1941 Winter is Horrible!

[Titanwarrior89]

ORIGINAL: Rasputitsa


I agree with you totally. Thats how I see it even if I lose time after time.....no hard static ahistorical setting.




I have no wish to win, as an Axis player, with any kind of 'help'. I would like to win (if it were possible) against a Soviet force, which has the same capabilities in equipment, doctrine and command that the actual Russian forces had. I would like the German forces to have the same capabilities that the actual forces had, the change would be the strategy that I thought may succeed, I am not looking for an automatic win and I don't expect one.

[hgilmer3]

I'm a complete rank amateur, but if I had been Hitler (**shudder**), when France and England declared war, I would have pulled back from Poland and asked for peace.  I bet they would have given it.  And then I would have (if I was a murderous bastard like Hitler and wanted to control Europe) waited 2-3 years and THEN attacked.

Seems to me they were pretty close to nukes themselves and all sorts of other nice toys.  Am I wrong in that?  And when I say toys, I mean weapons that could have been devastating if allowed to develop and get into the armed forces in sufficient quantity.

[Mike Parker]

Alot of things would have gone wrong with just backing out of Poland.. for one the reparations that would have been demanded. Also the cat would have been out of the bag I think in terms of cooperation amongst the other nations against you not to mention the fact that the USSR attacked Poland also from the other side... soooo. And perhaps the worst would have been the political fiasco both at home and elsewhere. Hitler really didn't believe the UK would involve itself in a continental war.. and that he could subdue Poland just as he had done with Czeckoslovakia earlier, but once world war was joined no way he could have pulled back with a "Oh my bad.. you were serious about assuring Polish soveignty!?"

[vinnie71]

You're assuming Hitler actually thought in terms of state to state relations. Poland was to be Germany's granary and supplier of raw materials. It was also to be the springboard for the invasion of Russia which was essentially Hitler's plan all along. Pulling out of Poland was not even an option in his mind. He fought the western powers because he had to, but he fought Russia because he wanted to. That's a mighty difference. He saw the world in ideological terms, and all the moves before and during the war were aimed at fulfilling his dream of a huge land empire. One should look at the network of alliances, economical pacts and the bullying of neutral states that Hitler undertook prior to and during the war, just to clear his hands for the Russian invasion.

[Sheytan]

I agree.

ORIGINAL: Offworlder

You're assuming Hitler actually thought in terms of state to state relations. Poland was to be Germany's granary and supplier of raw materials. It was also to be the springboard for the invasion of Russia which was essentially Hitler's plan all along. Pulling out of Poland was not even an option in his mind. He fought the western powers because he had to, but he fought Russia because he wanted to. That's a mighty difference. He saw the world in ideological terms, and all the moves before and during the war were aimed at fulfilling his dream of a huge land empire. One should look at the network of alliances, economical pacts and the bullying of neutral states that Hitler undertook prior to and during the war, just to clear his hands for the Russian invasion.

[Rasputitsa]

ORIGINAL: hgilmer3
I'm a complete rank amateur, but if I had been Hitler (**shudder**), when France and England declared war, I would have pulled back from Poland and asked for peace.  I bet they would have given it.  And then I would have (if I was a murderous bastard like Hitler and wanted to control Europe) waited 2-3 years and THEN attacked.

Seems to me they were pretty close to nukes themselves and all sorts of other nice toys.  Am I wrong in that?  And when I say toys, I mean weapons that could have been devastating if allowed to develop and get into the armed forces in sufficient quantity.

The main problem for a dictator is that you can never be wrong, or the bubble bursts and the adoration stops, so pulling back probably is not an option (like Saddam).

The Germans faced the first T34s in 1941, so how many would they have faced if it had all started 2-3 years later.

Reading about 'Hitler's Scientists', the Nazis had no interest in theoretical science, it was seen as Jewish physics. Those nuclear capable scientists that could, fled before the war, most of rest were side-lined until too late. There was probably very little chance that the Germans, or anyone else, could have committed to the huge investment in money people and secrecy, without the emergency of war. (without WW2 nuclear weapons might have been decades away).

