mdiehl's comments about Japanese infantry having no intrinsic anti tank capabilities, here is a list of weapons used by Japanese infantry to take care of the 'tank problem'.
Some of these would be listed as 'guns' in UV game terms.

Type 97 ATR (20mm)
Satchel Charge
Explosives
Kaenhoushaki (flamethrower)
Molotov Cocktails
91 Juuhou 10.5cm
94 Taisenshahou 3.7cm
1 Taisenshahou 4.7cm
Lunge Mine
Grenade Bundle
Hakugekihou 32cm (mortar)
99 Koushahou 8cm (AA gun, often used against ground targets)
41 Sanhou (7.5cm)

[Jeremy Pritchard]

I don't necessarily feel that the average Japanese squad was actually equipped with their latest AT weapons.

However, I am guessing that the increased AT ability of Japanese squads was actually their ability to take the risk to get close to AFV's and toss anything they can down any hole they can find. A buttoned up tank is not qute as secure as one might think. There are many vulnerable positions, notably the exhaust and tracks. While they might not be able to kill the crew, they can basically immobilize and cause the crew to bail (by wrecking the engine). This is the main reason why even in the Pacific, tanks had to be escorted by Infantry.

Regular Allied squads probably have less AT ability in UV, because at this time they had very few infantry AT weapons. In fact, even in the European Eastern Front it was not until late 1943 when the Infantry were given sufficient AT weapons. The Allies would have to rely on the same weapons as the Japanese (basically grenades or any other homemade weapon) to kill tanks. However, the Japanese would be more inclined to be wreckless with their lives to destroy the tank (not that there will be no allied instances of this, but they would rather rely on the greater amount of AT artillery support to take out tanks).

[Snigbert]

And of course there is always the old 'banana up the tailpipe' trick.

[Nikademus]

Originally posted by Jeremy Pritchard
I don't necessarily feel that the average Japanese squad was actually equipped with their latest AT weapons.

However, I am guessing that the increased AT ability of Japanese squads was actually their ability to take the risk to get close to AFV's and toss anything they can down any hole they can find. A buttoned up tank is not qute as secure as one might think. There are many vulnerable positions, notably the exhaust and tracks. While they might not be able to kill the crew, they can basically immobilize and cause the crew to bail (by wrecking the engine). This is the main reason why even in the Pacific, tanks had to be escorted by Infantry.

Regular Allied squads probably have less AT ability in UV, because at this time they had very few infantry AT weapons. In fact, even in the European Eastern Front it was not until late 1943 when the Infantry were given sufficient AT weapons. The Allies would have to rely on the same weapons as the Japanese (basically grenades or any other homemade weapon) to kill tanks. However, the Japanese would be more inclined to be wreckless with their lives to destroy the tank (not that there will be no allied instances of this, but they would rather rely on the greater amount of AT artillery support to take out tanks).

Agreement here Jeremy, this was pretty much what i said way back over on the UV thread where it originated. I left it at that as it truely is a non-issue + only Matrix can answer for sure. Certainly where land resolution is concerned at the scale UV plays it at the factors that truely count are

1) logistics

2) numbers (of men)

3) and level of support. (air and sea bombardment to hasten and maintain fatique and disruption)

Not to say that the level of detail provided by Matrix is not appreciated and desired, but in the 'great scheme of things', its the big three i mentioned that are going to make all the difference. Even exp of the units pales before it

The only time i've ever suffered signifigant tank losses (as Allied) was after they were starved out and forced to surrender along with the rest of the troops after the base was captured.

[TIMJOT]

Originally posted by Jeremy Pritchard
I have a few points here.

#1. The IJNAF did not have oodles of battle experience as was assumed. Only the Kaga, Ryujo and Hosho participated in the actions against China in 1938. In the Manchurian war, and the Russian border incidents, and the war in China, it was the IJAAF that bore the brunt of the fighting. As of 1939, 70% of all IJAAF pilots had 1000 hours of flying time (US pilots in 1944+ had 300 or more hours before sent off to combat, while IJNAF had less then 100), plus combat experience. Some G3M groups, and at least 1 A5M group took part, but that was about it for the IJNAF.

http://64.124.221.191/ijnaf.htm

I dont know about oodles, but your quite wrong on your assumption, because according to "Kaigun" the IJN routinely rotated most of there carrier pilots (particularly fighter pilots) to their land base units fighting in China. Also IJN *land base* units played a substantial part in the China prior to WWII. It was navy claudes and zeros that swept the China skies not IJA planes. So yes most IJN pilots had more *combat* expirence than USN pilots, who had no combat expirence at all prior to the war. Whether this expirence was tactically relevent is debatable, but the psychological advantage of having expirenced real combat first hand is indisputable if somewhat fleeting.

