Couple of questions, importance of Leningrad etc

[Titi]

ORIGINAL: paullus99

I believe there were some plans on the table to just liquidate the entire population of Leningrad anyway - saving them the need to feed all those mouths.

We are in 1941 and the Nazis haven't go so far yet in efficiency for mass destuction (sorry, can't find the exact words in english).
Beside that you are at the border of Finland that even if they don't have a problem that not a stone was left standing in Leningrad, won't agree to kill every citizens of the city.
You also have Sweden that may not stay neutral, US that will enter the war sooner (note that they never declared war on Finland at that time) ...

Even then, it will take ressources (men and supply) to do that dirty job.

So Closing control on Lake Ladoga and putting Leningrad at 0 supply must be worth more VP than control of Leningrad.

Finaly, It took 3 months for Germany to take control of Stalingrad, taking Leningrad in far less time must be see as a serious flaw in the game mechanisms.

[ComradeP]

Finaly, It took 3 months for Germany to take control of Stalingrad, taking Leningrad in far less time must be see as a serious flaw in the game mechanisms.

The battle for Berlin lasted a little over a week, or around a week if you're only talking about the city centre. Battles for cities didn't normally last months. Leningrad was besieged, not assaulted and the Germans didn't commit enough forces to capture Stalingrad, partially because there were few attempts to cut off the city (again, similar to Leningrad, where the Germans didn't commit the forces required to isolate the city through the capture of ports on Lake Ladoga). City battles lasting months would be a "serious flaw in the game mechanisms" not city hexes being captured in a week/a few weeks. Keep in mind that major cities like Leningrad are composed of multiple city hexes.

[Titi]

ORIGINAL: ComradeP

The battle for Berlin lasted a little over a week, or around a week if you're only talking about the city centre. Battles for cities didn't normally last months. Leningrad was besieged, not assaulted and the Germans didn't commit enough forces to capture Stalingrad, partially because there were few attempts to cut off the city (again, similar to Leningrad, where the Germans didn't commit the forces required to isolate the city through the capture of ports on Lake Ladoga). City battles lasting months would be a "serious flaw in the game mechanisms" not city hexes being captured in a week/a few weeks. Keep in mind that major cities like Leningrad are composed of multiple city hexes.

Berlin was defended by the equivalent of (full strength) 3 inf. div. with low morale, the same number volk. div. with low experience and some ants (panzert bat., ...). All with low supply and fuel (readiness).
Too few defender to man a city, even more if multihexes as you said.
The defense of the city was planned only 4 week before the attack started, so with few fortification.

Leningrad was protected by the Neva and other channels offering good defensive terrain.
Leningrad was at the starting point of the winter war one year ago so a major depot for the soviet, full of supply and amunitions to sustain a long siege, same for the navy arsenal.
Leningrad had a lot more defenders, more may be recalled from the finnish front at the North of the city if really needed. They may give weapons to a good part of two millions men and women.
Leningrad may call the remains of the russian Baltic fleet to offer big gun support.
Sure defenders will lack fresh tanks and artillery after some time but the german at the same time after the long advance don't have a lot of them left in huge quantity - like at Stalingrad.

Sure Russian morale wasn't at the highest level at that time, but it wasn't neither at the start of the battle of Stalingrad. Commissars with some shooting kept the russian army in line and Russians when forced to defend, do a pretty good job even more when german can't use the power of the mobility of panzers.

If Leningrad fell, it must be after a meat grinder battle like Stalingrad, not a walk in the park like the recent AAR.

[delatbabel]

ORIGINAL: ComradeP
... the Germans didn't commit enough forces to capture Stalingrad

The Germans committed 1/4 of their army to capture Stalingrad.

Yes, sure, they never put it out of supply, but they certainly threw everything at it that they were able. It was simply the case that the Russians threw in more (from a numbers point of view) because by that stage of the war they had more and were prepared to commit it.

