Radar in the new patch still maybe buggy

[LoBaron]

I don´t think the Japanese had much of a choice.

And I also don´t think that the British implementing the system first has much to do with better planning.

Radar was, in its initial stages, a pure defensive technology. So that the British were the first to get a general feel for its use,
because they were the first to be in a situation where an effective air defense was the only option, was only natural.

The BoB was the one large scale test farm which was needed to get experience working with the system, find the limits and
potential of the new technology, get a feel for the periphery needed to make sure the information was relayed to the correct destination,
and optimize integrated command and control centers which rely on radar as well as different means of communication.

To believe in a system you have to get results from either extensive testing or, better, actual combat.
Until then its only one of many options, and a bad one if you don´t need it, as was the case for the Axis powers until 1942.
Its much easier with hindsight and our understanding how radar shaped warfare.

Japan had only so many baskets to choose from, and radar was one of those that would not have worked for them. They simply did not have the
human ressources for research in that area.
Radar- (and practically all other electronic gear-) developement was heavily dependent on qualified researchers, engineers and techicians with an
university degree. The Allies had those in abundance, Germany a bit less but also enough, but Japan, as an agricultural nation with only small
limited areas of modern industrialisation did not.
Thats why the Japanese contrary to the Allies had to limit themselves to a very narrow but low risk lane of approach when adressing problems.

I doubt the Japanese even came close to understand the potential of radar until the war was already over.

[viberpol]

ORIGINAL: LoBaron

ORIGINAL: viberpol
I expect that Japanese radar, inferior as it is when compared to American, would detect enemy faster than Chinese spotters -- separated ground unit alone in the Jungle -- giving earlier warning than "eyesighting" giving longer time to target periods and more reaction time.

You expect too much then.

The Japanese had problems to get a "simple" airborne radio working with a reliability that justified the increased weight
of the fighter aircraft.
In fact the Japanese never used radio equipment in air warfare on a scale that it was implemented into the doctrine.

Japanese radar - which is a bit more complex than a radio, both in producing the data and the correct interpretation of the data -
was a highly unreliable experimental device. This applied to the Allies as well on a lesser scale.
It did not work in most instances and when it worked there still had to be operators with some experience drawing the right conclusions
from what they saw.

Don´t forget that the Allies had one big advantage on that technology in ´41 and later: The Battle of Britain. 2 Years of hard won experience
with an experimental set and the knowledge that this device probably saved them a much harder war.
The Axis powers had nothing in comparision except small test sites.

To protect all this, high priority had been given to antiaircraft defenses during 1943. The organizational setup was a combined army and naval defensive establishment which was well coordinated and integrated. Of the 367 antiaircraft weapons, 192 were army operated and 175 naval operated. The army units were used around Rapopo airfield and around army dumps and installations; they also participated jointly in the defenses lining Simpson Harbor. The naval units guarded Simpson Harbor and its shipping and the three airfields of Tobera, Lakunai, and Vunakanau.

"The Southeastern Fleet had built up an extensive and efficient early warning radar system. Besides the sets at Rabaul with ninety-mile coverage, there were radar sets to the southwest on New Britain, at Kavieng and Cape St. George on New Ireland, and at Buka. These sets would pick up Allied strikes and would radio warning to Rabaul from thirty to sixty minutes ahead of the attack.

Kramer J. Rohfleisch, James C. Olson, Berhardt L. Mortensen, Chapter X: Rabaul and Cape Glouster, in Wesley Frank Craven, James Lea Cate, Army Air Forces in World War II., vol. Volume IV, The Pacific: Guadalcanal to Saipan August 1942 to July 1944, pp. 311-312

[8|][8|][8|]

So you say that I should expect only some "small test sites"?
So you say that I should expect that the Japanese radar is almost as good/bad as the Chinese spotter?
Sorry, but I disagree.

[viberpol]

ORIGINAL: LoBaron

Radar- (and practically all other electronic gear-) developement was heavily dependent on qualified researchers, engineers and techicians with an
university degree. The Allies had those in abundance, Germany a bit less but also enough, but Japan, as an agricultural nation with only small
limited areas of modern industrialisation did not.
Thats why the Japanese contrary to the Allies had to limit themselves to a very narrow but low risk lane of approach when adressing problems.

I doubt the Japanese even came close to understand the potential of radar until the war was already over.

