1942 war start what if ideas

[Grfin Zeppelin]

ORIGINAL: olorin42

I think the best time for Japan to have gotten involved would have been as France was surrendering and Vichy France being declared. March into Vietnam and attach the Brits / Dutch by sea. The Brits had very little in the way of military assets in SE Asia. Bypass the Philipines. There's no way a US president will get a declaration of war against Japan in an election year (1940). Japan will have 6 months in 1940 to consolidate DEI/Malay/Burma and grab Rabaul/Moresby/Noumea/Suva. Except for Wake/Guam/Philipines, they could consolidate and fortify and those US possessions would be untenable.

Very smart and very true. The rapid events in Europe were hardly forseeable tho. But yes, this would have been the perfect moment. Everyone (even the soviets) were busy and Japan would have been in an amazing position after that.

[jwilkerson]

ORIGINAL: AW1Steve

Joe, I've been playing with the editor to, test other theories I've had, and it's amazing what the editor will let you do. One thing I haven't figured ,out...can you change the date that the war starts?
[&:]

You can certainly start a CG at a later date in AE. If you want an earlier date, you will have to switch games (to WPO).

[Capt Hornblower]

ORIGINAL: jwilkerson

ORIGINAL: AW1Steve

Joe, I've been playing with the editor to, test other theories I've had, and it's amazing what the editor will let you do. One thing I haven't figured ,out...can you change the date that the war starts?
[&:]

You can certainly start a CG at a later date in AE. If you want an earlier date, you will have to switch games (to WPO).

This seems tantalizing, but problematic. The idea of a 1940 summer start (as outlined above) is provocative. But using WPO to implement it would entail a humongous number of additions to the WPO database (or am I wrong?). If WPO was designed to have units that existed only up to 1930, then a 1940 campaign start would need to have a decade's worth of units added.

And then playing the scenario (as the Japanese) might be interesting, once. If Olorin42 and Grafin Zeppelin are right, the Japanese would achieve the aims they sought without war with the US. Would the US then enter a conflict post-election that was essentially a fait-accompli?

[guctony]

ORIGINAL: Capt Hornblower

ORIGINAL: jwilkerson

ORIGINAL: AW1Steve

Joe, I've been playing with the editor to, test other theories I've had, and it's amazing what the editor will let you do. One thing I haven't figured ,out...can you change the date that the war starts?
[&:]

You can certainly start a CG at a later date in AE. If you want an earlier date, you will have to switch games (to WPO).

This seems tantalizing, but problematic. The idea of a 1940 summer start (as outlined above) is provocative. But using WPO to implement it would entail a humongous number of additions to the WPO database (or am I wrong?). If WPO was designed to have units that existed only up to 1930, then a 1940 campaign start would need to have a decade's worth of units added.

And then playing the scenario (as the Japanese) might be interesting, once. If Olorin42 and Grafin Zeppelin are right, the Japanese would achieve the aims they sought without war with the US. Would the US then enter a conflict post-election that was essentially a fait-accompli?

Hımm one way around this problem in AE would be defining 1942 june as 1940 June changing every date accordingly. This would be easy and intresting.

[jwilkerson]

ORIGINAL: guctony
I would like ask you would it be feasible for Japan to start a war in 1942 preferably december 1942.

Actually the OP proposed at Dec 1942 start which can be done in AE.

In WPO the latest you can start (due to hard coded date limitations) is about 1933 (or is it 1932 - I forget). I've gone back as early as 1900 in WPO, but there is a gap between 1933-1940 that is currently not covered by either game.

[mike scholl 1]

ORIGINAL: olorin42

I think the best time for Japan to have gotten involved would have been as France was surrendering and Vichy France being declared. March into Vietnam and attach the Brits / Dutch by sea. The Brits had very little in the way of military assets in SE Asia. Bypass the Philipines. There's no way a US president will get a declaration of war against Japan in an election year (1940). Japan will have 6 months in 1940 to consolidate DEI/Malay/Burma and grab Rabaul/Moresby/Noumea/Suva. Except for Wake/Guam/Philipines, they could consolidate and fortify and those US possessions would be untenable.

The real question would be "How ready were the Japanese to do ANYTHING at this point?". They had no one in position to "March into French Indochina..", nor had they massed the shipping or troops to invade anything at that point. So they would have been caught as "flat-footed" as the rest of the world.

But as a starting point to prepare for such operations it would be interesting, and the opposition would certainly be distracted and unprepared even if it took several months to set up (The US hadn't even begun their peacetime draft yet.).

