Here come the Rebels! (Canoe v. Q-Ball)

[Bullwinkle58]

ORIGINAL: JohnDillworth

2. Japanese try to take it; Allies stop them at sea. Same ultimate result. Stuff in, Japanese out.

I don't think the Allies were in a position to do this. Taking on the full KB in the summer of 42 is just a quicker road to auto-victory. The allies have little to nothing to defend Karachi with. Certainly not enough to stop a full scenario 2 bunch of divisions. Once Karachi was taken, for all practical purposes, reinforcements stop. I this if AAR stops tomorrow (and I hope it does not) it at least provides the best clear roadmap to Japanese auto-victory I have seen in this forum.

KB, KB, KB!!!!! This obsession with the carriers! [:)]

An amphibious invasion of Karachi doesn't need the KB if it's a surprise. The RAF had diddly for anti-shipping models in early 1942. Some Stringbags, Albacores, miscellaneous other crappola.

That said, say they do use the KB. Per above, the USN MUST use its carriers, if only to allow the RN headspace to use its heavy skimmers, probably hiding out at Aden, to come in and clean off the invasion beaches. And the RN has some decent ships for that in the BB/CA range if they've been saved from earlier loss. Also, some of the Dutch metal might be sent northwest rather than die at Soerbaja.

Say the KB stays out of it. Maybe even out of the theater, making mischief elsewhere. Then the USN carriers devastate an amphib move on Karachi. There's no IJA LBA yet; it's still south of an Allied Bombay. (Although it'll be at Karachi soonest once it falls, and then the wormhole is useless. Bet(ty) on it.) There might be some mixing it up with the IJN BBs, but at worst the carriers get hurt, not sunk. But the landing beaches get swept more than likely.

As Nemo said yesterday, the IJN doesn't want a big carrier battle on the x4 VP basis. It would LOVE the Allies to roll over and let Karachi fall. To let Carrier Love rule the day. To have the big boys sit at Cape Town and watch, lest their paint be mussed. But that's not what they're for.

On land, the Japanese can't get the full Scenario 2 load of divisions to Karachi by land. Not and be in supply--the flanks would be enormous with Bombay untaken. Karachi needs to be an Inchon, and sealift isn't infinite. It would be a tough fight though, all the more reason for the Allies to intervene quickly, and keep supply off the beaches. Stowing the carriers in CT is not going to work--that's a month away, more or less. They need to be up the wormhole, which is a nice bit of sneaking and forethought. It would help if the sneaking happened before Socotra fell as well.

As I said, India is a naval campaign, which supports the anti-economic campaign ashore. Take Karachi, secure it, then get the non-industrial centers at Madras and Calcutta to self-fund Japanese ground supply needs and an air campaign on the west coast, then squeeze Bombay. Let the auto-reinforcements trigger. They'll rot at Aden if the wornhole is shut down. The few which poof into Karachi will die there, after eating up scarce supplies to activate devices.

[Canoerebel]

Interesting input and that makes for fun reading. Thanks, gents.

Now, as for Carrier Love, I've done things both ways. I've employed 'em and lost 'em early, while exacting a fair toll on the enemy, and I've hidden 'em and saved 'em while not inflicitng a fair toll on the enemy.

But here's the rub. When the carriers are safe and hidden, it can throw the major willies into the Japanese player. Many (most) will be afraid of sticking their neck out too far. And they are only likely to take chances in the one area where they have the KB. The rest of the map becomes safe.

If, on the other hand, the Allied carrers go "poof," or if they are employed way over on the edge of the map, the Japanese player can pretty much run amock.

In this game, I've suffered some humbling losses of territory in India, Oz, and New Caledonia, but Brad froze up in the Pacific for the most part. The Allies hold the Aleutians, Midway, Fiji, Samoa, Baker Island, etc. because Brad didn't want to take a risk. While my position isn't optimal, it's decent - and I have multiple options to take the war to the enemy in 1943.

I like the Carrier Love strategy, as The Bull put it, not because it lets me rampage in 1944 and '45, but because it puts the brakes on Japan in '42 and early '43!

[Nemo121]

I've never won an AE or WITP game by winning a carrier battle. I've also never lost an AE or WiTP game through losing a carrier battle ( and I've lost a few ).

I think more people should investigate ways to win without carriers. In my last three games I've been hopelessly outclassed in carriers and yet managed to grind out advances in the face of superior numbers and quality. The ALlies have a lot of strengths to exploit which the Japanese don't have. if you fight the Japs where they are strongest ( KB ) then you are bound to get a beating IMO.