I find this a bias that stem from the fact that it's very difficult to find reliable data on wartime Japanese radar technology as most of the equipment and the documentation was destroyed by the Japanese themselves.

Japan knew it's importance and actively tried to catch up and build many different sets of more or less efficient radar sets in hundreds.

The Marines captured the airfield on Guadalcanal, they also found an intact air warning radar. This set was said to be rather crude, but this was just a simple air warning set for out laying outposts. The Japanese searched the wrecks of Prince of Wales and Repulse to recover the radar equipment. It's what you call no interest?

Ironically, the Japanese had good technical minds, and had even developed an effective cavity magnetron in 1939, well before the British. They had people with good ideas, but radar work remained organizationally muddled and crippled by inadequate resources. The biggest problem as I see it was not the lack of ideas or technology, but the shortage of good-quality electronic components.

[LoBaron]

ORIGINAL: viberpol

ORIGINAL: LoBaron

ORIGINAL: viberpol
I expect that Japanese radar, inferior as it is when compared to American, would detect enemy faster than Chinese spotters -- separated ground unit alone in the Jungle -- giving earlier warning than "eyesighting" giving longer time to target periods and more reaction time.

You expect too much then.

The Japanese had problems to get a "simple" airborne radio working with a reliability that justified the increased weight
of the fighter aircraft.
In fact the Japanese never used radio equipment in air warfare on a scale that it was implemented into the doctrine.

Japanese radar - which is a bit more complex than a radio, both in producing the data and the correct interpretation of the data -
was a highly unreliable experimental device. This applied to the Allies as well on a lesser scale.
It did not work in most instances and when it worked there still had to be operators with some experience drawing the right conclusions
from what they saw.

Don´t forget that the Allies had one big advantage on that technology in ´41 and later: The Battle of Britain. 2 Years of hard won experience
with an experimental set and the knowledge that this device probably saved them a much harder war.
The Axis powers had nothing in comparision except small test sites.

To protect all this, high priority had been given to antiaircraft defenses during 1943. The organizational setup was a combined army and naval defensive establishment which was well coordinated and integrated. Of the 367 antiaircraft weapons, 192 were army operated and 175 naval operated. The army units were used around Rapopo airfield and around army dumps and installations; they also participated jointly in the defenses lining Simpson Harbor. The naval units guarded Simpson Harbor and its shipping and the three airfields of Tobera, Lakunai, and Vunakanau.

"The Southeastern Fleet had built up an extensive and efficient early warning radar system. Besides the sets at Rabaul with ninety-mile coverage, there were radar sets to the southwest on New Britain, at Kavieng and Cape St. George on New Ireland, and at Buka. These sets would pick up Allied strikes and would radio warning to Rabaul from thirty to sixty minutes ahead of the attack.

Kramer J. Rohfleisch, James C. Olson, Berhardt L. Mortensen, Chapter X: Rabaul and Cape Glouster, in Wesley Frank Craven, James Lea Cate, Army Air Forces in World War II., vol. Volume IV, The Pacific: Guadalcanal to Saipan August 1942 to July 1944, pp. 311-312

[8|][8|][8|]

So you say that I should expect only some "small test sites"?
So you say that I should expect that the Japanese radar is almost as good/bad as the Chinese spotter?
Sorry, but I disagree.

Sorry viberpol, but could you please shorten the list of medals you assign the article you are quoting?

It originates from exactly one man:

Capt. Bernhardt L. Mortensen, Air Force Historical Division, written in 1953 (1953, if wikipedia is to be believed where I guess you found that link you are quoting).

MORTENSEN, BERNHARDT L. Papers. 1942-1944

.02 cu ft

Call No. 732.04-1

IRIS No. 0258752

Major. USAAF. Duty assignments include: Historical Officer, V Bomber Command, 1942-1944.

Personal and official papers relating to Mortensen's War II service. Includes official documents relating to the establishment of the V Bomber Command's Headquarters in Townsville, Australia on 5 September 1942, and its subsequent move to Port Moresby, New Guinea a few months later. Contains colorful descriptions, written by Mortensen, of life at the base at Townsville, the people of Australia and the activities of the Air Corps personnel stationed there, including brief mention of the contribution V Bomber Command made in the Battle of the Bismarck Sea in March 1943.

