Holding Rangoon ?

[sdhundt]

I would be very interested in knowing if anyone has been able to hold Rangoon in a Pbem game. I have easily done it in a game against the AI but has anyone done it against a knowledgeable Pbem opponent. I would be interested in the details of your wins or losses.

[Canoerebel]

In a normal PBEM against evenly matched, experienced players, the Allies cannot hold Rangoon.  To do so is to invite disaster as the Japanese player would bypass the town and then isolate and destroy your troops. 

P.S. There has been at least one game in which Rangoon was retained by the Allied player, but I wouldn't try it against an experienced IJA player.

[beppi]

I think even in theory it is impossible when both try to throw their maximum into the battle there. That early in the game a japan player can just throw much more stuff at Rangoon than an allied player so sooner or later you will loose it.

[castor troy]

Like Canoerebel said, usually it´s senseless to try against an experienced and dedicated Japanese player and IMO is not worth the risk. There have been exceptions to this as with every other thing in the game.

[fcharton]

As the allies in 1942, "holding" doesn't mean much, really. If he wants it bad enough, the Japanese player can take pretty much whatever he fancies. However, and this the heart of allies strategies in the early game, there are places where you can make a stand. So perhaps the question should be : is it worth trying hard to defend Rangoon, and make Japan pay for it? (or, is fleeing to the jungle the only sensible option?)

In my opinion, a Rangoon/South Burma defense is feasible if the Allies start reinforcing the area at start AND manage to delay the japanese attacks. If you have enough time to reinforce Burma (which is a bit far from Japanese bases), make the region dangerous enough for transport ships, and keep KB busy elsewhere, you might be able to either push back the first wave, or delay it enough to allow chinese reinforcements to arrive (this is another key point). Once you start having troops on the ground and enough airbases in the region with planes (eg fighters which start in Burma, but also some diverted from Singapore), you can make Rangoon very expensive (even though it will most certainly fall in the end).

But again, a crucial factor is to gain enough time at start. Against a cautious Japanese player, or one who puts Burma a bit low on his shopping list (or is induced to do so), I believe it is possible.

Francois

[Rob Brennan UK]

Holding Rangoon is possible but it really really needs the japanese player to not care much about the area early on. If japan moves up the imperial guard div then save yourself and run . One good thing the allies can do is recombine the 1st Burmese Division from all those pointless fragments lying sbout. this unit while very poor exp can easily deal with any nosey Thai regiments trying to sneak in.

[crsutton]

I would think the biggest risk would be that an aggressive Japanese player would just head up the coast to India and cut the whole shebang off to gobble up later. Problem is the allies do not have enough troops to flood Burma and hold India at the same time. Not early on. I would rather lose Rangoon than Colombo or Chittagong.

[Nemo121]

I've only lost Rangoon once as an Allied player - in a very early WiTP game so it is possible to hold it even if the Japanese player wants it. The key is what are you going to do with it by holding it?

IMO holding Rangoon only makes sense as part of an overall strategy in which you either:
1. Use Rangoon to bring supplies into China in order to activate the Chinese theatre and draw SRA troops into China in order to weaken the enemy thrusts elsewhere. In that way by holding Rangoon you can create an OODA cycle in which the enemy's reactions to you holding Rangoon, while seeming reasonably to your opponent, actually help you to continue holding it ( robbing troops from the SRA to fight your more active Chinese troops indirectly weakens the enemy's deployable strength vs Burma/Rangoon and thus helps you to hold Rangoon which helps you to flood China with more supplies which allows you to be more active, forcing a further deployment of SRA troops and so on and so forth).

2. Use Rangoon to support significant ground operations into Thailand - whilst using naval and infantry units to guard against a short hook amphib landing behind these force or a long hook into India proper. This strategy is, IMO, quite risky unless you so tie down the IJN that it cannot feasibly support such amphibious operations.


The main errors I've seen with players attempting to hold Rangoon is what I think of as Hannibal syndrome. As his brother said, Hannibal knew how to win tactical and operational victories but now how to exploit them strategically. What Hamilcar actually said was something along the lines of, "He knows how to win but not how to use his victories." Most people don't even try to hold Rangoon and thus label attempts to hold it as impossible. But since they never thought it possible they never fully committed to it and made it possible IMO. Those who do commit tend to view holding Rangoon as the goal in itself - which is quite bad strategy as Rangoon in and of itself isn't worth much unless you can use that port for something useful.