One proposal I have seen, is that the German economy was so precarious after Hitler had bought his popularity (making the trains run on time, autobahns, etc.), that he needed war as a distraction and an opportunity to raid the treasuries of neighbouring countries (again see Saddam in Kuwait).

However, it's fun to speculate on what-ifs, which is why I like this game so much. [:)]

[Rasputitsa]

ORIGINAL: Mike Parker
Alot of things would have gone wrong with just backing out of Poland.. for one the reparations that would have been demanded. Also the cat would have been out of the bag I think in terms of cooperation amongst the other nations against you not to mention the fact that the USSR attacked Poland also from the other side... soooo. And perhaps the worst would have been the political fiasco both at home and elsewhere. Hitler really didn't believe the UK would involve itself in a continental war.. and that he could subdue Poland just as he had done with Czeckoslovakia earlier, but once world war was joined no way he could have pulled back with a "Oh my bad.. you were serious about assuring Polish soveignty!?"

'Don't forget the Russians' (movie - Patton), 1939-40 six countries were invaded and Hitler only invaded one of them. Russia invaded Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania and Poland. So who knows what might have happened, but then there is Japan. What would Hitler have done when Britain, France, etc. became involved in the Pacific, could he stand by, or try to cash-in.

I mentioned it in other postes, but a WiTE scenario 1942 Soviet attack on Germany, like Patriotic War 42 scenario for WIR [:)]

[vinnie71]

Agreed. The truth is that both dictators thought of war as being almost unavoidable due to ideological differences (polar opposites). The problem was in the timing...
 
What I said in my previous post regarding Hitler also applies for Stalin. The whole backstab of Poland, the overruning of the Baltic States, the attack on Finland and lastly (and most importantly in my opinion) the seizure of Romanian territory, were all intended to secure natural defences against the Germans and to have the ability to fight a war on what was foreign territory. His diplomacy, if it could be considered as such amounted to blodless landgrabs, which in a way provided the Germans with more allies.
 
Also in the diplomatic field, things were already coming to a head in '41 even without one side's intent on going to war with the other. German guarantees to Romania and Hungary, Bulgaria's forced submissive status, and German conquest of the Balkans meant that Germany was basically sticking it to Stalin. Romania alone would have been a causus belli because of its importance to the German economy... Also look at the pressure applied by both sides (and Britain) upon Turkey to enter the war on their side or at least deny its natural resources to the adversary. Basically Germany declared the Balkans as its own backyard in practice excluding the Soviets from the area. This was intolerable to Stalin as what he saw as Germany's meddling in Finland. Also German interest in the Middle East especially Rashid Ali's Iraq made Stalin uneasy. Last but not least, Germany's alliance with a declared enemy of the USSR in the Far East also had Stalin worried on its possible implications for the future.
 
In practice Stalin was pursuing the ages old Russina strategy of breaking out of the Black Sea with Germany taking the place of Austria Hungary. Germany was also engaged in isolating Russia and in stirring trouble in its backyard. No later than '42 both sides would have gone to war, either way.

[Rasputitsa]

ORIGINAL: Offworlder

Agreed. The truth is that both dictators thought of war as being almost unavoidable due to ideological differences (polar opposites). The problem was in the timing...

What I said in my previous post regarding Hitler also applies for Stalin. The whole backstab of Poland, the overruning of the Baltic States, the attack on Finland and lastly (and most importantly in my opinion) the seizure of Romanian territory, were all intended to secure natural defences against the Germans and to have the ability to fight a war on what was foreign territory. His diplomacy, if it could be considered as such amounted to blodless landgrabs, which in a way provided the Germans with more allies.

Also in the diplomatic field, things were already coming to a head in '41 even without one side's intent on going to war with the other. German guarantees to Romania and Hungary, Bulgaria's forced submissive status, and German conquest of the Balkans meant that Germany was basically sticking it to Stalin. Romania alone would have been a causus belli because of its importance to the German economy... Also look at the pressure applied by both sides (and Britain) upon Turkey to enter the war on their side or at least deny its natural resources to the adversary. Basically Germany declared the Balkans as its own backyard in practice excluding the Soviets from the area. This was intolerable to Stalin as what he saw as Germany's meddling in Finland. Also German interest in the Middle East especially Rashid Ali's Iraq made Stalin uneasy. Last but not least, Germany's alliance with a declared enemy of the USSR in the Far East also had Stalin worried on its possible implications for the future.

