How to judge Japan's attack without the benefit of hindsight?

[mike scholl 1]

ORIGINAL: fbs
I mean, could anyone, even in the US, really have predicted the overwhelming superiority in ships and aircraft the US would have by 1945?

British Minister Sir Edward Grey. He had stated more than 20 years earlier that "America is like a giant boiler. There is no limit to the power it can produce if only you can get a fire lit under it.." Pearl Harbor lit that fire with a blowtorch.

[xj900uk]

Asking the other way around... anyone could have believed the overwhelming enemy advantage so strongly as to put his career on the line for that? From what I remember, Yamamoto was against the war but only expressed the thing about "roaming wild for a year" in confidence. I don't know about him going public about that.

Actually, what happened was that one of Yamamoto's Naval friends/admirals in the ruling political elite sent Yamamoto a letter asking him for his best opinion as to what would happen if war came before Christmas '41 and the IJN had succeeded in its primary aim of neutralising 'the main threat' (ie the US Pacific Fleet, althogh it wasn't referred to in the letter), I think the letter was sent in the late spring/early summer when Pearl Harbor was still being formulated/planned but nothing was definite yet. The letter also asked Yamamoto what guarantees (if any) he would be prepared to give.
Yamamoto's response was short and straight to the point :
'If we go to war before the end of 1941 I guarantee we can raise merry hell with them (the Americans) for six months. After that I guarantee nothing'.
Yamamoto's reply was read out to the War Cabinet but then seems to have been rather studiously ignored. There is a minuted comment on file somewhere that the majority of officers thought he was being far too pessimistic. Somebody (sorry can't remember their name) brought up the issue of America's industrial power and might, comparing it to the only recently mechanised and still largely fledgling Japanese modern industry. The response was something along the lines of 'The Americans have no stomach for a long fight this far out in the Pacific. They will eventually cut their losses and go to the negotiating table. In the meantime the superior 'fighting spirit' of our armies more than outweighs any matieral advantage the Americans and their Allies may superficially deploy'.

Hindsight sure is a great thing... [8|]

[DuckofTindalos]

The decision had already been made, by the IJA, not the IJN.

[invernomuto]

ORIGINAL: Bullwinkle58

Sure, lots of analysts could have. A 2:1 difference in population, that most basic of economic inputs? It takes 30 years to grow a mature, 30 YO engineer. Steel differences not trivial, but you don't mention aluminum. We had it (as did Canada) made by HUGE Depression-era hydroelectric dam projects. We didn't need to import fuel to make metals. We had a never-ending supply. Factory organization? Ever hear of Henry Ford? The Japanese economy was still making sub-assemblies in paper shacks with dirt floors.

Also oil production. IIRC, USA was self sufficient in oil production in WW2.
German and Japan were not.

[Panther Bait]

The indications for the US's potential should have been obvious for anyone able to remember the post-WWI-1920's era. US manufactuing potential exploded in a very short time. Skyscrapers, cars cheap enough for many/most people to own one, mass production of cotton/textiles, etc. Look at the early graphs in the economic data link posted above. The US increases in production dwarf those of Europe and the rest of the world for the most part.

What skews some of the 1930's numbers is that the US was slower coming out of the Depression than other nations. The 1930's production numbers are much, much lower than they could have been, and even then the scope of the WPA infrastructure projects were laying the foundation for incredible expansion when it was necessary.

Mike

[fbs]

ORIGINAL: Panther Bait

The indications for the US's potential should have been obvious for anyone able to remember the post-WWI-1920's era. US manufactuing potential exploded in a very short time. Skyscrapers, cars cheap enough for many/most people to own one, mass production of cotton/textiles, etc. Look at the early graphs in the economic data link posted above. The US increases in production dwarf those of Europe and the rest of the world for the most part.

In the same way, the russian industrial production 20 years ago was that of a powerhouse. But if there was an attack that destroyed the remains of the russian fleet in Petropavlovsk, does anyone think that they can not only be back to 1970s-1980s industrial production, but multiply that by 4 and double their GDP, all in less than 4 years?