As to equal quality players etc... I think that vs an equal quality opponent an Allied player should be able to hold Rangoon IF he commits fully to it. Few do as they consider it impossible and so not worth attempting. The key is FULL committment. If you are going to hang on to Rangoon as the Allies then that needs to be one of two or, at most, three fulcrum points you choose on December 7th and support unhesitatingly throughout the first half of 1942. If you do so successfully then you can transition to a general offensive in all theatres in the second half of 1942 - again something which most consider impossible but which is entirely possible if you've chosen the right objectives in the first 7 months of the war.



To address the points of others:
1. Canoerebel: Canoerebel is right in pointing out the danger of an amphibious envelopment. You have to guard against that but, again, if you are making Rangoon one of 2 fulcrums on the map then part of defending and holding it will be to apportion sufficient forces to prevent a deep amphibious envelopment. So, doable but difficult.


2. Beppi is right. If the Japanese throw their maximum weight at Rangoon then it cannot hold. This is why Rangoon needs to be part of a greater strategy designed to draw enemy forces into action along disparate axes never allowing them to mass enough to take Rangoon from you. Rangoon was crucial to me in a current PBEM in which I sought to draw Japanese troops into China and away from Northern Sumatra so I could hold there. Also Northern Sumatra was crucial to Rangoon since the IJA had to invade Sumatra before moving on Rangoon since Sumatra had all the OIL. In addition drawing the IJA troops into China, through holding Rangoon ( which was supported by holding Sumatra ) I lessened the troops the Japanese could bring to bear against Sumatra thus allowing Sumatra more time to be reinforced etc and creating a spiraling cycle where the number of IJA troops needed to take Sumatra ( preparatory to taking Burma ) would increase over time just as the increasing combat in China was drawing off more and more troops into China.

Essentially I created a strategic troika of competing strategic needs in 3 different areas each of which supported the others on the Allied side but dyssynchronised the Japanese in terms of their phasing and force committments. If you choose the right series of supporting bases/actions within the theatre you can also pick defensive positions/fights which bolster Rangoon whilst creating a spiral of misallocation for the Japanese - which acts to safeguard Rangoon indirectly through manoeuvre rather than numbers in an attritional fight. That sort of manoeuvrist approach with differing impacts on both sides and tendency towards enticing misallocation is, for want of a better word, "tidy" and thus a nice way to conduct a fight rather than just brutishly outnumbering the opponent so that aspect appeals also. Overall though it is very effective IF you pick mutually supporting yet dyssynchronising ( to the Japanese ) objectives/actions.



The real key though is that against a good Japanese player with ambition you shouldn't actually be facing an invasion of Burma. Burma is just a worthless speedbump on the road to India and its only worth is its place between the anvil of ground forces in Thailand and the hammer of the amphibious envelopment in the Calcutta region. Of course one way to avoid such a landing in Calcutta is to tie down the forces which would be committed to such a landing in China. Again, the indirect approach is crucial for the Allies here.


As to the Imperial Guards. Don't get too worried about it. I forced the Imperial Guards + 2 Thai Divisions to rout with the 1st Burmese Division and a Chinese Army Division. Don't let reputations worry you too much. Pick good ground, fortify and when the enemy surpasses their hasty attack's culmination point don't be afraid to counter-attack. In my game the Imperial Guards and those 2 Thai Divisions are now bottled up by just the 1st Burmese Division. Their name is meaningless cause their strategic position sucks.


3. crsutton is kind of right with his input. That's why I think the key is to hold Rangoon in order to DO something which prevents that sort of IJA adventure. Increasing the combat capability of Chinese units three-fold fits the bill nicely and should allow you to win most of southern China back from the Japanese - which will certainly get a reaction.

[witpqs]

The Burma Road being open requires a road route all the way from Rangoon, so if/as the Allies continue to hold Rangoon the Burma Road can still be cut (denying 500 supply per day to China).