In practice Stalin was pursuing the ages old Russina strategy of breaking out of the Black Sea with Germany taking the place of Austria Hungary. Germany was also engaged in isolating Russia and in stirring trouble in its backyard. No later than '42 both sides would have gone to war, either way.

The World was a gunpowder keg and the fuse had been lit, it was just a matter of how long that fuse was. [:)]

[vinnie71]

Fast burning fuse, that's for sure!

[MengJiao]

Seems to me they were pretty close to nukes themselves and all sorts of other nice toys.  Am I wrong in that?  And when I say toys, I mean weapons that could have been devastating if allowed to develop and get into the armed forces in sufficient quantity.

According to Adam Tooze (The Wages of Destruction), in 1940 the Germans were proportionately as powerful as they were ever going to get. The drive to attack as much as possible in 1940 and 1941 makes perfect sense (according to Tooze) because the German economy could not be fully modernized and/or mobilized by the Nazis due to an archaic and inefficient agricultural sector. Waiting would just have made things worse as the USA and USSR ramped up their industries. According to Tooze, Hitler's knowledge of the growing power of the US forced him to attack Russia when he did. So the Germans were effectively doomed from the moment they embarked on military adventures since they were never going to fully modernize and they had little access to critical raw materials especially petroleum.
As far as I can tell they were never going to make an atomic bomb either.
Hitler's theory that the British Empire would see reason and surrender in 1940 was driven by the fact that that was effectively his last chance to avoid complete destruction.

[vinnie71]

Unfortunately the theory that Hitler saw things from simply an economic point of view is essentially flawed. Though like every dictator, he loved knowing and quoting endless statistics, he had absolutely no idea on how to work up an economy and finances as well. It should also be noted that USSR production was only guessed at and grossly underestimated by the Germans while the US was essentially still recovering from the Great Depression.
 
Regarding the German agricultural sector, it was and still is uncompetitive. But Hitler by 1940 had alternative sources at his disposal. France, Netherlands, Belgium and especially Denmark provided massive quantities of dairy products, fruits etc. Grains came from Poland and Romania and even soya was planted in Bulgaria for the Reich's benefit. Actually the agricultural sector took a hit in the war because of the massive recruitment drives that took place in the rural areas of Germany for the war. Also note that Germany had been a net importer of food from before WWI...
 
Essentially before 1942, the German economy was going in slow motion by choice, more than by need. Notice the large expansion of production that occured in 1943 and especially 1944. Only after Stalingrad when defeat stared them in the face did they really mobilise. Also lack of access to raw materials has been grossly exaggerated by many historians but until the summer of '44 he could easily bully even near neutrals in giving him what he wanted. In practice Swedish and Turkish ore output could be counted upon until the twin disasters of Bagration and Overlord. Germany had a strategic stockpile of raw materials and created a host of ersatz industries to replicate those materials for which they did not have any access (ex rubber). Where it couldn't (ex tungsten)
 
Petrolum was the Achilles heal of the Wehrmacht and industry in general. Which is why the bombing offensives on Ploesti. But only their physical capture and Hungarian oilfields by the Russians really crippled the Wehrmacht.

[MengJiao]

ORIGINAL: Offworlder

Unfortunately the theory that Hitler saw things from simply an economic point of view is essentially flawed. Though like every dictator, he loved knowing and quoting endless statistics, he had absolutely no idea on how to work up an economy and finances as well. It should also be noted that USSR production was only guessed at and grossly underestimated by the Germans while the US was essentially still recovering from the Great Depression.

Regarding the German agricultural sector, it was and still is uncompetitive. But Hitler by 1940 had alternative sources at his disposal. France, Netherlands, Belgium and especially Denmark provided massive quantities of dairy products, fruits etc. Grains came from Poland and Romania and even soya was planted in Bulgaria for the Reich's benefit. Actually the agricultural sector took a hit in the war because of the massive recruitment drives that took place in the rural areas of Germany for the war. Also note that Germany had been a net importer of food from before WWI...

