Pilot rotation versus fly until you die.

[angus]

[If this has been asked already, sorry but I couldn't find it.]

To simplify, in WWII Allied pilots flew a tour of duty - so many missions or so many months - and then got posted to a different role, frequently to training. They might later be sent back to a combat unit after finishing their tour again. Again simplifying, Japanese combat pilots kept flying until they couldn't fly or were killed.

UV doesn't appear to withdraw Allied pilots so far as I can see. Is it planned to change this in WitP ?

Angus

[msvknight]

I don't know the answer, but add a big hear hear from me. You are going to get some pretty amazing sortie counts by the end of the war otherwise....

[Mike Wood]

Hello...

Gary and I have discussed this issue. No decision has been made. With hundreds of items requested, we are trying to determine which can be added the fastest and which have the most impact on the game.

Thanks for Your input...

Michael Wood
___________________________________________________

Originally posted by angus
[If this has been asked already, sorry but I couldn't find it.]

To simplify, in WWII Allied pilots flew a tour of duty - so many missions or so many months - and then got posted to a different role, frequently to training. They might later be sent back to a combat unit after finishing their tour again. Again simplifying, Japanese combat pilots kept flying until they couldn't fly or were killed.

UV doesn't appear to withdraw Allied pilots so far as I can see. Is it planned to change this in WitP ?

Angus

[mogami]

Greetings, Well in regards to pilot rotation/number of missions.
The Japanese should be limited to the quality of replacement pilots unless they withdraw a certain number of pilots that have flown a certain number of missions and attained a certain skill level.
Like wise the Allies pilot training programs should be dependent on the number of and skill level of pilots withdrawn.

That aside. I don't think we really need to worry about pilots names. Just skill levels and factors that effect preformance. (fatigue and morale)(leave the names but don't worry if so and so has 100 missions flown. (the game could just reset missions flown at 25 or 50 or whatever)

So if the 20 front line fighter groups all send 1 pilot who has flown 25 missions and attained a skill of 80 then the base skill of new pilots would be 70 (or how ever many pilots are need to train a batch of new pilots)
This will mean new allied pilots will get better as time goes by and new Japanese pilots will not (unless Japanese player can keep enough pilots alive and withdraw them)

Prehaps a routine similair to the old plane type upgrade in PacWar
"Pilot So and So of 76th Fighter Sqd has reached level 80, do you wish to withdraw him?" If yes then he is removed and replaced by a new pilot from pool. And his skill is now part of formula for training new pilots.
New pilots would be trained using both the skill and number of withdrawn pilots.

This concludes this mornings Mogami babble

[Yamamoto]

I LOVE that idea Mogami. If I were the Japanese I would pull some of my starting pilots out right away to help increase the skill of my new pilots. Since the Japanese have quite a few pilots with skills in the 90's I would think that would give me better replacement pilots than the Americans for the rest of the war.

Playing as the Japanese the replacement pilot skill level has always hurt me the most.

Yamamoto

[Ranger-75]

You're missing the point.
It wasn't just withdrawing pilots to go into training. The Japanese flight training program was hopelessly inadequate from the very beginning. They lost more pilots BEFORE the Midway battle than they were going to graduate for the ENTIRE YEAR.

It was Japanese attempts to "speed up" the wrong parts of the training program that led to the declining pilot quality that appeared from the training schools as time went on. Later war Japanese pilots were so bad bevcause they had almost NO flight time before reporting to units, not because they didn't have any quality instructors back in Japan.

Contrast this with the 800-1200 flight hours that US pilots were getting before reporting to units as time went on.

[Jeremy Pritchard]

Another critical restriction on Japanese Pilot training is fuel. They simply were not lacking experienced trainers, but also enough fuel to maximize training facilities. The front lines had full priority of fuel, with the rear areas having about as much as they could, and used it to their maximum. The trainers that were left in Japan were suitable to get the pilots to the experience that they can with the fuel/time avalible. In order to get Japanese pilots up to Allied standards, especially later in the war, you would have to double or triple training time (as the Japanese had less flying time per month then a US trainee due to fuel shortages).

So, simply removing veteran pilots from the frontline won't do it. You would also have to limit fuel in at the front lines, which is almost impossible. Even if Japan stopped all offensive operations in April 1942, forever, it would still loose fuel stocks.

[mdiehl]

A third critical consideration for Japanese pilot training is that they still would not keep pace with the US in producing high quality trainees because the US had many more experienced pilots by mid 1943 than Japan. Moreover, the USN had something that no other service for any nation had, the advanced tactical fighter program, forerunner to the "Top Gun" program. In PW terms, USN pilots in mid 1944 who were graduates of the ATF should have exp around 95.

[Nikademus]

US flight training became more abreviated compared to pre-war standards as with other nations that needed to put as many new pilots into the air as possible in the soonest possible time, as the war commenced and progressed. They were still, of course in a far far better boat than the Japanese were, but it would not have produced rookie pilots with 95 exp.