[janh]

I don't recall a single German source mentioning any concerns about feeding the population in Leningrad and therefore avoiding to take the city.  In fact the Führerbefehle and the OKW plans clearly stated to take city.  Initially the plan was to take it in a rush past the unprepared defenders, as you all know.  But it didn't work out since AGN lacked the mobility and initiative to achieve a tactical surprise that late in the operations.  Tries to take it directly continued until it was decided that that the best way to take the city was by starving and bombarding its defenders.  Therefore, the Ladoga encirclement, which as you also know, didn't work out that well either.

But at no point can I recall any historical document or later literature source mention that the population of that city was of any concern (other than to add to the starvation rate of the defenders).  Think about it the other way:  Germans had taken so much ground by end of 1941 that they had to control at the order of 100Mio civilians, and some cities faced starvation (such as Kharkov).  Would two million more made a big difference to High Command?  Probably not.

[ComradeP]

Leningrad was protected by the Neva and other channels offering good defensive terrain.
Leningrad was at the starting point of the winter war one year ago so a major depot for the soviet, full of supply and amunitions to sustain a long siege, same for the navy arsenal.
Leningrad had a lot more defenders, more may be recalled from the finnish front at the North of the city if really needed. They may give weapons to a good part of two millions men and women.
Leningrad may call the remains of the russian Baltic fleet to offer big gun support.
Sure defenders will lack fresh tanks and artillery after some time but the german at the same time after the long advance don't have a lot of them left in huge quantity - like at Stalingrad.

Leningrad was defended by understrength or mobilizing Rifle divisions and People's Militia divisions when the Germans came knocking on its door. Like your Berlin example, there was little to no preparation for defense of the city from the direct the Germans were attacking from (the build-up for the Winter War you mention was all aimed at stopping an attack from the north). Fortunately for those defenders, the Germans had overstretched themselves and had wasted their mobile strength on flank protection.

If the Germans had focussed on punching through Soviet defences and would've assaulted the city, after taking control over their supply ports, within 3 months of the start of Barbarossa, I have little doubt that the defense would've collapsed like a house of cards like in BigAnorak's AAR.

I recommend Glantz's book on the siege of Leningrad if you want to have an idea of the state the Soviet defenses were in.

The Germans committed 1/4 of their army to capture Stalingrad.

A maximum of 14 divisions for the greater Stalingrad area isn't 1/4 of the German army.

[wosung]

ORIGINAL: janh

I don't recall a single German source mentioning any concerns about feeding the population in Leningrad and therefore avoiding to take the city.  In fact the Führerbefehle and the OKW plans clearly stated to take city.  Initially the plan was to take it in a rush past the unprepared defenders, as you all know.  But it didn't work out since AGN lacked the mobility and initiative to achieve a tactical surprise that late in the operations.  Tries to take it directly continued until it was decided that that the best way to take the city was by starving and bombarding its defenders.  Therefore, the Ladoga encirclement, which as you also know, didn't work out that well either.

But at no point can I recall any historical document or later literature source mention that the population of that city was of any concern (other than to add to the starvation rate of the defenders).  Think about it the other way:  Germans had taken so much ground by end of 1941 that they had to control at the order of 100Mio civilians, and some cities faced starvation (such as Kharkov).  Would two million more made a big difference to High Command?  Probably not.

Hitler didn't want any capitulation of Leningrad. Because then the Germans would have to feed its population ... somehow. Thus he ordered formal capitulation of the city had to be avoided at all costs - in times of the siege, and in times of German offensive actions around Leningrad.

In fact every million of the population in the SU counted against the Großraumpläne of the Nazi Regime. This was about rare (agrarian) ressources and a slavic slave-population, which for the sake of ideology and technocratic space-management, had to be vastly decimated by hunger. Germany didn't accept the Geneve Convention for the War in the East. This was all about annihilation.

German plans for Leningrad were not decided in what you call 'High Command'. Ultimately they were decided by Hitler.

Besides, there seems to be also serious evidence that even Stalin had an interest in the renintent population of Leningrad being ... educated by the German starvation siege, for the local party branch formerly had been not exactly pro-Stalin.