[Lameduck]

Well, France surrendered on June 22, 1940, and Japan moved into Vietnam in September 1940 so it didn't take too long for them to react. Since they spent some time making an agreement with the Vichy government, they could have moved quicker. For a what-if scenario you could have Japan declaring war in June 1940 when Italy did.

[mike scholl 1]

ORIGINAL: Lameduck

Well, France surrendered on June 22, 1940, and Japan moved into Vietnam in September 1940 so it didn't take too long for them to react. Since they spent some time making an agreement with the Vichy government, they could have moved quicker. For a what-if scenario you could have Japan declaring war in June 1940 when Italy did.

True..., but it was almost a year later when they finally occupied Saigon---so they really can't have been all that ready to exploit France's fall. As I said, the Summer of 1940 makes an interesting starting point for Japanese preparations. Including the "what if" factor of how much they can do without triggering US economic retaliation (which pretty much puts a time limit on when they HAVE to go to war or back down.

[Lameduck]

I think a Japanese DOW in June 1940 would have been a different situation. The move into north Vietnam was part of an agreement with Vichy to cut supplies to China; the move into south Vietnam was to get bases to attack the rest of the SRA. If Japan had moved in 1940, would an economic embargo mattered as much? With the BEF at Dunkirk, the French government fleeing to Bourdeaux, and the Netherlands already ocupied, there would be few extra troops to send. If Japan had the oil of the DEI, how much effect would the embargo have? The big question is how long would American isolationism last. The US Two Ocean Act was in July of 1940 so I don't think a US military build up could have been speeded up much.

[mike scholl 1]

ORIGINAL: Lameduck

I think a Japanese DOW in June 1940 would have been a different situation. The move into north Vietnam was part of an agreement with Vichy to cut supplies to China; the move into south Vietnam was to get bases to attack the rest of the SRA. If Japan had moved in 1940, would an economic embargo mattered as much? With the BEF at Dunkirk, the French government fleeing to Bourdeaux, and the Netherlands already ocupied, there would be few extra troops to send. If Japan had the oil of the DEI, how much effect would the embargo have? The big question is how long would American isolationism last. The US Two Ocean Act was in July of 1940 so I don't think a US military build up could have been speeded up much.

Again, the real question is just how ready the Japanese would have been to start a war "off the cuff" to take advantage of Germany's totally unexpected victory in the West. Japan could not afford to hamstring her economy by allowing the Army and Navy to requisition millions of tons of merchant shipping just to have it sitting around available "in case" an opportunity arose. Even if the decision to go to war was taken at the end of June, 1940 it would still have taken months to make the preparations, assemble the troops and supplies, allocate the shipping and covering forces, etc.

[Sardaukar]

Dec 1940 attack would have been interesting. It would give IJA/IJN 5 months to prepare... But what was the readiness of Japanese military in Dec 1940? One alternative history option is to have Japan to decide to attack after German success in West 1940 followed by US Two Ocean Navy Act. They would been close to each other and Japan viewed latter as very serious indeed.

Quick wiki: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Two-Ocean_Navy_Act

These two things might have been enough to convince Japan to try surprise attack IF they would have same leadership as in later 1941... Question is, were they capable for PH in Dec 1940?

[Alfred]

ORIGINAL: Sardaukar

Dec 1940 attack would have been interesting. It would give IJA/IJN 5 months to prepare... But what was the readiness of Japanese military in Dec 1940? One alternative history option is to have Japan to decide to attack after German success in West 1940 followed by US Two Ocean Navy Act. They would been close to each other and Japan viewed latter as very serious indeed.

Quick wiki: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Two-Ocean_Navy_Act

These two things might have been enough to convince Japan to try surprise attack IF they would have same leadership as in later 1941... Question is, were they capable for PH in Dec 1940?

Technical effectiveness of 7 Dec 1941 Pearl Harbor attack was only made possible following Japanese study of British November 1940 Taranto operation. So that is another real world reason (amongst many others) why all these early war Japanese proponents are merely talking pie in the sky. Given the "doctored" circumstances, of course any country can go to war earlier, but to then postulate that the later historical capabilities (both in doctrine/training and materiel) would still apply to an earlier timeframe is fantasy.