60 - 65 tops i'd say, which doesn't sound like much, until you compare equivilent Japanese rookie exp ratings, some i've seen even in UV during earlier times. (20's and 30's for the worst.....50's for most of the rest) An additional benefit (besides numbers) that helped rookie US pilots came in the form of the Hellcat, like it's predesessor a forgiving and well protected plane to fly which outclassed it's prime advesary and helped assure that rookie pilots would live to become expert pilots. From experiences in UV....exp in pilots goes up at a rapid rate in a favorable combat environment so rookies at 50-65 exp quickly become veterans of 70+ and experts 85-99.

By 44, most Japanese rookies would be 10's and 20's as seen in PacWar. Maybe a few 30's or higher.

Another interesting idea Mogami though i'm a little wary of it, for the simple reason already stated by Matrix.....they already have so many things on their plate...would this additional detail really produce substantial results? Retained or not the Japanese pilot replacement program will still be inadequate to the task......at first glance it would seem that all the IJN player will acomplish will be to hasten the decline of his/her airgroups by losing the services of acomplished pilots for little appreciable gain (due to all the other limitations/issues, most mentioned in this thread) Meanwhile the US training program will still chug along as it did historically.

Matrix already created a good alt idea in the form of Scen19 in UV. Perhaps making this (Pilot training) a full blown option along with IJN Sub doctorine would be an easier solution for the programers to give players a chance to explore this variable in the game.

[mdiehl]

Allied pilot training varied through the war, with respect to air time and service. The nadir was in the USAAF in late 1942, increasing thereafter. USN VF pilots were as extensively trained as the best trained Axis pilots (excepting the unnecessarily extreme and and possibly unproductive inflictions imposed on pre-war IJN pilots), and in general the tactical doctrine instilled in Western Allied and German pilots was far superior to the tcatical doctrine in which Japanese pilots were trained.

As to the 95 EXP, that would be specifically for USN pilots who went through the ATF program, not all navy/USMC pilots and certainly not USAAF pilots. IIRC, not all of them went through that training. Since UV already tracks pilots as individuals it's completely feasible to season established groups with 95EXP ATF graduates and get the combat model right.

The more typical non ATF USN/USMC pilot replacement EXP should be about 85, and USAAF should be 60 in 1942, increasing to 65 in 1943, and 75 in 1944.

It is of course perfectly appropriate for late war Japanes pilots to have low exp. Japanese replacement EXP should, however, be 5 if you set the US replacement EXP at 60.

[Nikademus]

dont agree. USN pilots went through ATF before and during the opening months of the war. The graduates were still raw compared to the veteran pilots of the established VF's, and still needed much additional work to integrate them into the squadrons. Hornet's experience at Midway was a testiment to that alone. As for the Marines......

Further, UV (and with it WitP) uses a standard two digit forum to measure exp. A typical interpretation vis-a-vis wargames goes something like this

0-10: no training, no exp

10-50: various level of training, usually either incomplete or poor. Also used to represent green, poorly trained units

50-60: fully trained but little to no battle seasoning

60-70: the iterim between veteran and green (but fully trained)

70-85: Veteran to highly seasoned veteran

85-99 Elite.

I'd give Thach a 95 after midway. I'd never give it to a rookie in any airforce.

Going with this interpetation, a pilot starting at anything over 60 without any battle seasoning can be 'interpreted' as one who has had a very thorough training and is in a good position to learn the ropes from more experienced leaders and fellow pilots. This falls in line with info gleaned from Lundstrom and Sakai's accounts of encounters with Hellcat pilots.

[msvknight]

I would not talk of pilots over 90 as anything other than those rare individuals who had the exceptional talent and luck to become top aces. I wouldn't give anybody who was merely trained a rating over 70. The Japanese naval units flew over China for 4 years prior to the beginning of the war with the Allies. That is why they should be rated so highly, not just because of their wonderful training.

The maxim that no plan survives the test of battle applies to training as well. Nobody knew who was going to be an ace prior to actually getting into combat. Many of the best peacetime pilots never gained the combat scores of their supposedly less able peers. It is to a large extent an instinctive thing, related to many more factors than merely training.

Having said that, I agree that the pilots coming out of the Allied training system should be superior, but the trade off for this is that their pilots should start to disappear once they reach a certain number of missions (ie rotated out). This should not be optional and the Japanese should not be able to take up this option. I would use the following formula for pilot quality:

IJN 1941 - 65, 42 - 55, 43 - 45, 44 - 30, 45 - 20
IJA 1941 - 50, 42 - 45, 43 - 35, 44 - 25, 45 -20
CW 1941 - 45, 42 - 50, 43 - 60, 44 onwards 65
USAAF 1941 - 40, 42 - 45, 43- 55, 44 - 60, 45 - 65
USN 1941 - 50, 42 - 55, 43 -60, 44 onwards 65

I think as my final word on the subject of replacement quality levels: The great aces usually get a rating of 95+. To say that any rookie navy pilot (however well trained) is automatically as good as a great ace the day they leave flight school is laughable. Late in the war, Japanese Navy units were still able to match it with the USN units, even though limited by poor fuel and greatly inferior numbers. I think Sakai deserves to be 50% better than some numbskull fresh out of the states however well trained.