Major Mortensens article is more something like a diary, and does not go into any technical detail about radar. It does not mention anything about the reliability of the system,
how he was able to access the information required, it does not tell you anything how good the training of the Japanese operators was (which itself is connected
closely to the radars reliability and how difficult it was to keep it operational) and it mentiones Japanese rader exactly one time, thats the line you are quoting.

The article was written in 1953(?) when the understanding of the technical capabilities of the Japanese where still a mixture of myths and a few rare facts and it was still a habit
to overestimate the technical capabilities of the Japanese.

What I can guarantee you is that, when the first Allied soldier set his foot on Rabaul, the Radar systems were long ago destroyed lumps of metal, extensively robbed of any parts which could
be used to repair something else. I doubt that even in theory this radar sets could have detected fighter aircraft or low raiders, even if it was online on a regular basis, which I also doubt.

And as has been discussed long ago heavies at altitude get detected in game anyway.

So...
Yes I say that you should expect only some small test sites for technical devlelopement of radar compared to the Allies testing systems.
And yes I say you should expect that the Japanese radar was almost as good/bad as the Chinese spotter.

And if I was you I´d check on your sources better before I believe something I read. [8|]

[viberpol]

ORIGINAL: LoBaron
Sorry viberpol, but could you please shorten the list of medals you assign the article you are quoting?

It originates from exactly one man:

Capt. Bernhardt L. Mortensen, Air Force Historical Division, written in 1953 (1953, if wikipedia is to be believed where I guess you found that link you are quoting).

And if I was you I´d check on your sources better before I believe something I read. [8|]

The source of the quote is from here: http://en.citizendium.org/wiki/Rabaul,_battle_of
Maybe it's based on wiki. But I was just quicksearching for any sources in English, as I remember similar descriptions from books published in my language.

Mortensen is one of the authors of the book quoted (Kramer J. Rohfleisch, James C. Olson, Berhardt L. Mortensen, Chapter X: Rabaul and Cape Glouster, in Wesley Frank Craven, James Lea Cate, Army Air Forces in World War II., vol. Volume IV, The Pacific: Guadalcanal to Saipan August 1942 to July 1944, pp. 311-312). Why shouldn't I believe in what the other authors signed to in what looks like a decent source?

[viberpol]

ORIGINAL: LoBaron
And if I was you I´d check on your sources better before I believe something I read. [8|]

The source redirects here: http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/AAF/IV/AAF-IV-10.html
And the citation:
The Southeastern Fleet had built (...) would radio warning to Rabaul from thirty to sixty minutes ahead of the attack. Surrounding Rabaul, the Japanese had also established strong beach and coastal defenses as well as heavily fortified ground defense zones
is from: History, 5th AF, Pt. 111, App. 111, Doc 9; USSBS, Rabaul, pp. 12-17
Don't know the source but USSBS (United States Strategic Bombing Survey) seems to be, again, a decent source and not merely "an article".

Quick search on the same page:
To Arnold, General Kenney confidently wrote:

(..)As the Jap has plenty of radar warning he should be able to put in the air between sixty and eighty fighters, so we will have between one hundred and one hundred twenty P-38's as top cover for the show.
Extract from ltr., Kenney to Arnold, 10 Oct. 1943, in memo for the C/S, 24 Oct. 1943.

As I understand you're of the opinion that the Japanese radar system around Rabaul was a piece of crap. It seems that American generals also disagreed with your opinion... [;)]

[ChezDaJez]

Japan had only so many baskets to choose from, and radar was one of those that would not have worked for them. They simply did not have the
human ressources for research in that area.
Radar- (and practically all other electronic gear-) developement was heavily dependent on qualified researchers, engineers and techicians with an
university degree. The Allies had those in abundance, Germany a bit less but also enough, but Japan, as an agricultural nation with only small
limited areas of modern industrialisation did not.
Thats why the Japanese contrary to the Allies had to limit themselves to a very narrow but low risk lane of approach when adressing problems.

I doubt the Japanese even came close to understand the potential of radar until the war was already over.

Sorry but that is incorrect. The Japanese actually developed the magnetron before the allies did but didn't realize it's potential prewar. What they primarily lacked was a vision for future need and that was their biggest problem related to electronics.