[fcharton]

ORIGINAL: crsutton
I would think the biggest risk would be that an aggressive Japanese player would just head up the coast to India and cut the whole shebang off to gobble up later. Problem is the allies do not have enough troops to flood Burma and hold India at the same time.

But is it not the gist of a Rangoon-defense strategy?

In my opinion, there are two reasons why an allies player might want to defend Burma. The short term reason, as Nemo explained, is to feed China. At game start (in scenario 1 at least), China holds about 20 000 of the 50 000 AV points the allies player controls. And this number can grow very fast if he can rest, refit and supply chinese units. These reinforced chinese units can cause a lot of trouble to the japanese player, and even gradually reinforce Burma (unless home rules prevent it).

The second, longer term, reason, is that it forces the Japanese player to expand westwards, towards the Indian Ocean, instead of progressing along the usual Borneo-Rabaul-Noumea line. This makes his communication lines much longer than the nice, interior, ones he enjoys when he progresses toward northern Australia and Fiji. Of course it also changes the Allies player long term plan. Instead of the traditional (and historical) sequence : buildup in western USA, assemble in Hawaii and Australia, and push westwards over the Pacific, the Allies would go there for a Continental strategy : buildup on the East coast, and move towards Cape Town, and fight northeastwards from India.

I'm not suggesting all US troops should move to Cape Town. But the point of a defense of Burma IS to lure Japan into the Indian Ocean, making his communications and front lines very long and harder to defend when allies reinforcements start to pour in. Of course, this strategy suits better "land war fanboys" (whereas most WITP players tend to love naval battles).

Francois

[Nemo121]

Why on earth would the long-term aim of holding Burma be to lure the Japanese into the Indian Ocean?

Surely a better aim would be to simply help stop them in their tracks at Singapore? Don't curb your ambition by assuming they'll still be able to continue the attack. Raise your ambition to stopping them cold in early 1942.

[fcharton]

If you fight in Burma, and make resistance stronger in China, Japan will need to commit troops. And once the troops are there, moving on towards India, to cut off Burma, or pushing forward after it has fallen is a sensible move (packing and going back to business in the New Hebrides would break the tempo, wouldn't it?) If the most likely outcome to a Burma defense is an attack over India, I, as the allies, must consider this a desirable strategic goal (else why bother defending Burma...)

Re Singapore : seems quite a lofty goal for the newbie I am (but I trust you could manage that)... Do you think Singapore is a prerequisite? Or could the Japanese player snub it, and just move on (say, build up airports in the north of Malaya, relentlessly bomb SG, and use Bangkok and Georgetown as staging bases)?

Francois

[Lameduck]

Sorry, I know I've just had this game for a short while and I haven't worked my way up to the main campaign yet, but I just don't get it. I can see the point of trying to hold Burma to push supply to China, but I can't see how you could do it without Chinese troops. Most of the AAR's I've been reading have no moving troops out without paying PP's for them as a house rule. If you don't have that house rule, can't Japan pull about 2500-3000 AV out of Manchuria to throw at China?

Also, what good does holding Burma do if your opponent lands in India and cuts the land supply lines to Burma? Most of the Indian troops have low experience and in clear terrain Japanese troops should cut through them. It seems to me that by trying to hold Rangoon you run the risk of losing India.

[Misconduct]

My opponent in my PBEM attempted to hold Rangoon with whatever he could muster out of Singapore, figuring he'd give up singapore to throw a defense at Palembang and Rangoon, by channel all from Java to Rangoon he figures this would be a critical base to keep.

He did manage somewhere over 55,000 troops in rangoon, I think I ended up sitting in Pegu or whichever base is next door, and blew the hell out of it by air. What he didn't figure on was the fact I had his Fort stuck at 3, and moved in 125,000 to take Rangoon.

In theory his idea was interesting except I landed in Calcutta and caught him with his pants down. I now hold as far west as Ceylon, Madras, Calcutta. Since I waited 2 months to attack him at rangoon I made good as sure his troops had no Supply and he fell within 2 turns.

Honestly John agreed with me that there was no purpose in holding Rangoon as an Allied player, especially without seapower or air power, neither which the british have against a decent Japanese player.

I think Johns main objective was to transfer the american carriers to south africa, and use them with british carriers to get a hold on Rangoon, but the plan fell through again when I landed in India.