[mdiehl]

The Japanese naval units flew over China for 4 years prior to the beginning of the war with the Allies. That is why they should be rated so highly, not just because of their wonderful training.

There are two problem as, I see it, with this line of reasoning. 1. Japanese pilots were trained in demonstrably inferior tactics. All otehr things being equal, a thoroughly trained, no combat experience Japanese pilot was at a disadvantage in comparison with a thoroughly trained, no-combat experience USN pilot. 2. Japanese combat experience in China was counter-productive. The a/c flown by the really poorly trained Chinese National pilots in the 1930s were largely antiquated Sov and Italian a/c, and their CN pilots were not trained in mutual support tactics. They were trained in the classic WW1 dogfight style, that is, *exactly* the tactics that Japanese would want them to use.

(Heading off *again* the obsession with the "Thach Weave" or as he called it "Beam Defense," as though that maneuver alone was responsible for winning the war from teh naval side, it was only one of a suite of mutual support maneuvers, developed in particular for the F4F, but other forms of mutual support were routinely practiced by the F4F pilots, even those who'd never been trained in that specific maneuver).

The learning curve for veteran Japanese pilots against USN pilots was just as steep as for rookie USN pilots. Different opponent, different training, different tactics, different a/c. It's one of the reasons why Sakai (whom some posters here seem to equate with a deity), damned near died making a rookie-like tail-on approach on a tight cluster of SBDs.

[Nikademus]

What inferior tactics are you reffering too. I have not seen or read this. If you are reffering to the oft mentioned 3-plane vs 2-plane element, this has been blown way out of preportion in my opinion. With three qualified or experienced pilots there would be negligable difference between the two, assuming that the formations dont break down to begin with once the furball begins. The Japanese mistake was later when they assumed (hopefully) that the element would work sufficiently with two rookies and one more experienced pilot in the lead. This proved incorrect.

Outside of that aspect i have seen no evidience of "inferior" training on the part of the Japanese prior to the start of hostilities

Further, this line of thinking in no way addresses the issue of rookie USN pilots being granted "expert" experience levels. Were it to be implemented, it would the USN which would be considered the diety, not Sakai who i for one, do not consider a diety anymore than he himself did. His reading was levelheaded, modest, and with few exceptions had nothing but respect for his American and Allied opponents. Not underestimating an opponent helps keep one alive in wartime. Most Allied pilots who survived lived by the same creed. (it did have reasearch too.

The learning curve for USN and IJN pilots when facing each other for the first time was equal. Dont agree? read Lundstrom Book I, if you have it. He also refuted (along with inferior training and inferior team training) , the notion that the Japanese pilots were only dogfighting obsessed shallow angle tail chasers. Any suggestion otherwise is baseless and untrue.

As for Sakai's encounter with SBD's.....a low side approach from behind is a standard and acceptible maneuver, one attempted by numerous USN pilots as well. In fact the first Zero kill by an F4F was a blindside attack (only from above and behind vs below) on a pilot who didn't see it until it was too late. Sakai's mistaken recognition of the plane is an understandable mistake in the heat of battle, nothing more, nothing less. There was nothing "Rookie" about it. A fighter's weapons are front only angle weapons, often a pilot's attention is as well unless he's smart. Hence you find yourself in situation such as that, you take it....unless your suggesting he should have end arounded the formation (thus alerting them) like a sub and purposely attempted a more difficult shot. "that" wouldn't be rookie either....it would be "stupid"


Certainly his getting his damaged A6M 500 miles back to Rabaul. while badly wounded was not "Rookie"

[mdiehl]

If you are reffering to the oft mentioned 3-plane vs 2-plane element

Yes.

this has been blown way out of preportion in my opinion.

In understand that is your opinion.

With three qualified or experienced pilots there would be negligable difference between the two, assuming that the formations dont break down to begin with once the furball begins.

4 plane scetion, 2 plane element. 4 USN a/c vs 3 Zekes, with each element in theory backing up the other, and each plane backing up his partner in the element. In practice, however, formations tended not to last very long. The tendency in any given F4F-vs A6M encounter in 1942 was for a couple more Zekes to be shot down than F4Fs (there were some exception "bounces" though, one IIRC, on 18 August, when Zekes bounced F4Fs, another in Septmber when F4Fs got the counce, in which casualties were heavily against one side).

Further, this line of thinking in no way addresses the issue of rookie USN pilots being granted "expert" experience levels.

It's a semantic argument on your part. If you define 60 as "expert" and assume that a rookie can't be an expert then you can't have a rookie with > 59 EXP. I don't buy your assumption. based on the combat results from PW the EXP levels were highly deterministic in combat and produced results inconsistent with history. Based on what I've read of UV, the problem is still there. 'nuff said.