The Japanese considered radar a defensive device and tended to eschew these types of devices that did not directly contribute to the offensive mission. This included sonar, radio and radar equipment. But in those areas that did contribute to the offensive mission, they were very good such as with HFDF capability.

Plus their experiences in China did not demonstrate a need for such equipment. Therefore funding for electronic projects was extremely difficult to come by in the years leading up to the war and through 1942. In many, many ways, the war in China provided the wrong type of combat experience. It lead them to believe that the next land and air war was going to be along the lines of WWI.

By the time Japan recognized the need for such equipment, it was too late. Some of their late war radars designs were quite innovative but by that time the Japanese ability to manufacture such equipment had become quite limited due to the incorporation of a large, unskilled workforce to replace conscripted workers. As one Japanese electronics engineer stated in the NavTech files, "We could design it and build it in the laboratory but the manufacturers couldn't produce it."

Chez

[stuman]

ORIGINAL: PaxMondo

ORIGINAL: TheElf


... We programmed for the possibility of an operator "Fumble" so it is possible that RADAR Actually has a detrimental effect. It was anything but a proven science...

Wow. This is really good ... as long as it happens to my opponent!

Thanks for the insight.

I think my pixelated soldiers fumble all of the time just to screw my games up.

[Alfred]

ORIGINAL: ChezDaJez

... "We could design it and build it in the laboratory but the manufacturers couldn't produce it."

Chez

And that quote encapsulates succinctly the fundamental problem which the Axis powers had in WWII. In the case of electronics, only Germany had the industrial facilities to build electronic devices in any quantity at reliable standards, and they too suffered from inadequate capacity compared to the Allies.

Japan had a second rate industrial capacity. By picking "winners" it created a facade of being in the first rank of industrail nations, but it really wasn't. To paraphrase General Thomas, Japan lacked both the "breadth" and "depth" in its economy to sustain a modern war.

Alfred

[LoBaron]

ORIGINAL: viberpol
The source redirects here: http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/AAF/IV/AAF-IV-10.html
And the citation:
The Southeastern Fleet had built (...) would radio warning to Rabaul from thirty to sixty minutes ahead of the attack. Surrounding Rabaul, the Japanese had also established strong beach and coastal defenses as well as heavily fortified ground defense zones
is from: History, 5th AF, Pt. 111, App. 111, Doc 9; USSBS, Rabaul, pp. 12-17
Don't know the source but USSBS (United States Strategic Bombing Survey) seems to be, again, a decent source and not merely "an article".

There is nothing about radar. "Radio warning from thirty to sixty minutes" (which is quite a broad spectrum) can be spotters on islands, or a combination.

Quick search on the same page:
To Arnold, General Kenney confidently wrote:

(..)As the Jap has plenty of radar warning he should be able to put in the air between sixty and eighty fighters, so we will have between one hundred and one hundred twenty P-38's as top cover for the show.
Extract from ltr., Kenney to Arnold, 10 Oct. 1943, in memo for the C/S, 24 Oct. 1943.

As I understand you're of the opinion that the Japanese radar system around Rabaul was a piece of crap. It seems that American generals also disagreed with your opinion... [;)]

I am sure you also read that according to Kenney the top cover consists of 100 - 120 P-38. Guess what they are escorting?

He says plenty of radar warning, he does not say anything about the quality, or the chance that the radar is online, but he has to take care if he wants to launch a raid
which produces a signal return the size of the moon.

Radar at Rabaul was an experimental device (as about any existing radar of that time), with a lack of spare parts, highly unreliable, and with partly trained operators learning on the job because
before there still was nothing to teach.
If this think was operational more than 1-2 hours per day on an average I´d be surprised.

[LoBaron]

ORIGINAL: ChezDaJez

Japan had only so many baskets to choose from, and radar was one of those that would not have worked for them. They simply did not have the
human ressources for research in that area.
Radar- (and practically all other electronic gear-) developement was heavily dependent on qualified researchers, engineers and techicians with an
university degree. The Allies had those in abundance, Germany a bit less but also enough, but Japan, as an agricultural nation with only small
limited areas of modern industrialisation did not.
Thats why the Japanese contrary to the Allies had to limit themselves to a very narrow but low risk lane of approach when adressing problems.

I doubt the Japanese even came close to understand the potential of radar until the war was already over.