[Nemo121]

fcharton,

I think the flaw in your logic is as follows:

1. You say that once there are more troops in China Japan can then mvoe towards India cutting off Burma.

I would suggest that if they put more troops into China then they will have less troops for an amphibious invasion of India - which makes that less likely and less likely to be successful. Japan cannot do everything it wishes. If it has to send 1,000 AV into China then that's 1,000 AV less for the DEI or Burma or India or the Pacific.



Maybe the simplest thing would be to outline my thinking in my PBEM game vs 1EyedJacks as I think people aren't seeing the inter-relatedness and that's crucial.

1. Palembang is, without doubt, the most important base on the map in December 1941.

2. To help defend Palembang I abandoned Singers without a fight and used the troops to bolster Palembang. There was no point trying to hold Singers as there is no supply generation there. Southern Sumatra does, however, produce about 30,000 tons per month which is enough to support a large defensive force without any naval resupply.

3. To draw troops away from Palembang it was necessary to:
a) draw more SRA troops into China,
b) tie down IJA troops in the Philippines and the Pacific.

In order to achieve 3a I had to hold Rangoon to allow supply to flow in. With secure supply lines Chinese troops immediately become three times as effective and can transition from a defensive force to an offensive force. This will draw thousands of AV away from the SRA if done right. Right now I am besieging Canton and on the oustkirts of Shanghai. Southern China is, effectively, mine except for a few coastal bases in May 1942.

In order to achieve 3b I diverted 2 regiments to the Kuriles and drew some 800 IJA AV there. Added to the troops drawn to China that was about 2,000 AV from the SRA removed from the drive into the DEI and Burma.


So, Holding Rangoon was only necessary because it allowed me to push supply into China which was, in turn, only necessary as a means of indirectly defending Palembang.


The invasion of the Marshalls was also an attempt to interfere with my opponent's OODA loop and draw his naval assets into a side-venture which would further delay the invasion of Palembang.


So, Rangoon isn't a thing to hold in and of itself. It serves a purpose only to allow supplies to go into China and China only serves a purpose if you use it to tie down large IJA formations, whose absence you then capitalise on elsewhere. A good way to think of this is as a Soviet Strategic Direction comprised of three Fronts - China, Burma/Malaysia and Java/Sumatra. Each Front is subordinate to the purposes of the Strategic Direction. The Western Strategic Direction's objective is to prevent the expansion of the Japanese economy by depriving it of Palembang and transitioning over to the offensive ASAP. The Eastern Strategic Direction - Comprised of the Northern Front ( Aleutians ), Central Front ( Hawaii to Canton ) and Southern Front - Canton to Port Rabaul - is subordinated to the needs of the Western Strategic Direction as that's the Strategic Direction which will win the war.

The Southern Strategic Direction- Rabaul to western coast of PNG and Java to PNG acts as the hinge and mainly forms a hinge which acts to co-ordinate phasing of activities between the Western and Eastern Strategic Directions and it also allows the shuttling of troops and other forces from the Eastern to Western SD and vice versa.

Each SD also has an over-arching offensive goal to be achieved by the end of 1942 which, when combined, will result in 2 deep envelopments which will dislocate the entire Japanese position. Obviously the Southern SD's thrust will act as the hinge for the other two SD's thrusts.

Bottom line though, Palembang is the crucial base which determined the Western SD's plan so the non-Sumatran Fronts in the Western SD are subordinate to the Sumatran/Javan Front. Since the Western SD is the primary one the Eastern and Southern SD's are subordinate to that and act to draw more forces away from the Western SD ( and specificlly the Javan/Sumatran Front ). Rangoon serves a purpose only in indirectly supporting Palembang by helping draw troops away... At least that's how I view it through Soviet doctrinal eyes. I'm sure other doctrines would view it differently.



I don't believe Singapore is something the Allies can hold in a PBEM. Without supply generation in the hex it will inevitably fall when the troops run out of bullets.

I don't believe Singers is a prerequisite to invading Burma or India. I think though that allowing the Allies to tie 500 AV pinning their defenders in place isn't too smart and that you are better off taking Singers purely to release those 500 AV for offensive action in India, should that be where you choose to go. I think that the Japanese player should take Palembang ASAP. Day one or two if possible. Then they should take Singers purely to prevent the tieing down of troops and then they can move on Oz or India with a good, strong force whilst using the other 500 AV to block intervention along the other axes.