[janh]

ORIGINAL: Nemo121
Play the man not the game and you can win almost any scenario unless it is horribly unbalanced... Once an opponent gets discourage and feels defeated it simply doesn't matter if they have 10 times the force you have on the field. They won't wield it properly if their mindset is wrong.
...
The ALlies have a lot of strengths to exploit which the Japanese don't have. if you fight the Japs where they are strongest ( KB ) then you are bound to get a beating IMO.

Fully agree, on both points. The first one is hardest to master, though. Nemo, sounds like you really know this business?

I think it is correct that Brad indeed realized too late that his strategic plans were diffuse, and his commitment not full -- I had the impression his worry about the whereabouts of the allied CV, and what CannoRebel could do with them, distracted him from what he actually should be doing himself. I recall that a while ago, after the discussion on triggering lines for reinforcements, he himself wrote that with that knowledge, he would have gone for Socorta and Karachi much earlier. Unfortunately he stopped posting in AAR and is now doing WiTE. But this remains one of my favorite AARs to follow! Hope it continues!

[Chickenboy]

ORIGINAL: janh

ORIGINAL: Nemo121
Play the man not the game and you can win almost any scenario unless it is horribly unbalanced... Once an opponent gets discourage and feels defeated it simply doesn't matter if they have 10 times the force you have on the field. They won't wield it properly if their mindset is wrong.
...
The ALlies have a lot of strengths to exploit which the Japanese don't have. if you fight the Japs where they are strongest ( KB ) then you are bound to get a beating IMO.

Fully agree, on both points. The first one is hardest to master, though. Nemo, sounds like you really know this business?

I think it is correct that Brad indeed realized too late that his strategic plans were diffuse, and his commitment not full -- I had the impression his worry about the whereabouts of the allied CV, and what CannoRebel could do with them, distracted him from what he actually should be doing himself. I recall that a while ago, after the discussion on triggering lines for reinforcements, he himself wrote that with that knowledge, he would have gone for Socorta and Karachi much earlier. Unfortunately he stopped posting in AAR and is now doing WiTE. But this remains one of my favorite AARs to follow! Hope it continues!

Guys...let's please observe OPSEC in these AAR postings. IMO, posting considered operational objectives in the opponent's AAR is crossing the line. [:-]

[Canoerebel]

Chickenboy is right - err on the side of caution. Don't reveal anything from Brad's AAR.

But I will say that nothing was said that is any use to me now. The information is very dated and I pretty much knew this anyway.

Back about three months ago, game time, I had sent reinforcements, such as they were, to Socatra - a remnant Indian brigade with a whole 19 AV. My patrol aircraft spotted a TF and I thought it was probably an invasion heading for Socatra. I sent the Allied carriers north from Mombasa. They were one turn from entering the Indian Ocean when I confirmed that the Japanese ships were a modest surface combat raiding force bound for the Arabian Sea. The threat was off and I pulled back my carriers.

That's how close I came to revealing their position.

[Bullwinkle58]

ORIGINAL: Canoerebel

Interesting input and that makes for fun reading. Thanks, gents.

Now, as for Carrier Love, I've done things both ways. I've employed 'em and lost 'em early, while exacting a fair toll on the enemy, and I've hidden 'em and saved 'em while not inflicitng a fair toll on the enemy.

But here's the rub. When the carriers are safe and hidden, it can throw the major willies into the Japanese player. Many (most) will be afraid of sticking their neck out too far. And they are only likely to take chances in the one area where they have the KB. The rest of the map becomes safe.

If, on the other hand, the Allied carrers go "poof," or if they are employed way over on the edge of the map, the Japanese player can pretty much run amock.

In this game, I've suffered some humbling losses of territory in India, Oz, and New Caledonia, but Brad froze up in the Pacific for the most part. The Allies hold the Aleutians, Midway, Fiji, Samoa, Baker Island, etc. because Brad didn't want to take a risk. While my position isn't optimal, it's decent - and I have multiple options to take the war to the enemy in 1943.

I like the Carrier Love strategy, as The Bull put it, not because it lets me rampage in 1944 and '45, but because it puts the brakes on Japan in '42 and early '43!

I would submit that this is more an issue with the Japanese player's emotions governing his strategies than with smart Allied play.

