Amphibious attack limitations

[Jeremy Pritchard]

I would hope for realistic amphibious landing circumstances. It was impossible for the Allies to actually take the offensive in the scale of 1944 in 1942, based on requirements of cargo vessels and landing craft. This is one of the reasons why the Japanese barrier was not busted open in 1943. Most of the Islands were relatively undefended (2000 or so defenders), but the Allies did not have the ability to land the troops required to take these islands all at once, but require months between landings to accumulate enough supplies, and landing equipment and have to wait for one campaign to end before they start another.

The Japanese only a few contested Amphibous landings. Those in Malaya, Philippines and Wake were against farily limited opposition, that did not compare to the defenses and determination of most of the later Japanese defended Islands. The Japanese could make a series of large landings because they were generally free of opposition. The Allies did not get that same luxury. I would hope that the representation of landing craft in order to do amphibious assaults would be included. This would also limit unrealistic British Amphibious assaults, as their landing craft situation was critical up until 1945!

In PacWar a system of house rules regarding amphibious attacks was made, with the Allies only being capable of landing X many units until 1943, X+Y by 1944, X+Y+Z by 1945. Also, numbers of units per landing should be limited as well. In 1943, at Tarawa, the US could only land one division at a time, and had to recycle landing craft. It was not until late 1944 when they could land more then one division at a single time (i.e., did not have to feed in 2 divisions, but could land them simutaniously).

If this is not included, expect the Allies to steamroll Japan, as the only thing slowing Allied advance was shipping limitations.

[TIMJOT]

Jeremy

I agree that the allies were limited by shiping and landing craft shortages in 42, which precluded a major advance through the central pacific, but they where able and probably should have mounted limited preliminary assualts. IMHO such a course of action would have been a better use of the limited assets available than the useless Solomons sideshow. The problem was the USN erroneously thought that these islands had been heavily fortified before the war. In fact as you point out these islands were only very lightly garrisoned in mid 42. Where Tarawa was a tough nut to crack in late 43 requireing divisions, special assualt craft and demolition teams. In mid 42 a regimental size assault useing standared landing craft and assualt boats probably would have surficed. Certainly immediatly after Midway IJN having no CVs available could do little to intefer. So I dont think special rules that preclude such a move is warranted. As long as historical shipping and landing craft levels are in place, their is no reason that an allied player shouldnt be able to mount a Guadacanal size landing in the central Pacific.

[Nikademus]

would a realistic appraisal of the available merchant assets, both those generally available as well as considerations of how much of that is currently being used for routine convoys, go a long way towards addressing this?

[lucascuccia]

One point I have been pushing around in other posts is the need for Tracked Amphib's. The 2nd Marines used them in limited numbers on Tarawa. Infact most of the Marine battle deaths were by poor bastards in LVCP the were stuck at the reefs edge and had to waid ashore several hundred yards through heavy fire.

There vehicles became more and more prominent as the island hoping war proceeded.

Also, may be an amphibious assault screen could pop up and allow the player to direct aspects of the assault (ie naval bombardments, air supports, which troops go ashore first, and so on). It could have a auto resolve toogle that would let the taskforce commander direct the assault automatically. The higher the land value, the better the operations runs.

Lucas