Or, the other way around, how much industrial production in modern Russia would increase upon an attack in Petropavlovsk? One can argue: nah, nothing, russian industrial power will be a "has-been" for the next 20 years... she can be pushed around and bullied, and will do nothing; production will increase 10% at best! Another person can argue: gee, keep in mind they used to have 70,000 tanks in the soviet army... they will be re-energized, will forget the internal differences, redirect the industry and will bring complete destruction to the attacker; she's a sleeping giant, and production will increase 300%!

Would you really believe in the second scenario if someone argued that? Enough to risk end of your career, prison and death to bring that public?

[oldman45]

I think a more logical theory could be the the following question:

What would have happened if the Japanese had only attacked Great Britain and the Netherlands? They would have gotten the Southern Resource Area and never engaged the US.

[Panther Bait]

You make some good points, but to be honest, I doubt highly that the US could do a repeat of it's WWII scale up in the same time frame today. Weapons are a lot more complex and skilled labor intensive to build nowadays to ramp up production like they did in the past. Factor in the increased lethality of today's weapons and I suspect everyone would run out of missiles, tanks, and planes in weeks or months of a large-scale conflict.

That being said, if the Russians were given a year or two to prep themselves like the US had going into WWII (most in the US knew that we were going to be in the war eventually as early as 1939 and production/militarization of the economy was starting to rise), I bet the Russians could start cranking up their industry again as well as anyone else in Europe could. For that matter, they are still one of the chief exporters of modern weapons now. They just can't afford to buy their own products at the moment.

Mike

[anarchyintheuk]

ORIGINAL: fbs

Hindsight is 20/20, so nowadays everybody think "Whaaaaat were the Japanese thinking? Didn't they know that the US could produce aircrafts by the hundreds of thousands? carriers by the hundred? Hoooooow could they be so blind?"

Japanese leaders were aware that the 2 ocean navy bill (and its contents) had passed by the US in mid-40. It shouldn't have been a surprise to them that they were going to be outbuilt nor by how much. Of course, the bill probably had a ticking clock effect on their decisions as well.

[m10bob]

As for Yamamoto not being real "public" in his feelings of America being a "sleeping giant", one must understand that he did know Americans well, having lived here in Conus for years, and Japan had a bunch of "nasties" running around killing and otherwise assassinating politicians and military leaders who did not go with the flow.

Mr Yamamoto did as all military people are trained.

He followed his orders.

[koontz]

Japan wanted to be the superpower of Asia. To dominate China, just look where they where
up to from -30s and forward, in a way you could actullay say that WW2 started
~30/31 or something like that.

ww2 wasnt a ww before 7 dec of -41.

Also Japan was an real dictatorship who looked at all "Ganjins" as
Untermenschen

But ofc with all the facts in hand, The Empire of Japan challenged the law of
gravity. Most of there early gains was aginst poor/little force.

Even in peace time the Japanese merchant fleet was in need of UK/USA to support the HI.

For each ton of supplies USN transported IJN came up to 0,5 kg.

To turn the question around....

Why the hell did it the allies so long to defeat the Empire?
For ie. Iwo Jima was without garison for an long time.

Where was the cooporation between USA and the rest of the allies?

[Bearcat2]

To get an idea of what the US could produce in a war, all you had to do was look at the US production in WW1, and the war ended before it got running at full capacity.

[vettim89]

This has been brought up and other threads and articulated better by others than I can but....

Japan's leadership never beleived they could defeat the USA in the truest sense of the word. Lead by the ultranationalists in the Army, they beleived they didn't have to conquer the Americans. They truly felt they were a superior race and that the west and especially the Americans were an inferior, weak race that had no stomach for true war. They felt all they had to due was hurt the USA badly and FDR would fold from pressure form the American populace. They continued to beleive this even to the bitter end.

The problem in that was two fold. The first is that the IJA had drunk a full barrel of the Bushido Kool-Aid. They honstly beleived that superior character alone could overcome any material advatage the west could thow a them. Unfortunately the couldn't see the truth. The USSR had handed them their lunch just two years previous and even though they had achieved numerous tactical success fighting the Chinese, all ten years of war with them had truly yielded was a strategic stalemate

The second is the Army especially did not study their advisaries very well. As awful as places like Betio, Iwo Jima, and Okinawa were in terms of casualties, they pale in comparison to Antietam, Gettysburg, and Fredericksburg. The US was less than 80 years removed from the bloodiest war in their history. When aroused, the Americans would fight and they would fight to the bitter end.