The USN operated for a time with only one surviving carrier in the Pacific, and still won by the summer of 1945 with a slower op tempo than AE allows. Yes, Midway happened in RL, but even so the carrier imbalance was profound for a time, far more so than AE Allied players who insist that four CVs are the minimum to overcome gridlock and execute an operation.

The KB is powerful, but it's not supreme. It can be countered, if loses are assumed and accepted. It has a glass jaw re Japanese repair facilities size and location as well. Hurt it once medium hard, and it's out until the USN starts getting the Essexes.

I still maintain that over time in the AE community the KB has assumed mythiic proportions. It needs to be respected, but it should not be the Number 1 factor in any Allied planning, and not knowing where it is should not confer the heebie-jeebies on the other side, any more than the Allies hiding their carriers. A hidden carrier is a carrier not attacking anything. A mixed outcome at best.

Edit: I wrote this before reading Nemo's post directly below the CR one I responded to. I agree with his stance, and not only because I know that submarines are the Most Important Platform.[:)]

[Canoerebel]

I came up with the strategy, employed it, tweaked it, stuck with it, and it worked. But I'm the first to admit I'm not sure it was the smartest strategy in the world; and I doubt I would do it again.

How many times in real life has a commander who really wasn't that great been smiled upon by fortune and thus elevated to an exalted status; and how many times has a commander with real talent been rendered a schmuk when fortune did not smile upon him? Probably frequently.

It's probably the same in football and baseball. Many times a good coach/manager makes a huge difference, but sometimes a complete idiot benefits from pure luck or a powerful roster; other times a talented coach/manager is undone by bad chemistry, a freak injury, or a terrible lineup.

Okay, I'm no genius. But for whatever reason, my strategy worked (at least to this point).

[Bullwinkle58]

ORIGINAL: Canoerebel

I came up with the strategy, employed it, tweaked it, stuck with it, and it worked. But I'm the first to admit I'm not sure it was the smartest strategy in the world; and I doubt I would do it again.

To beat Mr. Ed one more time, it worked because your opponent let it work, not because it worked. (Zen? Huh?)

I agree you shouldn't use it again, because people you play will read this AAR. [:)]

Marching around in the Kuriles? Ditto, maybe? [:)]

[Canoerebel]

I'm not sure I'm following the point. I know the strategy wasn't a stroke of genius; I know Brad didn't take full advantage; I know that I wouldn't use it again in the same circumstances.

But...can't you say that the Allied plan at Midway worked because the Japanese let it work? Had the Japanese concentrated their carriers and fleet, it is much more likely that the Allies could have been overwhelmed and lost. A lot had to go right for the Allies to win that particular battle.

Where does that leave Fletcher?

[Bullwinkle58]

ORIGINAL: Canoerebel

I'm not sure I'm following the point. I know the strategy wasn't a stroke of genius; I know Brad didn't take full advantage; I know that I wouldn't use it again in the same circumstances.

But...can't you say that the Allied plan at Midway worked because the Japanese let it work? Had the Japanese concentrated their carriers and fleet, it is much more likely that the Allies could have been overwhelmed and lost. A lot had to go right for the Allies to win that particular battle.

Where does that leave Fletcher?

Midway was a 360-degree fight.

In your game, Karachi wasn't moving and the wormhole rules are what they are.

[Canoerebel]

Bullwinkle, I'm struggling to understand your point.

It's always possible in hindsight to say the conditions were such that a successful commander got lucky and that his opponent didn't do what he should have done.

Nagumo could have done things differently and probably would have won at Midway. Brad could have done things differently and won in India. Fletcher probably got lucky at Midway, but he came up with a plan that worked. I got lucky in India, but I came up with a plan that worked.

I'm not saying I'm Fletcher - heck, I might be Pye or Kimmel or Turner - but my plan worked (to this point), so the media and the public wreaths me in laurels while astute military men and historians look closer and mutter that I got lucky.

[Bullwinkle58]

ORIGINAL: Canoerebel

Bullwinkle, I'm struggling to understand your point.

It's always possible in hindsight to say the conditions were such that a successful commander got lucky and that his opponent didn't do what he should have done.

Nagumo could have done things differently and probably would have won at Midway. Brad could have done things differently and won in India. Fletcher probably got lucky at Midway, but he came up with a plan that worked. I got lucky in India, but I came up with a plan that worked.

I'm not saying I'm Fletcher - heck, I might be Pye or Kimmel or Turner - but my plan worked (to this point), so the media and the public wreaths me in laurels while astute military men and historians look closer and mutter that I got lucky.