Sorry but that is incorrect. The Japanese actually developed the magnetron before the allies did but didn't realize it's potential prewar. What they primarily lacked was a vision for future need and that was their biggest problem related to electronics.

The Japanese considered radar a defensive device and tended to eschew these types of devices that did not directly contribute to the offensive mission. This included sonar, radio and radar equipment. But in those areas that did contribute to the offensive mission, they were very good such as with HFDF capability.

Plus their experiences in China did not demonstrate a need for such equipment. Therefore funding for electronic projects was extremely difficult to come by in the years leading up to the war and through 1942. In many, many ways, the war in China provided the wrong type of combat experience. It lead them to believe that the next land and air war was going to be along the lines of WWI.

By the time Japan recognized the need for such equipment, it was too late. Some of their late war radars designs were quite innovative but by that time the Japanese ability to manufacture such equipment had become quite limited due to the incorporation of a large, unskilled workforce to replace conscripted workers. As one Japanese electronics engineer stated in the NavTech files, "We could design it and build it in the laboratory but the manufacturers couldn't produce it."

Chez

Ok, you write "sorry this is incorrect" because you only quote the part which seems incorrect to you
and then repeat practically the same as the not quoted part of my post in your response below?

To realize that technology, which is not considered essential by the funder, often lacks funding, and to understand the reasons for that, is trivial.
The Chinese developed rocket technology long before the Germans. This clearly does not mean they built better rockets in WWII.

I already explained that the use of radar was considered defensive, to all war participants, not only to one, even if I had the Brits as an example.
The Japanese didn´t need it in China because the Chinese airforce was never a real threat except in the very early stages.
And I agree with you that China taught Japan the wrong lessons.

Japan made a couple of decisions that hurt them, I think everybody here would agree. With 20/20 hindsight thats also trivial.

The problem with Japan was the lack of about everything which would turn radar into the weapon it had the potential for, without
severely hurting other industrybranches or areas of research that were deemed essential for stemming the tide.

So: Technicians, physicians, electro-engineers, high qualified industrial workers, service men, radar operators, teachers, rare materials, spare part industry,...

The Japanese had an extremely limited pool of the above so by diverting many ressources to the project they would automatically cripple others.
Not really much of a choice if the other projects are really essential.

I think we have a very similar opinion anyway.


Btw: The Japanese really developed the magnetron very early but its use was first seen as a potential energy transmitter and later as a death ray device.


I am not saying that the Japanese did not produce a high ammount of radars, a bit over 7100 devices of a classes IIRC.
I am saying that they severely lacked every single ressource to turn the good idea (and they had some ok types, though many were attemted copies of basic Allied types captured in early 42
or completed with partly German technology) into the effective weapon the Allies made out of it.

[LoBaron]

ORIGINAL: viberpol
Why shouldn't I believe in what the other authors signed to in what looks like a decent source?

Because if the Articles title isn´t exactly "Japanese radar technology and developement in WWII, an asessment of capabilities"
you can bet that noone was interested in that sentence you like to quote, including the author, with the possible exception of us.

And because I have doubts that a historical officer has either much interest, or the options, to delve into Japanese radar technology
when writing a short story-like article about the Rabaul area in 1953.

[castor troy]

ORIGINAL: viberpol

ORIGINAL: LoBaron

Radar- (and practically all other electronic gear-) developement was heavily dependent on qualified researchers, engineers and techicians with an
university degree. The Allies had those in abundance, Germany a bit less but also enough, but Japan, as an agricultural nation with only small
limited areas of modern industrialisation did not.
Thats why the Japanese contrary to the Allies had to limit themselves to a very narrow but low risk lane of approach when adressing problems.

I doubt the Japanese even came close to understand the potential of radar until the war was already over.

I find this a bias that stem from the fact that it's very difficult to find reliable data on wartime Japanese radar technology as most of the equipment and the documentation was destroyed by the Japanese themselves.

Japan knew it's importance and actively tried to catch up and build many different sets of more or less efficient radar sets in hundreds.

The Marines captured the airfield on Guadalcanal, they also found an intact air warning radar. This set was said to be rather crude, but this was just a simple air warning set for out laying outposts. The Japanese searched the wrecks of Prince of Wales and Repulse to recover the radar equipment. It's what you call no interest?