Terminus hit the nail on the head: even though it was the right choice in terms of giving them operational freedom for their early conflicts, it doomed them. Once the American populace was enraged by its politicians, there really was no turning back. I have very seldom seen it discussed that the "treachor" of PH was more about the politicians covering their "exposure" and deliberately baiting the American public than it was about true acts of evil. But that is another discussion ......

[Nikademus]

The Japanese Army actually had a decent bead on the kind of war they wanted to fight vis-a-vis their opponents. They wanted to quickly secure the original objectives (i.e. SRA) and dig in to fight the long fight which would, with luck, allow them to get a settlement. The Navy became the service primarily infected with "Victory Disease" and began promoting expansions that culminated in Yamamotto's ultimatum regarding Midway and Hawaii. The Army's reaction to all these new plans for expansion (including a study vs. Australia) was tepid to say the least. Compromise was eventually reached regarding the South Pacific. (per Tolland.....securing of PM, Solomons, Fiji to cut supply lines) while Yamamotto initially was to take Midway with naval troops/troops currently attached to the command.

[vinnie71]

Going to take an opposing view.
 
In essence there was no other options for Japan but to go to war if it wanted to maintain its position of power on the world stage. We have to keep in mind that the Japanese war council was not just thinking in practical terms (ie production, resources, manpower etc) but also in terms of national prestige. Japan since the Meiji reformation had made it a practice of taking on the local bully boys and winning through sheer determination. In point of fact, America's meddling in its affairs (as Japan saw it) just pushed her into war. The embargo should not be seen soley as an economic attack but as a very public slap in the face to the ruling junta.
 
Why not attack when Japan attack? Come on, everyone can see the temporary advantages that Japan enjoyed in '41 and '42. The colonial regimes were essentially all in disarray with the defeat of all colonial powers on mainland Europe. America was essentially looking the other way, towards Europe. The military forces in the area of those who were expected to oppose them were essentially second rate. And the Japanese had sufficient concentration of strike power available to accomplish their initial tasks. Basically they were in a position to dictate terms in the military sphere at that particular time. Japan's whole plan rested on their own version of blitzkrieg, taking high risks all the time. But keep in mind that they had always taken such risks in taking on foreign adversaries and came out of it triumphant.
 
One other factor that made them turn south was the power of the Red Army. Their border clashes in Manchuria ended in humiliating and bloody defeat in 1939. The decision to turn to the south was also partly motivated in avoiding further confrontation in Manchuria which became a no go area. Taking over the colonial empires from enfeebled enemies whose only hope was essentially America coming to the rescue (which was both a contradiction politically and almost unthinkable before Pearl Harbour) was an easier prospect.
 
Finally, like all other combattants, the Japanese didn't think much of the US servicemen as an individual. With a navy imbued with a Nelsonian (or shall I say Togo's) spirit and a Prussian model army, they didn't think much of an army that required months if not years just to produce sufficient divisions in the field. They reserved greater respect for the US navy but thought of themselves as being superior in training and esprit de corps. Yet they did realise that the time to strike had come if they didn't want to be relegated to a second rate power. Someone mentioned the 2 ocean navy programme which would have made it that much harder for Japan to challenge US supremacy in the Pacific. They were also conscious of American economic support for the Allies through Lend Lease. The expansion of the army was proceeding slowly as well.
 
In essence Japan's position in '41 was that it was feeling that the US on one side and the allies were essentially cramping its activities in the Pacific. It was also in that most dangerous of moods - when a power decides that war could actually improve or at lease safeguard its position. They also had a good record against the big boys which made them less inclined to take orders from whoever the next big boy would be. (Besides there were a lot of examples throughout history of seemingly inferior powers taking on bigger ones successfully.)  Frankly what they saw as American and others meddling in their foreign adventures was intolerable and '41 presented the right moment to strike. When we argue 2 generations later dispassionatly while looking at economic figures that are not always translatable with military might, we must not forget the heady and passionate discussions that were taking place in Japan's ruling circles. We have the luxury of dividing cold hard numbers from emotions, something that was not possible in the atmosphere of that time. Let us not forget it, before we post our comments. After all, the bulk of the combattant nations were essentially all on their little crusades during WWII, and Japan was no exception.
 