Alfred

Alfred

[Sardaukar]

ORIGINAL: Alfred

ORIGINAL: Sardaukar

Dec 1940 attack would have been interesting. It would give IJA/IJN 5 months to prepare... But what was the readiness of Japanese military in Dec 1940? One alternative history option is to have Japan to decide to attack after German success in West 1940 followed by US Two Ocean Navy Act. They would been close to each other and Japan viewed latter as very serious indeed.

Quick wiki: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Two-Ocean_Navy_Act

These two things might have been enough to convince Japan to try surprise attack IF they would have same leadership as in later 1941... Question is, were they capable for PH in Dec 1940?

Technical effectiveness of 7 Dec 1941 Pearl Harbor attack was only made possible following Japanese study of British November 1940 Taranto operation. So that is another real world reason (amongst many others) why all these early war Japanese proponents are merely talking pie in the sky. Given the "doctored" circumstances, of course any country can go to war earlier, but to then postulate that the later historical capabilities (both in doctrine/training and materiel) would still apply to an earlier timeframe is fantasy.

Alfred

Alfred

Yea, I agree that doctrine and equipment for PH just was not there earlier. And later in 1942 USA was getting way too powerful.

But it's interesting to speculate what sort of chances Japan would have had in Dec 1940. They could have forfeited PH and gone straight to Indochina/Malaya/DEI/Philippines. This would have actually been according to their pre-war (and during it) doctrine of "decisive battle", waiting for US response to invasions and try to smash USN in one decisive clash.

[wworld7]

ORIGINAL: Sardaukar

Question is, were they capable for PH in Dec 1940?

Well, of you're using Wiki to support a particular case anything is possible. Reailty is not a chance, they needed Taranto (for torps) and the USSR to be involved with Germany. Without the later I can't see it happening.

[Sardaukar]

ORIGINAL: flipperwasirish

ORIGINAL: Sardaukar

Question is, were they capable for PH in Dec 1940?

Well, of you're using Wiki to support a particular case anything is possible. Reailty is not a chance, they needed Taranto (for torps) and the USSR to be involved with Germany. Without the later I can't see it happening.

True, without USSR preoccupied, they would not have dared, Stalin being so trustworthy treaty partner and all...[:D]

OTOH, they would probably be able to pull out similar conquest (without PH) without even touching garrison they had in Manchuria vs USSR. In 1940 UK and US were considerably weaker in Pacific so using same amount of troops as in 1941 would probably have made it as easy as it was in 1941. But USSR might have been tempted to steamroll to Manchoria & Sakhalin when Japan becomes preoccupied...

[JWE]

ORIGINAL: Sardaukar
Dec 1940 attack would have been interesting. It would give IJA/IJN 5 months to prepare... But what was the readiness of Japanese military in Dec 1940? One alternative history option is to have Japan to decide to attack after German success in West 1940 followed by US Two Ocean Navy Act. They would been close to each other and Japan viewed latter as very serious indeed.

Quick wiki: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Two-Ocean_Navy_Act

These two things might have been enough to convince Japan to try surprise attack IF they would have same leadership as in later 1941... Question is, were they capable for PH in Dec 1940?

Well, there was no Shokaku, no Zuikaku, the additional airgroups authorized in the 1937 plan were not even completely formed, much less trained. There was no Yamato, and it took Japan 7 months to implement Fleet mobilization and auxiliary conversion. Given the daily time-line of reality, the IJN was not ready for operations until 08/41, and then, barely. And that was just the IJN. In 1940, the IJA was still trying to come to grips with Nomonhan, in its peculiar, arrogant fashion; nan-deska!

Believe that Japanese preparations for war went as fast as possible, on an irl basis, given the irl facts of the time - intensified from the day of the Nazi/Soviet pact, and maximized once the shooting started in Poland. Given the lead times required, there really isn't any way that serious operations could be pursued prior to summer 1941. One would have to move the invasion and defeat of France back to 1939 in order to anticipate japanese operational readiness in late 1940, given the physical constraints on mobilization/readiness timing.

As to PH, the IJN did not have the CVs, nor the planes, nor the oilers, in 1940. Neither did it have its 'qualitative' battle-line ships to oppose the US battle fleet in the event the strike failed. It would have been an opportunistic risk of an insane degree and gone against every grain of doctrine that the IJN spent decades developing.

So, don't think it was possible for Japan to do a nasty in 1940. But one can never get a worm into the brain of someone like Tojo, or Ogaki, so there's always the possibility of highly irrational behavior.