His reading was levelheaded, modest, and with few exceptions had nothing but respect for his American and Allied opponents.

It was also anecdotal, which gives one a good sense of what it was like to *be* a pilot but not how the strategic results of the combination of planes+pilots worked out vis loss rates. Sakai would not know anything about US loss rates. Also, there is compelling evidence that many of his anecdotes were acquired through conversations with other pilots. Sakai has a lot to say about the proper tactics for engaging a P39 and its relative merits as a plane; yet Sakai never flew against a P39. (He was not at Rabaul during the early raids on PM. Moreover, during those raids, roughly March-April 1942, not one P39 was engaged. The Japanese strikes and their escorts came in at 20,000 feet, 3,000 feet above the maximum ceiling of the PM 39 Pursuit Groups). The first P39-Zeke encounter that I've verified so far occurred in August with a strike on Lae/Salamua, in which several Zekes were ambushed. By then, Sakai was assigned to the group attacking the Allies at Cactus. In a nutshell, his book is in general a good read, a good lesson in how to fly a Zeke, but you can't rely on it for strategic information.

The learning curve for USN and IJN pilots when facing each other for the first time was equal. Dont agree? read Lundstrom Book I, if you have it.

Hmm. Lundstrom I. Is that "The First South Pacific Campaign" (1975) or "The First Team." I've read the former quitye recently. Yet to find the latter, again (it's OOP). In "The First Team and the Guadalcanal Campaign," Lundstrom (in concluding chapter) cites Japanese sources that were quite pissed off because, as late as mid-1943, group/base commanders were exhorting new pilots to fly heroically and indivdualistically, deliberately telling them to eschew mutual support tactics (to the consternation of the surviving IJN vets). Lundstrom also notes superior Allied training in deflection shooting, a general tendency for the Allies to fly in mutual support (including both US pilot accounts of supporting wingmates, and Japanese pilots frustrations at being forced to deal with an attacking F4F just when they thought they'd the drop on some other Wildcat). Any suggestion otherwise is baseless and untrue.

As for Sakai's encounter with SBD's.....a low side approach from behind is a standard and acceptible maneuver, one attempted by numerous USN pilots as well.

Not against SBDs. Many IJN vets rapidly learned to approach an SBD obliquely, particularly the SBD 5. Sakai even wrote in his book that he mistook them for TBD/Fs (IIRC), and that he would not have approached them in this manner had he recognized them. Given that his memoir is of course an after the fact memoir, one can't determine whether he misidentified them because he *otherwise* would have recognized an SBD (but was absent minded that day, because the SBD stern asepct is not very similar to a TBD/TBF), or because he'd not much experience against SBDs (shooting or recognition). Since Sakai's first mission agains the USN was in the Cactus theater, I'm figuring the latter.

In fact the first Zero kill by an F4F was a blindside attack (only from above and behind vs below) on a pilot who didn't see it until it was too late.

The same may be said for *most* kills throughout WW2 in most theaters.

Sakai's mistaken recognition of the plane is an understandable mistake in the heat of battle, nothing more, nothing less.

Horse hockey. He was not engaged at the time. He was instead chasing and overtaking, by himself, a cluster of SBDs that were retiring from the action. He had several minutes in the approach to scrutinize his targets, and if he'd any doubts he could easily have maneuvered to an oblique position for a quick id check before moving in for the kill. Sakai f***ed up, plain and simple. His greatness and stamina, IMO, really are evident in coaxing his beat up Zeke back to Rabaul, especially considering his grievous wounds.

unless your suggesting he should have end arounded the formation (thus alerting them) like a sub and purposely attempted a more difficult shot. "that" wouldn't be rookie either....it would be "stupid"

That's another option. An oblique shot from behind would have been a safe and accurate approach with good firing interval, with relatively low (but not zero) deflection. I find your attempt to goad me ("stupid") banal, predictable, and typical of your usual rhetorical style. Many very good combat pilots developed end-around tactics for approaching a/c with robust defenses. Apparently you're not even aware of German single-engined fighter tactics against B17 boxes in the ETO, in which the end-around cum frontal attack was the preferred method of approach, despite the very brief firing window that it accorded, because it was not safe to close on a cohesive B17 box from astern. So, if my alternative is "stupid," then a whole bunch of German combat aces were also quite stupid.

End arounding the SBDs thereby alerting them would not be a terrible price. They can't outrun him. They can't outmaneuver. In the instance they were already at low altitude. If the formation beakrs up, it makes killing at least one of them easier because there's less defensive firepower. In effect, he could have beat one or more of them if he took them in detail.

Certainly his getting his damaged A6M 500 miles back to Rabaul. while badly wounded was not "Rookie"

On *that* we agree. I sometimes think that the EXP thing should be largely irrelevant in combat simulations until one's plane is taking hits, or as one is leaving combat in a damaged plane.