I'm talking about the specific application of a hidden carrier strategy to the Allied defense of India. Comparing to Midway is, IMO, a poor analogy as Midway involved a lot of groping about by both sides, chance search successes, and good Allied intel. In the case of Karachi Brad knew where it was located. He knew he didn't know where your carriers were (I think). I don't think you ever gave him SigInt to that efect, BUT he did know Karachi was vital. He was told that by several players reading his AAR. He gambled that he could achieve whatever he percieved his India goals to be without taking it. (His AAR is less forthcoming about some of this than you might imagine.)

Tactically, Karachi is totally different than Midway. It has a continent at its back; the sea approach is at best probably 45 degrees wide from the northwest for a Japanese invader. Otherwise Bombay-based search will see the amphibs. Brad knew where the wormhole exit is. He knew the rough status of Socotra to the extent he knew he didn't own it. (Midway had no "helping search base" nearby.) Karachi LCU stacking is diferent than Midway's, supply stocks without spoilage are different, reinforcement possibilities are diferent. It's nothing like Midway IOW.

Overall, what I'm saying is that, had he gone for Karachi you would have had to bring your carriers in to stop him, as I argued yesterday. Failing to do so would have given him everything he needed for an auto-vic progression. In that sense the decision to continue hiding them was his to swing, not yours to make. He never put you to that test, so the decision to continue to hide them wasn't really a decision, but a default.

I'm not sure that's better, but there it is.

[Canoerebel]

Ah, I understand better, but I think you're overlooking one thing and misconstruing another (and I'm enjoying delving into this so much, so it doesn't feel like beating a dead horse to me):

The Allied strategy from the beginning of the war was to hide the carriers, and to use them only if it became necessary to save India, Australia, or Hawaii. As Brad focused his intentions on India, I made it clear that I would use my carriers if necessary to fight for Karachi. That was never necessary. But had I done so it is possible that the Allies would have prevailed, both in the carrier battle and in the fight for Karachi. So I think I am justified in saying that my plan seemed to work (which is the position you originally took issue with).

Secondly, I wasn't comparing this situation to Midway as such; I was simply drawing on Midway as an example of a battle (any battle) where you might say the victor's plan succeeded only because the loser allowed it to succeed. Sure, but it succeeded.

So I'm saying that as with any battle, both sides made decisions that played heavily in the outcome and could have done things differently, but I don't think you can say my plan worked only because Brad allowed it to work.

[Canoerebel]

10/11/42

Poor Bullwinkle got ensnared in a seemingly neverending discussion that entertained me, but probably nobody else. So back to the game in the interest of moving things along:

India on the Ground: I made a snap decision to recall my armor and infantry on the road between Jalagon and Poona. They actually hadn't left the hex yet, but I've decided against chasing the stack that retreated down the yellow road. Instead, I'm sending the armor and some of the infantry down the good road towards Bombay. This will pose a threat to the outnumbered Japanese force besieging that town. I'm leaving about half my infantry in this hex to watch out for developments to the southeast, east, and northeast, if any (I don't want to leave my entire left flank underdefended).

India Para-assaults: The Chindits couldn't take the dot hex near Naipur, but a Japanese 'chutes unit reclaimed the dot hex east of Poona (my other Chindit force that recently took that hex is now a hex to the southwest giving chase to a battered IJA armored unit).

Pacific: Nothing has changed here.

[JohnDillworth]

But had I done so it is possible that the Allies would have prevailed, both in the carrier battle and in the fight for Karachi.

But unlikely if I recall. He had the big 6 together and you had not yet upgraded to TBF's. Not even sure if you were fully loaded on Wildcats yet. Plus you were in Capetown. Assume Brad came with everything (a good assumption as he did not know where your carriers were, or if you had all the Australians at Karachi). Full KB, maybe the mini KB, bunch of BB's (and SBD's love BB's as much as CV's, except they can't sink them) and maybe 5+ good Divisions and support. How much AV did you have at Karachi? How fast could your fleet have gotten there? I suspect your only advantage would be you could take your few remaining cripples back through the wormhole. Coulda, Woulda, Shoulda. Your opponent had every advantage but failed to execute. you win

[Bullwinkle58]

ORIGINAL: Canoerebel

Ah, I understand better, but I think you're overlooking one thing and misconstruing another (and I'm enjoying delving into this so much, so it doesn't feel like beating a dead horse to me):

The Allied strategy from the beginning of the war was to hide the carriers, and to use them only if it became necessary to save India, Australia, or Hawaii. As Brad focused his intentions on India, I made it clear that I would use my carriers if necessary to fight for Karachi. That was never necessary. But had I done so it is possible that the Allies would have prevailed, both in the carrier battle and in the fight for Karachi. So I think I am justified in saying that my plan seemed to work (which is the position you originally took issue with).