All this is based on serious archive research in Russia and Germany. See:

Jörg Ganzenmüller: Das belagerte Leningrad 1941-1944: Die Stadt in den Strategien von Angreifern und Verteidigern [Leningrad besieged...Attackers' and defenders' strategies on the city.]

http://www.amazon.de/Das-belagerte-Leni ... =8-1-spell
(you can look inside the book).

Regards

P.S.: I've no personal interest in promoting the book.

Edit: See pp. 371-372 for the archives researched in.

[Grisha]

The Germans would have done with Leningrad what they did everywhere else they had occupied in the USSR. The Russians were expected to provide for themselves for the most part. The intent was to make the occupied Russian population as little of a burden as possible for the Wehrmacht. Since Russians had no part to play in the Third Reich other than as slaves, there was no concern for their welfare. The fact that only half the Russian POWs survived the German camps also underscores this.

[janh]

ORIGINAL: wosung
All this is based on serious archive research in Russia and Germany. See: Jörg Ganzenmüller: Das belagerte Leningrad 1941-1944: Die Stadt in den Strategien von Angreifern und Verteidigern.

Thanks for the reference, every day one learns something new. Too bad the crucial chapters around p.20 are not accessible. High Command, with Hitler of course at its the head, accounts for its decisions, whatever they may have decided in the case of LG, and whatever later on became public of that information. It would seem quite inconsistent why Hitler would basically decide to eliminate the population of LG, but spare for example those left in Sevastopol, Rostov, Kharkov, Smolensk etc upon occupation of these centers.

Maybe the author, with the information he could dig out, arrived at this conclusion, but it leaves me wonder about its significance. Even illogical and crazy as Hitler was, he and his staff would probably have acted more consistently. I would bet that if the opportunity to take LG had arisen in late 41, or 42, without the need of distracting assets from other, more important operations, Hitler would not have hesitated to seize it.

Maybe it is one of the opinions that so often spring in historical science and require much more effort to correct than to spread. Or maybe those, that cannot be proven or disproved due to lack of evidence. Anyway, an interesting discussion.

[Titi]

ORIGINAL: wosung

ORIGINAL: janh

I don't recall a single German source mentioning any concerns about feeding the population in Leningrad and therefore avoiding to take the city.  In fact the Führerbefehle and the OKW plans clearly stated to take city.  Initially the plan was to take it in a rush past the unprepared defenders, as you all know.  But it didn't work out since AGN lacked the mobility and initiative to achieve a tactical surprise that late in the operations.  Tries to take it directly continued until it was decided that that the best way to take the city was by starving and bombarding its defenders.  Therefore, the Ladoga encirclement, which as you also know, didn't work out that well either.

But at no point can I recall any historical document or later literature source mention that the population of that city was of any concern (other than to add to the starvation rate of the defenders).  Think about it the other way:  Germans had taken so much ground by end of 1941 that they had to control at the order of 100Mio civilians, and some cities faced starvation (such as Kharkov).  Would two million more made a big difference to High Command?  Probably not.

Hitler didn't want any capitulation of Leningrad. Because then the Germans would have to feed its population ... somehow. Thus he ordered formal capitulation of the city had to be avoided at all costs - in times of the siege, and in times of German offensive actions around Leningrad.

In fact every million of the population in the SU counted against the Großraumpläne of the Nazi Regime. This was about rare (agrarian) ressources and a slavic slave-population, which for the sake of ideology and technocratic space-management, had to be vastly decimated by hunger. Germany didn't accept the Geneve Convention for the War in the East. This was all about annihilation.

German plans for Leningrad were not decided in what you call 'High Command'. Ultimately they were decided by Hitler.

Besides, there seems to be also serious evidence that even Stalin had an interest in the renintent population of Leningrad being ... educated by the German starvation siege, for the local party branch formerly had been not exactly pro-Stalin.