By the way. For those who think that every P40 vs Zeke encounter was akin to the surprise raid on Darwin, here is an early war account where the P40s chewed the tails:

home.st.net.au/~dunn/horn01.htm

[Yamamoto]

Maybe ALL new pilots should just show up with an experience of 1 and set to 0% training ( they do gain experience at 0% training ). Then it would be up to the player to decide if he wanted to rush them into combat or wait until they reached whatever experience level he felt comfortable with.

I do believe, however, that Japanese and allied pilots should gain experience at the same rate if the allied side isn't required to remove their aces back home for instructing.

Yamamoto

[Nikademus]

Originally posted by mdiehl



4 plane scetion, 2 plane element. 4 USN a/c vs 3 Zekes, with each element in theory backing up the other, and each plane backing up his partner in the element. In practice, however, formations tended not to last very long. The tendency in any given F4F-vs A6M encounter in 1942 was for a couple more Zekes to be shot down than F4Fs (there were some exception "bounces" though, one IIRC, on 18 August, when Zekes bounced F4Fs, another in Septmber when F4Fs got the counce, in which casualties were heavily against one side).

Before Midway, formations almost always broke up, for various reasons. Thach was an exception at Midway and ironically, it operated as a three plane unit after an F4F was shot down unanswered.

Most of the cases prior were one on ones, and the F4F's did not always come out on top. During Coral Sea 3 F4F's were shot down to zero (ahem, pardon the pun) zero's

It has also not escaped my notice that this diversion is irrelevent to the idea of EXP 95 rookies

It's a semantic argument on your part. If you define 60 as "expert" and assume that a rookie can't be an expert then you can't have a rookie with > 59 EXP. I don't buy your assumption. based on the combat results from PW the EXP levels were highly deterministic in combat and produced results inconsistent with history. Based on what I've read of UV, the problem is still there. 'nuff said.

wrong. Its called sticking to the point. Arguments regarding the virtues of formations and IJN training do not touch upon why USN rookies should come out with EXP levels within 4 points of the maximum the game allows. Your arguments along this line were based on the ATF....which i have already addressed. As for the tired old PW argument.....Jeremey has explained this half a dozen times, and it does not happen in UV, and when it does (to a minor degree in the F4F, major vs F4U and P-38) its due to plane attributes more than EXP.

It was also anecdotal, which gives one a good sense of what it was like to *be* a pilot but not how the strategic results of the combination of planes+pilots worked out vis loss rates. Sakai would not know anything about US loss rates. Also, there is compelling evidence that many of his anecdotes were acquired through conversations with other pilots. Sakai has a lot to say about the proper tactics for engaging a P39 and its relative merits as a plane; yet Sakai never flew against a P39. (He was not at Rabaul during the early raids on PM. Moreover, during those raids, roughly March-April 1942, not one P39 was engaged. The Japanese strikes and their escorts came in at 20,000 feet, 3,000 feet above the maximum ceiling of the PM 39 Pursuit Groups). The first P39-Zeke encounter that I've verified so far occurred in August with a strike on Lae/Salamua, in which several Zekes were ambushed. By then, Sakai was assigned to the group attacking the Allies at Cactus. In a nutshell, his book is in general a good read, a good lesson in how to fly a Zeke, but you can't rely on it for strategic information.

Irrelevent. Irrelevent and your opinion. On a side note, Lundstrom also does not tarry on loss ratios. He focuses on the how and why. I found no great disperity in Sakai's views and Lundstroms.

Hmm. Lundstrom I. Is that "The First South Pacific Campaign" (1975) or "The First Team." I've read the former quitye recently. Yet to find the latter, again (it's OOP). In "The First Team and the Guadalcanal Campaign" (snip)

"The First Team : Pacific Naval Combat from Pearl Harbor to Midway"

Lundstrom does say that USN pilots "employed" deflection shooting better than the Japanese, but not that they were better "trained" in it. The principal reason was technological, not skill or training based. The technical involved the merits of the A6M and the F4F.

It is also Lundstrom's "opinion" and not hard fact. Either way, right or wrong it is no indication of "inferior" training on part of the IJN.

As for your comments on Book II......as usual, irrelevent to the argument. You have yet to explain why USN rookies deserve what is considered "elite" status in UV and the upcoming WitP

Not against SBDs. (snip)

fail to see the point your making. I already said Sakai mis'ID the plane. Prior to the encounter i dont believe he had seen an SBD in the flesh since he was stationed at Lae, not a carrier. Also fail to see how this proves that USN rookies merit 95 exp. The first Zero sighted by a USN VF pilot mis-ID'd it as a bomber if i recall. Should i conclude that USN pilots were poorly trained?