Essentially before 1942, the German economy was going in slow motion by choice, more than by need. Notice the large expansion of production that occured in 1943 and especially 1944. Only after Stalingrad when defeat stared them in the face did they really mobilise. Also lack of access to raw materials has been grossly exaggerated by many historians but until the summer of '44 he could easily bully even near neutrals in giving him what he wanted. In practice Swedish and Turkish ore output could be counted upon until the twin disasters of Bagration and Overlord. Germany had a strategic stockpile of raw materials and created a host of ersatz industries to replicate those materials for which they did not have any access (ex rubber). Where it couldn't (ex tungsten)

Petrolum was the Achilles heal of the Wehrmacht and industry in general. Which is why the bombing offensives on Ploesti. But only their physical capture and Hungarian oilfields by the Russians really crippled the Wehrmacht.

That was the view before Tooze rechecked the economic information. Tooze's book has completely changed the landscape of assessing Nazi policies and German capabilities.

For example, Tooze says the Germans were building up as fast as possible well before 1942. The drop in 1941-1942 is due to a poorly-timed attempt to retool and readjust (1937-1940 -- when the USA started gearing up for war -- would have been better) and the apparent production growth in 1943-1944 is just lag off the retooling.

Tooze also says that allied strategic bombing had a major impact on German production. Again the apparent growth after bombing is a lag in the parts pipelines.

Tooze also says that Hitler was capable of a form of a crude form of quasi economic thinking. Apparently an expert German banker with the middle name of "Horace Greely" convinced Hitler that the USA was going to clobber him beyond belief if he didn't take over a real economy like the USSR had.

Tooze claims the labor problems in the Reich were so bad (again due to the cranky agricultural sector) that a slave labor model was substituted for a pure slaughter model for dealing with subhumans. So 1942-early 1943 were geared for pure slaughter (eg Treblinka), but most of 1943-1944 was set up more for slave labor (eg Auschwitz which still has one of the world's largest synthetic rubber plants nearby). So economic pressures could have an impact even on the pet ideological programs such as slaughtering the subhumans so if slave labor can be substituted for slaughter as a Nazi policy, economic pressures must have had major impacts on even core Nazi values.

[vinnie71]

Sorry but that doesn't tally with what went on the ground.

Certain industries had to built from scratch - tanks and aircraft industry come to mind. But also the whole ersatz economy setup (synthetic oil and rubber for example) were set up in anticipation of war more than anything. They could barely expand their armed forces to decent levels in 1940. As to Germany arming furiously before the war, all one has to do is look at its expansion of the armed services. For the campaign in France they had only 10 Panzer divisions because priority went to the Luftwaffe. They also possessed a lot of vehicles taken from the Czechs whose excellent tanks equipped something like 4 of these 10 divisions.

As to the USSR having a real economy, let's not kid ourselves. It was sizeable but totally mismanaged and concentrated on heavy industry with little left over for real expansion. Again keep in mind that no one outside the USSR really knew the real figures of GDP let alone what sort of industry it had. German expansion during the war was also due to the fact that small operators were forcibly put under the orders of large cartels, who anyway ran the economy until '42 at least. One problem the Germans had was the constant turf wars between producers and Hitler's total lack of intervention to right the ship of state. Todt and later Speer had a massive problem in dealing with the pocket empires created in the war boom by cartels and even the armed services themselves, Luftwaffe and SS in the first instance. But from '43 onwards Speer was given the political authority to ride roughshod over oppostion by Hitler himself. He built on the foundations that Todt created

As to Hitler fearing America, its a massive joke. Not to be offensive to America, but it did not loom that large in Hitler's mind simply because even in WWI, their participation was rather limited and overshadowed by the French and British contribution. America's potential became evident only from about mid '42 and not before and he thought mostly in continental terms. Remember the guy DECLARED war on America, in a way saving Roosvelt from a strategic and political dilemma. Also keep in mind that America was at that time extremely wary of entering the war and it took two years and a surprise attack for FDR to fully commit America to war.