[guctony]

ORIGINAL: JWE

ORIGINAL: Sardaukar
Dec 1940 attack would have been interesting. It would give IJA/IJN 5 months to prepare... But what was the readiness of Japanese military in Dec 1940? One alternative history option is to have Japan to decide to attack after German success in West 1940 followed by US Two Ocean Navy Act. They would been close to each other and Japan viewed latter as very serious indeed.

Quick wiki: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Two-Ocean_Navy_Act

These two things might have been enough to convince Japan to try surprise attack IF they would have same leadership as in later 1941... Question is, were they capable for PH in Dec 1940?

Well, there was no Shokaku, no Zuikaku, the additional airgroups authorized in the 1937 plan were not even completely formed, much less trained. There was no Yamato, and it took Japan 7 months to implement Fleet mobilization and auxiliary conversion. Given the daily time-line of reality, the IJN was not ready for operations until 08/41, and then, barely. And that was just the IJN. In 1940, the IJA was still trying to come to grips with Nomonhan, in its peculiar, arrogant fashion; nan-deska!

Believe that Japanese preparations for war went as fast as possible, on an irl basis, given the irl facts of the time - intensified from the day of the Nazi/Soviet pact, and maximized once the shooting started in Poland. Given the lead times required, there really isn't any way that serious operations could be pursued prior to summer 1941. One would have to move the invasion and defeat of France back to 1939 in order to anticipate japanese operational readiness in late 1940, given the physical constraints on mobilization/readiness timing.

As to PH, the IJN did not have the CVs, nor the planes, nor the oilers, in 1940. Neither did it have its 'qualitative' battle-line ships to oppose the US battle fleet in the event the strike failed. It would have been an opportunistic risk of an insane degree and gone against every grain of doctrine that the IJN spent decades developing.

So, don't think it was possible for Japan to do a nasty in 1940. But one can never get a worm into the brain of someone like Tojo, or Ogaki, so there's always the possibility of highly irrational behavior.

still there is a huge benefit in taking action june 1940. It doesnt even call for PH attack. If everything dealth before election. It is a limited action in DEI. Securing oil in 1940 would mean alot of things. A one year action agains British in DEI would certainly mean a seperate peace with British. Even not. How could US perform any kind of embargo if DEI is in the hand of Japan.

Hitler A self educated capacity did only succeed in Europe for a while because he did not hesitate.

[jwilkerson]

Making an alternate history scenario in the editor does not require "justification". One persons perfectly "plausible" scenario might be another person's "fantasy" - but we should not require everyone to agree. When I made my "Cautionaries" scenario, I did what I thought made sense. I did write down my assumptions - but I did not require or expect agreement, I created the scenario for the enjoyment of those who chose to play it!

[mike scholl 1]

ORIGINAL: jwilkerson

Making an alternate history scenario in the editor does not require "justification". One persons perfectly "plausible" scenario might be another person's "fantasy" - but we should not require everyone to agree. When I made my "Cautionaries" scenario, I did what I thought made sense. I did write down my assumptions - but I did not require or expect agreement, I created the scenario for the enjoyment of those who chose to play it!

But "impossible" is still "impossible". Unless you want to assume that Japan was sitting around since 1939 with with 4,000,000 of it's 6,000,000 tons of merchant shipping swinging at anchor on the off chance that the military MIGHT decide to go to war. At which point the question is moot, because Japan's economy has already collapsed. Even "fantasy" needs to have a degree of "plausibility".

[Sardaukar]

ORIGINAL: mike scholl 1

ORIGINAL: jwilkerson

Making an alternate history scenario in the editor does not require "justification". One persons perfectly "plausible" scenario might be another person's "fantasy" - but we should not require everyone to agree. When I made my "Cautionaries" scenario, I did what I thought made sense. I did write down my assumptions - but I did not require or expect agreement, I created the scenario for the enjoyment of those who chose to play it!

But "impossible" is still "impossible". Unless you want to assume that Japan was sitting around since 1939 with with 4,000,000 of it's 6,000,000 tons of merchant shipping swinging at anchor on the off chance that the military MIGHT decide to go to war. At which point the question is moot, because Japan's economy has already collapsed. Even "fantasy" needs to have a degree of "plausibility".

Thus, I'd propose Dec 1940 start for such alternative scenario. This would give Japan 5 months time to mobilize after German success in West and US Two Ocean Act. Of course Japan would not get Dec 1941 force levels, but 5 months is about same they used in 1941 preparations after war vs USA started to look inevitable.

I think actually balance then might even favour Japan bit more than in Dec 1941, since both UK & USA were very weak in Pacific in 1940.