Horse hockey. He was not engaged at the time. He was instead chasing and overtaking, by himself, a cluster of SBDs that were retiring from the action. He had several minutes in the approach to scrutinize his targets, and if he'd any doubts he could easily have maneuvered to an oblique position for a quick id check before moving in for the kill. Sakai f***ed up, plain and simple. His greatness and stamina, IMO, really are evident in coaxing his beat up Zeke back to Rabaul, especially considering his grievous wounds.

your opinion only. When you've flown in the shoes of a WWII pilot, where one error can mean the difference between life and death and often did....come back and see me. Until then....please explain how this proves that USN pilots out of flight school deserve a 95 rating

That's another option. An oblique shot from behind would have been a safe and accurate approach with good firing interval, with relatively low (but not zero) deflection. I find your attempt to goad me ("stupid") banal, predictable, and typical of your usual rhetorical style. Many very good combat pilots developed end-around tactics for approaching a/c with robust defenses. Apparently you're not even aware of German single-engined fighter tactics against B17 boxes in the ETO, in which the end-around cum frontal attack was the preferred method of approach, despite the very brief firing window that it accorded, because it was not safe to close on a cohesive B17 box from astern. So, if my alternative is "stupid," then a whole bunch of German combat aces were also quite stupid.

not when one's time is limited by fuel constraints. not when the reletive speeds between the aircraft are not optimal. And not when you want to preserve the element of suprise. Many combat situations had to be taken as they were presented and pilots often did not have the luxery of choosing the most optimal position. Planes are not X-wings after all, achieving position takes time, valuable time. This paragraph also does not address the central issue. All it establishes is that you dont have much respect for Sakai. I already knew that....he was Japanese after all. As for "goading".....that is your style. I meerly stated fact.....Sakai, under the misassumption that he was facing a fighter, made an approach used by many fighter pilots, US included. No less valid than bouncing from above or attacking out of the sun. I think Sakai would have recognized a B17 on sight and chosen a different option.....like the ones he encountered in New Guneau.

On *that* we agree. I sometimes think that the EXP thing should be largely irrelevant in combat simulations until one's plane is taking hits, or as one is leaving combat in a damaged plane.

If you played UV you'd know that this already has been done. There is little appreciable difference between watching an EXP 91 and an EXP 71 fighter duel because so many other factors are includeded. As Drongo pointed out.....Plane specs appear much more dominant from observations of P-40 vs A6M, A6M vs F4F, and especially P-38 and F4U vs A6M

I'm glad we agree. Unfortunately, the subject of the thread is pilot rotation and EXP levels for rookies. Still have seen nothing relevent that justifies USN pilots coming out instant experts, even amoung their fellow experienced USN pilots.

[mdiehl]

Midway, formations almost always broke up, for various reasons. Thach was an exception at Midway and ironically, it operated as a three plane unit after an F4F was shot down unanswered.

Not following you here. Generally speaking formations lost cohesion very quickly in airc ombat both before and after Midway. USN pilots tended however to stay more cohesive, primarily because of training emphaisizing teamwork and mutual support. In detail, Japanese "teamwork" tended to (a) not emphasize mutual support, and (b) consist of sections making linear runs one at a time against a target, often allowing their target to thwart the attack run via maneuver.

the cases prior were one on ones, and the F4F's did not always come out on top. During Coral Sea 3 F4F's were shot down to zero (ahem, pardon the pun) zero's

?? Neither are correct. The second, well, it's been a while since I had First Team at my disposal. In theF4F thread in UV, however, a fellow quoted specific passages about Coral Sea, in which the F4Fs trounded the Zeroes. The *sum* of the encounters at Coral Sea of all F4F vs A6M encounters was 16 Zekes downed in exchange for 10 F4Fs (Lundstrom's introduction to "The First Team and the Guadalcanal Campaign, I'll provide a freakin page number the next time I check the book out of teh library).

It has also not escaped my notice that this diversion is irrelevent to the idea of EXP 95 rookies

Do you think that the historical combat losses and the tactics in which the real pilots were really trained are irrelevant to, er, whatever game design you think you're trying to influence?

Arguments regarding the virtues of formations and IJN training do not touch upon why USN rookies should come out with EXP levels within 4 points of the maximum the game allows.

If one is assessing the merits of a combat simulation, including its assumptions, one has to ask whether the assumptions produce accurate results. In light of the effects that EXP differential produce, one should set the EXP levels to produce something like historical results. Hence you end up with rookie pilots with 95 EXP to fix the otherwise flawed assumptions. One could, of course, drop the the 20 point spread separating Kido Butai and the USN at game start.

Your arguments along this line were based on the ATF....which i have already addressed. As for the tired old PW argument.....Jeremey has explained this half a dozen times, and it does not happen in UV, and when it does (to a minor degree in the F4F, major vs F4U and P-38) its due to plane attributes more than EXP.

Basically, you claim I'm wrong, if not wrong, irrelevant, and if not irrelevant, holding a unique perspective. You are certainly mistaken on the last account. IIRC, Jeremy has played the game UV alot and thinks the F4F vs A6M model credits too much to the Zeke side, and the F4U vs. *whatever* model too much to the Corsair side. With respect to the F4F vs A6M, he and I seem to agree. As to the F4U, I can't say whether the results are "right" or not. I've held that an adequately trained F4U pilot holds a huge advantage over the most veteran A6M pilot for some rather obvious technical reasons. How exactly that should play out vis loss ratios is not something that I've spent any time researching, though.