Ironically, the Japanese had good technical minds, and had even developed an effective cavity magnetron in 1939, well before the British. They had people with good ideas, but radar work remained organizationally muddled and crippled by inadequate resources. The biggest problem as I see it was not the lack of ideas or technology, but the shortage of good-quality electronic components.

the further you get into the game, the more you will find out that radar (also Japanese radar) works quite well now, perhaps even too well. You will notice this as the Japanese when you get most (all) of your fighters into the air and as the Allied because you fail to destroy Japanese fighters on the ground if they haven´t been damaged before, while you could expect to destroy up to 50% of the undamaged ones on the ground during the time land based radar didn´t work. As the Allied, it feels like having AWACS, I pretty much can rely on everything scrambling.

[Puhis]

ORIGINAL: vaned74

It appears to be different how sweeps are handled vs ordinary raids and are extremely difficult to detect even for massed radar concentrations with excellent sets.

Sweep results in Downfall scenario:

vs Moppo (24 CPS-1 equiv Jap radars) - P47s detected sweeping at 21, 14, 15, 34, 43, 25, 48, 29, 29, 120 nm. Only once detected far enough out to make a difference in CAP.
vs Oita (no radar) - P47 detected sweeping at 47,11, 49, 29, 46, 21, 32 nm

Jap sweep versus Okinawa - lots of SCR-270 and some CPS-1 radars, Oscars at 20,000 ft - detected at 46 nm, 28, 40, 27 nm (*even the Japanese sweeps stand to score good results against Allied late war radar)

Bombers on the other hand -
G4M Bettys vs Okinawa - detected at 200, 200, 200 nm
B24 Liberators vs Oita (no radar) - detected at 40, 40, 40, 40, 40, 40
B29 vs Nagasaki (radar) - 200, 160, 160, 200, 120, 200

Only problem I see might be this: Did any of these radars even had range of 160-200 nm (300-370 km) IRL? I have a feeling that radars are usually working too well...

[LoBaron]

The Japanese developed radar sets with a theoretical range of 300 miles.

Naturally that does not mean it picked up raids at that distance as a habit.

And I agree that radar is a bit too reliable, if something is wrong with the model at all, but as long as that reliability is reduced to medium to large bombing raids from high altitude
I am fine with it.
Continuus system breakdowns are hard to simulate in WitP AE.

[viberpol]

ORIGINAL: LoBaron

ORIGINAL: viberpol
The source redirects here: http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/AAF/IV/AAF-IV-10.html
And the citation:
The Southeastern Fleet had built (...) would radio warning to Rabaul from thirty to sixty minutes ahead of the attack. Surrounding Rabaul, the Japanese had also established strong beach and coastal defenses as well as heavily fortified ground defense zones
is from: History, 5th AF, Pt. 111, App. 111, Doc 9; USSBS, Rabaul, pp. 12-17
Don't know the source but USSBS (United States Strategic Bombing Survey) seems to be, again, a decent source and not merely "an article".

There is nothing about radar. "Radio warning from thirty to sixty minutes" (which is quite a broad spectrum) can be spotters on islands, or a combination.

LoBaron, I am not here to fight with you on the topic. [;)]
It's not worth it nor it was my aim.
I've got an opinion, you've yours, we disagree.

But you put out my sources as being worthless. I quoted the source of the same citation as above. If were kind enough and check it, you'd know I shortened the version here. It is about radar, it's about several sets of radars, because it's the same quotation. I copy it once again with the note pointing to USSBS for you if you're lazy enough:
The naval units guarded Simpson Harbor and its shipping and the three airfields of Tobera, Lakunai, and Vunakanau. The Southeastern Fleet had built up an extensive and efficient early warning radar system. Besides the sets at Rabaul with ninety-mile coverage, there were radar sets to the southwest on New Britain, at Kavieng and Cape St. George on New Ireland, and at Buka. These sets would pick up Allied strikes and would radio warning to Rabaul from thirty to sixty minutes ahead of the attack. Surrounding Rabaul, the Japanese had also established strong beach and coastal defenses as well as heavily fortified ground defense zones.3
1. History, 5th AF, Pt. 111, App. 111, Doc 9; USSBS, Rabaul, pp. 11-12.
2. USSBS, Rabaul, pp. 11-18.
3. Ibid., pp. 12-17.

Whether the USSBS is a worthy/unworthy your attention and respect, I leave it to you.