[Drongo]

Boy, this has become a busy thread

Posted by Mdiehl

Wups. Reread your sentence Drongo. Right, flak accounted for more strike a/c than F4Fs did over Guadalcanal.

Stop it or you'll have me in tears.

At no point did I state my assertion, of flak shooting down more strike a/c than the F4F did, was based only on engagements over Guadalcanal. The line you left out of my paragraph stipulated that I was talking about the losses from Coral Sea, Midway and Guadalcanal (covering the carrier battles and attacks on Henderson Field).

I would have to agree with Nikademus that your case for F4F's + US pilots matching or exceeding A6m's + IJN pilots will need a lot of proving. Since your the one making the claim and this arguement is not thread related, how about breaking new ground and starting a new thread specifically for that purpose. Matrix would be more likely to notice that than something buried in an unrelated thread. It could only help you in your pursuit of justice.

[mdiehl]

Okay, Drongo, flak accounted for more *strike* a/c at Coral Sea, Midway and Guadalcanal. That's why I was specifically zeroing in on the subject of the A6M-F4F relationship. And you'll be relieved to know I'm *done* with that, because I'm right and the opposition is not. The thread's been done to death, the links, cites and crash counts are done and have been posted in various MG forums. Unless Nik or someone else comes up with a new source that refutes the numbers in Lundstrom [Nik, see: The 1st Team and the Guadalcanal Campaign], that closely match those in Frank [Guadalcanal], I'm not budging.

As to EXP. Clearly not just *combat* experience as EXP increases with training. EXP therefore must account for training, tactics, doctrine &c. [Nik. The radio thing, again, see the 1st Team at Guadalcanal, or either of Sakai's bios. Re cohesion, see same and accounts in Bergerud's Fire in the Sky as to why IJN a/c formations with fighters tended to be unusually visible. Re Thach. The units stationed at Guadalcanal were not trained in the Beam Defense. They were flying standard pre-Thach USN tactics.]

The list of IJA AT weapons is interesting. Most of them are not inherent to a standard rifle co squad. Perhaps UV incorporates the equipment of the bn level heavy weapons co at the squad level? In which case one would have to look at the Allied equivalent organizational level and run down the inventory of Allied weapons so used. I think you'd fine the Allies better equipped for AT. Some of the IJA weapons listed are not organic even at the regimental level.

Two of the weapons, lunge mine and molotov, were not inherent in the IJA rifle co squad but could have been made available in a pinch. You'd not find a lunge mine in the Allied inventory, but a gasoline bomb, who knows? The Allies made more use of motorised transport, so you *might* be more likely to find an Allied gasloline bomb than an IJA one.

[mdiehl]

BTW Jeremy thanks for the interesting training link. Re AFV, the problem with crawling all over a buttoned up tank (looking for that crow-bar to wedge into the road wheel, etc) is the tank's supporting infantry. (Not lecturing there, we all know that.) If indeed the IJA squad higher AT value reflects the presumed willingness to hazard such an effort, there is a case for making IJA squads more generally vulnerable to infantry fire when Allied tanks are in the mix.

[mdiehl]

While it is difficult to say how one will be able to "win" with Japan using WitP, we can speculate a little. Assuming that Japan gets casualty and control VPs, and that invading India or Australia will be very difficult w/ respect to divisions, transports or supply, what can one do?

IJA plans envisioned taking India. Possibly a hopeless task, but they had it in mind. The IJA specifically rejected a desire to invade Australia (which they estimated to require at least 12 divisions). Assuming that one thorws 12 divisions at the Bay of Bengal, there are some objectives that can pay off well. Ceylon being an important one. While the desired goal of trashing Eastern Fleet is not realizable (because of fall-back bases unknown to Japan), it gives Japan control of the approaches to all of the eastern half of India, and lengthens the trip to get to Australia via the Indian Ocean. In the attrition war that Japan hoped to fight and win (forcing the Allies into casualty exhaustion), stretching the Allies supply slows down the Allies ability to deploy and reduces the amount of equipment that can be deployed, while making the supply route more vulnerable to a.c. Some of the IJN CB-BBs might make good surface raiders in the Indian Ocean and near South Africa.

[Jeremy Pritchard]

To expand on this, should the IJN keep their post Midway plans (or just scrap Midway and follow these plans) to take New Caledonia, Fiji and the surrounding Islands this would do much to do the same thing as would taking Ceylon. However, this too would strech resources thin. Cutting off Australia would delay advance, but could speed it up, as Japan might lose more resources defending these far off bases, or the US could just move in through the Central Pacific, hoping, or knowing, that Australia is safe from invasion and will have to make due on its own for a few years. The problem about Japan attacking, is eventually they will run out of steam. The Allies could try to push back the 'bulge', or ignore it, or cut it off at the stem.