Irrelevent. Irrelevent and your opinion.

You *are* a real talented scholar. You cite Sakai's expertise, as the definitive source, then when I point out some obvious inconsistencies in his accounts and mistakes he made, you dismiss them as "irrelevant." You must be some well-respected historian to know which sentence in Sakai counts and which one to ignore.

On a side note, Lundstrom also does not tarry on loss ratios.

You mean he did not write *four chapters* of combat-by-combat descriptions and analyses in which he tallies the verified loss numbers as well as the claimed and credited kills from both 25th Air Flotilla and the guys at Cactus?

"The First Team : Pacific Naval Combat from Pearl Harbor to Midway"

Right. Now go check out the sequel. "The First Team and the Guadalcanal Campaign."

Lundstrom does say that USN pilots "employed" deflection shooting better than the Japanese, but not that they were better "trained" in it.

In the sequel he specifically attributes it to training, and looks to examples from the Cactus combats as proof, of things that he attributes to USN training (citing USN and USMC pilots) and Japanese training (citing IJN pilots).

The principal reason was technological, not skill or training based. The technical involved the merits of the A6M and the F4F.

I have no idea what you imagine deflection shooting to be, other than taking the right lead on a target approached obliquely, that the "technical merits" would matter that much.

It is also Lundstrom's "opinion" and not hard fact.

Quite so. Forgive me if I believe his peer-reviewed published opinion on this matter.

Either way, right or wrong it is no indication of "inferior" training on part of the IJN.

Except that Japanese training did not emphasize deflection training and USMC/USN training *did.* So, with respect to deflection shooting, USN.USMC pilots were, in fact, better trained.

As for your comments on Book II......as usual, irrelevent to the argument.

Just plug your fingers into your ears and chant "irrelevant."

You have yet to explain why USN rookies deserve what is considered "elite" status in UV and the upcoming WitP

Step 1: Fight Combat.
Step 2: Compare Combat results to likely historical results.
Step 3. If CRT Cas Losses == "Improbable Result [consult lookup table]" then go to "evaluate assumptions," else assume assumptions correct.

"Evaluate Assumptions"
Step 4.1 Examine propositions for historical accuracy. Look for mitigating circumstances that explain error causing condition 3.
Step 4.2 Refine assumptions.
Go to Step 1.

"Assumptions Correct"
Stop tinkering with model. Move on to next design aspect.

fail to see the point your making. I already said Sakai mis'ID the plane. Prior to the encounter i dont believe he had seen an SBD in the flesh since he was stationed at Lae, not a carrier.

The *point* being that combat experience against the Chinese from 1937-1941 (oft cited as validation of high PW/UV EXP ratings) is not necessarily of any value against the USN/USMC in 1942. Different opponents, different tactics, different planes, different amounst of training. If you expect from prior combat experience for an SBD to be easy pickings for a tail up run without fear of retaliatory fire, you get a big surprise, even if you have ten quintrillion hours of combat time. If you expect an F4F pilot to obligingly turn with you in energy bleeding combat, or for the F4F section to fall to pieces from poor discipline, or the F4F to fall after modest damage (as was the case with the CNAF after the first few engagements in 1937), you're in for a big surprise.

I can hardly make the point clearer

to see how this proves that USN rookies merit 95 exp. The first Zero sighted by a USN VF pilot mis-ID'd it as a bomber if i recall. Should i conclude that USN pilots were poorly trained?

Design for effect. Either lower IJN EXP or increase Allied EXP if the model fails to produce accurate results. Frankly, I find the claim that IJN pilots were "90/70" better experienced than USN pilots to be dubious not only because historical loss ratios indicate something more like1:1 in 1942 through October, but also because *no one* at Matrix or anywhere else has provided a cogent explanation as to how the EXP numbers were selected.

Your opinion only. When you've flown in the shoes of a WWII pilot, where one error can mean the difference between life and death and often did....come back and see me.

Hahahah. OK. Now it's "only WW2 air combat vets can have an opinion. Do you *intentionally* mock yourself?

Until then....please explain how this proves that USN pilots out of flight school deserve a 95 rating.

Design for effect. Either the IJN vets get lowered or the USN rookies get raised. I notice that you've reduced ATF to "flight school" as though USN pilots transitioned directly from the T6 to the combat line without extensive advanced training.

Not when one's time is limited by fuel constraints. not when the reletive speeds between the aircraft are not optimal.

Are you *seriously* contending that 109 pilots developed the head-on run because of *fuel shortages* rather than because of the defensive firepower of the B17E/F box when approached from astern? If I post verbatim a ME109 quote on this will you promise never to offer another creative theory about the proper aerial tactics on this forum again? Optimal speed? The 1943 109s (and FW 190s that used the same approach or a top-down diving attack) had more than 100 mph on the B17. For that matter, read about why P40 and F4F pilots tended to make oblique approaches on the Betty? Do you suppose that 20mm stinger in the tail influenced the approach angle? Hmm.