This revisionist history that is very fashionable nowadays but which looks at the world through modern eyes and has the advantage of hindsight... Its thinking the situation backwards - he couldn't invade Britain, therefore he should turn east to capture the necessary resources in case America came into war???? Its also a very Anglo Saxon point of view, in a situation where the person in question was thinking in continental terms. For Germany, throughout its history, its greatest fear and greatest opportunities were to be found in the east.

[paullus99]

I've always been very curious what would have happened if Hitler & Stalin had managed to come to a more "concrete" understanding in 1939 - since they had much more in common with each other than any of the Western Allies - a combined front against the evils of the "capitalist/democratic West."

I know it would have been difficult in the extreme, given the basic ideologies - but if they had any inkling of what the next two years might have held, perhaps a true accommodation could have been reached.

[vinnie71]

Difficult to concieve. But they also had one thing in common - both wanted autarky for their empires and that could only happen if they took the resources of their neighbours. Also Germany despite the Nazi charade, was essentially a western country with similar institutions to France, Britain or America (ex private enterprise etc)

Hitler would have never agreed to being bullied due to reliance upon Russian deliveries of raw materials. Stalin also coveted Turkey's and the Middle East resources, though the reason why is not really clear because the Russian economy had the necessary raw materials itself.

But the ideological confrontation was paramount. The funny thing is that in the end Stalin proved to be more pragmatic and less doctrinaire and changed allies as it suited him, while keeping in mind the goals he set for the USSR. Both could find temporary accomodation with ideological foes for the short term, but in the end both were essentially committed to war. Hitler struck first...

[MengJiao]

ORIGINAL: Offworlder

Sorry but that doesn't tally with what went on the ground.

Certain industries had to built from scratch - tanks and aircraft industry come to mind. But also the whole ersatz economy setup (synthetic oil and rubber for example) were set up in anticipation of war more than anything. They could barely expand their armed forces to decent levels in 1940. As to Germany arming furiously before the war, all one has to do is look at its expansion of the armed services. For the campaign in France they had only 10 Panzer divisions because priority went to the Luftwaffe. They also possessed a lot of vehicles taken from the Czechs whose excellent tanks equipped something like 4 of these 10 divisions.

As to the USSR having a real economy, let's not kid ourselves. It was sizeable but totally mismanaged and concentrated on heavy industry with little left over for real expansion. Again keep in mind that no one outside the USSR really knew the real figures of GDP let alone what sort of industry it had. German expansion during the war was also due to the fact that small operators were forcibly put under the orders of large cartels, who anyway ran the economy until '42 at least. One problem the Germans had was the constant turf wars between producers and Hitler's total lack of intervention to right the ship of state. Todt and later Speer had a massive problem in dealing with the pocket empires created in the war boom by cartels and even the armed services themselves, Luftwaffe and SS in the first instance. But from '43 onwards Speer was given the political authority to ride roughshod over oppostion by Hitler himself. He built on the foundations that Todt created

As to Hitler fearing America, its a massive joke. Not to be offensive to America, but it did not loom that large in Hitler's mind simply because even in WWI, their participation was rather limited and overshadowed by the French and British contribution. America's potential became evident only from about mid '42 and not before and he thought mostly in continental terms. Remember the guy DECLARED war on America, in a way saving Roosvelt from a strategic and political dilemma. Also keep in mind that America was at that time extremely wary of entering the war and it took two years and a surprise attack for FDR to fully commit America to war.

This revisionist history that is very fashionable nowadays but which looks at the world through modern eyes and has the advantage of hindsight... Its thinking the situation backwards - he couldn't invade Britain, therefore he should turn east to capture the necessary resources in case America came into war???? Its also a very Anglo Saxon point of view, in a situation where the person in question was thinking in continental terms. For Germany, throughout its history, its greatest fear and greatest opportunities were to be found in the east.