Secondly, I wasn't comparing this situation to Midway as such; I was simply drawing on Midway as an example of a battle (any battle) where you might say the victor's plan succeeded only because the loser allowed it to succeed. Sure, but it succeeded.

So I'm saying that as with any battle, both sides made decisions that played heavily in the outcome and could have done things differently, but I don't think you can say my plan worked only because Brad allowed it to work.

I'm not trying to mud all over your play, planning, or accomplishments, just to be clear. You're a better player than I am for sure. And it's always easier from the peanut gallery, and when you've read the other AAR.

That said, from reading this one, from memory (I haven't gone back to review months ago), it seemed to me at least that the possibility of auto-vic dawned on you fairly slowly. I don't know when, but it was after Ceylon fell and Brad had taken on Calcutta at least. Strategically, IMO he should have left Calcutta for Phase 3-4 and gone striaght for Karachi after Ceylon. (There was interesting debate on the other side long ago about whether Ceylon is even necessary to a take-India move; you'll enjoy that as will future players.)

If he had gone north right away your carriers were porked at Cape Town. Too far away to swing the battle, IMO because you didn't really think he'd be that bold, and you were hedging them into the Canal Zone agian if needed to stop a Hawaii gambit with India to that point being a grand, huge, massive deception. Or Oz. (CT makes more sense to help west-coast Oz than India, right?)

A big question for you in retrospect, and future Japanese players, is when, exactly, will the Allies be forced to throw down on an India defense, and where should the carriers be stashed to defend Karachi. It's not an easy question. Brad seemed to me to be pretty blunt. You were worried a lot about mid-Pac moves, Suva, Midway, etc, etc., and he was wielding an 11-division+ blunt instrument in India. Just when the Allied player has to commit all-in Texas Hold-Em-style to defending India, Oz, or Hawaii is a great question. Japanese deception could make it harder. I don't think Brad did that after his relatively spare Oz foray petered-out.

[Bullwinkle58]

ORIGINAL: JohnDillworth

But had I done so it is possible that the Allies would have prevailed, both in the carrier battle and in the fight for Karachi.

But unlikely if I recall. He had the big 6 together and you had not yet upgraded to TBF's. Not even sure if you were fully loaded on Wildcats yet. Plus you were in Capetown. Assume Brad came with everything (a good assumption as he did not know where your carriers were, or if you had all the Australians at Karachi). Full KB, maybe the mini KB, bunch of BB's (and SBD's love BB's as much as CV's, except they can't sink them) and maybe 5+ good Divisions and support. How much AV did you have at Karachi? How fast could your fleet have gotten there? I suspect your only advantage would be you could take your few remaining cripples back through the wormhole. Coulda, Woulda, Shoulda. Your opponent had every advantage but failed to execute. you win

All true. Plus, for future, it has to be said and said, that the Allies should WANT a carrier battle off Karachi for auto-vic avoidance. Not only do they get a crack at troop-rich merchants sitting as ducks unloading, but carrier-to-carrier the Japanese have to sink 4 Allied carriers to every one of theirs just to not lose ground on the auto-vic. If the USN lost 3 and the IJN 1 with some others damaged, it's a huge strategic win for the Allies.

[Canoerebel]

Hmm, you guys are asking interesting questions forcing me to flail through mental cobwebs to reconstruct what happened. Here's how the campaign developed as I saw it:

1. Brad made an elaborate, complicated move on Oz. I took notice, but I wasn't convinced he was going that way because he didn't commit any big units. Had I seen divisions landing in Oz, I would have been more convinced.

2. At first, I was very worried about Hawaii, but gradually in early '42 my concern shifted more to India. I had already sent the first Aussie division on to Oz by that point, but I diverted the second to India long before Brad made a move that way.

3. I stationed the carriers in Capetown primarily to defend India, but also to move on southern Oz if that became necessary. Getting from Capetown to Hawaii is terribly long and as we went into February '42 I was nearly certain Hawaii wasn't the objective. I wasn't worried at all about Midway, Fiji, New Zealand, the Line Islands, etc., but only because I had decided I couldn't afford to do anything to defend them. All reinforcements were going to India, Oz, Hawaii and, to a much lesser extent, the Aleutians.