Many combat situations had to be taken as they were presented and pilots often did not have the luxery of choosing the most optimal position.

Agreed. Most victories happened quickly in engagements that were over in a minute or less, often with victims that never knew they were under attack. In meeting engagements there was plenty of time to set up attacks however. Most of the ETO combats over Germany were meeting engagements with an hour or more of sophisticaed German vectoring, and lots of "hovering outside of defensive armament range" on the part of the Axie fighters until (a) a head on or diving approach was available, or (b) the bomber box lost cohesion due to flak, rocket attack, or as with the 2nd Schweinfurt raid, absence of cohesion from the get go. Getting back to Sakai, he had plenty of time to choose the apporach he wanted and plenty of fuel to do so.

This paragraph also does not address the central issue. All it establishes is that you dont have much respect for Sakai.

Incorrect again. Neverthelss, Sakai, despite his experience and talents, made a huge and nearly fatal error in his apprioach run on SBDs, and an IJN pilot with any EXPERIENCE fighting SBDs would probably have chosen a better approach. Extensive combat experience in one theater or even against one particular kind of plane does not necessarily amount to much in a novel situation.

I meerly stated fact.....Sakai, under the misassumption that he was facing a fighter, made an approach used by many fighter pilots, US included.

Yes. Exactly. Was his assumption the sort of assumption that a veteran of combats vs SBDs would make? No. Why not? Because a combat veteran approaching an F4F from aft would see the wing located centerline on the fuselage, and would see a straight wing. A combat veteran would know that the SBD has a slighly gull-wing shape with the wing flush with the bottom of the fuselage. A Combat veteran would be tempted to confuse an SBD for a TBD, but for the gull-ish wing, but not a TBF (centerline wing). Sakai's approach was poorly chosen, and a veteran of combats vs. the USN would likely have chosen a different approach. A veteran of Chinese or Philippine combats vs the USAAF would not necessarily know how to deal with the situtation, although the gull-ish wing should also differentiate
the SBD from the P39/400 or P40.

I think Sakai would have recognized a B17 on sight and chosen a different option.

Well, he said that he and his pilots learned from being pretty badly shot up by Kelly's B17 that the B17 was tough to approach from astern, so I agree.

I'm glad we agree. Unfortunately, the subject of the thread is pilot rotation and EXP levels for rookies.

Other than the fact that Japanese combat experience in China and the PI was not very helpful in the South Pacific, that the USN had a pilot rotation and Japan did not, that the USN had an advanced training program in which pilots were trained to fight against a/c flying with Japanese tactics and Japan had no corresponding training program, and that the Japanese trained to use a 3-plane section rather the superior 4-plane 2-element formation used by the Allies.

[wpurdom]

mdiehl's description doesn't seem to be the same book the rest of us read. Lundstrum certainly gives considerable importance to the fact the Japanese were fighting at the end of an 800? (IIRC) mile flight, that often they would not ditch their external fuel tanks because of these constraints, which greatly reduced aerodynamic qualities, and that planes fought stripped of radios due to that self-same distance-fuel factor. Of course the Americans had an advantage in coordination fighting with the advantage of Guadalcanal's radar and radios. Of course, F4F's could never have returned the compliment and fought at Rabaul, but imagine F4F's fighting unencumbered Zeroes with external fuel tanks and without radios. That would have been a real massacre.

[mdiehl]

A6Ms ditched their radios because their reliability was dubious, and therefore not worth the weight penalty. The A6M had the range to make the trip to cactus and back with the radio installed, dropping the wing tanks (even partially full) in combat, and with about 7-15 minutes (there's lots of variation among individual a/c) of air time over Guadalcanal. The fuel crisis for the Zeke was "what fo I do if my wing tank is punctured with an 800 mile return flight facing me." Lundstrom does a very credible job distinguishing between A6MS seen leaving the combat area (by firned of foe) but that never arrived at Rabaul. The majority of A6M casualties at Cactus were flamed in situ, and the crash was observed locally.

As Lundstrom noted, the radar (and coastwatchers) often gave the Allies sufficient time to head out of the combat area, form up, and turn a disadvantaged situation into a meeting engagement. Meeting engagements indisuptably favored the F4Fs, because they were more rugged. The lack of warning at Port Moresby (not addressed by Lundstrom) factors heavily in A6M victories over P40s there, and in the highly successful Kido Butai raid on Darwin (whereat almost all the IJN victories were against planes that were climbing at low alttiude, just taking off, or still on their take-off run).

Absolutely there's no question that the initial conditions of a combat are highly deterministic in the losses for any single engagement. It's not obvious that the Cactus advantages were so overwhelming, though, as they were mitigated by hinky radar (at times), and often inferior numbers.

One could of course turn to the CV engagements at Midway and Coral Sea that occurred easily within the operational radius of A6Ms with plenty of air time to spare and well-maintained radios. Funny thing, in both engagements the F4Fs shot down more Zekes than they lost in verifiable direct combats between F4Fs and Zekes.