All this is based on serious archive research in Russia and Germany. See:

Jörg Ganzenmüller: Das belagerte Leningrad 1941-1944: Die Stadt in den Strategien von Angreifern und Verteidigern [Leningrad besieged...Attackers' and defenders' strategies on the city.]

http://www.amazon.de/Das-belagerte-Leni ... =8-1-spell
(you can look inside the book).

Regards

P.S.: I've no personal interest in promoting the book.

Edit: See pp. 371-372 for the archives researched in.

To add to the sources :
The German Northern Theater of Operations 1940-1945 pp 195-196
available online :
http://books.google.ca/books?id=Nw0VAAA ... CEoQ6AEwCA

the sources are :
OKW, WFSt, Abt. L (I Op.), Nr. 002119/41, Vortragsnotiz Leningrad, 21.9.41.OKW/1938. H. Gr. Nord, Kriegstagebuch, 22.6.-31.8.41, 29 Aug 41, and passimin succeeding volumes of the K.T.B. H. Gr. Nord 75128/1.

[wosung]

ORIGINAL: janh

ORIGINAL: wosung
All this is based on serious archive research in Russia and Germany. See: Jörg Ganzenmüller: Das belagerte Leningrad 1941-1944: Die Stadt in den Strategien von Angreifern und Verteidigern.

Thanks for the reference, every day one learns something new. Too bad the crucial chapters around p.20 are not accessible. High Command, with Hitler of course at its the head, accounts for its decisions, whatever they may have decided in the case of LG, and whatever later on became public of that information. It would seem quite inconsistent why Hitler would basically decide to eliminate the population of LG, but spare for example those left in Sevastopol, Rostov, Kharkov, Smolensk etc upon occupation of these centers.

Maybe the author, with the information he could dig out, arrived at this conclusion, but it leaves me wonder about its significance. Even illogical and crazy as Hitler was, he and his staff would probably have acted more consistently. I would bet that if the opportunity to take LG had arisen in late 41, or 42, without the need of distracting assets from other, more important operations, Hitler would not have hesitated to seize it.

Maybe it is one of the opinions that so often spring in historical science and require much more effort to correct than to spread. Or maybe those, that cannot be proven or disproved due to lack of evidence. Anyway, an interesting discussion.

Nazi Regime, in this case, acted not without a certain consistence and logic. Many party, military and scientific institutions planned the geopolitical-racial future of "the East". They did so in a non-coordinated, contesting way. They produced a series of documents known as the "Generalplan Ost". Its technocratic rationale was, there won't be more people in the East (including German settlers), than the remaining ressources there can feed.

About German consistence and the urban Russian population in Leningrad, Sevastopol, Rostov, Kharkov, Smolensk:
Without having all the data at hand, I'd think 1. Leningrad had the biggest pop. of all those cities. 2. Leningrad was quickly reached and besieged by the Wehrmacht in the very first weeks of the war. Not so the other cities. 3. Symbolically and economically Leningrad was a special place for both sides.

And most important: According to "General Plan Ost", the very Leningrad region was envisioned as living space for German settlers. Thus, the millions of slavic urban population would have been a lialibity, which, even in case of deportation, would have to be fed elsewhere. Thus no acceptance of capitulation.

To be fully understood: It's not the Wehrmacht didn't continuously assault Leningrad, because it just wanted the population to die from hunger in a long siege. Wehrmacht did try assaults when it reached Leningrad 1941. It planned further assaults on Leningrad in summer 1942 when it moved Manstein's 11th Army, the conquerers of Sevastopol, some 3.000 kilometers North to Leningrad. When Stalingrad and the Caucasus were the next targets. Without avail, because of Soviet counter-offensives in the Leningrad-Volkov sector.

Wehrmacht militarily just wasn't capable, or willing, to amass the needed forces for the conquest of Leningrad. Thus the siege.

But if Wehrmacht would have conquered Leningrad, it probably wouldn't have accepted any capitulation - until nobody would have been left to capitulate.

Regards