The Japanese AT dilemma is like a 'Catch-22'. Should they have high AT values because they take risks against enemy tanks? If they have these high values, then should not their infantry vulnerabilty be higher? What happens when you get infantry vs. infantry, and Japan still gets this 'vulnerability' when tanks are not even around? Can this be figured in to have a special IJA squad rating when fighting tanks and infantry vs. fighting just infantry? Who is to say that the IJA squad will be targetting the tank instead of the infantry? This is the problem when you incorporate local tactics into a strategic game. I am not sure how to solve this, unless it just assumes that IJA squads will act just as if they are fighting infantry with tanks, and will be a bit more cautious.

Also, I have not heard of Japanese squads having particularly much AT assets. However, since encountering enemy tanks is fairly low, I understand why. Local AT artillery should be capable enough to take on enemy tanks (even 'obsolete' guns, as they tended to fire at very close ranges to guarantee a kill, but virtually no chance of survival. So, you could have powerful IJA AT guns, but are very weak in defense).

[mogami]

Greetings, The Japanese player must never forget who the main enemy is. .........The US Navy. All the land combat in China or India can not win the war if the US Navy is not dealt with.
Japan will not lose the war due to a lack of Infantry divisions. She will lose when she can no longer safely move her divisions.
Things to remember
1. The US Navy is the prime enemy
2. Air power is the best means of dealing with the US Navy-IJN does not have enough ships to defeat USN alone.

So I believe (and everyone can have their own idea) that any Japanese War plan aiming for victory must first and formost always target the US Navy. Anything else is a side show.

[Jeremy Pritchard]

I think that there sould be two forms of experience.

#1. Training experience

#2. Combat experience

Training experience tells how much pilots, troops and sailors know how to use their equipment. Training is really good in increasing the chance of survival in battle.

Combat experience tells how much pilots, troops and sailors have learned how to use their equipment, under battlefield conditions and stresses. Each will have a 'maximum' or based on levels, but can get away from the problem of highly experienced vs. highly veteran becoming blirred. While the Japanese have more combat experience, the training experience of the Allied forces was very high. It is difficult to say how many combat hours = training hours, or wether or not your first combat experience makes significant strides, while further combat does not really cause an individual to learn that much.

Realistically, training is fairly incramental. Every hour has you familiarize yourself with controls and abilities of your aircraft. However, after your first few combat missions, there really is not much more you can learn. An individual with 100 training flying hours is different then someone with 300 training flying hours, however, an individual with 3 missions is not that much different then one who has 20. I see experience to follow an incramental system. You raise experience fairly rapid in training until you reach a plateau where you know your aircraft and how to fly in and out, and then you get another big boost of experience after your first few missions, as you learn how to apply your skills learned through training to actual combat. You still can increase your skill after the first few missions, but it should not be nearly as drastic as after your first few missions.

In fact, sometimes veterans wear themselves out. Noticably, the British Army in 1944-45 was an extremely veteran formation, with many troops being in combat from 1940. However, by that time a lot of self preservation took over, as they have been in it so long that winning does not seem to matter over that of surviving another day.

[Jeremy Pritchard]

here is sort of the training and experience curves...


Training Experience

_______________. (500 hours)
__________. (400 hours)
______. (300 hours)
___. (200 hours)
_. (100 hours)
. (0 hours)

Combat Experience

_________________. (3 missions)
_______________. (2 missions)
_____________. (1 mission)
. (0 missions)

[mdiehl]

Is that how they are in the sim or how you feel they should be modeled? I was thinking that the training curve should be something like this. Just tossing out a POV.

1000 hs __________.
750 hs _________..
500 hs ________...
300 hs ________.
200 hs _____..
150 hs __.
100 hs ..
50 hs .

Relative to *that* scale, each sortie in which A-A combat occurs should have the potential to probabilistically add about one "." every third or fourth sortie.

Advanced tactical combat training should be treated as combat EXP. Rotating seasoned pilots to rear ares should increase advanced tactical combat training rates.

Of course, there's no telling whether the WitP model will make a distinction between the two.

[Jeremy Pritchard]

I was actually posting a hypothetical theory, not a researched proposal. I am not sure what WitP will use to measure experience.

[mdiehl]

Me too. The relative exp thing vs. training vs advanced tactical training is a real challenge. Mine not based on anything that I can quantify. The USN Advanced Tactical School in late 1942 or e. 1943 (forgot when they implemented ATFS -- it later became the "Top Gun" program) apparently is very good at combat sim, thus pretty effective at allowing pilots to experience something like real combat without dying in their first several "missions." I've never read any account though that provided some sort of theoretical conversion between reality and ATFS.