[viberpol]

ORIGINAL: LoBaron

ORIGINAL: viberpol
Why shouldn't I believe in what the other authors signed to in what looks like a decent source?

Because if the Articles title isn´t exactly "Japanese radar technology and developement in WWII, an asessment of capabilities"
you can bet that noone was interested in that sentence you like to quote, including the author, with the possible exception of us.

And because I have doubts that a historical officer has either much interest, or the options, to delve into Japanese radar technology
when writing a short story-like article about the Rabaul area in 1953.

USSBS

And why you want to discredit that poor major Mortensen is beyond me... [;)]
I bet there are other sources that that strange article you're pointing out of the good early warning system at Rabaul.
Here is a quotation from INTERROGATION NAV NO. 52 USSBS NO. 224 p.209
Interrogation of: Commander DOI, Yasumi, IJN ; Gunnery Officer, Staff South Eastern Fleet March 1943-1945, Based at RABAUL.

Q. Did you have any radar installations at RABAUL?
A. Yes, we had a secret one, well hidden on Cape ST. GEORGE. It could pick up planes about 100 Kilometers away. We also had coast watchers with radio at BUIN and EMPRESS AUGUSTA Bay. We generally had about an hour's notice of the approach of your planes from GUADALCANAL. That was enough time to man our guns and put up fighters. Carrier attacks would sometimes surprise us.

[Smeulders]

Again they are talking about the complete system, coast watchers and radar that generally gave an hours warning. Also note that "it could pick up planes about 100 kilometres away" doesn't mean that it regularly did.

Some calculations, Cape St.George is 100 kilometres from Rabaul, meaning that it in a best case scenario it could pick up raids 200 km before Rabaul. However, even the B-17 flew at a cruise speed of 293km/h (according to wiki). So the radar set at Cape St.George was, according to these figures, technically incapable of giving an hours warning, even when picking up a raid at max range. I'm not sure about the speed of other bombers, but I guess they won't have been much slower.

[viberpol]

ORIGINAL: Smeulders

Again they are talking about the complete system, coast watchers and radar that generally gave an hours warning. Also note that "it could pick up planes about 100 kilometres away" doesn't mean that it regularly did.

Some calculations, Cape St.George is 100 kilometres from Rabaul, meaning that it in a best case scenario it could pick up raids 200 km before Rabaul. However, even the B-17 flew at a cruise speed of 293km/h (according to wiki). So the radar set at Cape St.George was, according to these figures, technically incapable of giving an hours warning, even when picking up a raid at max range. I'm not sure about the speed of other bombers, but I guess they won't have been much slower.

It wasn't? [&:]
If 100 + 200 (of the effective range from the table below) = 300, and bombers fly from New Guinea at aprox. 300 km/h, it's exactly an hour before they'd hit Rabaul... (Even if I am not sure if only the 5th/13th Air Force based at Salomons made the bombing of Rabaul? I believe there were Dobodura, PM based raids? Cape St George is a southernmost point on the island of New Ireland). So why're you saying it's impossible?

Ok. Here some data for those of you that believe that Japanese sets were some "piece of equipment that could"... [:)]

The screen comes from original report of US Naval Technical Mission to Japan compiled in XII '45.
Original available here : http://www.fischer-tropsch.org/primary_ ... 20E-12.pdf

Notice some pieces, though experimental in 45, were of 550/450 km Max/effective range.
But there are some other types of 300/200 km that were used in some numbers even from '42-43.

[LoBaron]

I know those tables viberpol.

They don´t say anything about the performance of the radar set.

Using an emitter of sufficient strenght and suitable wavelenght to produce a return signal is only the first, relatively crude, step of the story.
What is done with the signal return and which methods are used to interprete the output is at least equally important, and thats a field in electronics
where the Japanese did not compare to any Allied system. Whether it was radio, radar or computational devices, they were unable
to get a complex system to work with a simplicity and reliability to suit field operations, at least not until very late in the war when they were already choked
ressourcewise.

Don´t confuse as-a-matter-of-fact comments about theoretical capabilities of a radar installation and its surroundings with an actual asessment of the devices´
performance in a combat enviroment.

And sorry if you got the impression I wanted to discredit good old Major M.
I am sure he writes a whole lot of good stories, but I am also pretty sure his expertise is not radar. [;)]