There would have been no better time to do it, though with hindsight it would have been better if they had allowed America to go to war with Germany and then struck at Pearl or/and limited their attacks on European colonial holdings. But this scenario did not look like it was going to happen soon, while the embargo might have had its desired effect. Thus Japan opted for immediate war.
 
At least that's my take...

[Bullwinkle58]

ORIGINAL: Offworlder

Going to take an opposing view.

In essence there was no other options for Japan but to go to war if it wanted to maintain its position of power on the world stage.

Well, it's always "cheaper" to rob the store than to pay retail. At least for a short time.

Japan had numerous options in, say, 1930. Just because the British and French and Dutch empires were empires doesn't mean they weren't interested in peaceful trade for raw materials. Do you have any evidence that, if China had remained un-invaded, Japan would have been denied strategic resources and at least some access to finished goods markets? Of course they had options.

Or, said another way, the history of Japan for the past 65 peaceful, incredibly productive years has been a mirage?

[Moss Orleni]

Empires in the Balance by H.P. Willmott offers some interesting insights on the subject...

[Bullwinkle58]

ORIGINAL: Moss Orleni

Empires in the Balance by H.P. Willmott offers some interesting insights on the subject...

Any bottom line thoughts? My reading pile has snow on top of it.

[The Gnome]

ORIGINAL: Bullwinkle58

ORIGINAL: Offworlder

Going to take an opposing view.

In essence there was no other options for Japan but to go to war if it wanted to maintain its position of power on the world stage.

Well, it's always "cheaper" to rob the store than to pay retail. At least for a short time.

Japan had numerous options in, say, 1930. Just because the British and French and Dutch empires were empires doesn't mean they weren't interested in peaceful trade for raw materials. Do you have any evidence that, if China had remained un-invaded, Japan would have been denied strategic resources and at least some access to finished goods markets? Of course they had options.

Or, said another way, the history of Japan for the past 65 peaceful, incredibly productive years has been a mirage?

Even if war was the only option... Why antagonize a then neutral United States?

They could have ignored China altogether and just preyed on the overstretched holdings of the Dutch, British, and French. This could have let them go into China and possibly, once the Germans had the Russians on the ropes, go into Siberia.

The US at the time was nearly wholly isolationist and was not in a position to intervene on behalf of any empire.

[mike scholl 1]

ORIGINAL: Offworlder

Going to take an opposing view.

In essence there was no other options for Japan but to go to war if it wanted to maintain its position of power on the world stage.

The reality is that in 1850, Japan was a backward "third world" nation. By dent of determination, hard work, and self sacrifice they had dragged themselves into the ranks or the "second rate" world powers by the turn of the century. But even more important for their growth on the world stage was logistics..., they were about 10,000 miles from the center of power of any first-world nation. This is what allowed them to humiliate the Tsar in 1904-05.

Unfortunately, being the biggest fish in their small pond still didn't make them a first rank power..., but it enabled them to act like one in East Asia. And that seems to have deluded the Japanese into thinking they were one. Then the US passed the "Two Ocean Naval Bill" and it's supplement; and Roosevelt called for the production of 50,000 planes a year---and suddenly grim reality was staring Japan in the face. No way could they compete with such production (and that was before war kicked the US into "high gear").

Having deluded themselves for almost half a century, the Japanese leadership just couldn't bring themselves to accept that reality. So they plunged themselves into a hopeless war banking on the delusion that "staunch fighting spirit" could beat firepower.

Bullwinkle58 made a good point. It would have made much more sense for Japan to have striven for economic domination of East Asia rather than physical conquest. But given the militarists who dominated her government, reality is that she almost had to get her teeth kicked in before she would accept this.