Overall I think Japanese players are very methodical and make very small advances most of the time. Very few of them achieve an operational breakthrough and then unleash an Operational Manoeuvre Group-equivalent through the gap in pursuit of a major strategic objective which dislocates the enemy's entire frontal defensive line and moves the line 1,000 miles instead of 150 miles. I think that without Burma it is eminently possible to invade India and unleash a significant OMG into the enemy's strategic depth dislocating the entire Burma line and even the Calcutta short-envelopment anti-amphibious defence forces.


Lameduck,
Yes they can. But you can more than make up for that 3,000 AV if you've got good supply lines into China. I used 1 Division of Chinese troops to help bolster the 1st Burmese at the critical time if memory serves me right. With that said if my game were involving paying PP to move troops across borders then the two Thai Divisions wouldn't have accompanied the Imperial Guards Division and I wouldn't have needed the Chinese Division so, overall, it balanced out IMO.


Misconduct,
Aye, you faced a player who tried to hold Rangoon in order to hold Rangoon. Doing so without a greater strategic framework is a losing proposition... and so, rightly, he paid for it with disaster.

[CV2]

Biggest problem with Rangoon is you can only supply it by sea. Supplies over land will migrate to Calcutta. When the Japanese have bombed you out of supply, it will fall. And the allies cant realistically hope to supply it by sea. Truth be told, if the Japanese had planned to move to India, trying to hold Rangoon will only help him. He will by-pass it and that will leave you less to hold the line in India with.

[Nemo121]

Why can't you supply it by sea?

I routinely make CAP traps over naval TFs such that my opponent is now scared of attacking them. When he does he routinely loses 30 to 40 bombers in a day. When he brings naval TFs in they find numerically superior RN or USN SC TFs ready to intercept them and end up losing more than they sink. Also, if you are holding on to Sumatra as well as Rangoon you can easily prevent naval interdiction of Rangoon by SC TFs by stationing some SC TFs at Palembang, another SC TF at Rangoon and another SC TF in northern Sumatra to intercept the IJN as it moves up the straits there.

Again, there is no impossible, just stuff which you have to think your way through...

[CV2]

ORIGINAL: Nemo121

Why can't you supply it by sea?

I routinely make CAP traps over naval TFs such that my opponent is now scared of attacking them. When he does he routinely loses 30 to 40 bombers in a day. When he brings naval TFs in they find numerically superior RN or USN SC TFs ready to intercept them and end up losing more than they sink. Also, if you are holding on to Sumatra as well as Rangoon you can easily prevent naval interdiction of Rangoon by SC TFs by stationing some SC TFs at Palembang, another SC TF at Rangoon and another SC TF in northern Sumatra to intercept the IJN as it moves up the straits there.

Again, there is no impossible, just stuff which you have to think your way through...

Well if he had half a brain, he would have a couple of cruiser squadrons sitting in Tavoy or Moulmein waiting for you. And what are you going to "hold" Sumatra with?

Simple fact of life as a Japanese player: if anything gets to be too much of a pain, you send in the KB to clear out the area.

[Nemo121]

Ah, it only things were really that simple in real life. If you send KB in then a good Allied player will simply withdraw his air force and navy, let you hit thin air and then re-appear when you withdraw KB again.


As to having CA TFs at Moulmein... Umm, they have to reach there - through the blocking TFs in northern Sumatra, they also have to be able to refuel there ( which will be difficult ) and they also cannot reprovision. It'll also allow the Allied SC TFs and air force to get at them. CA or CL TFs at Moulmein would have a very short life expectancy vs a competent Allied player.


As to the rest... It must be nice to be able to come up with such simple solutions to complex issues. Nice but, I fear, less than wholly successful. Still, I wish you the best with your approach.

[CV2]

The only reason to leave Rangoon is if the Japanese were moving into India to begin with, meaning the bulk of the Japanese fleet would already be there, and wouldnt likely be leaving anytime soon. Sooooo as for moving the fleet back into the area after the Japanese left, there would be little reason for that as Rangoon would already be Japanese controlled by that point.