I know that's the old view. But new and very fashionable evidence has come to light. Hitler was very worried about the USA. I know it sounds a bit nutty, but apparently he was. I first heard of that nutty thing about the US in a West German Army staff study so I wasn't as surprised as I might have been to find it in Tooze.
As for German industrial capacity. Yes, it could barely get an army going in 1940 and according to Tooze it was already running as hard as it could. Not Surprisingly Todt killed himself in 1942 when it became clear that things weren't working so well.
The deal with Britain is perhaps the oddest. Hitler apparently thought it was clear to everybody that the USA was the real enemy of the British Empire and he assumed the British could see that. Hence his expectation that the British Empire would at least sit out WWII rather like the French. Thus the attack on Russia was relatively rational and not as ideological as it seems since (according to Tooze) he had to get hold of most of the Russian economy so as to eventually face the USA.
It's hard to see how he was wrong about that. The Russian economy may have been mismanaged, but it had a lot more potential than the German economy which would have been very very lucky to reach merely Russian levels of mismanagement. Had the Nazis secured most of the Russian economy and held onto it into say 1944, they would have been in much better shape than they were in the 1944 we know where the badly managed Russian economy plus lend-lease was doing a lot better than the really amazingly very badly managed German economy was doing.
According to Tooze, Speer did nothing of any substance,but was pretty good at public relations. And as for Todt, he showed his assessment of the situation by killing himself.

[Rasputitsa]

ORIGINAL: paullus99
I've always been very curious what would have happened if Hitler & Stalin had managed to come to a more "concrete" understanding in 1939 - since they had much more in common with each other than any of the Western Allies - a combined front against the evils of the "capitalist/democratic West."

I know it would have been difficult in the extreme, given the basic ideologies - but if they had any inkling of what the next two years might have held, perhaps a true accommodation could have been reached.

That is almost what happened, as Germany and Russia started WW2 in September 1939, by jointly invading Poland, with other countries invaded by Russia at the same time. The aggression was a joint enterprise.

Britain was preparing a force to help Finland against Russia and it was only Sweden refusing transport rights which delayed it (rights which were granted to Germany later in the war). We nearly had the situation of the Allies against Germany and Russia, with Japan waiting in the wings. We would have been at war with both dictators.

It was only the attack on Norway which finally ended all plans to help Finland. One of the reasons why the Allied intervention in Norway was so poorly organised, was that the ships had been loaded for a transport mission to Finland and were used instead for a counter invasion of Norway.

How's that for a WiTE scenario, Western Allied forces in Finland, but the white line has got to go. [:)]

[vinnie71]

ORIGINAL: MengJiao

I know that's the old view. But new and very fashionable evidence has come to light. Hitler was very worried about the USA. I know it sounds a bit nutty, but apparently he was. I first heard of that nutty thing about the US in a West German Army staff study so I wasn't as surprised as I might have been to find it in Tooze.
As for German industrial capacity. Yes, it could barely get an army going in 1940 and according to Tooze it was already running as hard as it could. Not Surprisingly Todt killed himself in 1942 when it became clear that things weren't working so well.
The deal with Britain is perhaps the oddest. Hitler apparently thought it was clear to everybody that the USA was the real enemy of the British Empire and he assumed the British could see that. Hence his expectation that the British Empire would at least sit out WWII rather like the French. Thus the attack on Russia was relatively rational and not as ideological as it seems since (according to Tooze) he had to get hold of most of the Russian economy so as to eventually face the USA.
It's hard to see how he was wrong about that. The Russian economy may have been mismanaged, but it had a lot more potential than the German economy which would have been very very lucky to reach merely Russian levels of mismanagement. Had the Nazis secured most of the Russian economy and held onto it into say 1944, they would have been in much better shape than they were in the 1944 we know where the badly managed Russian economy plus lend-lease was doing a lot better than the really amazingly very badly managed German economy was doing.
According to Tooze, Speer did nothing of any substance,but was pretty good at public relations. And as for Todt, he showed his assessment of the situation by killing himself.

Actually as far as I know (from memory) Todt had an airplane crash and not committed suicide.