4. I caught wind of Brad's move on Ceylon just two or three days before his ships arrived on March 7. But I had growing suspicisions already ("spidey senses" were going gang busters by then). I had a British division there augmented by some Indian troops, but they weren't enough. The defenses held for about three weeks; I was hoping for four.

5. I wasn't positive where Brad would go next, but I was far more concerned about Karachi and Bombay than Calcutta. I kept most of my troops at the former, and what I did send to the east remained in strategic mode for a long time. I had alot of AV available to defend Karachi or Bombay against amphibious invasion. I didn't shift these untii it was clear he had fully committed to Calcutta-Chittagong. And I always left a stout garrison at both places. Given the disruption that Japanese troops suffer in amphbious assaults due to poor quality ships, I'm sure that any invasion force would have been really roughed up - failure to prep would have contributed.

6. Allied air would have been a complete non-factor in defending against an invasion. Allied air in India in early '42 is pathetic.

7. I was most worried about an IJ invasion of Surat, with a quick breakout. In my opinion, this would have succeeded, though I would have had time to get troops to Bombay or Karachi to make a stand. It was essentially impossible to adequately defend Bombay, Karachi, and Surat, so the latter was my weakest point. I also needed troops to fight on the front to slow down the enemy advance. All of this was a difficult balancing act. Very tense.

8. Brad also could have imposed a naval blockade on Karachi, coinciding with a ground campaign moving west from Calcutta and north and west from Madras. I had to get supplies and troops into Karachi, so such a move would have forced me to commit my carriers. I spent alot of time organizing little convoys to send in troops and supplies in manageable groups just in case Brad sent his carriers or battleships.

What I'm saying is that I was much more aware of the situation, where the threats were, and the possibility of auto victory than you seem to think, Bullwinkle. Go back and read through the AAR and you'll see this spelled out from December '41 through early and mid '42..

Where I find fault with my strategy was letting things reach the point where Brad had a real shot at auto victory. I probably needed to commit my carriers earlier. I came very, very close, but things never quite reached a bad enough state that I thought I had to.

[crsutton]

ORIGINAL: Bullwinkle58

ORIGINAL: JohnDillworth

But had I done so it is possible that the Allies would have prevailed, both in the carrier battle and in the fight for Karachi.

But unlikely if I recall. He had the big 6 together and you had not yet upgraded to TBF's. Not even sure if you were fully loaded on Wildcats yet. Plus you were in Capetown. Assume Brad came with everything (a good assumption as he did not know where your carriers were, or if you had all the Australians at Karachi). Full KB, maybe the mini KB, bunch of BB's (and SBD's love BB's as much as CV's, except they can't sink them) and maybe 5+ good Divisions and support. How much AV did you have at Karachi? How fast could your fleet have gotten there? I suspect your only advantage would be you could take your few remaining cripples back through the wormhole. Coulda, Woulda, Shoulda. Your opponent had every advantage but failed to execute. you win

All true. Plus, for future, it has to be said and said, that the Allies should WANT a carrier battle off Karachi for auto-vic avoidance. Not only do they get a crack at troop-rich merchants sitting as ducks unloading, but carrier-to-carrier the Japanese have to sink 4 Allied carriers to every one of theirs just to not lose ground on the auto-vic. If the USN lost 3 and the IJN 1 with some others damaged, it's a huge strategic win for the Allies.

I respectfull disagree. Sometimes it is not just a matter of points in the road to autovictory. For one thing in 1942 with weak fighters and functionally useless torpedo bombers, the odds are that the Allies will lose more carriers than Japan in a stand up fight. However, for arguments sake, if in early 1942 the Allied lose four carriers and Japan loses four, then the remaining KB gang will hold carrier supremacy until early 1943. At this point the Japanese player can fairly safely split his carriers or even pull off some major operations without the use of carriers. So, even with a step back in VP point gain, a trade off in carriers opens up a big opportunity for Japan to attain some major conquests in 1942 and pull out an autovictory.

The biggest stragetic counter that the Allies hold in 1942 is the "unknown." If the Japanese player knows at all times where four of your carriers are (in this case on the sea bottom) then he will hold all the cards for the next year. You can talk of Allied LBA but in scen #2, Allied LBA cannot match Japanese LBA in 42.