Also lend-lease complemented the Soviet industry. Despite being able to produce nice tanks, the Soviet economy could not even produce sufficient boots for her army. American trucks contributed a lot for the campaigns of the Red Army and food and medical supplies also made their way in some quantity. One aspect of lend lease everyone concentrates upon is the number of weapons the allies sent to Russia. Actually what was most important was rather the supplies of perishibles. This also highlights the crazy economic decisions taken in Stalin's Russia whereby it was able to produce a lot of tanks etc, but couldn't even feed its own people. The legacy of these decisions are still felt today...

Hitler's Germany was slow to mobilise its economic potential for various reasons. One was political/ideological. He was sensitive to public opinion (believe it or not) and sought to actively hide the bad part of the war. Secondly, he had no blueprint for wartime economic mobilisation like the British had. Thirdly the whole ethos of blitzkrieg (indeed of every German army from Moltke's Prussia to Hitler) was to avoid long drawn military confrontation and get it over and done with one massive blow. Fourthly mobilisation sucked the available manpower pool dry pretty soon (some say as early as 1941) and it was difficult to replace and find additional expert workers to run an expanded economy. Fifth most of the post '42 expansion in production came not through increasing plant at the big producers but through harnessing the smaller production lines.

There is no denying that even in Hitler's mind there was an underlying economic motive, but it was far from the principle aim of his war in Russia. Even the deployment of his army for Barbarossa would bear that out. Lebensraum was a concoction of autarky, racism and 'manifest destiny' cooked up by a bitterly disappointed provincial who by an accident of fate, became the leader of the largest Western European State.

It is important not to attribute one single or overriding reason for war in the east. Ideology, economy, international rivalry, personal foibles and even a predisposition of the armed forces to see war in the east as unavoidible, all contributed to its outbreak. It is simplistic to attribute one reason as being the main issue above all other issues. In the end history reflects the bias of the author not the evidence on the ground (darn feels like I'm back at Uni arguing with my tutor [:'(])

America featured little in the equation and surely a lot can be understood of his grasp of American economical/military potential, when he declared war on her against the advice of all his cronies. Post war American power, be it economic or military, was not in evidence before or at the begining of the war and Hitler thought that his U boats could keep her at bay until he finished his business in the East. He did not fear America, on the contrary, he actually loathed it for what it represented. Note that he was not alone in this appreciation, nor was were the Germans alone in thinking so. Ex The British lectured them on strategy (never mind that their own strategy had failed miserably...) even though American strategy was correct from the get go and they tailored their forces accordingly. Though this mind seem strange in modern context, at that time it was a commonly held assumption especially since their armed forces were so small at the start of the war.

Hitler was a simple and a complicated man, which is why people of his times never understood him (see Chamberlain and Mussolini). What he said was so crazy and scary that nobody really believed him, even the Germans. And he is still little understood today.

Again revisionist history also takes a distinctive Anglo Saxon bias, not only for this period but even for other periods. There is a whole drive to reinterpret history, from the Romans to present day, in order to put the Anglo Saxon world at centre stage. It also attributes an overriding economic factor to all decisions (Marxist theory of history coming back through the window???). But if one looks even at WWII, the real struggle was carried out in the East and the war decided on the Russian steppes rather than the beaches of Normandy. We in the west conveniently forget that, but it was the sacrifice of the Russians and misery which countries caught up between the 2 colossi suffered that stopped the German advance cold. Without Kursk, there would have been no Overlord and not the other way round and Bagratin was launched prematurely on the Western allies insistence.

So shall we agree to disagree? [;)]

[MengJiao]

ORIGINAL: Offworlder


Actually as far as I know (from memory) Todt had an airplane crash and not committed suicide.

Also lend-lease complemented the Soviet industry.

So shall we agree to disagree? [;)]

Yes, Todt turned in a negative report on German prospects on the East front after personally
touring the Front in September 1942 and personally reporting his negative findings personally to Hitler,
and then his plane blew up. It was probably
a bit suicidal to tell Hitler that Germany was not going to win the war.

I was as surprised as anyone that Hitler had this nutty thing about the USA and until I read Tooze, I thought all the usual stuff
about Germany's not being mobilized and not having any economic reasons for doing anything.

The lend-lease thing kind of confirms Hitler's assessment of the situation.

Sure. Let's disagree.